σκυτάλη when he was there ἰδίᾳ (Thuc. i 128.3 and 131.2), and was an eminent Spartiate able to send off messengers on private business in this carefully controlled state (Thuc. i 132.5)? So it is probably idle to ask what an Argilian was doing in Sparta, and for some time at that, having been Pausanias' boy-friend. According to Gomme ad loc. the Argilian 'was a slave, as can be seen from Pausanias' promise not to punish him', but in that case why did he run off to Taenarum risking the wrath to come and not quietly make his way to Argilos? If we amended 'Αργίλιος to Αἰγίλιος, some sense would enter the story, for there was a locality of Laconia called Αἴγιλα (Paus. iv 17.1). However, Nepos *Paus.* 4.1 has 'Argilius', and evidently drew his account from Thucydides (who presumably would not have been as precise about the origins of a perioec or a slave).

28. Some have taken refuge in the statement of Justin ix 1.3 (that Pausanias occupied Byzantium *per septem annos*) to bridge the gap between his return to the Hellespont in 477 and the fall of Themistocles. But, as J. Wolski, *EOS*, 49, 1954, p. 78f. pointed out, the Ephorus papyrus (*F.G.H.* 70, F191) suggests that Pausanias was no longer in control of Byzantium when Cimon sailed out to the siege of Eion. (*Pace* Lippold, art. cit. and Fornara, art. cit.) One may add that, if Pausanias had been so long in Byzantium, he would in all likelihood have used its strategic position to some purpose, and there is nothing to suggest that he did. Either Justin was misled or the text is corrupt.
29. Forrest, art. cit., p. 237, who thinks that Pausanias probably died about 474/3. But what, on this hypothesis, was he doing between 477 and then? If Thucydides' narrative conceals that gap, there is no great difficulty in supposing that the gap was a bit longer and that Pausanias died in 471. Cf. Lippold, art. cit., p. 328, n. 33.
30. Cf. Ar. *Pol.* 1307 A3f.
31. Plato *Laws* 692 D and 698 E provide the date for this revolt. There is no reason for placing it in 491.
32. References are collected by R. F. Willetts, *C.P.* XLIX, 1954, p. 27.
33. According to J. Wolski, art. cit., p. 88 f., Pausanias went with official support, barely ἰδίᾳ. But, despite the σκυτάλη (Thuc. i 130) which might argue public business (but which Pausanias may have carried as regent), this does too great violence to Thucydides. Gomme is not, however, convincing in arguing (ad i 128.3) that the 'Ελληνικὸς πόλεμος was the war against Persia.

ΔΙΚΗ IN ARISTOPHANES' CLOUDS[1]

W. F. Richardson

The theme[2] of *Clouds* is the conflict between science and religion. The play portrays vividly this conflict in the experience of one Strepsiades, a man of conventional piety who for the first time in his life encounters scientific views of the universe. His story, as he moves through temptation, sin and repentance, is the plot of the play. We must first trace this plot in some detail, after which we can proceed to examine the position of the moral law (δίκη) in the play.

I. *Plot*

The character of Strepsiades as presented in the opening scenes of the play affords a fairly obvious portrait of conventional piety. He has a certain belief in the gods, with Zeus at their head. When his belief in Zeus is challenged, he will make some sort of a fight for it (367 ff.). The gods are useful to swear by (1, 246), and before embarking on a new project he will pray to them for success (127). But apart from this his religion has no influence whatever on his way of life.

Temptation and Sin

To this man of conventional piety comes temptation through money. He is plagued with debts which his son has incurred, and his creditors are becoming urgent for payment (13 ff.). As the play opens he has been pondering in the night on his position. A man of stronger piety than Strepsiades might have been pondering on ways of paying his debts; Strepsiades has been pondering on how to avoid paying them, and has concocted a fraudulent scheme that will achieve this end.

His scheme is thoroughly dishonest and amounts to simple theft (the verb ἀποστερεῖν will be applied to it at 1305 and 1464, cf. 487). Yet throughout most of the play he feels no qualm of conscience about it, even when, faced with Pheidippides' refusal of co-operation, he himself sets it in motion by presenting himself for instruction at Socrates' Thought-Factory. Near the end of the play (1463-4) he will discover that his action in conceiving this scheme and setting it in motion is the basic sin from which all his troubles are derived.

As a direct result of his attendance at the Thought-Factory he is assailed by a further temptation and falls into a further sin. This time the temptation comes to him through the person of Socrates, who commences his education by introducing him to scientific views of the universe. The result is that Strepsiades is tempted to abandon even such slender religious beliefs as he has. The process is made quite explicit as the play unfolds.

Strepsiades broaches the subject quite accidentally when he swears 'by the gods' to pay Socrates any fee he may ask (245-6). Socrates pounces immediately on this (247-8): 'This is your first lesson (πρῶτον): the traditional gods are no longer current coin with us.' He then introduces the clouds as the only gods[3] whom the scientists now recognize.

'The Greeks did not worship them [i.e. the clouds] as deities, but regarded them simply as part of the mechanism by which Zeus sends rain' (K. J. Dover, *Aristophanes*: *Clouds*, p. lxviii). Their symbolic value here is thus obvious: they symbolize the replacement of the traditional gods with Zeus at their head by the natural phenomena studied by science. The old religion has been done away with; science now reigns in its stead.

In the lengthy passage which follows (365-426), Socrates is concerned with one thing: to break down Strepsiades' belief in Zeus.[4] He attacks this belief by giving scientific explanations, based on the agency of the clouds, for phenomena which Strepsiades had been accustomed to ascribe to the action of Zeus. Strepsiades puts up a fight for his religious belief in Zeus (368, 374, 379, 397); but the temptation to abandon it is overwhelming and he eventually falls. In 423-6, at Socrates' prompting, he vows that in future he will have nothing to do with the traditional gods. This rejection of the traditional religion with Zeus at its head is the climax to which the whole first section of the play has been leading up.

The next stage in Strepsiades' career begins when Socrates discovers that he is unteachable and expels him from the Thought-Factory. Turning to the clouds, Strepsiades asks them what he should do, and they advise him to send his son to be taught in his place (794-6). The fact that this advice comes from the clouds will be picked up at a key passage later in the play (1452-61).

In the scene that follows Strepsiades takes over Socrates' position as tempter: having been led astray himself he proceeds to lead others astray. In the dialogue that follows, as he tries to persuade Pheidippides to take his place, his new-found scientific beliefs are stated firmly and unequivocally, though not without humour (e.g. 825-8). But it is only by dint of a strongly emotional appeal (861-4) that Strepsiades finally persuades his son to go to the school and hence, by implication, to reject Zeus in favour of science (for he well knows that this is the first lesson his son will have to learn, cf. 247). At this point Aristophanes puts a significant comment into Pheidippides' mouth (865): 'You'll regret this some day.' This is strictly accurate. By his conversion[5] of Pheidippides Strepsiades has set in train the events which will lead to his own punishment.

The culminating sin in this catalogue of evil is ὕβρις, which is the keynote of Strepsiades' two scenes with his creditors.[6] The point of these scenes is the high-handed arrogance with which Strepsiades, freed from the restraint of a belief in Zeus and relying on his son's new-found skill to get him unscathed out of any resultant lawsuit,[7] sees fit to conduct himself (1239-41):

Πα. οὔ τοι μὰ τὸν Δία τὸν μέγαν καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς
ἐμοῦ καταπροίξει. Στ. Θαυμασίως ἥσθην θεοῖς,
καὶ Ζεὺς γέλοιος ὀμνύμενος τοῖς εἰδόσιν.

No tragic hero ever made a more hybristic remark than that; and there can be little doubt that, when Aristophanes makes Amynias use the very word ὕβρις at 1299, he intends it to be understood, not merely as 'assault', but also in the technical sense of tragedy. The vengeance of heaven follows immediately and inevitably.

Punishment

Strepsiades' punishment is achieved through the indirect agency of Pheidippides. This is the reason why it had to be he and not Strepsiades who succeeded in learning all Socrates' lessons at the Thought-Factory.[8] Had Strepsiades succeeded in learning them he would have become invulnerable to punishment, capable of arguing his way unscathed out of any situation. As it is he finds himself, as a result of his sins, at the mercy of a son who not only proceeds to beat his father but proves that he is right to do so. All this is foreshadowed in the short chorus which precedes this scene (1303-20): the chorus are beginning to come out in their true colours, which will be so tellingly revealed later in the play (1458 ff.).

The punishment for Strepsiades' ὕβρις is a belabouring about the head and jaw (1324), for this is comedy, not tragedy, and it would be out of place for the vengeance of heaven to take any severer form. Yet those hard knocks are sufficient to clear Strepsiades' head, and at the end of his *agon* with Pheidippides (1351 ff.) he is beginning to see things in their proper light again. As Pheidippides offers to prove that he is entitled to beat, not only his father, but also his mother, Strepsiades realizes for the first time since the play began that this sort of attitude, which might have been his own if he had gone on with Socrates' course, is evil (κακόν: 1444). Only a few lines ago he was still prepared to acquiesce and to admit that Pheidippides was right to beat him (1437-9); now he sees that to beat one's father is evil and to beat one's mother an even worse evil (1444), which can only lead its perpetrator to complete and utter ruin (1447-51). He has, in other words, turned his back on the teachings which Pheidippides now embodies; and his repentance begins at this point.

Repentance

Strepsiades' repentance involves reaching the realization that he is himself responsible for his present position and that the blame for it lies squarely on his own shoulders. The stages by which his arrogance in the creditor scenes is broken down to this humble acceptance of blame are clearly portrayed. At first he blames the clouds (1452-3), but they, with great emphasis, put him right 1454-5):

> Χο. αὐτὸς μὲν οὖν σαυτῷ σὺ τούτων αἴτιος . . .

This reply puzzles him. He had looked upon the clouds as his friends and mentors; why, then, did they keep egging him on to his doom (1456-7)? The explanation is rapidly forthcoming (1458-61):

> Χο. ἡμεῖς ποιοῦμεν ταῦθ' ἑκάστοθ' ὅταν τινὰ
> γνῶμεν πονηρῶν ὄντ' ἐραστὴν πραγμάτων,
> ἕως ἂν αὐτὸν ἐμβάλωμεν ἐς κακόν,
> ὅπως ἂν εἰδῇ τοὺς θεοὺς δεδοικέναι.

One can hardly overestimate the effect of this speech on Strepsiades at this time. He had put his whole trust in the clouds. At their behest he had solemnly forsworn, and later mocked at, the traditional gods. The phenomena of science were his new gods. With science on his side Zeus and the other gods were quite unnecessary.

Yet already, as a result of Pheidippides' treatment of him, he had begun to wonder, even to doubt. The consequences in the ethical sphere of these anti-Zeus views seemed all wrong (1444, 1447-51). What had happened? Now of a sudden the veil is viciously ripped aside and the true situation revealed. All along he has been deluded.[9] Science, the erstwhile god, is shown to be nothing but a servant of the gods, a servant whose function is to test the faith of men on earth.

In a flash Strepsiades' ideas are reorientated. He had been puzzled that things seemed to be going wrong; now, from his new viewpoint, everything appears in correct perspective. His punishment may be severe, but he has deserved it (1462). The fault is entirely his own; he has no-one but himself to blame. The whole sorry process has its origin in his totally immoral desire to cheat his creditors out of their money, and for this desire and the plan which he evolved in pursuit of it he himself bears the sole responsibility (1463-4):

> Στ. οὐ γάρ μ' ἐχρῆν τὰ χρήμαθ' ἁδανεισάμην
> ἀποστερεῖν.

At this point his repentance is complete.

Atonement

The desire to make what amends one can for one's sin is an essential concomitant to repentance. The basic responsibility for what happened must lie with Strepsiades himself, as he has now recognized. But Socrates and his school have treacherously played upon his weakness; instead of helping him back to moral sanity they led him on with their pernicious doctrines (223-456) until he found himself floundering in his present morass. But for them he might have seen the danger in time and avoided all this trouble. They are a positive danger to society! Here, then, is one way in which he can seek to make amends. In 1464-6 he invites Pheidippides to join him in destroying Socrates and his chief henchman. The idea is frustrated by Pheidippides' refusal to co-operate; but in the dialogue which follows the invitation the depth of Strepsiades' penitence is made very clear (1464-77).

The final scene of the play shows the final vindication of the gods. Strepsiades, who had previously been prepared to assert dogmatically that there were no gods, now bends humbly to the statue of

Hermes, asks for pardon (1479-80), and seeks the god's advice. How is he to make atonement? The god's answer is soon forthcoming. He is to strike at the root of the trouble by burning down the Thought-Factory (1484). And so Socrates and Chaerephon are punished for their ὕβρις (1506), just as Strepsiades was before. We thus observe a double (chiastic) parallelism in the plot, whereby Strepsiades is tempted by Socrates, then Pheidippides by Strepsiades, and at the end Strepsiades is punished by Pheidippides and Socrates by Strepsiades. Of the three, only Strepsiades repents; and his repentance results in the removal from society of the taint represented by the Thought-Factory. And thus for Zeus, the clouds and the Athenian state as a whole all ends happily.

II. Δίκη

In presenting in this play the conflict between science and religion Aristophanes is concerned, not with the problem in general, but with one particular aspect of it. If the scientists are allowed to do away with Zeus and the other gods altogether, what will be the effect on human life in the field of morality? In answering this question Aristophanes starts from a view of the moral law which is firmly Aeschylean. The following quotation from Denniston and Page's edition of *Agamemnon* (note on 184 ff.) puts the matter in a nutshell (my italics): 'Aeschylus tells us that Justice is not man-made: *it is a rule for life on earth imposed by Zeus*. If you break his law, he will teach you to mend your ways by inflicting punishment; you will learn perforce not to ignore the divine origin and sanction of the rules of conduct which govern civilised society.'

This is precisely the background which Aristophanes assumes for *Clouds*. Its connection with the plot as set out above, and especially with 1458-61, is obvious.

The rule for life on earth imposed by Zeus is δίκη; and δίκη is the key idea in the understanding of *Clouds*. That Aristophanes is accepting the Aeschylean view of the transcendence of δίκη is seen from the following lines (902-3):

Αδ. οὐδὲ γὰρ εἶναι πάνυ φημὶ δίκην.
Δι. οὐκ εἶναι φῄς; Αδ. φέρε γὰρ ποῦ 'στιν;
Δι. παρὰ τοῖσι θεοῖς.

Hence δίκη in *Clouds* is the transcendent standard, or set of rules, by which any man's conduct can be judged as moral or immoral. Conduct which obeys the rules is moral (δίκαιος = in accordance with δίκη) and conduct which disobeys them is immoral (ἄδικος = not in accordance with δίκη). It is the gods, and Zeus in particular, who impose these rules: morality depends on the traditional religion. Reject Zeus, as the natural scientists are trying to do, and this morality must automatically go as well, for then the absolute standard is gone. Then the sole rule for life on earth will be the expediency of the individual: 'every man for himself'. The danger inherent in this situation is the main point which Aristophanes is endeavouring to make in this play. We proceed to examine his development of this idea by following through the occurrences of δίκη and its cognates in the light of the plot.

Setting the Stage

The first occurrence of the root is at 25. Though this is merely an aside thrown out by the dreaming Pheidippides, it illustrates exactly the view of δίκη set out above. Pheidippides is dreaming that he is taking part in a chariot race, the rules of which require that each competitor keep in his own lane. But one of his rivals has left his own lane and is trying to crowd Pheidippides off the course. And so Pheidippides shouts ἀδικεῖς: 'You're breaking the rules!' This use of ἀδικεῖν recurs at 497, 1080 and 1175.

The first important passage comes when Strepsiades, having conceived his brilliantly clever scheme (76) for getting rid of the burden of his debts, wakes Pheidippides up to tell him about it. He shows Pheidippides the Thought-Factory and tells him about the men in it (98-9):

Στ. οὗτοι διδάσκουσ', ἀργύριον ἤν τις διδῷ,
λέγοντα νικᾶν καὶ δίκαια κἄδικα.

A few lines further on he amplifies their claims (112-5):

Στ. εἶναι παρ' αὐτοῖς φασιν ἄμφω τὼ λόγω,
τὸν κρείττον', ὅστις ἐστί, καὶ τὸν ἥττονα.
τούτοιν τὸν ἕτερον τοῖν λόγοιν, τὸν ἥττονα,
νικᾶν λέγοντά φασι τἀδικώτερα.

These two passages must claim our attention at greater length, for much that follows is dependent on them.

It has long been realized that the background to exegesis here is the dictum of Protagoras τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν. Protagoras taught that on any matter two opposing statements (λόγοι) could be made, representing two opposite points of view. To a normal person under normal circumstances one of these would appear self-evidently correct: this is the stronger (κρείττων). The other, which a normal person considering the two would reject as obviously false, is the weaker (ἥττων). But, said Protagoras, a skilled arguer could take the weaker position and, by manipulating his arguments, convince his hearers of its rightness, i.e. could cause it to become the stronger position (τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν).

Now, it is these two statements of two opposite points of view which, as personified by Aristophanes, are said (112-3) to dwell in the Thought-Factory. Individually each is nothing more than a neutral statement of an attitude; but if they are brought together there is an immediate conflict between them and they dwell in a constant state of bickering (as Aristophanes will illustrate later in the play). Each of them will then strive to prove superior to the other and to convince hearers of the rightness of his own viewpoint; and so the λόγοι become, not mere statements, but statements with a persuasive purpose, i.e. arguments.[10] Likewise λέγειν means 'to state (neutrally) one's point of view'; but in a context of debate, where the purpose of this activity is to induce others to accept one's point of view (νικᾶν or πείθειν), it means 'to state one's point of view with a persuasive purpose', i.e. 'to argue'.

Aristophanes has complicated this situation by making a moral judgment upon it. For him, a way of arguing (λόγος) which shows the superiority of the stronger position is δίκαιος (= in accordance with δίκη), and one which shows the weaker position as superior is ἄδικος (= not in accordance with δίκη). Thus victory in debate is Right or Wrong according as the type of arguing used is δίκαιος or ἄδικος; and this is the meaning of 99, in which the words δίκαια κἄδικα should be taken ἀπὸ κοινοῦ with both λέγοντα and νικᾶν.

In debate, the κρείττων λόγος becomes a δίκαιος λόγος, and the ἥττων λόγος an ἄδικος λόγος. For, if the rules are obeyed (if Right be done) the stronger position will by definition be victorious in debate, so that naturally he will argue in accordance with Right (δίκαια λέγειν). The only chance of the weaker position is to disobey the rules and become an ἄδικος λόγος. Apparently the stronger position has no come-back if the weaker position adopts these tactics; as far as this play is concerned, arguing in a way contrary to Right always wins the victory. Granted that this is so,[11] the threat to δίκη is obvious; and it is with this that Aristophanes is concerned.

We must now return to the specific case of Strepsiades. In the two passages under discussion he is simply repeating what others have told him: he is not concerned to make on his own account moral judgments on the types of arguing involved. As a man of very little religion he has very little sense of δίκη either. It is immaterial to him whether these ways of arguing are in accordance with δίκη or not; he is concerned purely with his debts.

Now, concerning justly and legally incurred debts two opposing statements might be made: (a) that they should be paid back, and (b) that they should not. Of these the first is the κρείττων and the second the ἥττων λόγος. But according to Protagoras a skilful arguer could take position (b) and argue for it in such a way as to convince hearers of its rightness. This is the essence of Strepsiades' brilliantly clever scheme; for if the rightness of position (b) can be convincingly established, he will not have to pay his debts. Somewhere he has heard this type of arguing described as 'immoral' (cf. 115), but this has no influence on him. On the contrary, his whole scheme depends on learning this system, and he has no interest whatever in the other, 'moral', type (116-8, cf. 245, 657, 885).[12] Hence from the outset his whole enterprise is branded as morally wrong. Not to pay back one's debts is 'immoral'; and to learn a type of arguing which will enable one to achieve this end is 'immoral' as well. This, as we have already seen, is Strepsiades' basic sin to which he ultimately owes his punishment.

In the opening scene, then, Aristophanes has laid his foundations for the lesson he wishes to draw. The audience are assumed to be familiar with Protagoras' systems of arguing. Aristophanes sets before them a man who, though not a villain in the deep-dyed sense, is proposing to use one of these systems for a purpose which they would recognize as wholly immoral. The plot is thus nicely launched. Will Strepsiades be successful? Or will δίκη triumph?

The Interview with Socrates

Pheidippides having refused to have any part in the scheme, Strepsiades himself goes to the Thought-Factory and explains his wants to Socrates. He is not interested in arguing in accordance with the rules; it is τὸν ἕτερον λόγον, the 'immoral' type of arguing, that he is after (244-5). When he swears by the gods to give Socrates any fee he may exact, Socrates replies with a most important line and a half (247-8) which must again engage our attention (cf. p. 60).

The word πρῶτον (247) is important. The sentence which it introduces is Strepsiades' first lesson, and a moment's thought shows why this is so. It is basic to the whole position ascribed to Socrates in this play. So long as the traditional gods, with Zeus at their head, remain, the δίκη administered by Zeus will also remain and there will be a moral stigma against the type of arguing which Strepsiades wishes to learn which will inhibit its use: a person with moral scruples will not only never be able to use it but will not even be able to learn it properly. But if one can get rid of Zeus, then this transcendent moral law will cease to exist, the moral stigma on sophistic argument will be gone, and one will be left with two ways of arguing and nothing more. Each individual will then have a simple choice, uninhibited by any moral considerations, between the two in any given situation, and can freely choose whichever is most beneficial to himself at the time. Later in the play Aristophanes will demonstrate the type of situation this could lead to.

Aristophanes sees the natural science which has, to its own satisfaction, got rid of Zeus, as the source of this amorality. From their own point of view the sophists are not immoral but amoral: there is no δίκη, just as there is no Zeus, and hence they can feel free to argue in any way they like. But a man in whom any vestige of belief in Zeus remains will not be so free; and hence the non-existence of Zeus is the first lesson that must be learned in the sophistic training. Only when this moral freedom is obtained can the other studies follow. This is the reason why the non-existence of Zeus[13] is laboured at such length through the scientific arguing that takes place before and after the arrival of the clouds.[14] It is the reason why 423-6, where Strepsiades finally renounces entirely his belief in Zeus and the traditional gods,[15] are to be viewed as the climax of this early portion of the play: they make the rest of the play possible, and the action after the *parabasis* depends on them. And lastly it is the reason why the clouds, after Strepsiades has made this affirmation (and not before), are able to promise him that he will get what he wants (431).

Up to the point where the *parabasis* begins, then, δίκη is definitely coming off second best. Strepsiades' scheme, on the other hand, is proceeding smoothly.

The Contest between the two λόγοι

After the *parabasis* Strepsiades' scheme strikes an unexpected snag (we have already seen why the exigencies of the plot made this necessary: p. 61): although the required basis (rejection of Zeus) has been laid, he simply is not sufficiently intelligent to learn the lessons required of him. He therefore persuades Pheidippides to go in his stead. At this point the two λόγοι are brought on to fight it out between themselves, ostensibly so that Pheidippides can choose between them, but really to give Aristophanes an opportunity of expanding on his idea of δίκη and his attitude to it in this play.

The two λόγοι are statements of two opposing views on life. One of them accepts a transcendent standard of morality: this is the κρείττων λόγος. The other rejects it (ἥττων λόγος).[16] In this scene they are brought together, and tension and bickering immediately results. The bickering is channelled by the chorus into a set debate.

Once the debate begins, the λόγοι become λόγοι in the other sense, as each seeks to put his viewpoint forward in a persuasive manner. The rules of the debate are set out in 935-8. The κρείττων λόγος, as always, will abide by the rules, and in debate becomes a δίκαιος λόγος; but the ἥττων λόγος, eager as always for victory, must become an ἄδικος λόγος. Hence he does not abide by the rules of the debate, but indulges his talent for making the worse appear the better cause and, inevitably, wins.

The two outlooks on the world embodied in the two λόγοι are the result of training and education in childhood. That is why the basic topic of debate in this contest is the difference between two systems of education: the old (producing δίκαιοι, people who recognize the existence of δίκη) and the new (producing ἄδικοι, who do not recognize the existence of δίκη). The basic question to be set before Pheidippides (and the audience) is: 'Here are two systems of education, producing two different sets of results. Which do you prefer?'

The κρείττων λόγος speaks first, and gives an idea of the sort of training he used to make his pupils undergo when there was no competition from other systems. It is a training which has as its end the instilling of σωφροσύνη (962), 'self-control'. The children were taught about the moral law (τὰ δίκαια λέγων: 962) and, knowing its demands, trained themselves to control their desires and passions so as to keep within it; i.e. they were taught to obey the rules, and that not only in moral matters but also in others such as music (969-71). This system achieved results: the men who fought at Marathon were its products (985-6). If Pheidippides would like to be fit and healthy in every respect, as they were, then let him, too, choose this system! So, in outline, runs the argument (961-1023).

It is then the turn of the ἥττων λόγος (1036-1104). He makes it very clear from the outset that he is not going to obey the rules in this debate. Not for him a systematic account of the type of training he represents; instead he intends simply, by clever conceits, to score points off his rival's argument and so throw it into confusion. Already before the debate he had given notice of his intention to do this (942-4), and at the beginning of his speech-in-reply he states the same intention (1036-7). His whole speech, he goes on to point out, will be an illustration of the benefits which his type of training will bring, and which are worth so much to him (1038-43).

After a preliminary skirmish about hot baths (1045-54) he comes to the real core of the system advocated by the κρείττων λόγος, the self-control (τὸ σωφρονεῖν: 1060) which it inculcates as its principal virtue. Lines 1061-2 are the key to his approach:

Αδ. ἐπεὶ σὺ διὰ τὸ σωφρονεῖν τῷ πώποτ' εἶδες ἤδη
ἀγαθόν τι γενόμενον, φράσον, καί μ' ἐξέλεγξον εἰπών.

He goes on to show that self-control (a) never did anybody any good, and (b) is actually disadvantageous, because it forces people to miss pleasures to which they are by nature entitled. Furthermore, he says, self-control is in any case pointless. Nothing that you do can conflict with the moral law (δίκη) for (as he has already insisted: 902) there is no such law. Hence, if you indulge your desires so freely as to break the civil law and get hauled before the court as a result, you can defend yourself on the grounds that you have not broken any moral rules (ὡς οὐδὲν ἠδίκηκας: 1080); for your actions have been in acordance with personal expediency, and that is the only moral law you recognize. And (this with much irony) you can prove your point by observing that Zeus himself[17] acts likewise (1080-2; cf. 904-6). In brief, then, his offer to Pheidippides is freedom to break the moral law with a clear conscience (because there is no moral law) and to break the civil law with impunity (because he will invariably be able to argue his way out of any trouble). The result is moral anarchy; and this is precisely the point which Aristophanes is driving at. The next scenes of the play will show this moral anarchy in action.

In the last lines of the contest we see foreshadowed another point which Aristophanes will be making later in the play. The menace of this approach to the moral law is not static, but presents an urgent and ever-increasing problem. Leave it alone for too long and the old values will all have been irretrievably swallowed up in this anarchy, just as the κρείττων λόγος here expresses himself convinced by the arguments of the ἥττων λόγος and ends by joining him.

Moral Anarchy in Action

The two scenes with Strepsiades' creditors are a fairly obvious illustration of this moral anarchy in action. Δίκη here reaches its lowest point as Strepsiades' personal expediency reigns supreme. He goes to the ultimate length of breaking an oath sworn to the gods (1227) and, not content with that, mocks at the gods as well. It is a picture of a man acting with a complete lack of moral principle. It is a perfect example of ὕβρις.

Yet the audience might well be expected to feel a certain sympathy with Strepsiades at this point. He has succeeded in sending his creditors away with a flea in their ear; would that they could do the same! Perhaps there is something in this sophistic education after all! The possibility of this attitude must be firmly suppressed if the play is to have the effect its author intends; and the suppression is carried out (a) by the punishment of Strepsiades which immediately follows, and (b) by the far more terrible activities of Pheidippides, which are intended to produce an immediate revulsion of feeling.

The scene in which Strepsiades is beaten up by Pheidippides introduces a sort of second *agon*. The key lines here are 1331-3:

Στ. τὸν πατέρα τύπτεις; Φε. κἀποφανῶ γε νὴ Δία
ὡς ἐν δίκῃ σ' ἔτυπτον. Στ. ὦ μιαρώτατε,
καὶ πῶς γένοιτ' ἂν πατέρα τύπτειν ἐν δίκῃ;

Δίκη here is used in two different senses, and the answer to Strepsiades' question depends entirely on which sort of δίκη is meant. Strepsiades uses it in the sense of a transcendent moral law; at long last he is beginning to realize (if only momentarily) that such a thing does exist. He is helped to this conclusion by simple ideas of self-preservation: for one of the transcendent moral laws requires reverence and respect for one's parents. For Pheidippides, on the other hand, such δίκη does not exist. His moral standard now is simply that of personal expediency, and he thinks of justice in the weakened sense of what we would describe as 'only fair'. He will proceed to prove in the *agon* that follows that it is 'only fair' that he should beat Strepsiades (1338-43); no amount of logic could ever prove that father-beating was just in the transcendental sense.

Just before the *agon* begins, Strepsiades confesses to a certain gloomy curiosity (1344):

Στ. καὶ μὴν ὅ τι καὶ λέξεις ἀκοῦσαι βούλομαι.

But more than just gloomy curiosity is involved; for in fact a great deal hinges on what Pheidippides says. If he does not manage to give a convincing proof of his thesis, then that is the end of the matter; but if he does manage it the consequences for Strepsiades and for Athens in general will be very far-reaching. It will mean that Strepsiades can look forward to many years of punishment at his son's hand whenever he does something of which his son disapproves. It will mean that morality in the best sense of Athens' past years must go by the board and must be replaced by a debased type of justice founded on the principle of 'every man for himself'. This is, in fact, a test case; and if Pheidippides wins it then something will have to be done, or the outlook is bleak indeed.

In the *agon* Strepsiades has the stronger position, arguing that children should reverence and respect their parents. He puts his case as strongly as he can, pointing out the basis of gratitude for services rendered on which this respect should rest (1380-5). Pheidippides, in his defence, argues the weaker position. His main point, as we now expect, is 'fairness'. Strepsiades beat him when he was a boy; it is therefore 'only fair' that he should now beat Strepsiades. He uses δίκαιον in this sense of 'only fair' at 1405 and 1411; and he so succeeds in persuading Strepsiades of the rightness of his viewpoint that Strepsiades uses it in the same sense at 1437 and 1439. Strepsiades has lost that momentary vision which he had of that transcendental δίκη which would not allow all this to happen. Pheidippides has won.

His victory means that nothing in the moral sphere is now outlawed. Theft, murder, adultery, all can be justified quite as readily as Pheidippides has justified his treatment of his father. An audience which could look with an indulgent and sympathetic eye on a man who rid himself of his debts in this way cannot but be appalled when they consider the result of taking this type of approach to its logical conclusion. Yet the position seems hopeless. How has all this come about? What can be done to repair the damage? Strepsiades' repentance provides the answer. The old religion, with Zeus and a transcendent δίκη, takes care of all such matters. Hence in this moral crisis the claims of the old religion must be reasserted.

The Final Scene

The claims of the old religion are dramatically reasserted in the final scene of the play. Three things combine to drive the point home: the clouds' revelation of their true identity and function, Strepsiades' repentance, and the burning of the Thought-Factory. There are moral ills in the state, and they are on the increase; but this is how to cure them. Man's safest rule for life lies with the old gods.

III. *Conclusion*

Hence Aristophanes' treatment of the conflict between science and religion is very much on a practical level. The criticism of science is not that it is atheistic, but that it is replacing the traditional gods with unsatisfactory substitutes. The unsatisfactory nature of these substitutes is most clearly to be seen in the field of the moral law; for, unlike Zeus, they impose no δίκη upon the world, and therefore leave man in a state of moral chaos. In such a case man's only moral standard would be his own individual expediency; and if at first sight that might seem to be not such a bad idea, on second thoughts the utter uselessness of such a debased standard of justice and morality becomes apparent. The solution is a reassertion of the claims of the traditional gods, and in particular of the Aeschylean δίκη administered by Zeus.

NOTES

1. Professor Blaiklock, whom we honour in this volume, is widely known for his religious, as well as his classical, writings. In this article, which pursues a religious theme through a famous work of classical antiquity, I seek to pay tribute to both these aspects of his achievement, to which I, in common with many others, am profoundly indebted.
2. I am assuming that our version of the play, which is the author's revision of an earlier version now lost, is sufficiently coherent to have a theme. C. H. Whitman (*Aristophanes and the Comic Hero*, (Harvard, 1964) ch. 4) writes: 'Interpretation of the *Clouds* is seriously hampered by the fact that our version is not the original one', and later: 'The parabasis alone . . . suffices to show that it [i.e. the surviving version] is an ill-adjusted mingling of earlier and later passages . . . . All these facts prompt the serious question of how far it is justifiable to attempt an interpretation of a play which may not, as it was left, represent the poet's wishes in any very clear way.' The interpretation in this article is offered as its own justification.

3. They are δαίμονες at 253, but θεοί at a key passage (423-4).
4. This is the consistency which, *pace* Dover (op. cit. p. xxxv), lies behind Socrates' brand of atheism: the whole point of his gods and divinities is that none of them is Zeus. See also n. 13 below.
5. The main task of conversion will, of course, fall on Socrates (cf. L. Strauss: *Socrates and Aristophanes* (New York, 1966), p. 50). But Strepsiades alone is responsible for getting Pheidippides to the Thought-Factory; and his reason is still the basic one from which all his sins stem, that of wanting to defraud his creditors: 882-5.
6. 'Many commentators have fancied that, in these scenes, we have illustrations of the sophistic art, which Strepsiades had wished—but in vain—to acquire, in order to escape the clutches of his creditors' (W. J. M. Starkie, *The Clouds of Aristophanes* (Macmillan, 1911), p. xx). Starkie goes on to point out, rightly, that 'there could be no greater misconception than this' (loc. cit.). In fact, Strepsiades' pseudo-sophistic language here is quite as ridiculous as it has been earlier; and at the end of the scenes he is quite as much in debt as before, and faces the prospect of legal action, not only for recovery of money, but probably for assault as well.
7. He has said precisely this at 1142-3, cf. 1211, 1228-9.
8. It also provides the explanation of the curious song addressed by the chorus to Socrates at 804-13. Strepsiades has been dismissed from the Thought-Factory; there must be no chance of Pheidippides suffering a similar exclusion, or the clouds' carefully laid scheme (as hinted in 813, they are deceiving Socrates as well as Strepsiades) would fall to the ground. Hence they play upon Socrates' mercenary instincts (as portrayed in this play) by urging him to make as much as possible out of Strepsiades by giving Pheidippides the full treatment.
9. The first hints of this surprise ending were given as far back as 813 (see n. 8 above) and 865.
10. In several places 'ways of arguing' is a closer equivalent. The extension of meaning is very slight.
11. Certainly Aristophanes has taken this for granted; and perhaps we are dealing here with one of those exaggerations which are an integral part of comic technique. It is necessary for the plot and does not affect the theme.
12. This, of course, makes him an unfair representative of Protagoras' teachings, but not of the type of use to which an unscrupulous person might put them.
13. For, if Zeus can be got rid of, it matters not what gods are set up in his place, for they have no δίκη involved with them. See also n. 4 above.

14. The passage dealing with lightning (395-406) is specially important. Strepsiades had previously viewed this as Zeus' way of punishing those who transgress a certain part of the transcendent moral law (τοὺς ἐπιόρκους: 397). By doing away with Zeus in his explanation, Socrates does away with such punishments as well. Hence the fact that Strepsiades *is* later punished helps to make him see things in their true light.
15. The presence of Chaos in the trinity which he vows to recognize is noteworthy. Chaos is a state in which, by definition, there are no rules of any sort, moral or other.
16. Cf. Dover's edition (op. cit.), in which the designations of the two characters are changed from the traditional δίκαιος and ἄδικος λόγος to κρείττων and ἥττων λόγος. This is strictly accurate.
17. We must distinguish here between Zeus the object of genuine worship, who administers δίκη, and Zeus the god of mythology, who acts as if he had never heard of it. The ἥττων λόγος makes his point here and at 904-6 by implying (presumably from conviction) that the latter is the only Zeus. But it is with the former Zeus that Aristophanes is concerned in this play, and on a return to whom the moral welfare of the state depends.

AUCKLAND CLASSICAL ESSAYS

PRESENTED TO E. M. BLAIKLOCK

EDITED BY B. F. HARRIS

1970
AUCKLAND UNIVERSITY PRESS
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS