PLUTARCH: CHANCE, PROVIDENCE, AND HISTORY

The aim of what follows is to show as far as possible that Plutarch believed the course of history was largely predetermined, and in particular to show that the rise of Rome and her continuing success were due to a guiding providence. There has been little attempt to bring together those passages in Plutarch's works which suggest the involvement of providence in the process of history, and in particular his ideas about the involvement of the divine in Roman history have, with the exception of the rhetorical *de fort. Rom.*, received surprisingly scant attention.[1] The reason for neglect lies partly in the difficult nature of the material, partly in the fact that the subject relates properly neither to Plutarch historian nor to Plutarch theologian. The safest approach will be to remain sensitive to the context of the passages used in evidence and to remember Plutarch's own warning to square theory with fact (*de prof. in virt.* 75f.).

I. INTRODUCTION

The difficulty in estimating Plutarch's belief of providential interference in history lies principally in his terminology. I have collected examples of terms used for the range of senses from chance to provi-

[1] D. Babut, *Plutarque et le Stoïcisme* (Paris 1969) 477ff., has noticed more than most (divine involvement seen in the plague at Athens; in Timoleon's liberation of Sicily; in Hannibal not attacking Rome after Cannae; in Roman power in Greece; in the end of the Republic); cf. also R. Barrow, *Plutarch and his Times* (London 1967) 129 (decline of Greece; origin of Rome); C. Jones, *Plutarch and Rome* (Oxford 1971) 69 (Roman power in Greece); F. Brenk, *In Mist Apparelled* (Leiden 1977) 165, 168f. (origin of the principate; decline of Greece); H. Aalders, *Plutarch's Political Thought* (Amsterdam 1982) 58–59 (origin of Rome; Roman power in Greece; Caesar's monarchy); A. Barigazzi, "Plutarco e il corso futuro della storia," *Prometheus* 10 (1984) 270 (origin of Rome); there is nothing relevant in Lassel's *De fortunae in Plutarchi operibus notione* (Marburg 1891). I do not intend to say anything of substance here about *de fort. Rom.* (see principally K. Ziegler, "Plutarchos," *RE* xxi.1 [1951], col. 719–20; R. Flacelière, "Plutarque 'de Fortuna Romanorum'," *Mélanges Carcopino* [1966] 367–75). Although it builds on Plutarch's serious ideas about the rôle of fortune, its genre invites a discrete treatment which I give in *CQ* 39 (1989).

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dence in an appendix (to which reference may be made, see end of article), but some general remarks are needed here. In the religious and philosophical works of the *Moralia* Plutarch distinguishes clearly enough between events which are predetermined or guided by providence and those which happen by chance. On the one side there is 'God' (θεός) or 'the Gods' (οἱ θεοί; Plutarch is uninhibited by his monotheism), 'lesser divinities' who are his agents (δαίμονες), 'providence' (πρόνοια), and less frequently 'the divine' (τὸ θεῖον, τὸ δαιμόνιον), and some other terms; on the other we have 'fortune' (τύχη), 'chance' (τὸ αὐτόματον), and some other terms. God is in control of all that is important in the world, and anything that comes about by chance should be held to be irrelevant.[2] In the *Lives* the picture is different. Here we still find θεός directing actions, but πρόνοια has practically disappeared along with 'the divine' and δαίμων is very much more frequent (with the distinction between δαίμων and θεός now blurred). The greatest difference is the meaning of τύχη. We expect this to mean 'fortune' or 'luck'; but often it is made into a guiding force and is used in contexts where we might have expected God or providence.

The change in meaning undergone by τύχη in Hellenistic times from simply what happens to the power which directs this has been adequately charted. It was during this period too that δαίμων became a popular and associated term used to refer similarly to some supernatural power over which we have no control.[3] Hellenistic notions of τύχη as a power and its equivalence with δαίμων naturally gave it a more directional sense than mere luck, while δαίμων itself was popularized and became more distant from God. One development from this sense of a definite power was the popular belief in personal fortune and personal δαίμονες guiding our lives. At the same time τύχη and δαίμων kept the meaning of an independent force.

The easy interchange between τύχη and δαίμων is fully evident in Plutarch himself. Brenk has shown well enough that there are many passages where Plutarch starts by talking of τύχη and finishes by speak-

[2] Brenk (n. 1 above), 117, rightly locates Plutarch within the Platonic tradition here.

[3] See M. Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion,* II (Munich 1961) 200–18 "Tyche and Daimon"; U. Wilamowitz, *Der Glaube der Hellenen,* I and II (Berlin 1931–1932) I, 362–69 (esp. early meanings of δαίμων), II, 297–309 (esp. on personal usages).

ing of δαίμων (and vice versa).[4] His examples come from the *Lives* and non-philosophical works of the *Moralia.* In more serious thinking Plutarch has no time for τύχη but he does believe in δαίμονες. His daimonology is complex and incoherent. But we can say that while he may have believed δαίμονες originated from beatified human souls, he probably did not believe in a personal δαίμων as a constant companion and thought of δαίμονες as independent beings under the control of God who from time to time made use of them to communicate his desires to men (this is important for divine interference in history).[5]

In the *Lives* Plutarch's own belief in a daimonology and the popular acceptance of such beings at work in the world encouraged their frequent mention. Popular beliefs are also behind the frequent use in the *Lives* of τύχη. For the most part τύχη signals the involvement of something more than coincidence but far less than providence. It is able to put things together and then stand them on their head (as spec-

[4] Brenk (n. 1 above), 146–54.

[5] On Plutarch's daimonology, see as an introduction D. A. Russell, *Plutarch* (London 1973) 75–78; Y. Vernière, *Mythes et symboles dans la pensée de Plutarque* (Paris 1977) 249ff.; Brenk (n. 1 above), 49ff., 92ff., 130ff.; J. Moles, *A Commentary on Plutarch's Brutus* (Diss. Oxford 1979) 391ff. (with bibliography on 397). The personal δαίμων and personal τύχη are part of the popular belief of Plutarch's day (cf. Dio of Prusa xxiii, *That the Wise Man is Happy,* 6, 9) which Plutarch exploits for literary reasons. See e.g., *Caes.* 38.5 (Caesar tells the boatman, "You carry Caesar and the Fortune of Caesar sailing with him"; cf. *reg. et imp. apophth.* 206c–d, *de fort. Rom.* 319c–d; copied by Appian *B.C.* 2. 236, Zonaras 10.8) and 57.1 (the Romans "yield before the man's τύχη"), passages which frame the Civil War; cf. Wilamowitz (n. 3 above), II, 307, who notes the development from the τύχη βασιλέως in oaths. There is no cause either to think that Plutarch believed in independent evil δαίμονες as found in *Dion-Brut.* At *de Stoic. repug.* 1051b–d Plutarch repudiates the idea that such beings have been appointed a place in the world by God and providence (the Zoroastrian dualism of the *de Is. et Osir.* is too firmly imbedded to allow generalization). At *Dion* 2.5 the doctrine is described as "outlandish." Its purpose is to add an element of mystery and suspense to the preface and narratives of the pair, and most importantly to illuminate the heroes' virtue in difficult circumstances (cf. *Aem.* 34.8 for a comparable envious δαιμόνιον, *Per.* 13.16 ὥσπερ δαίμονι κακῶι τῶι φθόνωι τῶν πολλῶν). On communication/interference via δαίμονες, see *Caes.* 66.1 (Caesar's death in the Theatre of Pompey was "clearly the work of some δαίμων" [cf. *Brut.* 14.3 δαίμων τις ἐδόκει]), *Cato Min.* 54.10 (Caesar's δαίμων [the personalization is literary] works through Pompey's εὐλαβεία and ἀπιστία), *Pomp.* 76.9 (see n. 52 below), *de gen. Socr.* 588c–589f (a δαίμων is put forward as the source of Socrates' sign), 593d–594a (Theanor, summarizing the dialogue, suggests that δαίμονες help souls at the end of their cycles of rebirth; see A. Corlu, *Plutarque, Le Démon de Socrate* [Paris 1970] 78–79 on the distinction between God and δαίμονες here). See also *de gen. Socr.* 593a–d, *Cor.* 32.4–8, and *Numa* 4.11 on communication and suggestion by God.

tacularly in *Demetr.* where there is no sense of providence in the hero's vicissitudes). Τύχη, along with δαίμων and even θεός, refers mostly to events quite minor in themselves. It is only when we have more or less unequivocal statements on changes of truly great importance cumulatively (the liberation of Sicily in *Dion* and *Tim.*) or singly (such as *Phil.* 17.2 on the Roman expansion in Greece) that we are entitled to say that Plutarch counts in the involvement of providence. His use of τύχη (and other terms) instead of πρόνοια reflects the fact that people tended to talk of fortune rather than seeing divine reasoning at work (as Philo puts it, *quod deus immutab. sit* 176).

We should not forget that the involvement of suprahuman power in men's lives often functions as a moral or ethical register—how does a hero get on in a particular circumstance? This is especially true with τύχη. Chance happenings have a considerable impact on men's stability and character.[6] The best example of Plutarch's interest in resilience to bad fortune outside *de tranq. an.* is in *Aemilius.* In this *Life* τύχη also means something more than fortune. Aemilius as a public man is cosseted by great good fortune which Plutarch makes clear is the genuine favour of the gods (cf. 12.1 εὐτυχία and δαίμων, 24.4 θειότης and τύχη). But there is no idea of a wider guiding providence—Aemilius' campaign did not produce really great changes in the world.[7] By contrast, in the paired *Timoleon* Plutarch goes out of his way to posit the involvement of divine guidance and assistance in Timoleon's mission to liberate Sicily. His reasons for involving providence are mainly to do with the unbelievable change in the island's fortunes and the status of its Greek inhabitants. Providential guidance in the *Life* is expressed not only by θεός and δαίμων, but also and for the most part by τύχη. One of the strongest passages to stress τύχη is at 16.10–11 where Plutarch talks of the weird and wonderful concatenation of events which τύχη used to strike down an assassin about to kill Timoleon. Plutarch talks similarly of providence at *de sera num. vind.* 558f.; this, together with the tenor of the *Life,* makes it impossible that he is talking of mere chance in *Tim.*[8]

Plutarch sometimes makes this sense of τύχη clearer by adding

[6] I discuss Plutarch's thoughts in this area in a paper in *Phoenix.* 43 (1989).

[7] There is a hint of divine punishment in the end of Philip II's line at Cynoscephalae in *Aratus.*

[8] Cf. Babut (n. 1 above) 479, "la vie de Timoleon est en effet tout entière placée sous le signe de la « chance » (τύχη, εὐτυχία). Mais cette chance doit rien au hasard, etc."

adjectives like θεῖος or δαιμόνιος. But often, as with other terms, we must go by context and frequency. These criteria have determined which passages have been considered in sections III and IV below on Greek and Roman history. Certain periods and/or major events clearly attract comments on the involvement of τύχη/θεός, etc. These are, apart from the liberation of Sicily, the origin of Rome, the decline of Greece, the rise of Roman power in the Greek East, and especially the fall of the Republic and the establishment of monarchy at Rome. In considering relevant passages, where space allows something will be said on human motivation behind these great political changes, for Plutarch, who is always interested in human qualities, firmly believed in free will and we find that the will of the gods is never imposed on men. Rather, what men have to offer in terms of virtue or benefits is made use of by the divine to carry out its wishes. In *Tim.*, for example, Plutarch takes great pains to emphasize Timoleon's virtue and the stability and legality he brings to the Sicilian Greeks—this is crucial for the support his mission receives from the gods.

It is not always as easy to work out Plutarch's reasons for involving providence. Nevertheless, after looking at the areas where providence is especially active, it will be suggested in section V that the reason for divine aid in the case of Timoleon—that is, providential concern for man's good government—is relevant also to the other examples and especially to Rome. Plutarch did not simply muddle what happened with what was *destined* to happen. The present order and good government of the world was pleasing to the divine in his eyes, and indeed divine interest was obvious in the natural world around him also.

II. SOURCES AND INFLUENCES

Before turning to specific passages it is desirable to note whether Plutarch betrays the influence of his predecessors in this central view of providence interfering in history. The works of Polybius, Livy, and Dionysius covered the decline of Greece and the power of Rome in sufficient breadth to have affected him. Poseidonius' world view also merits consideration as a possible source.[9]

[9] Other influences will be mentioned where necessary.

Polybius often attributes events of a sensational nature to τύχη,[10] and frequently uses fortune as a literary device.[11] However, it has long been recognized that in one passage at least (1. 4.1ff.) τύχη is conceived of in a Stoic fashion with a definite purpose, the propagation of the Roman Empire.[12] On the other hand at 1. 63.9 Polybius rejects any help for Rome from τύχη.[13] To explain the apparent contradiction it has been proposed that Polybius "was led to confuse what had happened with what was destined to happen, and so to invest the rise of Rome . . . with a teleological character."[14] In fact 1. 4.1ff. does no more than assert that the present state of the world is due to the strange workings of τύχη (which is not luck), and it is for this reason that a universal history is desirable. The implication is that the histories of the other states and nations are all linked together by fortune in a chain of events from which has come the present Roman world-empire. At 1. 4.4 Polybius seems to say that fortune as providence sanctioned the virtues of Rome ("fortune's finest and also most beneficial performance"). Here he is close to Plutarch, but there is nothing in his work to indicate that he saw Roman power as part of God's providential vigilance over the world, and there is no discernible trace of Polybian influence in Plutarch's writings.

Polybius was continued by the *Histories* of Poseidonius. These ran down to the death of Marius (there may also have been a special work on Pompey's eastern exploits). It has long been known that Plutarch drew on Poseidonius for Marius and used him also in the biographies of Marcellus and Brutus.[15] Despite the loss of most of his philo-

[10] Cf. F. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius,* I (Oxford 1957) 18; for an example, see 9. 6.5 "the unexpected stroke of luck" of troops being at Rome in 211 B.C. to thwart Hannibal's attack.

[11] A comparison with Livy will show a number of places where Polybius attributes events to the intervention of τύχη, albeit in a rhetorical manner, whereas Livy ignores these references to the capricious or vindictive deity or replaces them with alternatives (see P. Walsh, "Livy and Stoicism," *AJP* 79 [1958] 365f.).

[12] First pointed out by W. Warde-Fowler, "Polybius' Conception of Τύχη," *CR* 17 (1903) 446, who noted the employment of σκοπός, οἰκονομία, and συντέλεια.

[13] "This makes clear the assertion I made at the outset, that the progress of the Romans was not by τύχη . . . nor αὐτομάτως"; cf. Dionysius 1. 4.2–3, Onasander proem. 5–6, Appian pref. 43–44.

[14] F. Walbank, *Polybius* (*Sather Classical Lectures* 42 [Berkley 1972]) 63–65.

[15] J. Malitz, *Die Historien des Poseidonios* (*Zetemata Monogr. zur klass. Alt.* 79 [Munich 1983]) 75–78, 88, 394–405.

sophical and historical work his views of history can be established fairly securely. His modified Stoicism emphasized the continuous communion and mutual sympathy between the world of God and the world of man. For him πρόνοια and φύσις are aspects of God.[16] The world is shaped by providence, and its present political structure depends ultimately on the fact that Rome possessed in Italy the most naturally favoured land in terms of climate and geography.[17] Poseidonius lays particular stress on the high calibre of the formative generations of Rome and, despite a conviction that the world was in a period of decline, may have been ready to hope for a return to the good old ways on the basis of certain virtuous contemporaries.[18]

Plutarch differs from Poseidonius in a number of ways. He does not have a Stoic world view and does not see a necessary link between the forces of nature and the world of men. God, identified with providence, is clearly in charge of the laws of nature. There is nothing to suggest that the Romans were better fitted by nature to rule the world, nor that they would fulfill the duties which had been imposed on them. Poseidonius did not influence Plutarch on a theoretical basis, nor can he be said to have done so in particulars.[19]

What of Livy? His central theme is an ethical determinism: if one espouses *pietas, fides, virtus, concordia,* etc., *fortuna* will follow.[20] On an individual scale this means that, *fortuna, ut saepe alias, virtutem est secuta* (4. 37.7). On a larger scale we have the *fortuna urbis / populi Romani,*[21] an idea that became established in the late Republic (though there had always been temples of Fortuna Publica at Rome) and self-evident truth in the Principate. Despite this, there is in Livy no idea of a larger providential power overseeing political events on a world scale as there is in Plutarch. Even Rome's dominion over other peoples such as the Greeks is never construed as destined or necessary in the divine plan. Rather, though there is sometimes a casual remark about aid from fate or fortune (cf. 1. 4.4, 46.5 etc.), and Rome's begin-

[16] Cf. K. Reinhardt, *Poseidonios von Apamea der Rhodier genannt* (Stuttgart 1954), col. 644.

[17] Malitz (n. 15 above), 75ff., 359.

[18] Malitz (n. 15 above), 408, 426.

[19] The *Histories* seem to have had very little suggesting God's interference in the world; cf. Malitz (n. 15 above) 420–21.

[20] P. Walsh, review of I. Kajanto, *God and Fate in Livy, JRS* 48 (1958) 193.

[21] Referred to by Walsh (n. 11 above) 368ff., as the "sectional" power of fortune.

nings are cautiously seen as divine (Pref. 7),[22] explanations are made in human terms of such events as the beginning of the Republic (cf. 2. 1), or even the Gallic sack of Rome in which, though *fortuna* certainly plays a part, there is no real sign of providence.

Finally, Dionysius of Halicarnassus.[23] Aside from stock usages (the τύχη of this or that battle) Dionysius is happy to ascribe Rome's survival and prosperity to the πρόνοια of the gods. Book 5. 7.1 and 54.1 (cf. 2.3) offer a particularly forceful statement of the functions of this protective agent of Rome (see also 10. 10.2, 15. 3.1[24]). There is, however, no accreditation to πρόνοια of explicit instances of Rome's imperial expansion. There may be a hint of providential guidance in the discovery of Romulus and Remus by Faustulus (1. 79.9, κατὰ θείαν τύχην) but more probably this is a figure of speech. Τύχη itself never bears the sense of providence. Indeed, "so far as τύχη goes, Rome would have been submerged at Cannae" had not the numbers of her troops saved her (2. 17.3–4, cf. 1. 9.4). Dionysius' narrative only stretched to the end of the Pyrrhic War, but at 1. 5.2 he does justify Greece's ὑπόταξις to Rome as being "in accordance with what is natural, for it is a universal law of Nature . . . that the stronger shall always rule the weaker." Here there is no suggestion of a beneficent providence. The difference between the extent of divine protection in Dionysius and Plutarch is due perhaps to the fact that the former had other ways of explaining Rome's hegemony, in particular the Greek provenance of all things Roman. In the later first century B.C. this was an easier idea than that of providence working through Roman rule to benefit Greece and the world.

III. GREEK HISTORY

We may now turn to Plutarch. The object of this section and the following two is to concentrate on examples of providential action in

[22] Cf. I. Kajanto, *God and Fate in Livy* (Turku 1957) 55—Livy nowhere really thinks of Rome's foundation as directed by a Stoic world force.

[23] For remarks on Dionysius and fortune, see C. Schultze, *Dionysius of Halicarnassus as a Historian: An Investigation of his Aims and Methods in the Antiquitates Romanae* (Diss. Oxford 1981) 278–80 on his championing of human qualities against τύχη, 281–82 on his view of πρόνοια and divine favour.

[24] Apparently the only instances of divine πρόνοια except 20. 9.2 where it punishes Pyrrhus for plundering a temple of Persephone.

history. Most material is of course drawn from the *Lives*. First, we will consider the history of Greece and in particular her decline (the area where divine interference is most apparent in Greek history), then we will look at Rome form her origins to the establishment of the Principate. It will be seen that providential involvement is much greater in Roman history. The final section of the paper will seek to discover the reason why this is so. It has already been noted that the terminology used to express providence is fairly varied. Τύχη is found alone or in combination with terms such as δαίμων or θεός, which also occur in this sense independently. These words will appear promiscuously in the examples below. The examination will focus on those passages where Plutarch's serious belief in providence is evident, whatever terms may be used to voice it.

Let us start with Athens. There is a little evidence to suggest that Plutarch felt providence was not prepared to further the aims of the Athenian Empire. This would not be surprising since providence intervenes positively on the side of those who bring benefits. Athens' hegemony was not beneficial, for it involved Greeks fighting Greeks.[25] This was naturally against God's will.[26] Some degree of negative involvement is indicated in the Athenian plague—τι δαιμόνιον—which "obviated human calculations" (i.e., Pericles' wartime strategy, *Per.* 34.4). It would be wrong to attribute superstition to Plutarch since he speculates on the rational cause and spread of the disease (34.5; cf. *de sera num. vind.* 558e–f).[27] However, he does often adduce as one alternative in such events some uncertain higher power whose aims are facilitated through wholly explicable means (cf. *Per.* 6.4–5—both the scientific and the mantic explanation of a portent are correct).

Nicias takes this further. At 13.5 (and also *de Pyth. orac.* 397f) Plutarch records the portentous destruction of an Athenian dedication: "at Delphi there stood a gold Palladium set on a palm tree of bronze, a dedication by the city from their victory spoils in the Persian Wars. Ravens flew up and pecked at it for many days, and they bit off the golden fruit of the palm and cast it down." Pausanias records the same

[25] *Arist.* 24.3—greed of the Empire; *Flam.* 11.3–6—Greece's internal wars fought by men like Agesilaus, Lysander, Nicias, and Alcibiades.

[26] Cf. *de E ap. Delph.* 386e, *de gen. Socr.* 579b–d—God's instruction to "double the altar at Delphi" is interpreted by Plato as an injunction to renounce warfare for culture.

[27] So Brenk (n. 1 above), 121–22.

story with disbelief (10. 15.5) and ascribes it to the Atthidographer Cleitodemus.[28] The latter was presumably Plutarch's source,[29] and Plutarch follows him in exploiting the dramatic potential by placing the incident before the Sicilian expedition in the *Life,* whereas in *de Pyth. orac.* it is a reflection of the actual disaster.[30] Plutarch then quotes the oracle (also *de Pyth. orac.* 403b) which told the Athenians to fetch the priestess Hesychia, and so τὸ δαιμόνιον was thereby urging them "to keep the peace." It is quite probable that Plutarch believed in the portent (as well as exploiting its drama) and also in the oracle, for they came from his shrine.[31] There is another interesting remark at *Nic.* 17.4, that after many victories over the Syracusans the Athenians finally received an ἐκ θεῶν ὄντως ἢ τύχης ἀντίστασίν τινα.[32]

It is tempting to conclude from this that for Plutarch God was not prepared to further a world-wide Athenian sovereignty which would have been detrimental to Greece; but there is nothing that clearly looks like interference. It is with Greece's loss of freedom and subjugation by Macedon that we first begin to find notices about destiny. *Dem.* 19.1 is particularly important:

> it would seem that some τύχη δαιμόνιος or the revolution of affairs, which was helping to bring to a close the liberty of Greece at that time, opposed the actions being taken [by Demosthenes before Chaeroneia], and brought to light many signs of what was to come.

It is characteristic of Plutarch to advance divine and human explanations. As has been noted, these alternatives are complementary and it will be seen from other passages that the explanation of history in human and political terms does not preclude the wishes of the divine. In *Dem.* 19 Plutarch goes on to quote a Sibylline oracle (137 Hendess) relating to the site of the battle (19.1–2). To credit the oracle he is pre-

[28] Or Cleidemus; *FGrH* 323 F 10.

[29] Cf. e.g., *Them.* 10.6.

[30] Cf. *Tim.* 8, the dedication of a sacred trireme on the basis of dreams of the priestesses of Persephone and the later appearance en route to Sicily of a heavenly torch bearing witness to this: in Diodorus Siculus (16. 66.3–5) the dedication is made as a result of seeing the divine torch. Plutarch is more organized.

[31] Though he knows that the Athenians denied the portent (13.6). It is less likely that he read anything into the other signs recorded in *Nic.* 13 except the message of Socrates' δαιμόνιον (13.9), which he clearly accepted (cf. *de gen. Socr.*).

[32] For the phrase, cf. *Aem.* 36.1.

pared to change his local geography. He quotes another oracle (138 H) and finally leaves a question mark over the matter (19.3–20.1). In this passage Plutarch's own statement of the part taken by τύχη makes it reasonably safe again to assume that he believed in the signs and oracles he quotes.[33]

With regard to the decline of Greece note further *Phoc.* 1–3 where Plutarch draws a picture of providence combatting the ἀρετή of virtuous men such as Phocion and Cato Minor. The nations of both men were in a bad plight and it is made clear that their virtue was being rendered ineffectual by fortune. At *Phoc.* 28.2f. Plutarch records how men reflected on the attitude of τὰ θεῖα to Greece in the past and now (in 322 B.C.) "when the gods were observing the most grievous sufferings of Greece." This passage no doubt has a literary aim,[34] but we will see shortly that both it and *Dem.* 19 are by no means the only ones where Plutarch seems to think of the decline of Greece in terms of something destined.

Τύχη does not interfere in the lives of Alexander and the Diadochi. This might seem surprising with regard to Alexander, for certainly in the two essays *de Alex. Mag. fort. aut virt.* fortune is clearly involved in Alexander's life and sets out to hinder his attempt to unite the world in a vision of Stoic cosmopolitanism. Plutarch's very particular aim in these two essays is shown clearly by the fact that Alexander was generally felt to enjoy the support of fortune. The essays are really a disquisition straight from the schools of rhetoric on ἀρετή versus τύχη. In the *Life* Plutarch is careful not to allow himself to credit Alexander with any aid from τύχη or the gods.[35] There is hardly any mention of a great civilizing mission.[36] Alexander's final conquest of Persia is greeted with an emotional Hellenocentric comment at *Ages.* 15.4 where Plutarch begs to differ with the view that Greeks who missed the sight of Alexander on Darius' throne were deprived of great pleasure—rather, they would have wept over the waste of all those Greek generals at Leuctra, Coroneia, and so on. In the case of the Diadochi, even if τὸ θεῖον disapproves of their type (*Demetr.* 12.3–5), Plutarch

[33] Contrast *Cam.* 6.3 where Plutarch is more cautious on a portent.

[34] Cf. *Cato Min.* 53.3: Cato cannot understand why the gods formerly supported Pompey but now desert him.

[35] Cf. J. Hamilton, *Plutarch, Alexander: A Commentary* (Oxford 1969) lxii.

[36] Cf. Hamilton (n. 35 above), lxv.

is more interested in pointing out the extraordinary changes they underwent in material and military fortune than in finding examples of divine restraint,[37] though he does hint at divine punishment in the end of the Macedonian kingdom (*Arat.* 54.4–8[38]).

Quite a contrast with all of this is made by the narrative of the liberation of Sicily in *Dion* and *Timoleon.* It seems that Plutarch found the freeing of this island something so remarkable—given its depressed state and the abundance of tyrannies—that only providential power could have been responsible. At *Dion* 4.3–4 he comments on Plato's voyage to Sicily: it came about θείαι τινὶ τύχηι and was

> not a matter of human planning; but some δαίμων, as it would seem, who was from afar laying the foundation of liberty for the Syracusans and devising the destruction of the tyranny, conducted Plato from Italy to Syracuse and brought Dion in contact with his conversation.

At 26.7f. Plutarch narrates the τύχη παράλογος of the messenger who is stopped from reaching Dionysius, absent from the island αὐτομάτως (26.1), for "Dionysius was destined (ἔμελλε) to learn of the war in Sicily only later and from others" (27.1). At 50.4 Plutarch comments on the fate of the tyrant himself: "even to-day, of the illustrations men give about τύχη, the exile of Dionysius is the strongest and the plainest." His extraordinary change of fortunes is noted also at *Tim.* 14.2–3 and 16.1. Though the remarks refer in the first instance to Dionysius' personal circumstances, his exile was a necessary part of the freeing of the island.[39]

It could be objected that liberation rather lends itself to ideas about the involvement of fate in order to enhance the drama of the situation. No one would deny this is true.[40] On the other hand *Tim.* enables us to draw the line between the dramatic potential of such situations and belief. *Tim.* is shot through with statements about the support of τύχη for Timoleon's mission. The passage at 16.10–11 has already been mentioned. Three other important comments weigh the

[37] Cf. *Demetr.* 35.3–4, 45.3–5; *Pyr.* 13.1, 22.3, 26.2, 30.3.

[38] On which, and also on Cassander, see n. 47 below.

[39] Cf. the like removal by fortune (through their deaths) of Crassus, Brutus, and Alexander (*de fort. Rom.* 326a).

[40] Cf. *Pel.* 8.9 for the prevention of a message similar to that of *Dion* 26.7f. but without any mention of fortune.

contribution to his success made by τύχη and by his ἀρετή (19.1, 21.4–5, 36.4–5), a contrast Plutarch is fond of (cf. above). In the last passage Plutarch declares that, "the generalship of Timoleon compared [with that of Epaminondas and Agesilaus] was exercised with much ease as well as glory, and appears to those with a clear and fair mind to be οὐ τύχης ἔργον, ἀλλ' ἀρετῆς εὐτυχούσης,"[41] i.e., Timoleon's virtue merited the co-operation of fortune. Why is this so? Timoleon had fought tyrants and barbarians. On his account Greece's temples "would possess barbarian spoils with the most beautiful of inscriptions showing the justice of the victors alongside their valour" (29.6). Contrast Plutarch's feelings on the results of Greece's internal wars at *de Pyth. orac.* 401c–d: "on beautiful offerings you can read the most disgraceful of inscriptions." Timoleon was the only Greek of his time to deal harshly with barbarians and tyrants and justly with fellow Greeks (*Tim.* 37.4–5). There was good reason as far as Plutarch was concerned for his mission to be supported by τύχη. Plutarch may have built upon a traditional association between the hero and fortune,[42] but he made what he found his own.[43]

It is also in the complete transfer of Greece as a nation to the control of Rome that Plutarch counts in the divine. The principal passages are *Phil.* 17.2 (the Romans "were already becoming more closely involved with Greek affairs. . . . Their strength, μετὰ τοῦ δαίμονος, was growing great in all areas, and the end was near to which it was necessary [ἔδει] that the fortune [of Greece] must come in its cycle";[44]

[41] For the phrase, cf. *Aem.* 2.3 on the Aemilii. Epaminondas and Agesilaus were of course among Plutarch's favourite models.

[42] There is no clear evidence that he did. It has been suggested that Timaeus, who was clearly a source (4.6, 10.7, 36.2, *synk.* 2.4), first elaborated Timoleon's links with fortune (M. Fontana, "Fortuna di Timoleonte: Rassegna delle fonti letterarie," *Kokalos* 4 [1958] 10–11). However, the surviving accounts of Diodorus 16 and Nepos *Tim.*, even allowing for their smaller scale, share hardly any common ground relevant to fortune with Plutarch, nor is there really anything concrete to suggest that Timaeus' narrative differed from them. Further, Plutarch's invention of the association with providential τύχη goes closely with his tampering with history in the *Life,* most obviously the favourable presentation of the liberated Syracusan δῆμος compared with *Dion* and the democratic constitution at Corinth (cf. J. Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth. A History of the City to 338 B.C.* [Oxford 1984] 385–86). I discuss *Aem.–Tim.* in *Historia* 36 (1989).

[43] We should not forget that *Dion* lacks the especially forceful ideas about providence in *Tim.* because the liberation was not successful and beneficial.

[44] Cf. Brenk (n. 1 above), 168, n. 22, on the unlikely suggestion that Plutarch had a cyclical theory of history. For ἔδει see Appendix.

cf. 17.5) and *Flam.* 12.10 (peoples, cities, and kings willingly entrusted themselves to Rome: "the result was that within a short time—τάχα που καὶ θεοῦ συνεφαπτομένου—everything became subject to them"). These passages refer not to the liberation of Greece from Macedon in 197 B.C. but to the period after this (in *Phil.* explicitly to the years following the conquest of Antiochus). *Phil.* 17.2 seems to refer only to Greece (despite ἐπὶ πάντα, 'in all areas'), for the statement leads up to Philopoemen's opposition in Greece. The *Flam.* passage points to a wider subjugation of the Greek East and this may be why Plutarch is cautious about the rôle of the divine (τάχα που).[45] Both passages strongly suggest that Rome's involvement in Greece was pleasing to the divine power. That Plutarch is thinking of providence in this pair tends to be confirmed by the fact that he does not deal with ordinary chance, luck, etc.[46]

Here one should note also the oracle Plutarch records in the mouth of his poet friend Sarapion at *de Pyth. orac.* 399c–d. This all-embracing prediction includes Rome's conquest of Carthage, the appearance of a new volcanic island in front of Thera, and according to the exegesis given by Sarapion Philip II being at war with the Aetolians and being beaten by Rome. This last interpretation is difficult to find in the oracle, to say the least. Sarapion asserts that the concatenation of events guarantees the oracle's "prognosis"; but we may say that Plutarch considered the reference to Philip and Rome to be far too obscure to merit the inclusion of the oracle in *Flam.* (where there are no oracles or portents bar 7.7 and 20.6), as well as contradicting the suggestion that attacking Philip and liberating Greece was a conscious and deliberate policy which owed nothing to divine suggestion (*Flam.* 11.7).[47]

[45] Wider subjugation: cf. 12.8 Ἕλληνας, . . . πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, 12.10 οὐδὲ δῆμοι καὶ πόλεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ βασιλεῖς. Αξουθεσ σεατοξ ζοσ γαφυιοξ αβοφυ υθε διχιξε ιτ Πμφυασγθ'τ δετισε υο τυσεττ υθε ησαυιυφδε οζ υθε πεοπμετ αξδ υθεισ χομφξυασϑ αττογιαυιοξ ψιυθ Ζμανιξιξφτ (υθιτ δοετ ξου πσεγμφδε διχιξε αιδ).

[46] Cf. *synk.* 2.1: "no one would ascribe Philopoemen's victories to τύχη"; the pair is in fact freer than usual from casual expressions like κατὰ τύχην.

[47] The oracle does not simply demonstrate God's foreknowledge, but very much that the things mentioned will happen in that order and not by chance, as Sarapion says at 399d (cf. 399b). For the eruption of the island, cf. Strabo, 1. 3.16, Justin, 30. 4.1, Pliny *H.N.* 2. 202. Sarapion also affirms the truth of an oracle concerning a slave-war which the Romans received 500 years before it happened; the reference is unclear.

There is one other passage that may be relevant to divine interference in Greek

In sum, there is little to suggest that Plutarch attributes the ordinary changes of history to a divine agent in the Greek *Lives*. But changes of a very large scale with significant results (the liberation of Sicily, Greece's loss of freedom, and the supremacy of Rome over her) seem worthy of the ascription.

IV. ROMAN HISTORY

That providence does not further Athens, and indeed impedes her development, clearly contrasts with the rise of Rome (a contrast which is thrown into greater relief by the very similar explanations Plutarch offers for the growth of the two empires in human terms[48]). At *Rom.* 8.9 Plutarch comments on the fabulous way in which Romulus and Remus came to power:

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history. At *de sera num. vind.* 552e–553d Plutarch avers that God has refrained from the early punishment of wicked rulers such as Periander, Cassander, and others, because they still had some good in them to work (in the case of the former the colonization of Apollonia, Anactorium, and Leucas; of the latter the refounding of Thebes; on Periander, cf. Proclus' remarks taken from Plutarch at *de decem dub. circa provid.* 8. 56 11. 40ff. [ed. Isaac]). In the *Lives* we do not find comparable examples of constructive procrastination. The essay does of course concentrate on bad men and there are few examples of these among the heroes, but we might have had a similar remark in say *Demetr.*, where Plutarch clearly praises Demetrius (and Antigonus) for freeing the Greek cities (8, esp. 8.2, *synk.* 2.3). There is no doubt that Plutarch believed what he wrote in the *de sera num. vind.* However, he may have felt that the postponement of divine punishment could have jarred in the different texture of the *Lives* (where it might have appeared too speculative and unfair to the hero); though his belief in the eventual punishment of bad men themselves or through their descendants (another idea in *de sera num. vind.*) has surely occasioned his remarks about Philip and Perseus in *Arat.* 54 and the numerous instances of divine punishment of men involved in heroes' deaths (cf. *Eum.* 19.3; *Caes.* 69.2,4–14; *Dem.* 31.4–6 [ἡ Δημοσθένους δίκη, cf. *Phoc.* 30.9–10 δαίμων τις]; *Cic.* 49.6; *Dion* 58.3–7 [cf. *de sera num. vind.* 553d]; *Pel.* 35.4–12; *Crass.* 33.7–9 [δίκη]; punishment not attributed to the divine occurs in *Pomp.* 80.7–9; *Gracchi* 21.4–6, 39.1–2; on the punishment of Nero and Vespasian, see n. 68).

[48] A comparison of Plutarch's comments on the rise of Athens and Rome shows very similar ideas about the corruption of the people by increasing power (e.g., *Them.* 19.5, *Cato Maj.* 27.3), the degeneration from earlier class harmony (*Cim.* 17.9, *Gracchi* 20.1) to discord (e.g., *Per.* 11.2–3, *Marius* 35.1), the rôle of good politicians in controlling the δῆμος (*Per.* 15.1, *Aem.* 38.2), and so on.

> some people have seen the story in terms of fictions and drama, but it is not necessary to be incredulous when we see what great structures fortune builds, and when we reflect that the Roman state would not have reached its present power, had it not been of a divine origin, and one which was attended by extraordinary events.

This explicit statement (cf. 7.5, *de fort. Rom.* 320a–321b; Livy Pref. 7) cannot be matched in *Numa,* though Numa, whose reign is characterized by τύχη in *de fort. Rom.,* is seen in his *Life* as enjoying a close connection with the gods.[49] To find a statement comparable to that in *Rom.* it is necessary to turn to *Cam.* 6.3, where Plutarch says with regard to the alleged utterance of Juno of Veii that, "those who defend the miracle have a most powerful advocate in the τύχη of the city, which from its small and contemptible beginning could never have come to such heights of glory and power unless God had stayed by her and made many important manifestations of himself from time to time." Plutarch in fact reserves judgement about the portent itself;[50] but the providential care exercised over Rome is assumed to be true.[51]

At *Marc.* 3.2 Plutarch comments thus on the invasion of the Gauls before the Second Punic War: "it seemed something wonderful and the result of τύχη ἀγαθή that the Gallic war did not break out at the same time as the Punic War." We should compare what he says about the revolt of Vercingetorix at *Caes.* 26.2: "if he had done this a little later when Caesar was involved in the civil war, Italy would have been possessed of terrors no lighter than those aroused by the Cimbri." There is no talk of τύχη, etc. here. However, in *Alex.-Caes.* there is anyway little mention of fortune in any meaning. In the *Marc.* passage

[49] See esp. 4. Further, Numa's birth on the same day as Rome's foundation is hailed as being κατὰ δή τινα θείαν τύχην (3.6); the fact he became king at all is held to be "something great and really divine" (*synk.* 4.15, cf. *de fort. Rom.* 318b); and the incredible goodwill shown to the king, and the harmony which is the hallmark of his reign, are due (20.8) "either to fear of the gods, who were thought to have him in their care, or to reverence for his virtue, or to a δαιμόνιος τύχη" (that Plutarch is not speaking exclusively is made clear by his quotation of Plato [*R.* 499b; cf. similarly 473d cited at *Dem.-Cic. synk.* 3.4] on the wise and virtuous ruler as the appointee of "some divine fortune" [20.9–12]).

[50] Contrast above on *Dem.* 19.

[51] Note that the observations at *Cam.* 6.3 are not prompted by Livy (his scepticism on the portent [5. 22.6] is quoted by Plutarch ad loc.).

Plutarch is not saying that the timing of the Gallic invasion was manifestly due to providence, but observing that it was very fortunate not to have to fight the Gauls along with Hannibal. The statement is more than passing surprise. In the Hannibalic War itself supernatural interference is again offered to explain the behaviour of Hannibal in not attacking Rome immediately after Cannae (*Fab.* 17.1): "it is not easy to say what λογισμός turned him from his course; rather it would seem that his hesitation and pusillanimity in this matter were the work of a δαίμων or some god standing in his way." Here a great and obvious opportunity was missed and so Plutarch is prepared to see more than human considerations at work. Divine guidance seems to have had a hand in the decision.[52]

The rôle of the divine in Rome's take-over of Greece has already been noted. By way of contrast there is nothing in *Gracchi, Marius,* or *Sulla* to suggest that Plutarch saw the upheavals of those years as directed by providence. Indeed, at *Sulla* 7.7–11 he records the opinions of the Etruscan soothsayers that a new age had dawned in a tone of clear scepticism.[53] At the end of the Republic, however, where a lasting political change did occur, fate definitely asserts itself. At *Crass.* 21.1 Plutarch calls the emir Abgaros the worst of "all the evils τύχη brought for the destruction [of the Romans]." If here it is legitimate to see only a reference to Crassus' own destruction, in *Pomp.* (see below)

[52] Cf. *Fab.* 27.2 "the great and secure εὐτυχία of the country" after Hannibal; the theme recurs at *de fort. Rom.* 318b–c (the followers of Fortune apart from Numa and Priscus are Aemilius Paulus, Metellus Macedonicus [and family], Aemilius Scaurus, and Sulla), and 323e–423d (the extraordinary successes from the defeat of Hannibal to the victories of Pompey). For the δαίμων at work on Hannibal, cf. *Pomp.* 76.9 where Plutarch asks whether Pompey's plan to journey to Egypt "was really Pompey's intention, and not a δαίμων which was guiding him on that course."

[53] The notion is found also in Kleombrotos' tale at *de def. orac.* 421c. We should note here *de sera num. vind.* 553a where Plutarch suggests that Marius was preserved by God as a bitter medicine that the Romans needed at the time; as with similar remarks about divine procrastination with notorious individuals in Greek history (cf. n. 47 above), we should probably not expect to find such remarks in the *Lives* where they might have appeared too hypothetical and ungenerous. The acceptable belief in God's beneficence justifies of course the idea of Caesar as a good doctor supplied by ὁ δαίμων at *Dion-Brut. synk.* 2.2. For the common medical imagery, cf. F. Fuhrmann, *Les images de* Plutarque (Paris 1964) 238–40, M-H. Quet, "Rhétorique, Culture et Politique. Le fonctionnement du discours idéologique chez Dion de Pruse et dans les *Moralia* de Plutarque," *Dial. d'hist. anc.* 4 (1978) 64.

his death is an intrinsic part of the progress towards civil war. In *Crass.* itself Plutarch makes Crassus allude to "the great fortune and glory of the Romans" (26.6), an ironical passage as shown by *synk.* 5.2 where we read, "Crassus made so many blunders that he did not allow τύχη the opportunity to show any favour, so we wonder not that his folly succumbed to the power of the Parthians, but rather that it prevailed over the εὐτυχία of the Romans."[54] The defeat of Crassus was such a surprise that mention of Rome's usual good fortune is not out of place.

Plutarch is not just being rhetorical. It seemed to be part of the planned change in Rome's government to remove those who would have stood in the way. At least this is what one might understand from *Pomp.* 53.8–9: Crassus had been a κώλυμα in the way of civil war and so τύχη removed this third man from the contest to leave one against one. In this chapter of *Pomp.* Plutarch notes the estrangement of Pompey and Caesar developing from the death of Julia (53.7), and at 46.3–4 he has said he will trace the fall of Pompey and the rise of Caesar in political terms; yet there is an extra element which removes Crassus in a very unexpected way.[55] Plutarch might have added one of his sententious statements about τύχη confounding the plans of men to no purpose (cf. *Pomp.* 42.12, *Marius* 23.1). He did not, for here there was a purpose, that Rome should become a monarchy. When he goes on at 53.10 to say what a slight thing τύχη is compared with φύσις, he is not detracting from its power—he means that although it was at this time open to Pompey and Caesar alone to share the empire between them (cf. 70.3), their incredible greed would not let them do so (cf. 53.7–8).

In *Pomp.* Plutarch makes good use of τύχη (etc.) as a dramatic mechanism (e.g., 46.2, "how happy he would have been had he finished his life at this point [61 B.C.], up to which he had the fortune of Alexander"). Pompey's conversation at 75.4–5 with the Peripatetic philosopher Cratippus is part of that, but also contains a remark by Plutarch himself about the change in the Roman constitution. Pompey complains to Cratippus about πρόνοια; Cratippus is represented as making a noncommittal reply instead of putting forward a counter-argument which would have been hurtful and inopportune. Plutarch

[54] At *Crass.* 27.6 Plutarch says that Crassus lying on the ground in misery after Carrhae was for most people an illustration of τύχη, but for thinking men of folly and ambition. There τύχη means 'luck'; Plutarch is not talking of luck at *synk.* 5.2 (where, note, human failings also come out).

[55] Cf. n. 39 above.

then adds himself,[56] "when Pompey asked about πρόνοια, Cratippus might have shown that,

> τοῖς πράγμασιν ἤδη μοναρχίας ἔδει διὰ τὴν κακοπολιτείαν,

and he could have asked, 'How, Pompey, and by what proof, can we believe you would have used τύχη better than Caesar had you won?' But these matters, which are the affairs of the gods, must be left as they are."[57] We may compare *Dion-Brut. synk.* 2.2:

> δεομένοις ἔδοξε τοῖς πράγμασι μοναρχίας ὥσπερ πραιότατος ἰατρὸς [sc. Caesar] ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ δαίμονος δεδόσθαι.

In this passage we again find political/human need as well as the will of God. Similarly at *Cim.-Luc. synk.* 1.1 Plutarch says that Lucullus is to be considered blessed because he missed the μεταβολή which τὸ πεπρωμένον wrought in the constitution through the Civil Wars. These passages demonstrate very nicely the close connection between the actions of men and the intentions of providence. The Civil Wars were not begun by God—they were due to human evils (*Pomp.* 70; cf. *de Stoic. repug.* 1049d)—but they fitted in with God's plan for the political structure of the world (and compendiously also, it seems, with his plan for the population of Greece.

Plutarch was keen to understand human ambitions and desires as determining factors in politics (cf. also *Pomp.* 46.3–4 above). Cato Minor is pictured at *Phoc.* 3.4 as a courageous mariner struggling against τύχη which eventually "destroyed the constitution by means of others," but in the *Life* Plutarch's interests focus on Cato's principles and their own disastrous effect on the Republic.[58] Political explanations feature most importantly in *Caes.*[59] For example at 28.1 we read

[56] There is a crux here, but this seems to be the correct sense.

[57] The last sentence "But these matters . . ." is given by Ziegler, following Sintenis[2], to Cratippus. This is surely wrong, for the bland statement is in keeping with what the philosopher actually did say (§ 4 "acquiescing"), not what Plutarch says he might have said had he been prepared to contradict Pompey.

[58] Among the many criticisms Plutarch goes so far as to suggest that Cato's righteousness forced Pompey to side with Caesar, thereby precipitating revolution and the overthrow of the State (30.9–10).

[59] Cf. C. Pelling, "Plutarch and Roman Politics," in *Past Perspectives: Studies in Greek and Roman Historical Writing*, ed. I. Moxon, J. Smart, A. Woodman (Cambridge 1986) 159–60.

that, "Caesar had long ago decided to put down Pompey, just as, of course, the latter had decided regarding the former" (cf. *Ant.* 6.2). Plutarch's interest in a political account of Caesar's career probably explains why he does not develop the central theme of providential guidance in *Caes.* itself—he always remains sensitive to the contexts he creates, suggesting it only at 63.1 (the alleged portents of Caesar's death make τὸ πεπρωμένον seem unpreventable rather than unexpected). Analysis of human motives, though, will not help to determine which man would be successful in the end. Plutarch notes here (*Caes.* 28.4) the κακοπολιτεία which Caesar, as he says, took advantage of (cf. *Pomp.* 75.5 above). On the other hand, when people said that, "the most gentle of doctors" was needed, they meant Pompey (28.6), though it was Caesar who was the divine choice (*Dion-Brut. synk.* 2.2).

Caesar's success evoked a good deal of rhetoric about his personal fortune.[60] But although he was important in establishing the path towards monarchy, he did not of course establish the Principate. The régime under which Plutarch was pleased to live (cf. p. xx below) was assured by the victory of Octavian and Antony at Philippi. Providence was clearly involved here. First, note *Brut.* 47 where the news of Brutus' victory at sea does not reach him in time:

> but since, as it would seem, political affairs were no longer to be in the hands of the many, but required a monarchy, God, wishing to lead off and remove from the stage the only man who stood in the way of the one who had the ability to rule, cut off that [good] fortune, although it very nearly arrived in time for Brutus to hear. (47.7, cf. 47.5)

Second, after the removal of Brutus, it is left to Antony and Octavian to settle things between them. The most important statement is at *Ant.* 56.6. Plutarch is talking of how Cleopatra bribed Canidius to use specious arguments to bring on the war. These prevailed over Antony's better judgement Plutarch says, and adds in an aside,

> ἔδει γὰρ εἰς Καίσαρα πάντα περιελθεῖν.

There is no explicit mention of fate, etc., here, but given the other passages (see Appendix) ἔδει can signify nothing else. Antony's dramatic

[60] Cf. n. 5 above.

end offered scope for using τύχη as a literary device in his *Life* (cf. 33.2–3, similarly *de fort. Rom.* 319f–320a).[61] This should not obscure the fact that his death fitted squarely with the designs of providence.

To sum up: the history of Rome was full of highly significant and unexpected historical events—her rise, her constant success, her control over Greece, the establishment of the Principate—which Plutarch felt were not explicable in human terms alone; rather, for reasons we now turn to, Plutarch saw in these events evidence of direction by the guiding force of providence.

V. THE AIMS OF PROVIDENCE

What was providence trying to achieve by interfering with Greek and Roman history? Plutarch offers some answers in context, notably, for example, that the divine power wished to see one man in charge of Rome in order to put an end to bad government. But in terms of the history of the world he does not obviously indicate long-term aims for the divine. One could argue that the particular stress on God's rôle in the origin and successes of Rome simply reflects the series of evidently momentous and cataclysmic events with which the city was associated. The major events of Greek history tended to be transient; Roman events were less obviously so since the whole world was involved and the world, once changed, stayed changed; hence the involvement of providence.

On this line of argument Plutarch has merely confused what did happen with what was destined to happen, and there seems to be no reason to attribute to him a belief in a guiding or beneficent providence (with an interest in the present and future as much as in the past). However, we have seen one example among the evidence relating to Greek history, that is the liberation of Sicily, where the clear aim of the divine is the good of man. Here Plutarch forcefully and independently involves providence intervening on behalf of the Sicilians first through Plato and Dion and later by lending support to Timoleon, a benefactor of Greeks against barbarians and tyrants. The introduction of providential care is the more deliberate because Timoleon's suc-

[61] In fact, though both *Ant.* and *Demetr.* employ a good deal of theatrical imagery, permutations of fortune are used much more in *Demetr.*

cessful actions were of limited duration (as Plutarch must have known). It is not simply permanent events which are ascribed to divine guidance.

The same providence interferes in Greek and Roman affairs. Consider Rome's involvement in Greece and the Greek East. Plutarch does not make the two statements about divine aid for Rome at *Phil.* 17.2 and *Flam.* 12.10 merely because Roman power did increase so dramatically. At *Phil.* 17.2 he clearly associates τύχη bringing to an end the freedom of Greece with the rise of Roman power in this area μετὰ τοῦ δαίμονος. *Flam.* 11 and 12 suggest why he thought this was so. At 11.3–7 he recalls that the heroes of ancient Greece ("men like Agesilaus, Lysander, Nicias, and Alcibiades") did not benefit their country by the victories they won (cf. further *Tim.* 36.1,4), whereas Flamininus and the Romans did so unexpectedly and consciously. In 12.1–4 Plutarch gives concrete examples of Flamininus' policy of liberation. Then, speaking of a later period, he goes on to say that Rome deserved the power she won through her benefactions among the peoples, cities, and kings of the Greek East (12.7–10). Typically he offers very human motives—the Greeks are naturally grateful for Rome's benefits. But he takes this further when he adds, "the result was that within a short time—and perhaps God was lending a helping hand—everything became subject to them" (12.10). Their philhellenism is pleasing to the divine, and the implication is that their power increases for this reason.

A difference between providential furtherance of Timoleon and of Rome is that in Timoleon's case the divine is actively pursuing the aim of liberating Sicily before his mission is thought of, whereas it seems to begin supporting Rome in the midst of her actions. We should probably say that Timoleon had already proved his "credentials" as far as commitment to liberation goes by the killing of his tyrant brother Timophanes (the ideals he shows in Sicily are visibly important from the beginning of his *Life*). Rome proved her worth through Flamininus who, like Timoleon, was personally interested in liberation and benefaction (as Plutarch is keen to bring out in his *Life*). She could thenceforth be supported as a divine agent.

On the other hand we have seen that the foundation of Rome and her earlier history also attracted statements by Plutarch about divine fortune. These statements do not obviously spring from ideas of liberation or benefaction. Surely here it was only the fact of Rome's prosperity which led him to talk as he does in *Rom.* and *Cam.*? There is

truth in this, but not the whole truth. The expansion of Roman power in the Greek East was associated by Plutarch with her benefactions there; it will be suggested below that Plutarch counted the stable government he lived under in the Empire as a part of providence's continuing active interest in the world; given this, it is not too much to suggest that Plutarch may have viewed Rome's foundation and earlier history as a part at least of God's overall aim.

How did the system under which Plutarch himself lived fit with his ideas about what was pleasing to the divine? Is there anything to suggest that he may have seen the Roman Empire of his day as fulfilling the aims of providence? The primary aim of the guiding power in Plutarch's eyes was to uphold the rule of justice on earth. Plutarch frequently talks of the essential goodness of divine power (e.g., *de adul. et amico* 63f). Man has a capacity for such goodness in ἀρετή, which in its contemplative form is how he may achieve a Platonic approximation to God (*de virt. mor.* 444c–d, *de sera num. vind.* 550d–e[62]). The path of virtue has sure consequences: "la felicité est associée à la vertu, elle-même associée à la puissance" (as Babut puts it); vice is by contrast linked with weakness.[63] Plutarch is at his most righteous when he says that favour, goodwill, altruism, and kindliness are τὰ μὲν ἀρετῆς καὶ δυνάμεως, and that anger, temper, and hostile and destructive behaviour are τὰ δὲ ἀσθενείας καὶ φαυλότητος (1102e). From moral strength it is a short step to associating political strength with ἀρετή. Virtue can lead to power: "often enough [virtue] not only renders men sensible, honest, and upright in actions and words, but also is likely to secure for them δόξας καὶ δυνάμεις" (*de aud. poet.* 24c–d).[64] Power is obviously better if it is combined with virtue. If it is not there are serious consequences for the ruler and for those whose example he is: "in weak and lowly private persons folly is combined with a lack of power and, therefore, results in no wrongdoing . . . but power when supplemented by vice adds vigour to the passions" (*ad princ. indoctr.* 782b–c[65]).

Many of Plutarch's thoughts on the ideal ruler are to be found in the *max. cum princ. phil. esse dis.* and especially in the *ad princ.*

[62] Cf. Plato *Theaet.* 176b–c.

[63] Babut (n. 1 above), 441 n. 3 (citing *Pel.* 21.6, *de def. orac.* 420d, *non pos. suav. vivi sec. Epic.* 1102e); cf. 475–76.

[64] The thought is traditional—cf. *Iliad* 17. 251, "From Zeus honour and fame attend."

[65] Cf. *de Alex. Mag. fort. aut virt.* II 337c, *de laude ips.* 545e, *Eum.* 9.1, *Dion* 1.3.

indoct.[66] The ruler in *ad princ. indoct.* is specifically βασιλεύς (as in Dio of Prusa's *Orations on Kingship*). He is the sun, the mirrored image of God (781f). The ruler who wishes to copy not God's virtue but his anger will be punished by God's nemesis (780f). It is not simply for reasons of "poetic justice" that several of the *Lives* end with some form of divine punishment for bad men.[67] In the essay devoted to the subject, the *de sera num. vind.*, Plutarch even pictures the punishment of the former Emperor Nero (567f–568a[68]). The true qualities of the ideal ruler are "good counsel, justness, goodness, and high-mindedness" (*max. cum princ. phil. esse dis.* 776f), and "legality, justice, truth, and mildness" (*ad princ. indoct.* 781a).[69] He should aim at "making himself alike to God through ἀρετή" (780e). "Every act of a king should appear θεμιτὸν καὶ δίκαιον" (781b, cf. *Demetr.* 42.8–9). Naturally God is happy to teach and advise such a man for the best (*max. cum princ. phil. esse dis.* 776e, *Numa* 4.11).

Plutarch believed that the collaboration between God and his chosen ruler would be of practical benefit to the ruled. Numa is the classic example of a philosopher who owing to "some divine fortune" became βασιλεύς on the Platonic design and brought peace to his nation (*Numa* 20.8–12). Again, in his later years Augustus' political acts were βασιλικώτερα καὶ δημωφελέστερα (*an seni resp. ger. sit* 784d). The polity of a ruler who has accustomed himself to be ruled for public benefit no less than to rule is "a democratic and legal régime" (783d). This was the government Plutarch felt he lived under, at least under Trajan (784f τρυφῶντες in legality and peace, cf. *de Pyth. orac.* 396f τρυφὴ καὶ μαλακία of the present).

Plutarch's thoughts on the ideal ruler are thoroughly traditional.[70]

[66] For Plutarch's thoughts on ideal rulers, see Aalders (n. 1 above) 33–34; H. Weber, *Die Staats–und Rechtslehre Plutarchs von Chaironeia* (Bonn 1959) 34–40.

[67] See n. 47 above.

[68] Cf. *amatorius* 771c on the punishment of Vespasian.

[69] Cf. A. Wallace-Hadrill, "The Emperor and his Virtues," *Hist.* 30 (1981) 302ff. on the usual number of four virtues characteristic of kings (the canon is ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, φρόνησις/σοφία [bravery, temperance, justness, wisdom], as at Menander *Peri Epideikt.* 3, p. 373 Sp., but these vary and Plutarch goes his own way here).

[70] Thus it is unlikely that either *max. cum phil. esse dis.* or *ad princ. indoct.* were addressed to anyone in particular. It is not impossible that *ad princ. indoct.* was intended for the emperor, since the ruler is a world ruler; but one feels that Plutarch would have been more open if this were so. The addressee of *max. cum princ. phil. esse dis.* is often given as Sorkanos but the reading of the Mss. σωρκανόν (etc.) is unknown as a proper or a common noun.

remembers that Plutarch does not have the Stoic conception of *statio* (τάξις), whereby each institution fulfills its providentially given place in the order of the universe, nor does he feel that because a man is an emperor he will therefore execute the duties particular to his rôle.[71] The maximum of virtue one could expect in a Numa or a Lycurgus was not possible for most of us. Naturally what Romans, including emperors, did with their power as men might not always be welcome; but individual virtues are not what counted.[72] The overall benefits in the world from Roman political stability were manifest and desirable among men and pleasing to God, and Plutarch's thinking here must be the principal reason why he believed that providence had encouraged the establishment of monarchy at Rome to bring to an end κακοπολιτεία.

Many Greeks under the Empire ascribed to Rome important benefits close to home, especially peace.[73] For Plutarch the benefits of Rome are limited to political blessings. Peace is naturally amongst these. In the encomium *de fort. Rom.* the Empire is a "cosmos of peace" (317c). Elsewhere he is more cautious about attributing peace and other benefits. He summarizes the blessings the cities require at *praec. ger. reip.* 824c as εἰρήνη, ἐλευθερία, εὐετηρία, εὐανδρία, and ὁμόνοια. The first is implicitly and the second (meaning political freedom) is clearly connected with Roman rule.[74] The last, concord, is the concern of the Greek politicians and peoples.[75] In this passage abun-

[71] The Stoic duties are similar to those in Plutarch's *max. cum princ. phil. esse dis.* and *ad princ. indoct.;* cf. P. Brunt, "Stoicism and the Principate," *PBSR* 43 (1975) 22ff.

[72] Contrast Josephus—in the *B.J.* he plays up Roman virtue partly to accord with his central doctrine that there was a divinely planned transfer of power to the Roman side (this has nothing to do with the wider workings of the divine plan, but enables Josephus to criticize the Jewish rebels on religious as well as political grounds); cf. T. Rajak, *Josephus. The Historian and his Society* (London 1983) 99, 194.

[73] Cf. V. Nutton, "The Beneficial Ideology," in *Imperialism in the Ancient World,* ed. P. Garnsey and C. Whittaker (Cambridge 1978) 210 with n. 18; J. Palm, *Rom, Römertum und Imperium in der griechischen Literatur der Kaiserzeit* (Lund 1959) 31f.

[74] πρὸς μὲν εἰρήνην οὐδὲν οἱ δῆμοι τῶν πολιτικῶν . . . δέονται· πέφευγε γὰρ ἐξ ἡμῶν καὶ ἠφάνισται πᾶς μὲν Ἕλλην πᾶς δὲ βάρβαρος πόλεμος· ἐλευθερίας δ' ὅσον οἱ κρατοῦντες νέμουσι τοῖς δήμοις μέτεστι (note 824e: there is no cause now for dissent among Greek politicians because "τύχη has left no prize available," i.e., real power is in Roman hands).

[75] 824d: λείπεται δὴ τῶι πολιτικῶι . . . ὁμόνοιαν ἐμποιεῖν καὶ φιλίαν ἀεί.

dance and population derive from God. That is the case also in other passages along with general freedoms and even peace (*de Pyth. orac.* 408b–c, *de def. orac.* 413f–414b, cf. *de tranq. an.* 469e). Plutarch does not underplay Rome's contribution in these matters for reasons of national pride. Rather, he felt that caring for the state of the natural world, away from statecraft, was far more directly under God's control.[76]

At *de def. orac.* 413f–414b responsibility for the natural world intersects in an unexpected way with Roman history. Plutarch's tutor Ammonios explains that now Greece could field only 3,000 hoplites,[77] for she has had the greatest share "of the general depopulation which αἱ πρότεραι στάσεις καὶ οἱ πόλεμοι have brought about over practically the whole world." This must refer to the Civil Wars ("the whole world"). When a little below this Ammonios attributes an earlier population increase to "the decision of God" (414b), we see that Rome's Civil Wars had been made use of in the divine plan to regulate Greece's population. In some passages Plutarch complains openly about the deleterious effect of the late Roman Republic on the Greek East.[78] He speaks of very human actions—plunder, taxation, impressment. Here blame is laid on no one. The wars are part of the scheme of things, God's will working through the ways of men. The end of κακοπολιτεία with the coming of the Principate led, as we know, to an economic and cultural revival in Greece. The potential of divine aid working through man, which had been shown in the material renascence of Sicily (*Tim.* 35.4), is celebrated by Plutarch in *de Pyth. orac.*[79] At Delphi and at Pylaea, the other meeting place of the Amphictyons,[80] God had "brought about after a drought as it were of earlier desolation and poverty, affluence, splendour, and honour"; Plutarch and his friends had done their bit, but the improvements could not have hap-

[76] Unlike the Stoics, for whom nature was controlled by necessity; cf. Babut (n. 1 above) 483 (alluding to *de fac. quae in orbe lun. app.* 928c), 315.

[77] This is plainly an exaggeration to reinforce the point that God has shut down certain oracles, publicizing thereby Greece's ἐρημία. "Now"—the dramatic date of *de def. orac.* is A.D. 83 or earlier (see R. Ogilvie, "The date of the *De Defectu Oraculorum*," *Phoenix* 21 [1967] 119; Jones [n. 1 above], 136, n. 1).

[78] *Sulla* 12.5–14; *Ant.* 62.1, 68.6–8; *Sert.* 24.5; *Luc.* 7.4–7, 20.1–6.

[79] Dated to after A.D. 95 by C. Jones, "Towards a Chronology of Plutarch's Works," *JRS* 56 (1966) 72.

[80] That is, Thermopylae; see G. Daux, *Rev. Arch.* 11 (1938) 3–18; Jones (n. 79 above), 64.

pened "in a short time through human care unless God were present here lending inspiration to the oracle" (409a–c).

A study of Plutarch's political works, expecially *praec. ger. reip.*, may lead one to say that Plutarch would probably have preferred Greeks to be the guarantors of political stability in the world just as he wished them to be in the πόλεις (*praec. ger. reip.* 824d–825f). Rome was after all a foreign power (*Flam.* 2.5 ἀλλόφυλος ἀρχή, 11.7 ἀλλόφυλοι ἄνδρες). However, although Plutarch naturally thought of Greece as τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ θεοφιλέστατον γένος (*de sera num. vind.* 568a),[81] there is nothing to suggest that he had ideas comparable to those of Philo, who believed that a Jewish kingdom would arise in God's own time.[82] Plutarch wished to avoid Roman involvement in Greece's cities (see *praec. ger. reip.* 19, esp. 814e–815b), but she was not, generally speaking, a foreign and unwelcome power (unlike Macedon[83]). There was nothing "barbaric" about the Romans, as Pyrrhus remarked (*Flam.* 5.6; cf. *Pyrr.* 16.7). Nor was there anything βαρβαρικόν or ἔκφυλον in their attitude to God, as Plutarch explains at length at *Marc.* 3.6. Proper religion has a "god-given and ancestral dignity" (*de superstit.* 166b). The Romans certainly kept to τὰ πάτρια in this matter (*Marc.* 5.6). They were a fitting instrument for providence.[84]

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APPENDIX OF TERMS

Terms are arranged alphabetically; they have been drawn primarily to the *Lives,* but examples have also been included from the *Moralia*; numbers of examples by themselves are not intended as a guide to actual frequency.

[81] Cf. *Demetr.-Ant. synk.* 1.3: the eastern part of the Empire is the μοῖρα ἐπιφανεστέρα.

[82] See R. Barraclough, "Philo's Politics: Roman Rule and Hellenistic Judaism," *ANRW* II.21.1 (1984) 521.

[83] See *Arat.* 16.2–4, 38.6–7; *Phil.* 8.6; *Ag./Cleom.* 37.7; note ἀλλόφυλος used of Macedon at *Arat.* 16.4 and of Rome at *Flam.* 2.5, 11.7 (quoted above).

[84] Cf. Plutarch's views with those of the early Christians on the Empire being sanctioned by God (*Rom.* 13.1–7, I *Tim.* 2.1–2, *Titus* 3.1, I *Pet.* 2.13–17, *Prima Clem.* 37); the Pauline principle differs from Plutarch in being markedly establishmentarian without attention to the benefits of the régime.

'Ανάγκη (ἀναγκαίως): 'necessity';

Not a power by itself (cf. *de an. procr. in Tim.* 1014e–1015a), but used loosely as such at *Marius* 23.1 (quoted under Νέμεσις).

Αὐτομάτως (ἀπ' αὐτομάτου, ταὐτομάτον): 'spontaneously', 'by chance' often with τύχη (in a casual sense);

Without providential significance (e.g., *Cat. Min.* 19.3, *Caes.* 66.1, *de fort.* 99d, *de Alex. Mag. fort. aut virt.* II 335e), except at *de fort. Rom.* 324d and possibly at *Tim.* 12.9 (cf. 36.6).

'Ο Δαίμων (οἱ δαίμονες): 1. '(lesser) god', 'divine spirit'; 2. 'genius'; see Introduction on the easy interchange between this word and τύχη (*Ant.* 32.2–3 is a good example in Plutarch);

1. Standing loosely for θεός: *Caes.* 66.1, *Galba* 14.2, *Ag./Cleom.* 43.7, *Dion* 4.4; cf. below on θεός.

   In the *Moralia* δαίμων as an independent force is rarely used for θεός (cf. *de tranq. an.* 471d with τύχη), but is properly a demi-god or a mortal soul which attains to the pure state (cf. also *Rom.* 28.10) and may act as God's agent. Plutarch almost certainly did not believe in the existence of evil δαίμονες interfering independently or on behalf of providence (cf. *de Stoic. repug.* 1051b–d), though these do appear for dramatic reasons (e.g., *Dion* 2.4; cf. n. 5 above) or in popular speech (cf. *de tranq. an.* 471d).

2. *Tim.* 16.11, *Alex.* 50.2, *Caes.* 69.2 (Caesar's avenging genius), *Brut.* 36.7 (Brutus' evil δαίμων), *de fort.* 97d, *de tranq. an.* 470d.

   Note *Alex.* 30.3 "the δαίμων of the Persians," where Hamilton (n. 35 above) 78, observes the notion of a national δαίμων is rare (he compares *de fort. Rom.* 324b)—there may be some attempt to catch an oriental way of expression (cf. *Them.* 29.2, *Artox.* 15.7, *Luc.* 27.6 for the δαίμων of Persian and Armenian kings; see Brenk [n. 1 above] 151).

   There is nothing to suggest that Plutarch actually believed in personal δαίμονες (n. 5 above).

Τὸ Δαιμόνιον: 1. 'the divine power'; 2. 'a divine spirit' (= δαίμων);

1. A general term for providence (*de sera num. vind.* 548c); it opposes the superstitious man (*de superstit.* 168d), approves actions (*Sulla* 14.12), indicates what will happen (*Cic.* 14.4, *Dion* 2.3), or what should (*Nic.* 13.6).
2. This meaning is rare—*Dion* 2.6, *de def. orac.* 418d, 420e (all plural).

Δίκη: 1. 'Justice'; 2. '(divine) justice';

1. An ancient personification (cf. Vernière [n. 5 above] 236, on parallels): cf. *ad princ. indoctr.* 781b.
2. Used infrequently to signify punishment by God: *Tim.* 30.9, *Dem.* 31.4 (almost an avenging genius), *de sera num. vind.* 551e.

Ἔδει (δεόμενα): it was necessary;

The meaning of ἔδει is certainly teleological at *Ant.* 56.6, *Pomp.* 75.5, and *Phil.* 17.2 (where it stands with τύχη); Comparable is *Dion-Brut. synk.* 2.2: δεομένοις ... τοῖς πράγμασι ... τοῦ δαίμονος. Cf. also ἔμελλε at Dion 27.1.

Ἡ Εἱμαρμένη (τὸ εἱμαρμένον): 'fate', 'destiny';

This is not common in the *Lives* or the *Moralia*: *Brut.* 31.7, *Pyr.* 16.14, *quaest. con.* 9.5, 740d, *de Stoic. repug.* 1055d.

Εὐποτμία: 'good fortune';

This is not a common term (occurring only in the *Lives;* εὔποτμος occurs very rarely in the *Moralia*), and is mostly without any providential significance: *Arist.* 24.2.

It would seem to allude to more than material fortune at *Aem.* 1.8 where it is used of Timoleon (and Aemilius).

Εὐτυχία: 'good fortune';

Mostly without providential significance, but at *Nic.-Crass. synk.* 5.2 (the national fortune of the Romans) and *Tim.* 19.1 (Timoleon's extraordinary fortune) we are not dealing with mere luck.

Τὸ θεῖον (τὰ θεῖα): 'the divine power';

In the *Lives*: *Fab.* 18.2, *Demetr.* 12.3, *Coriol.* 32.8. More usual in the *Moralia*: *de def. orac.* 426d, *de gen. Socr.* 593d.

Ὁ θεός (οἱ θεοί): 'God';

This is the commonest term in the *Moralia* for the suprahuman agency. It is less common in the *Lives*—it is used in passages of a teleological or philosophical nature such as *Brut.* 47.7, *Phoc.* 2.9, and also in fairly ordinary ways (*Sulla* 27.6). It is used occasionally with δαίμων (*Fab.* 17.1, *de aud. poet.* 16d), or with τύχη (*Nic.* 17.4).

Νέμεσις: 'nemesis', 'retribution';

This is often a figure of speech (*Phil.* 18.3, *Pomp.* 38.1), but there is a providential sense to the cognate verb at *ad princ. indoct.* 780f and the noun may be invested with some power at *Marius* 23.1 as the force which vitiates men's plans (ἡ τύχη τις ἢ νέμεσις ἢ πραγμάτων ἀναγκαία φύσις).

Παραλόγως (παράλογος): 'unaccountable';
Rarely used of unexpected and significant events: *Tim.* 19.6, *Dion* 26.7 (τύχη παράλογος).

Τὸ Πεπρωμένον (πέπρωται): 'fate', 'destiny';
Used rarely: *Caes.* 63.1, *Brut.* 6.5, *Nic.* 9.8.

Πρόνοια: 'providence';
This is common in the *Moralia,* but occurs in the *Lives* in this meaning only at *Pomp.* 75.4–5 (Pompey's words to the Peripatetic, Cratippus; cf. also in Plutarch's humorous remarks against the Epicureans at *Ser.* 1.3), probably because it sounded too technical and dry.

Σύμπτωμα: 'event', 'happening';
A very general term with Stoic colouring, not necessarily indicating things outside human control: *Otho* 4.10, *de com. not. ad. Stoic.* 1072c.

Τύχη: 1. 'chance'; 2. 'fortune(-s)' (general situation); 3. 'fortune' (as a power), 'providence'; 4. 'genius';

1. In Plutarch's philosophical works this is the only meaning (along with συντυχία); the meaning is often made plain by phrases like ἀπὸ τύχης, διὰ τύχην, etc. (see Lassel [n. 1 above] 38–39) or is reinforced by another term such as αὐτόματον (e.g., *de Pyth. orac.* 398b, *adv. Col.* 1115b).
   Τύχη alone and in similar phrases and combinations occurs frequently in this meaning in the *Lives* also.
2. A common meaning (cf. εὐτυχία, δυστυχία): e.g., *Per.* 20.3.
   The plural seems to mean 'bad fortune': *Pomp.* 11.4 (Carthage), 55.4 (Rome), *Phoc.* 1.4 (Greece), *Flam.* 21.12 (Marius).
3. In the *Lives* Plutarch is not principally concerned by philosophical exactitude and so τύχη may be set up as a power (note that it is never a goddess except in *de fort. Rom.*). It is often the force men have to face and which opposes their ἀρετή (e.g., *Phoc.* 1.6, 3.4). It is clearly the course of providence at *Rom.* 8.9, *Tim.* 16.10, *Phil.* 17.2 et al.; note *Dem.* 19.1 (δαιμόνιος; cf. Brenk [n. 1 above] 169, n. 23), *Marc.* 3.2 (ἀγαθή), *Dion* 26.7 (παράλογος), *Luc.* 19.6 (θεία).
4. This is not common: *Caes.* 57.1, *Demetr.* 50.1. Like δαίμων it may be used of states: *Pyr.* 29.11 (ἀγαθὴ τύχη of Sparta), *Alex.* 30.8 (Persians).

Τυχηρά: 'coincidences', 'chance happenings';
Not common in the *Lives: Dem.* 3.3.

Commoner in the *Moralia: de fort.* 100a, *de virt. mor.* 444a, *de tranq. an.* 477a.

Τὸ Χρεών: 'necessity';

Very rare: *Demetr.* 4.4.

Χρόνος: 'time';

Rarely used in a providential sense: *de fort. Rom.* 316f (μετὰ θεοῦ), *de Pyth. orac.* 398e.