Chapter 2

INNARDS

> A story is told of Heraclitus, that visitors came, wanting to meet him, but hesitated when they saw him warming himself at the stove in the kitchen. He told them to be bold and enter, "For there are gods even here."
>
> —Aristotle *De part. anim.* 645A20–22

ENTRAILS: LEARNING, FEELING, DIVIDING

GREEK TRAGEDY describes what happens inside human beings daemonically and biologically, in ways that read to us like metaphor. But their daemonology and biology are very different from ours, and play a role in Greek ideas about the self that matches little in our experience. I shall start with biology, although daemonology will creep in even here.[1]

Most cultures picture some inner place for the site and equipment of consciousness. Our culture is as anomalous and inconsistent as any, though we do put consciousness mainly in the head.[2] In the fifth century, a few intellectuals imagined the brain might have something to do with consciousness, but this was eccentric. Socrates refers to a controversy, current when he was young, about what part of the body we think with. This intellectual controversy continued through the fifth century and on into the next.[3] But in ordinary fifth-century life, when people wondered what

[1] Basic studies on the biology and its implications include Snell 1953 and 1978, Dodds 1951, Onians 1954, Claus 1981, Bremmer 1983, Sullivan 1988, and Caswell 1990. Jaynes 1976 is an important eccentric addition. "Daemon": see pp. 114, 138 below.

[2] Cf. Jaynes 1976:44–45. Philosophically, Wollheim (1974:41–53) argues that the concept of mind behind English usage is not fully spatial but "tinged with spatiality": that we attribute shifting degrees of spatiality to mind, and the greater the degree of spatiality, the more distorted and inhibited our intellectual activity becomes. Yet all "spatially tinged" conceptions of mind "derive ultimately from an assimilation of mental activity to bodily functioning. . . . We are at home in our mind somewhat as in a body. This is the mind's image of itself."

[3] Pl. *Phd.* 96A. Alcmaeon of Croton, in the early fifth century, was probably the first to think the brain was important, KRS p. 339 (cf. Pl. *Phd.* 96B). *DMS* 17 (Loeb 2:174) may owe something also to Diogenes (*floruit*, 420s B.C.), KRS p. 449 n. 1. Philolaus fr. 13DK seems to argue (in the late fifth century) that the *archē* of rationality is in the brain: "The head is the *archē* of *noos*, the heart of *psuchē* and perception." Plato followed Philolaus in siting intellect in the head (Pl. *Ti.* 44D, cf. perhaps the joke "no ears and brain" at Pl. *Hipp. maj.* 292D; this may be an example of Aristophanes' influence on Plato, see on *Nub.* 1726 below). By the end of the fourth century, the brain had some supporters as the center of consciousness, but still had some powerful opponents. For Chrysippus (judging by Galen's attack on him, *De plac. Hp. et Pl.* 4.1, 2), the brain was just one inner part to which people vaguely refer: everyone believes the psyche's government is in the heart. Galen sites intelligence in the brain, spirit in the heart, daring in the liver. This position was only possible after Plato. But even after Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and the Epicureans went on putting consciousness in the heart (see A. E. Taylor 1962:518–21). Galen shows us how the culture held to the heart's primacy long after empirical proof was available that the brain was the locus of perception and locomotion. Before Plato, in fifth-century Athens, it was very odd to call the brain the center of anything. The apparent exception, Ar. *Nub.* 1726, proves the point. Strepsiades puns on *ap'onou* and *apo nou*, then says Amynias "had his brain shaken" when he fell (an imaginary, tragic-parody fall) out of the chariot. Is something missing in the text? Line 1275 ends uncertainly. R, the best manuscript, omits the attribution to Strepsiades, and Starkie, having studied facsimiles (intro., p. lviii), suggests *ad loc.* that R omitted something. Working with the accustomed text, however, we can simply note that Strepsiades makes this comment after becoming an "intellectual." The first signs of change in him are "mind" jokes: eccentric nonsense about the brain.

[4] Schneider (1968) argues that in painting Ajax and Achilles playing draughts, Exekias makes a psychological point—the mental concentration of the players. Anachronistically, he assumes the head is "the biological origin of thought and therefore of concentration" (p. 386) for Exekias, as for himself.

[5] Anxiety, fear, grief: e.g., *Ag.* 995, *Cho.* 413, *Aj.* 995. Desire: Herodas 1.56, Theoc. 7.99. Softening: *Or.* 1201.

[6] Hot: Ar. *Ran.* 844, cf. 1006. Stretched: *Hipp.* 118.

[7] *Eum.* 249, *Med.* 221.

was going on inside someone, what mattered was that person's *splanchna*, "guts." It is easy to forget this and to fail to follow through the differences it makes. Psychology in tragedy's world has practically nothing to do with the head.[4]

Splanchna (singular *splanchnon*) are the innards, the general collection of heart, liver, lungs, gallbladder, and attendant blood vessels. English translations of *splanchna* depend on context. The lexicon reaches for words like "entrails" (in contexts of divination) and "bowels" (in contexts of emotion). "Feeling," "mood," "temper," or "mind" often seem more apt. *Splanchna* feel. They feel anxiety, fear, grief, and sometimes love and desire. In the New Testament, *splanchnizomai* is "I feel pity." *Splanchna* soften in worry. The bully Menelaus "will soften his *splanchna*" when his daughter is at risk.[5] But in vehement feeling they are hot and taut. A young man "has a stretched *splanchnon* and says foolish things."[6]

How physical is this word? Sometimes the physicality seems obvious. When the Erinyes have chased Orestes, their *splanchnon* "pants with many labors." But sometimes it is less obvious. The word can read like "character." It is unfair, for instance, to dislike someone before you "clearly learn their *splanchnon*."[7]

Rather than prejudge this word's concreteness or abstraction, let us

watch how the word behaves and what ideas it attracts to its neighborhood. *Splanchna* contain feeling, but also hide it. One may conceal feeling "under one's *splanchna*." The very inner thing that must be learned, if we want to know people, masks their feeling. Tragedy, especially Euripides, gives voice to a Greek sense of lack here. There is no "clear proof" by which to understand *phrenes* (which I take, for the moment, to mean "mind"). If good people lived twice, *then* "it would be possible to know the bad, the good." External judgment is confusing. "There is no clear boundary set by the gods between the good and bad." One cannot "judge" people by a "clear" outside token, there is no "accurate" test of their value.[8]

This thought is voiced increasingly through the fifth century. Only being with people helps us judge them. We cannot see into another's *splanchna*. Would it were possible, says a fifth-century drinking-song,

> to see what sort of man each person is,
> divide up (*dielonta*) his breast
> and look at his mind (*nous*), then close it again,
> and think with an undeceiving mind (*phrēn*)
> that he's your friend.[9]

The Byzantine scholar Eustathius aligned this song with an Aesopic fable that blamed Prometheus for placing *pulai*, "gates," in the human breast.[10] He interprets the *splanchna* here as gates of thought and feeling, gates we close against outsiders. We are doubly masked. Our innards in themselves are hard to see, and they mask the feelings they contain. Perhaps these are two ways of saying the same thing.

Gates to what we cannot see must be forced. Or else we try art: an art of understanding what we do not know. In another context, *splanchna* do have "clear marks," and are opened to disclose what is unknown. This is divination, an aspect of Greek life as normal to the tragic audience as electronics is to us. That drinking-song assumes familiarity with it. Extispicy, the art of divining the gods' will from animal entrails, was ingrained and ancient in Greek communities. From at least the Bronze Age onwards, their eastern neighbors read entrails. Clay models of livers and lungs, scratched to divide different patches from each other, have been found in a Bronze Age temple at Ras Shamra, the Ugarit site on the Syrian coast (where, on a clear day, you can see Cyprus), which has clear affinities with Minoan-Mycenaean art. Division and marking are central to *splanchna* in divination from the Mediterranean start.[11]

[8] *HF* 657–71, *Alc.* 1009; *Med.* 516–19, *Hipp.* 925–29, cf. *Ag.* 838–39.

[9] See Athen. 694E, E. *El.* 367–90, cf. *Ag.* 840. Tragic "opacity": see Pigeaud 1981:395.

[10] Eustathius 1574.16. On this song (*PMG* no. 889, p. 473), cf. Barrett *ad Hipp.* 925.

[11] The models, and the "liver of Piacenza": see Courtois 1969: figs. 6, 7–11, 14; Körte 1905; Beard and North 1990:68. See generally Pliny *NH* 7.203; Blecher 1905; Bouché-Leclerq 1879, 1:171; Halliday 1913:189–90, 200. The liver's "landscape": see Durand and Lissarague 1979:92ff.

Fifth-century Athenians accepted that divination was important, and knew the physical procedures for reading those markings. Herodotus, telling his Greek audience about Egyptian sacrifice, points out that Egyptians extract intestines, leaving the *splanchna* and fat:[12] the opposite of Greeks, who take out *splanchna* first.

In tragedy, sacrifice is a likely occasion for murder, and *splanchna*, like dreams, can tell more than the immediate interpreter can know. Aegisthus invites a stranger, Orestes in disguise, to share his sacrifice. He kills the beast, offers the stranger his sword to carve it, and Orestes slashes:

> Aegisthus gazed earnestly at the sacred parts
> taking them in his hands. There was no liver lobe
> to the *splanchna*! And the portal-vein
> and gallbladder showed evil visitations near
> to the person looking at them.

"Visitation," in the sense of "attack," is indeed near. Aegisthus admits he is afraid of Orestes and fears "a stranger's trick." Orestes tells him not to worry, demands a heavier axe, and cuts. Aegisthus seizes the *splanchna*. "Dividing them (*diairōn*), he gazed earnestly at them." As he gazes, Orestes splits his spine.[13]

One link between animal *splanchna* opened and inspected in divination, and other people's *splanchna* that we want to learn, is the wish to know something "accurately," "rightly": words important in both contexts. We go to divination for "things unmarked," *asēma*, without a sign, obscure: for "things we do not know clearly." Seers "foretell" things "by looking at fire and through the folds of *splanchna*, and bird omens." One "unfolds" *splanchna* as one unfolds a writing tablet. Neither can be read without unfolding. Their message is apparent when they are "opened," as a friendly character is "disclosed."[14]

Another linkage is "dividing" words. Aegisthus "divides" the *splanchna*.

[12] Hdt. 2.40. No one at Athens in the mid-fifth century consistently rejected divination; see Beard and North 1990:84.

[13] E. *El.* 826–29 (Denniston *ad loc.* supplies *ousas* after *prosbolas*, assuming that liver and gallbladder have further bad signs, it is not merely that there is no liver lobe), 838–39.

[14] See E. *Supp.* 211–13. Cf. Cic. *De div.* 2.32, Plu. *Alex.* 73. *Ptuchas* for *splanchna* and *deltos*: E. *Supp.* 212, *IA* 112, *IT* 760. Tablets "hide" writing in folds. Cf. *diaptuchas* for the *delton*, *IT* 793. *Diaptussō* is "I open, spread out, disclose." The written charge against Hippolytus seems reasonable, but not if you "unfold" it, *Hipp.* 985. People who think they're the only ones to be right are empty when "opened up," *Ant.* 709. Galen (2:520) uses the word of "opening up" the abdomen. People (or what they have said) can be "revealed" as tablets are "loosened," "opened," *IA* 307, 321. Ideally, you "open the clear key" of your *phrenes* to friends (*Med.* 660), as you "disclose" your name (and therefore identity), A. *Supp.* 322.

Division is vital in sacrifice. Plato compares logical "division" to division practiced in sacrifice: "Let us divide them by their parts, like a sacrifice," he says. Division in sacrifice is a basic image, available for intellectual use. In sacrifice, the pieces are "parted": apportioned to human beings for eating, to gods for burning. *Splanchna* are the centerpiece of the sacrificial meal.[15] Sacrificial innards have a Hermes-like dual role. Humans eat them, gods mark them.[16] Gods are concerned with both their demarcating markings and their due division.

The verb "divide," used for "breaking apart" *splanchna*, has other meanings: "distribute" (as in "apportioning" shares of a sacrifice), but also "distinguish or demarcate" (as in Plato's "division" of the soul, or the "distinction" between logical categories), and "determine," "decide" (rights in a legal action, the true interpretation of a dream).[17] The word for physical division is also "discernment," assessment of the mind by the mind. "Telling" a person's true character, their *splanchna*, involves judging from obscure signs, "dividing" good and bad.[18]

In both contexts, therefore, innards join the desire to know what is obscure and within, to the dividing and distinguishing needed to get at it. Greek fantasies about *splanchna* point also towards that vital division between divine and human. *Splanchna* markings matter to gods. The gods may be "pleased" by them, may even have put them there. One tradition attributed the first extispicy to Prometheus, mediator between human and divine, often held responsible for the civilizing arts, of which extispicy is one. "Prometheus" seems to mean "Forethought," aptly for a figure involved in divination. Myth linked his theft of fire to his invention of sacrifice, which embodies human effort to communicate with gods.[19]

Consulting the entrails of a sacrifice expresses (among other things) a

[15] Eating *splanchna*: see Ar. *V.* 654; cf. *Il.* 1.464, Ar. *Av.* 984. Sometimes *splanchna* seems to *mean* "sacrifical feast," e.g., Ar. *Eq.* 410, *SIG* 1002.4 (fifth or fourth century, Miletus). Cf. Semonides 12(W): "Grasping *splanchna* like a kite" means stealing them from a sacrifice. The horror of the story of Thyestes, who unwittingly eats his own children's *splanchna* (*Ag.* 1222), lies partly in his eating the best bits, the bits where consciousness and life had been. Dividing and eating sacrifices: Hes. *Theog.* 554; *h. Merc.* 130; Burkert 1983:6 nn. 21, 22, 36 n. 8. "Dividing," as in sacrifice: Pl. *Polit.* 287C.

[16] See L. Kahn 1978:67.

[17] *Diaireō*: "I distribute" *splanchna*, *Il.* 1.464, *Od.* 3.9; "tear open" a hare, Hdt. 1.23 (cf. Pl. *Phdr.* 253C, Ar. *Nub.* 742); "determine" rights, *Eum.* 472, 488, 630; "decide" a dream's interpretation, Hdt. 7.19.

[18] See *dieidenai*, *Med.* 518; *diagnōsin phrenōn*, *Hipp.* 926.

[19] Rival claimants for the invention of sacrifice include Delphus (at Delphi, Parke 1967:72) and Hermes, who invents fire and prepares a sacrifice afterwards (*h. Merc.* 111, 120–33). Cf. Prometheus (Dodds 1973:31); "Pro-metheus" might recall *prophētēs* (but Fascher 1927 argued this should mean "spokesman *for* the supernatural" and does not necessarily entail *fore*knowledge).

hope that gods communicate back. Aeschylus's Prometheus says he taught human beings to watch for

> the *splanchna*'s smoothness,
> what color a gall vessel should be to please gods;
> and the liver lobe's dappling symmetry.

Extispicy assumed that gods took an active interest in innards. Hegesander, a historian from Delphi of the second century B.C., records two Cypriot epithets of Zeus, "Companion-of-the-Banquet" and "*Splanchna*-Cutter," Splanchnotomos. In late antiquity, *theos*, "god," referred also to some part of the entrails. Long before, in the sixth century B.C., Theagenes of Rhegium offered allegorizing interpretations of Homer in terms of entrails as if gods and innards were intimately connected. Apollo represented the gall, Dionysus the spleen, Demeter the liver, and so on.[20] In historical times, King Agesilaus supposedly lured the Spartans into war by writing VICTORY on his hand and imprinting it on the liver of a sacrifice. *Splanchna* receive the image-impress of gods. They reflect what gods want to be. The thought seems to be that god, in some sense, is in the innards, or has at least reached in there to divide and mark them.[21]

Why? Animals were in many ways felt to be closer to gods than were human beings. It is tempting to explain this Greek use of animal innards by structuralist argument. Animal mediates between human and divine (see Chapter 7). But this is not enough. The use of animal *innards* in divination must be connected to the interest gods took in their human equivalent. Homeric gods put or throw ideas and feelings into human innards.[22] Homeric and tragic imagery of feeling embodies the idea that gods, or godlike feelings, strike and enter the innards (see Chapter 6). At one level, emotion or inspiration *is* divinity's active interest in the entrails.

Demarcated, observed by gods and humans, animal innards are a medium of communication between divinity and humanity, as human innards are between one person and another. Innards are both ambiguous and necessary in two operations where "clarity" of "distinguishing" is vital: finding out what gods intend for you, and how other people really feel (and what they intend) for you.

To us, these sacrificial anatomic overtones seem alien and irrelevant to

[20] *PV* 493–95; Athen. 174A; Hesych. s.v. *theos*, see Stanford 1939:119–20.

[21] Plu. *Mor.* 214E–F. Roman poets are influenced by Etruscan and Roman divination, both practice and concept (see Beard and North 1990:55–61), but also by Greek poetry and *its* assumptions about divining. A seer inspecting entrails to "find out the gods' anger" cries, "The infernal gods have entered the breast of the slaughtered bull," Luc. *Phars.* 1.633. Before the Lemnians are murdered, "They filled the shrines with incense smoke, but the fire on every altar was black, and in no entrails did *deus integer* breathe," Stat. *Theb.* 5. 176.

[22] *Od.* 19.10, *Il.* 3.139; cf. Snell 1978:57.

questions of "mind." How many of us hold a calf's entrails in our hands, realize the liver lobe is missing or how markings vary on the "portal vein," believe this matters, and apply words for what we are holding to the inner equipment with which we imagine we feel and think? But tragedy and its audiences were familiar, in intense, mystery-surrounded, physical experience absent from our own lives, with the stuff to which they attribute activity within themselves.

I believe this divinatory dimension of *splanchna* radically affected Greek assumptions about the innards' role in consciousness, and ensured that some concrete picture of examinable organs was alive in their thought when they spoke or heard the word *splanchna*, or any of the multiple words associated with *splanchna*. I shall argue the "concreteness" later. First I want to introduce the detailed words.

There are many of them. Words for equipment of consciousness have a pluralizing effect, like the "many names" of gods who so often affect the innards. There are several "organs," and even more words. From the start, multiplicity is a core condition of consciousness, as of religion, in Greek thought.[23]

Tragedy's language of consciousness rests on Homer, with whom Athenian poets thought and worked, and on the lyric poets of the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. But later use of the accumulated Greek language of consciousness also illuminates tragic usage. The important later sources here are the Hellenistic poets of other cities, and above all the Athenian Plato, born 429 B.C. (Plato was 14 years old when *The Trojan Women* was first performed, and tragedy profoundly influenced his writing.) There are some variations in how these words behave in different genres. But in general, tragedy rests on a basic and consistently Greek poetic core of expectations about innards.

Heart, Liver, *Phrenes*, Inner Liquids

There are three words for "heart": ***kardia*** (feminine), and ***kear*** (or ***kēr***) and ***ētor*** (neuter). These all behave in the same sort of way. *Kardia* is excitable and mobile; it knocks, shakes, jumps, or "leaps from the breast" in panic. "Knocked" by emotion, it receives grief and courage. It suffers, endures, is "eager." One can become "full of heart," "love from the heart." It beats and swells with rage.[24] *Kēr*, too, moves, rejoices, or grieves in the breast and

[23] This is a positive way of putting what Snell 1953 put as an absence, arguing that Homer lacks a sense of psychic whole; see below, nn. 112–17; this view rested partly on Böhme 1929 and deeply influenced subsequent thinking (references in Sullivan 1988:14 n. 9; add Jaynes 1976, chs. 3–4).

[24] "Leaping": e.g., *Il.* 13.282, cf. Thgn. 1199. Detienne 1989:57–60 takes the heart's leaping as the "physiological mechanism fundamental to Dionysism." "Jumping"; e.g., *Il.* 10.94,

thumos ("spirit"). The common Homeric phrase *kēri*, "with heart," qualifies loving, honoring, being angry. A person is emotionally hurt in the *kear*.[25] *Ētor* also "beats up to the throat." You feel passion, laughter, and grief with it. It "shouts in grief." You are "struck" in it. It, too, is a center of impulse. In longing for her husband, Penelope "wastes away in her *ētor*." Sometimes there is intellectual as well as emotional activity in it. Achilles "ponders" in his *ētor*, divided. Zeus's *ētor* can be "persuaded by prayers." It was a popular idea in the fifth century that the heart was a center of thought and perception as well as feeling.[26]

The liver, *hēpar*, is center of divinatory attention.[27] It can be pierced by a sword and "approached by" emotional pain. One feels anger in it, and fear.[28] Commentators sometimes call it the "seat" of passions, especially anger, fear, lust. But we should watch our own metaphors. These passions do not sit on the *hēpar* but slash, tear, and eat it. Love is "a harsh god" who "gashes the liver within." The center of lust is eternally lacerated and consumed. The mythological embodiment of lust's action on the liver is Tityus, who sexually assaulted the goddess Leto, and whose fate after death is to be chained in Hades while two vultures tear forever at his liver. But the liver is also a receptacle. It should have *cholē*, "bile," in it. A coward's liver does not. The liver is emotional, an image receptor. In Plato's visionary anatomy, the worst part of the soul, the bit that has no reason, simply receives images and is influenced by them. This part is nearest the liver.[29]

Some words have an uncertain physiological meaning, but nevertheless connect intuitive, mental, and emotional experience to the body. *Prapides*

Pl. *Symp.* 215E (cf. Ar. *Nub.* 1391), A. *Supp.* 785. "Knocked" by feeling, receiving feeling that "comes upon" it: *Il.* 2.171, 21.546; *Od.* 17.489; Ar. *Ran.* 54. Suffering, loving, etc.: *Od.* 20.18, cf. E. *Or.* 466 (with *psuchē*); *Il.* 10.244; Ar. *Nub.* 86. Handley (1956:208) sees ***kardia*** as a physical organ and emotional center both in everyday fifth-century language, as reflected by Aristophanes, and in poetic language.

[25] *Kēr*: *Il.* 14.139, 6.523, 7.428; *Od.* 18.344, 7.82 (see further Webster 1957:151). *Kēri*: *Il.* 9.117, 13.430; *Od.* 5.36; *Il.* 13.119. Tragedy: e.g., *PV* 247, 392. Idea parodied: Ar. *Ach.* 5. See Webster 1957:152–53.

[26] *Il.* 22.452, 21.389, 9.9; *Pers.* 991; *Il.* 3.31, 5.250, 21.114; *Od.* 19.136. Grief "comes on" Achilles, "in his *ētor* in his shaggy breast he wondered, divided," whether to kill Agamemnon or not, *Il.* 1.188. Cf. Pi. *O.* 2.79. Jaynes (1976:267) dislikes the idea of more than one word for "heart," and suggests that *ētor* means the gastrointestinal tract. This approach denies Greek psychological language its multiplicity (see below, n. 111). For the heart as a thinking, perceiving organ, see below, n. 31.

[27] See E. *El.* 827, Pl. *Ti.* 71E, Luc. *Phars.* 1.633ff., Stat. *Theb.* 5.176ff.

[28] *Ag.* 432, 792; *Eum.* 135; E. *Supp.* 599; *Aj.* 938. Physicality: see, e.g., *Il.* 20.469; E. *Supp.* 919.

[29] See Theoc. 13.71, *Od.* 11.578–80; cf. Prometheus's eagle at A. fr. 193.13–17R, "On my fat liver he screams. . . . But when my gnawed liver swells, renewed in growth, he returns greedily to his terrible meal." For liver with bile in it, see Archil. 234W. Our divinatory faculty is put near the liver to compensate for our foolish part, "which has no share in reason or intelligence," Pl. *Ti.* 71D–E.

is a rare plural word, used in Homer and tragedy to mean "understanding," or "place of understanding," and also "place of desiring": in the old-fashioned English sense, one's "heart." The giants tell Zeus they "know his *prapides* and *noēma* [thought] are all-surpassing." Achilles' longing to grieve leaves his *prapides* and limbs. Once women exist, even a man whose wife "fits his *prapides*" has a difficult time. If you push something (the text does not say what) "under your crowded [or dense] *prapides* [i.e., thoughts], and attend to them constantly, all will be well," says Empedocles mysteriously. That "something" seems to mean understanding. It belongs under our *prapides*.[30]

Phrēn and its plural, *phrenes*, much argued-over words, are at the center of tragic language of mind. *Phrēn* is not used in early prose but is common in poetry. The heart kicks it, it delights in music, *thumos* gathers towards it, it raves in madness, a united community hates "with one *phrēn*," and Zeus's *phrēn* is "*turned*." The plural, *phrenes*, however, is common in both poetry and prose.

Instead of introducing *phrēn* by argument and categorization, considering possible original meanings and possible changes in use, let me bring forward a doctor's polemic written around the end of the fifth century, by one of the few writers who thinks the brain has something to do with consciousness. He is arguing against the popular idea that *phrenes* have a key role in thinking and feeling. His attack reveals, therefore, what most people in his day believed *phrenes* did:

> The *phrenes* have an empty name. They acquired it by chance and convention, not because of reality and nature. I do not know, myself, what power *phrenes* have to think (*noein*) and to be intelligent (*phronein*), except that if someone is unexpectedly overjoyed or upset, they leap and make the person jump. This is because of their fine texture and very wide extension in the body. They do *not* have a cavity into which they receive anything (either good or bad) falling into them. They are disturbed by both [good and bad] things because of their weak nature. They do *not* perceive anything before the other parts of the body, but have that irrelevant name, and are reputedly the cause [of perception], like the parts by the heart called "ears," though they do not share in hearing at all. Some people say that it is the heart with which we think (*phronein*), and that it feels upset and anxiety. This is *not* true.

His negatives show how popular thought in his day could ascribe perception and sane thinking (*phronein*) to the heart, or to *phrenes*—etymologically connected to *phronein*—and how it saw *phrenes* as a receptacle into which things "fall."[31]

[30] *Prapides*: *Theog.* 656, 698; *Il.* 24.514; A. *Supp.* 87–90 (see p. 135); Emp. frr. 132.1, 129.2–4, 110.1DK (see Wright 1981:258–59).

[31] *DMS* 20 (Loeb 2:178–80; my emphasis). *Phrēn*: the one early prose use is Heraclitus fr. 104DK, "What *noos* or *phrēn* do they have?" See *PV* 881; *Il.* 9.186, 22.475; *Sept.* 484; *Eum.* 986; *Il.* 10.45. Important work on *phrēn* and *phrenes* includes von Fritz 1943; Snell 1953, 1978:53–60; Claus 1981 (esp. p. 16); Sullivan 1988 (cf. Darcus 1979).

At the end of the fifth century, by the end of extant tragedy, most people assume that they think and perceive and feel with internal organs, often their *phrenes*. What, precisely, do they think these are? Let us watch how *phrēn* and *phrenes* behave as words in Homer and tragedy, without prejudging their physical, intellectual, or metaphysical qualities, and keeping alive our own uncertainties about what exactly in our terms *phrenes* might be.

Phrēn's first feature seems to be responsiveness. It is acted upon, rather than initiating action. The heart kicks the *phrēn*. A *phrēn*, as we saw, can be "turned." "A sleeping *phrēn* is lit with eyes." The verbs make *phrēn* passive. It is the emotions that are active. Grief covers Hector's *phrenes*, *erōs* covers those of Paris. Fear "holds" *phrenes*. They receive and express emotion. Tears fall from the *phrēn*. The dead, except Teiresias, do not have *phrenes*.[32]

Like the heart, *phrenes* have receptor passivity, are acted on by feelings. Thinking or perceiving mingles with feeling. Hearts have "ears"; *phrenes* may have eyes. Gods "place" in *phrenes* practical ideas like calling an assembly. Their roles imply a vital question. From where does human knowledge come, from inside or outside, from human beings or gods? Hector "knows in his *phrenes*" that gods have abandoned him.[33] Something done "from the *phrēn*" is like something done "with the heart," done "sincerely." "I measured your *phrenes* and realized how great a bitterness you are to me, as my enemy," says Ion to his would-be murderer.[34] He thinks he has seen into, as we would say, her heart or mind. Either of these problematic words of ours would fit. We know, act, respond to ideas, with *phrenes*.

All this seems in line with popular ideas attacked by the Hippocratic doctor. *Phrenes* contain emotion, practical ideas, and knowledge. We ourselves think of these as qualitatively different things, but popular fifth-century thought did not. *Phrenes* are containers: they fill with *menos*, "anger," or *thumos*, "passion." They are essentially mobile, too, and they "tremble within."[35] They are the holding center, folding the heart, holding the liver. A thunderbolt striking "in the very *phrenes*" is an image of annihilation. You are struck, you know, understand, tremble, feel, or ponder in that responsive, compact, containing center.[36]

[32] *Eum.* 104 (cf. *Corp. Herm.* 4.11, 7.2, "eyes of the heart"); *Il.* 8.124, 3.442; A. *Supp.* 379; *Sept.* 919; *Od.* 10.493.

[33] *Il.* 1.55, 13.55 (cf. "throw this in your *phrenes*," i.e., "attend, think hard about this," 1.297), 22.296; *Od.* 9.600, cf. 10.438; *Il.* 9.434, 2.301.

[34] *Cho.* 107 (*logos* from *phrēn*); *Sept.* 919 (pouring tears from *phrēn*); *Ag.* 1515 (from a friendly *phrēn*, cf. 805, *ap' akras phrenos*); *Ion* 1271. These suggest that what comes from *phrēn*, a *phrēn* seen properly, is true.

[35] *Il.* 1.103, cf. 13.487.

[36] *Il.* 16.481; *Od.* 9.301; *PV* 363, cf. *Eum.* 159 (reproach is a blow, striking under the

But sometimes *phrenes* are an active, initiating force. They "pilot" the *thumos*, "spirit." They can imagine the opposite of what is, create what is not, and deny what is said. A man "rich in respect of his *phrenes*" is only imagining his wealth. When Hippolytus considers breaking his vow, he appeals to the inner integrity of *phrēn*: "My tongue promised, my *phrēn* did not."[37] By the mid-fifth century, it is possible to oppose *phrenes* to the externally seen body. They are its conscious inwardness. The word *phrenes* becomes popular in tragedy for "mind." Aristophanes, who stretches to brilliant absurdity the surreal implications of intellectual and tragic language, parodies tragedy when he uses *phrenes*, especially when mocking the mandarin "mind" of an intellectual.[38] But the emotional dimension of *phrenes* continues. In an early tragedy, *phrēn* "raves with grief-cries." In a later one, Theseus cries with grief for the too well-intentioned *phrēn* of Hippolytus, who did not, after all, break that vow: "Alas for your *phrēn*, pious and good." People feel intense love and grief in *phrenes*.[39] *Phrenes* are actively, decisively emotional and imaginative.

Even in activity, *phrenes* are responsive, answerable, vulnerable. Tragedy favors the word *phrenes* in contexts of feeling and thinking. But the vulnerability of *phrenes* is also important. The emotional and intellectual activity whose center they are often wounds them. They are more often acted on than active. When someone's *phrenes* are struck and gashed by fear, or by gods, that person is paralyzed, incapable of action or judgment.[40] *Phrenes* also abandon a person, "stand away," get lost. One can lose one's hold on them, be no longer "in" them, be "struck out," "empty of *phrenes*," "no longer in one's *phrenes*."[41]

There are inconsistencies in this language. It would be odd if there were not, for the damage and loss of *phrenes* is also madness: a territory where even professional theories are full of contradiction. The language of tragedians working for the "mad god's" theater, whose genre is perpetually

phrenes); *Il.* 10.10 (trembling), 1.362 (grief approaches *phrenes*). Knowing, thinking, wondering, planning with *phrenes*: see Snell 1978:59ff.

[37] *Pers.* 767, *Erg.* 455, *Hipp.* 612.

[38] *Phrenes* opposed to body: e.g., Hdt. 3.134; E. *El.* 387 ("flesh empty of *phrenes*"). For the comic parody of tragic language taking *phrenes* as "mind," see Handley 1956:217–18, 220–23.

[39] *Phrēn* and feeling: *Sept.* 484; *Hipp.* 1454; *Med.* 143; *IA* 1434. See Claus 1981:54 for more references. For *phrenes* and feeling in later tragedy, see, e.g., *Hipp.* 256; *Med.* 55; see also Claus 1981:55.

[40] Charioteers "struck in *phrenes*," frightened when their warrior is killed, cannot drive away from danger, *Il.* 13.394, 16.403; cf. *Pers.* 115, *Ag.* 479. Gods "harm" *phrenes*, *Il.* 7.360, 15.724.

[41] "Keep your head" (as English might say) is "Don't stand out of your *phrenes*," *Phil.* 865. A man should not let a woman "throw him out of his *phrenes*," *Ant.* 648. When her brother is to be killed, Electra "stands out" of her *phrenes*, *Or.* 1021. "Are you not-in-your-*phrenes*?" is "Are you mad?" *Heraclid.* 709; cf. "Where are you in your *phrenes*?" S. *El.* 390. "Empty of *phrenes*": *Ant.* 754. When Io goes mad, her *phrenes* are "twisted aside," *PV* 673.

aware of the possibility of madness, is entitled to verbal inconsistencies about what passion does to *phrenes*.[42] Normally, one has *phrenes*, and is in them. These are two ways, seemingly (to us) contradictory, of evoking the same thing: safe sanity. To "have" *phrenes* is to be in control, be sane. *Sōphrōn*, "having a safe *phrēn*," means prudent, ideally controlled, sane, "in one's senses."[43] In tragedy, the acts and attitudes that precipitate the tragic action are precisely not *sōphrōn*. They could be *aphrōn*, "without *phrēn*," or *ekphrōn*, "out of *phrēn*." Like Xerxes' sacriligious attempt to invade Greece by chaining the sea, they are in some sense mad. Madness is a trembling, a battering, a confusion, a disease, or a loss, of *phrenes*. There are few tragedies that do not speak to the possibility that *phrenes* can be hurt, lost, damaged. And though *phrenes* return (tragedy, I believe, perceives madness as a temporary condition), this inward damage causes irrevocable damage in the outside world.[44] *Phrenes*, like *kardia*, receive both knowing and feeling. Accordingly, damage to them is emotional and intellectual and leads to madness. The possibility that they can be damaged or lost is central to the vision of human structures easily smashed, from and to which the tragedies speak. There is no *terra firma* in tragedy, especially not within.

These innards flow with emotions that behave like liquids. Blood is important here (see Chapter 8), but there are also other liquids, or liquid-looking words: *cholos*, *cholē*, *menos*.

Cholē, or *cholos*? Homer generally uses *cholos*, tragic poets and the Hippocratics use *cholē*. Both mean "gall," "bile." *Cholē* is normally "blonde," but when diseased is black. It is always bitter. Mothers smear it on the nipple to wean babies. There are vessels, gallbladders, to "hold" it, but it is stirred and moved, boils over, floods the heart. *Cholē* is also fury, or furious madness. The liquid's physical bitterness coheres with anger's emotionally bitter force. *Alastōr* (avenging daemon) is "bitter" too.[45] When Achilles stops his men from joining the Greeks, he is told, "Surely your mother raised you on *cholos*." The reproach would have suggested to fifth-century

[42] "*Mainomenos Dionysos*": *Il.* 6.132; see Padel 1981:110–14.

[43] *Sōphrōn*: see Pl. *Crat.* 411E; Arist. *EN* 1140B11. "*Sōphrōn* and in control of yourself": Pl. *Gorg.* 491D, sums up the general ideal; cf. *Ag.* 1664, *Cho.* 140, *Aj.* 132. "Having" *phrenes* and *nous*, Ar. *Ran.* 534, and being "in charge of *phrenes*," *Ant.* 492, mean being sane, being aware. *Emphrōn* is "sane," often as opposed to "mad" (*Cho.* 1026, *Aj.* 306, *PV* 848).

[44] See Snell 1978:55, 64–72, 76, on *aphrōn*, *diaphrōn*, *saophrōn*, *phrenes* trembling, raving. Mad grief is a trembling, madness a confusion, of *phrenes*: *Phoen.* 1285, *HF* 836. Xerxes' impious act was due to *nosos phrenōn*, *Pers.* 750. Tragic madness is a temporary episode of self-destructive, dangerous behavior, see Padel 1981:108–14.

[45] See *Anc. Med.* 19 (Loeb 1:48): "The bitter principle, which we call yellow *cholē* . . . ," cf. the color and processes described in Pl. *Ti.* 82E–83D. *Cholē* is cognate with German *gelb*, "yellow," and Latin *helvus*. Black, i.e., diseased: *Aph.* 4.23 (Loeb 4:140). Used in weaning: Diphilus 74 (Kock). *Cholē* is contained in the *cholai*, gallbladder, *Ant.* 1010; the "*dochai cholēs*," S. *El.* 828; cf. *PV* 495. *Cholades* are "bowels," "guts," *Il.* 4.526. *Thumos*, too, is bitter, *Cho.* 390 (see Chapter 4, n. 45), like *cholos*, *menos*, strife, and *alastōr* (*Ag.* 1501).

audiences a paradox: Achilles was nourished by what is used to turn a baby *away*.[46]

Cholē signifies bile, black fury. The principle here, which we shall meet in other contexts, is that when something goes wrong, things inside supposedly go black. When bile increases, when anger comes, this bile is black. The core verb, *cholaō*, "I fill with bile," means the same as *melancholaō*, "I fill with black bile." Both can mean "I am passionate" or "I am mad." Here is the basic ingredient of melancholia and its overpowering afterlife.[47] *Melancholia*, *melancholikos*: Greek medical writers use them of delirium or of anyone they think is full of black bile. The words begin to take on their extra tones of passion and madness in the late fifth century. Incorporated into Hippocratic humoral theory, they become psychological and ethical terms, moving towards that Renaissance vision of "melancholy" which compacts several categories of physiological, psychological, and moral damage.[48]

Cholos is "of the *phrenes*" that hold it. *Cholos* seizes you, sinks into you, conquers you, comes to you. You nurse, ripen, or quench it.[49] It has a close relation to *thumos* ("spirit"). *Cholos* "falls into," is thrown into, or is stored in *thumos*. Yet, like *thumos*, *cholos* can be roused, be moved, boil over.[50] The active verb *choloō* is "I make angry," that is, "I make full of bile." Its natural object is another person's *ētor*. It is more common in the passive voice, *choloomai*, "I am made angry" (i.e., I am angry) in my *phrenes*, heart, or *thumos*.[51]

Another closely related, but more diverse, liquid word for anger is *menos*. Odysseus says Achilles will not quench his *cholos* but "is filled even more with *menos*." These are not constant synonyms, though we can translate both as "anger." With *menos* we are not on such clear physical ground. It is a Homeric and tragic word, but no medical usage tells us what *menos* "is" or "is like," or if it is always liquid. Its function seems to be to fill things.

[46] Ar. *Lys.* 465; Dem. 25.27; Ar. *Ran.* 4, *Thesm.* 468, *V.* 403. At Ar. *Pax* 66, *cholē* seems to mean *mania*, see Platnauer *ad loc.*, Dover *ad Nub.* 833. *Cholē* floods heart in fury: *Cho.* 184. Achilles: see *Il.* 16.203.

[47] *Cholaō*: Ar. *Nub.* 833; *melancholaō*: Ar. *V.* 14, *Pl.* 12, 366, 903; Pl. *Phdr.* 268E; Dem. 48.56, Men. *Sam.* 218; and often in Galen. *Melancholikoi* means "dipped in black bile," of the arrows at *Trach.* 573. See Flashar 1966:11–49. The image of a "black sun" ruling the mind features in modern discussions of schizophrenia and melancholia, see Laing 1965:201–4; Kristeva 1989:151. Cf. the blackness of tragic madness, the absence of reason's image, light, Padel 1981:115, 125.

[48] See Klibansky, Panofsky, and Saxl 1964; Flashar 1966: chs. 3–8; Simon 1978:228–37.

[49] E.g., *Il.* 2.241, 15.122; Sol. 4.39 (West); *cholos* of a god: *Il.* 18.119; *Od.* 3.145; *h. Dem.* 350. Seizing, sinking in, etc.: *Med.* 1266; *Il.* 1.387, 4.23, 9.553, 18.119, 9.525. *Cholos*, nursed, ripened: *Il.* 4.513, 9.565 (cf. Arist. *EN* 1126A24, where it is softened and digested); should be quenched: *Il.* 9.678.

[50] *Il.* 9.436, 675, 14.50, 6.326; Pi. *P.* 11.23; *Med.* 99; *PV* 370. Black bile's later connection with laughter (the "smiling spleen"), see Pagel 1981:86.

[51] Active: *Theog.* 568; passive: *Il.* 16.61, 13.206, 16.585, 21.136, 1.217, 4.494.

When Agamemnon is angry, his "black *phrenes* fill around greatly with *menos*." *Menos* fills *phrenes*, soul, and *thumos*. The *menos* of *thumos* "boils," like *cholē*. *Menos* is often coupled in these contexts with *thumos*, but their relationship is mobile and inconsistent. Both can be taken as "anger" or as "spirit," but one can act upon the other. *Menos* "seizes" and fills *thumos*.[52]

Menos can also more generally mean "energy." Wine "increases *menos* in a weary man." *Menos* is "force," which is often "ferocity," as in a wild animal, the hot sun, fire, or stormy gales, or as in *atē*, that self-destructiveness of mind.[53]

One can fantasize. Is blood, that obvious inner liquid, behind (in some sense) this strong hot black strength filling the mind, which is increased by wine and "lost" at death?

We should be clear about what this suggestion implies. It is true that when *menos* has color it is black, that Greek often (not always) calls blood "black," and that *menos* is said to flow away and be lost through a fatal wound.[54] But if we say *menos* "is really" or "was once" blood, we impose our own story patterns and assumptions about mind, and language, and how we talk of mind, onto these Greek words. "Really" implies that the physical is always present in, prior to, and more truthful than the abstract. "Was once" implies a whole mythopoeic narrative behind Greek words for "mind": that they "once" referred to physical organs "and then" developed more abstract meanings.

I prefer to keep the uncertainty and variety of such a word alive in our readings of it. It may be true both that these words mean real liquid in real innards, and that they are anger and force. They may be more. Our own categories are not the only ones to compare with Greek words. The Ilongot, for instance, a society of headhunters in the Philippines, have a word *liget*, which suggests energy and anger. It rises in the heart. For them, "motions of the heart are emotions." Yet *liget* attaches not so much to selves as to interactions. Chili pepper gives *liget* to a stew, ginger revitalizes *liget* in a killer, winds have more *liget* when obstructed. *Liget* is engendered between things when they meet and confront each other. It is also revealed in people when they pant and sweat. It flows inwardly and generates red-

[52] *Il.* 9.679, 1.104. *Menos* filling and boiling: *Il.* 1.103, 22.312; Arist. *Rh.* 1406A2; Ar. *V.* 424; cf. Pl. *Ti.* 70B. For further studies of *menos*, see Lindsay 1965:70–72; Nagy 1980. *Menos* and *thumos*, *menos* seizing and filling *thumos*: see *Il.* 5.470, 23.468, 22.312.

[53] "Force" given by wine: *Il.* 6.261; *Reg. Acut. Dis.* 63 (Loeb 2:118, cf. *Anc. Med.* 9 [Loeb 1:26], effect of "the *menos* of fasting"). "Force" of sun, wind, rivers, fire: *Od.* 10.160; *Heraclid.* 428; *Il.* 12.18, 6.182; Ar. *Ach.* 665. Of *atē*: *Cho.* 1076. Claus (1981:25) comments that *menos* compounds (like *dusmenēs*) underline the word's "power."

[54] Black blood flows from a wound: *Il.* 4.149. Blood is sometimes *chlōron*, e.g., *Trach.* 1055, but this is usually taken as "fresh." Cf. *melan menos*, *Aj.* 1412 (which might mean gushing "life blood," but it is unclear; see Jebb on *phusai ad loc.*). At *Il.* 17.298, brain and blood spurt out of a wound and *menos luthē*. *Menos* is often (e.g., *Il.* 5.296) "lost" with *psuchē*. Onians (1954:46–51) sees *menos* as blood, but cf. pp. 89–91, and below, n. 56.

ness in the self. It is dynamic, organic, chaotic violence, and also the stuff of life.

The anthropologist who reports on the Ilongot at first simply translated *liget* as anger, but then saw that through the ways in which it worked, and the associations it held for the Ilongot, *liget* embodied a whole set of principles and connections underlying the entire way they conceptualized society, bodies, and world. Refraining from tying the word down to one kind of meaning, following it instead in its variety and implications, she found that this method yielded far richer insight into the Ilongot's understanding of self than she would have gained from the unthinking assumption that one English translation can always explain one word.[55]

So, rather than speak of *menos* as a liquid that "once" meant blood, or that by the time Homer uses it is only an abstract force, I would follow its diversity. In many places it behaves like blood, resonant with anger's blood connotations in the *Iliad*, that strongly male war-poem. But I think it unlikely that it ever *only* meant blood. The physical stuff belongs with the emotion. This is especially important because in other places *menos* behaves not as liquid but as breath. Homeric warriors "breathe *menea*" (the plural of *menos*). They are ready to attack and are "breathing fury."[56]

There are two points here. One, on the physiological side, is that in Greek anatomy, inner channels and vessels contain both breath (or air) and liquid. We shall meet this idea again later (Chapter 3). The other is a principle of approach. We do not have to say that *menos* "is" either breath or liquid. It acts now as one, now as another. In being now one, now another, it may also be other things, things that (in our terms) are more abstract. "Life force" has been suggested, for instance.[57] *Menos* in its diversity brings together three decisive Greek images: emotion's ferocious impact on innards, breath and liquid as interchangeable ways of describing this impact, and the flooding of the mind.[58]

Like the innards they fill, inner liquids are multiple. In Homer, *ichor* means the fluid gods have in their veins instead of blood. It seems pallid, blonde. In the fifth century and later, the word can mean putrified blood, occasionally ordinary blood, serum of blood or gall, or any pale discharge. Yellowish liquids in the innards seem to be identified not with anger, the blackening emotion, but with fear, like facial pallor.[59] Innards and their contents, like the meanings of these mind-words, are multiple and fluid.

[55] Rosaldo 1980:37–47.

[56] E.g., *Il.* 2.536, 3.8, 11.508. Onians (1954:49–58) argues that *menos* is conceived as liquid here. But *menos* seems to work sometimes as liquid, sometimes as breath (see pp. 89–91).

[57] Claus 1981:24–25, though cf. below, n. 66.

[58] See pp. 81–84 and 88.

[59] *Ichōr* in gods' veins: *Il.* 5.340. Pale liquid in human veins: *Cord.* 11 (Littré), *Nat. hom.* 12 (Loeb 4:34); cf. Pl. *Ti.* 83C; Arist. *Mir.* 845A8, *HA* 521B2, 630A6, 586B32. See Fraenkel *ad Ag.* 1480. *Krokou baphas* (*Ag.* 239) probably refers to the saffron-dyed dress (crocuses make clothes "blossom with gold light," *Ion* 890). Blood flowing onto ground is usually dark, Lloyd-Jones 1990 i. 303. *Krokou baphas*, from this fear-filled context, is echoed later: *krokobaphēs* qualifies a pale fearful inner liquid, *Ag.* 1121. Cf. *chlōron deima*, *Il.* 10.376; Sappho 31V; E. *Supp.* 599; Pi. fr. 123 (Snell-Maehler); and compare comic jokes about yellowing oneself in fear, e.g., Ar. *Ran.* 308.

[60] Böhme (1929) projected modern distinctions between "physical" and "emotional," or "psychological" onto his treatment of soul-words, as Snell (1931) said reviewing him. Snell's own approach (1953, 1978) was to take psychic terms as "analogous to organs." He influenced Dodds 1951 and Fränkel 1975—he has influenced everybody—and this aspect of his work is one basis of my approach. But I would stress that any "analogy" is in *our* minds, not in Greek mentality, for to say that *Greek* imagination made an analogy between psychic and physical would anachronistically imply that it drew that distinction.

[61] Ilongot: Rosaldo 1980:37–47. This example and this study illuminate Homeric mind-

"Spirit," "Soul," "Mind"

> A word's meaning depends not so much on its linguistic past but rather on the place the word occupies in relation to the general system of the language at the period in question.
> —J. P. Vernant, *Myth and Society in Ancient Greece*

Three final words, *thumos*, *psuchē*, and *nous*, raise new, more complicated questions. Or perhaps they raise similar issues, but in more acute and complex ways. They have inspired argument throughout European philosophy. I introduce them here as "innards" because Greek is clear that they are "in" us, and because they share profoundly in the learning, feeling, thinking, and dividing attributed to innards. In early Greek poetry, they share the intermittent physicality of heart, *phrēn*, and *cholos*. They behave *like* them.[60] The question is not what actual physical reference they might have, but how the words behave. Homer and tragedy use them as if *thumos*, *nous*, and *psuchē* are contained and move, like other innards, inside the body. This must be the basis for our approach to them, as readers of the language and poetry which pliantly express Greek assumptions about what is within us.

Thumos derives from *thuō*, "I seethe," used of an angry man or sea. So far, I have translated it as "spirit." "Soul" or "heart" work in some contexts, "impulse," "desire," or "courage" in others. *Thumos* is notoriously difficult to translate into English. It may be that other non-European languages—Ilongot, for instance—would recognize and pinpoint its range better. In action, *thumos* is appetitive, practical, urgent. It impels a person to satisfy desire for food, drink, song. People wish in their *thumos*. It is energetic, imperious. It "commands" people, stirs them up. It is often coupled with *menos* in battle contexts ("energy and spirit," "force and courage"), but it can be turned and persuaded, like the heart.[61]

A common practical but archaizing translation for *thumos* is "heart," as in "take heart," "heartening." Like *kardia*, *thumos* is a site of feeling. Fear "falls" into it. A person rejoices in or with it. It is glad in their breast. A friend is "dear to their *thumos*." Agamemnon cherished Briseis "from his *thumos*." Medea, seeing Jason, was "struck by desire in her *thumos*." *Thumos* suffers, endures. Immortal Apollo says mortals have an enduring *thumos*. In a sense, this tough *thumos* is independent of self. "You" can oppose your *thumos*. In a speech that grounds the fall of Troy in divine conflict—or self-conflict—Zeus expresses anger with Hera, who wants to abort the human truce. Hating Troy, she wants the war to go on to its destructive end. Zeus would rather save Troy. But he gives way, to avoid "conflict between us two." He gives ground "willingly but with an unwilling *thumos*."[62] War shall continue, based on conflict not between Zeus and his wife, but between Zeus and his own *thumos*.

Like *cholos* and *menos*, *thumos* is central to anger. When it is the subject of an active verb, it is often translated "anger." But people are also angry in or with their *thumos*. *Thumos* is "piercing," "stronger than reasoned plans." But, like *ētor*, it can also reason and consider. Words are thrown "into" it. One deliberates "in *phrenes* and *thumos*."[63] Yet *thumos* is "in" *phrenes*. It collects in them, increases there, fills a person. In this it seems to resemble *menos*. It is "breathed out" or flies off at death. The *thumos* of warring gods is "blown" in different directions. This range of usages suggests a liquid or

words profoundly. In her study of Homeric *thumos*, Caswell (1990) concentrates on its semantic associations and contexts, and sees *thumos* at the center of every internal experience. *Thumos* desiring, commanding: see *Il.* 8.301, 16.255; *Od.* 9.139; Pi. *O.* 3.25; *Il.* 10.220; S. *El.* 286. Cf. *Od.* 9.302, "but another *thumos* held me back." In everyday fifth-century vocabulary as reflected by Aristophanes, *thumos* often means "anger," "desire," or "instinct," Handley 1956:207–8. *Thumos* as "stronger than yourself": Dodds 1951:16. As "spirit": e.g., *Il.* 20.174; *Od.* 10.406 (cf. Sappho 42V). *Thumos* persuaded: *Il.* 15.94, *Od.* 9.33. Calypso's "is not made of iron but compassionate," *Od.* 5.191. Address to your own *thumos* or instruction by it: see Lloyd-Jones 1983:9, 14–20, 23, 38–39, 44; Darcus 1980.

[62] *Thumos* as "heart," enduring: e.g., *Il.* 14.156, 7.189, 24.49. Loving "from *thumos*": *Il.* 9.343. *Thumos* struck with desire: *Med.* 8. Locus of courage and endurance in Aristophanes: Handley 1956:216. *Thumos* declines in use after Homer; see Claus 1981:49; Darcus 1981. *Psuchē* replaces many innard-words in most fourth-century philosophy, but Plato brings back *thumos* for the divided soul in *Rep.* bk. 4. Under his influence (presumably), Aristotle reclaims this now old-fashioned-seeming word; see *EN* 1149A25–B2; Burnyeat 1980a:79, 84, 90 (see esp. nn. 17, 21). "Willing with unwilling *thumos*": *Il.* 4.38, 43.

[63] *Thumos* as sharp strong anger: *Il.* 1.429, 17.254, 9.496; *OC* 1193; *Med.* 1079. Site of "pondering": *Il.* 1.193, 2.409, 15.566; *PV* 706; Caswell 1990:2–3, 28, 35. S. *El.* 1347 seems to mean "I cannot even bring him [or memory of him] into my *thumos*." Electra cannot recognize or remember the man to whom she entrusted Orestes. Jebb (*ad loc.*) translates: "I cannot even bring [a conjecture] into my mind." Electra has just been asked, "Don't you understand what is going on?" She answers with *ge*: "No, and I don't even *es thumon pherō*." We should link this with *enthumoumai*, "I have in mind." *Thumos* is here expected to have an intellectual role.

breath, like *menos*, yet elsewhere *thumos* behaves more like a vessel or an object. Like *kardia*, *thumos* is "seized" by *menos* and beats in the breast. Like *phrēn*, it is "knocked" by *atē*. People "gnaw" it in anger.[64]

Clearly, the question "What is *thumos*?" must have a complex answer that allows it to be several kinds of thing. No single explanatory word, like "breath" or "agitation,"[65] "life force,"[66] or "faculty,"[67] will do. The "breath" element is important. The Latin equivalent of *thumos* is *spiritus*, related to "respiration." But *thumos* is also liquid, like *cholos*, which boils in and swells the innards. *Thumos* is a thing seized, struck, gnawed, a receptacle filled, a volatile, forceful breath or liquid, an emotion and impulse (passionate anger, desire), a *place* of emotion and inner debate ("heart," "mind"), and a

[64] *Thumos* in *phrenes*: *Od.* 20.38, *Il.* 13.280. Collects in the *phrēn*: *Il.* 22.475. Runs back into the breast: *Il.* 4.152. Caswell (1990) thinks it fundamental to Homeric *thumos* that it is contained in *phrenes*. Hector "increases the *thumos*" of his allies by food and gifts, *Il.* 17.226. *Thumoō*, like *choloō*, is "I make angry," presumably with a similar background picture, filling with angry liquid; cf. E. *Supp.* 581, *thumōsai phrenas*. The more common middle voice suggests, like *choloomai*, "I am filled with *thumos*," as with a liquid; cf. "filled" with *thumos*, e.g., Pl. *Rep.* 411C; Isoc. 12.81. It flies off, as if it were "spirit," at death, *Od.* 10.163, leaving the bones, *Il.* 12.386. Breathed out at death: *Il.* 13.654, 20.403. Blown different ways: *Il.* 21.386. *Menos* seizing, filling, thrown into *thumos*: *Il.* 23.468, 22.312, 17.451. *Thumos* "beats" in the breast in fear, hoping for victory: *Il.* 7.216, 23.370. Gashed in anger: *Il.* 1.243. Like *kradiē*, *thumos* "warms" in the breast, *Od.* 4.548. Grief "comes on" *thumos* and *kradiē* together, *Il.* 2.171. The obstinate, struggling *thumos* is struck by *atē*, *Ant.* 1097. Aristophanes parodies such passages: *Nub.* 1368–69, "My heart heaved, but biting my *thumos* I said . . ."; cf. above, n. 38. Bremmer (1983:54) takes *thumos* as an ego-soul that moves. He and Caswell (1990, who stresses the "wind-breath" view) do not make enough room for passages where *thumos* behaves as a vessel, as something beaten or gashed.

[65] Onians (1954:49–58) pioneered the concrete-to-abstract approach, took *thumos* as "breath," and collected rich material around this idea. Breath has been the strongest candidate in recent discussion; see Redfield 1975:174; and Caswell 1990:16, 62–63, who points out the qualities *thumos* has in common with winds and suggests it is "the human counterpart to winds." Jaynes (1976:69) calls *thumos* "simply motion or agitation." From the idea that a raging sea has *thumos*, he infers that *thumos* is "not really an organ and not always localized," not letting it be thought of in several ways at once.

[66] Claus (1981:22, 37–42) has the most useful analysis of possible approaches to this Greek material. Rosaldo (1980) suggests freer approaches to such words, perhaps because the language and society she studies are removed from the Greek tradition. Claus (p. 15) opposes the concrete-to-abstract reasoning of Onians (also reminding us, p. 25 n. 45, of the middle ground suggested by Nilsson). He identifies a core meaning "life force" in most "soul-words," which in my view weakens his clear-headed, skeptical approach. He analyzes (pp. 37–42) different "shadings" of *thumos* in different Homeric contexts, but his "anomalous uses" are those which do not fit his "life force" meaning. Like Jaynes (in this instance), he does not allow for fluctuations in ideas of *thumos*, which might behave in turn as a breath, an agent, an organ, a force, or as several (to us different) things at once.

[67] Sullivan (1988) takes the opposite corner from Onians. She rightly refuses to "limit each term to a particular range of meaning" (p. 36 n. 50). But in expounding soul-words, she substitutes "faculty indeterminately corporeal" for "organ" (pp. 8–9; see below, n. 86), and "faculty" in this context is equally loaded and anachronistic.

force or cast of mind: "spirit," "temper." We might compare it to a Greek divine persona, and say that *thumos* "is" the principle that connects all these different things in Greek mentality. Like the Ilongot's *liget*, *thumos* is either the sum, or the common denominator, or both, of its possible activities, at work in Greek imagination. Volatility is its own essence, and the essence of how it is perceived.

A similar volatility marks the history and semantic field of *psuchē*. It, too, behaves sometimes like breath,[68] sometimes like blood.[69] Sometimes it means simply "life." You fight about it, risk it. You have only one, which leaves you at death.[70] But *psuchē* is also the sensual, emotional, purposeful self. It feels and endures. In battle you are "strong in hands and *psuchē*." In this sense, it "dies" in you by faltering. You are struck in it, "overcome in your *psuchē* by *erōs*." You please it by satisfying a desire.[71] *Psuchē* can be a source of perception, can be coupled with "thought" and "reason" in an intellectual and moral role. A *psuchē* can be "bad."[72]

[68] Breathlike, connected perhaps with *psuchō*, "I blow": see Snell 1953:9; Claus 1981:93 n. 3. It crosses your *herkos odontōn*, *Il.* 9.408. You gasp it away when you faint, *Il.* 22.467. *Psuchorrhageō* is "I gasp out my life": *Alc.* 20, *HF* 324, *IT* 1466. For a critique of suggested meanings (vital fluid, etc.), see Bremmer (1983:11, 13–17, 21 n. 21), who accepts the relation of *psuchē* with *psuchein*.

[69] Bloodlike as well as breathy (see Claus 1981:68), it gushes from a wound, *Il.* 14.518, 16.505. At moments of destruction it is linked with *menos*: see Böhme 1929:112; Claus 1981:61. Electra sucks the blood of her mother's *psuchē*, S. *El.* 786. Cf. Ar. *Nub.* 712, and *psuchopotēs* (Hesych. s.v.). Onians (1954:94–122, 129ff.) associates it with brain-and-spinal fluid, and semen. Claus reconsiders the "breath" view, starting from a usage that "implies blood" (pp. 95–97). He elicits from the contradictory material a "relatively consistent life-force identity" of *psuchē* in Homer. But again he loses the possibility that, like *menos*, the word can mean something that is conceived in several ways at once. Bremmer (1983:5) points out that the fact that *psuchē* may once have had a connection with breath does not necessarily mean it has this meaning in Homer, nor that we should expect to find its use consistent.

[70] See *Od.* 3.74 (risking it), *Il.* 9.322, *Od.* 22.245 (fighting for it), *Il.* 21.569 (Achilles has one, and men think him mortal). See Garland 1981; and for post-Homeric references, see also Claus 1981:64 (with nn. 16–22). Struggle "about a *psuchē*" is about a "life" (often in Euripides, e.g., *Heraclid.* 984 and *Or.* 847, but also in Aeschylus and Sophocles, e.g., *Eum.* 115, S. *El.* 1493, *Ant.* 559; cf. *OC* 999—a return to "life"). *Psuchē* can be coupled with *menos*, *aiōn* (e.g., *Il.* 16.453), *biotos* (e.g., Thgn. 730 Bergk), and *thumos* (e.g., *Il.* 11.334), as if they all meant "life." Things "dear as *psuchē*" are dear as life, *Erg.* 686. Your children are your *psuchē*, *Andr.* 419 (see further Claus 1981:64 with n. 21). Claus (1981:93–102) discusses the old view that *psuchē* developed from "shade" (of the dead) to "life," but he prefers to think that even by Homer's time *psuchē* was absorbed into "life-force" words, and so behaved like one itself. (His project is to elicit a model of patterns of usage for consciousness-words that illuminates the presence of *psuchē* in classical Greek).

[71] Pi. *P.* 1.48; Ar. *Eq.* 457; Pi. *N.* 9.32, 39; S. *El.* 903 (the sight "impresses" my *psuchē*); *Hipp.* 527, 505 (I have schooled my *psuchē* to endure *eros*). Aristophanes reflects an everyday usage of *psuchē* as courage, character, life, but a poetic usage of it as life, soul after life, the enduring, emotional soul, according to Handley 1956:207, 212–15; cf. Webster 1957:150–51.

[72] *Phil.* 1014; *Ant.* 176 (where it is coupled with *phronēma* and *gnōmē*); *OC* 499. In tragedy, this usage appears most often in Sophocles. "Psychological" usage in Homer: Claus 1981:99–102. *Psuchē* associated with intelligence: Claus 1981:157–58.

Psuchē was also used in a way that became historically crucial to us through Plato's speculation on it and subsequent usage in Christian Greek. Much Greek writing is lost. The first time in extant work that *psuchē* seems to mean soul, the essential "you," potentially immortal, is in Heraclitus in the late sixth century, followed by Pindar in the fifth century. This usage became important in prose in the fourth century, especially in philosophy, above all in Plato. Plato makes central the idea of *psuchē* as the important "you" in your life. He conceives of it in such a way that it makes sense to debate its immortality: does the important "you" survive death? *Psuchē* becomes the vehicle of personal identity between now and any possible afterlife.[73]

This meaning belongs with another early meaning of *psuchē*, common in Homer: "spirit" in the sense of "ghost." The *psuchai* of dying heroes go down to Hades, shrieking, while "they themselves" are left as carcasses on the field. *Psuchē* leaves the body in a faint, or at death, "when *thumos* first leaves the white bones, and *psuchē* takes wing and flies off like a dream." In Hades, the ghosts are *eidōla*, "images," insubstantial negatives of the bodies they once enlivened. Charon, like Hermes, is *psuchopompos*, "escort of souls." This *psuchē* is a flying thing: *psuchē* could mean "moth" in later prose.[74] As "ghost" or "immortal soul," *psuchē* is detachable from the physical self. Elsewhere, people address their own *psuchē*, or it speaks to them, as other innards do.[75]

Psuchē behaves differently, therefore, in different contexts. Like *thumos*, it can be breathlike or fluid, ebb from the body, fly or flutter overhead. But it also acts like an organ in the body. Like the heart, with which it is often coupled ("O my poor *psuchē* and heart"), it shakes in agitation. Like the *phrēn*, it "wanders" in madness. Dionysus is *psuchoplanēs*, "he who makes

[73] Pi. fr. 133 (Snell-Maehler), first used by Rohde to make his case for *psuchē* meaning "life"; see Hdt. 2.123; Pl. *Meno* 81B. For Heraclitus, see Snell 1953:17–19; C. Kahn 1979:126–30, 238–40, 311 (see esp. nn. 112–13); Claus 1981:125–38. Before Plato, the two issues (soul as the important "you," soul as immortal) should be treated separately. Heraclitus's *psuchē* may or may not be immortal, but it does already look like the essential "you"; see Nussbaum 1972.

[74] Soul distinguished from carcass-self: *Il.* 1.3. Soul flies off: *Od.* 11.221–22. Sarpedon's soul leaves him when the spear is pulled out. Mist covers his eyes, but he breathes again. Boreas's breath makes him live after he loses his *thumos*, *Il.* 5.696–99. *Psuchē* as soul flying off at death is rare in tragedy, but cf. *Or.* 676, and the images of flying things in the mind, the flying mind, pp. 96–97. Souls taken down to Styx and across it: *Od.* 11.37, 83. Hermes Psychopompos: Plu. *Mor.* 758B; *Od.* 24.1–10; see above, Chapter 1. Charon *psuchopompos*: *Alc.* 361. *Psuchē* as "shade": see Claus 1981:61, 66–68, 86–88. Nilsson (1955, 1:198 n. 53) connected the soul's departure with the first creatures settling on the corpse, as if early representations of the soul had the shape of flying insects. *Psuchē* as moth or butterfly: Arist. *HA* 551A14.

[75] Pi. *P.* 3.61; *Phil.* 712; *Ant.* 227; *Hipp.* 173. Internal dialogue: cf. above, n. 61.

souls wander."[76] *Psuchē* is appetitive, perceptive, mobile, intelligent, "life," "self," "mind," "soul," "ghost." When we choose a word to translate it, we tilt each passage with a particular load of *psuchē*'s semantic heritage, picking over the debris from centuries of reflection accumulated between the early Greeks and ourselves. As far as translation goes, different words fit different contexts. *Psuchē* escapes through wounds, continues an independent eternal existence outside the body, but keeps enough of its relationship with a particular self to resemble that self's body in Hades. If any inner human part is immortal, it is the *psuchē*. Yet even this is shadowily somatic.

Nous, *no-os*, is most often simply translated "mind." It is an essentially perceiving force: "intention," "sense." *Nous* sees and hears. People who act with *nous*, and "have" it, are sensible. People who do not are senseless, unwise, insane. When *nous* is directed towards an object it is something like "attention." But it is also emotional. People enjoy with their *nous*. *Nous* stays "unafraid in the breast."[77] It is intellect and intelligence: an *anoos kardia* is an "unintelligent heart." Or it is an act of intellect, a "thought," a "plan." The philosopher Anaxagoras uses it of the active cosmic principle, the blueprinting force behind the universe.[78]

No one has suggested any physical reference for *nous*, yet Greek poets often make it behave like *phrēn* or *kardia*. Verbally, it follows the pattern of heart, *phrēn*, *thumos*, suggesting a vessel, and an organ, and a force. In that drinking-song fantasy of carving the breast to see the mind, the aim is to see *nous*, and to know someone is your friend "with an undeceiving *phrēn*." This is a joke, of course, but what is it joking about? That *nous* and *phrēn* are hidden, like *splanchna*. If only we could see them and see into them.

[76] Ar. *Nub.* 319; *AP* 9.524.24; *Or.* 466. Cf. Pl. *Ti.* 69B–C, "Receiving the immortal *archēn psuchēs*, they framed round it a mortal body, and gave it the body as its vehicle, and housed in this another *eidos psuchēs*, the mortal one, which has terrible passions," a passage reflecting Plato's own "insight into the disunity" (see below, n. 115) of Greek soul-and-body language. Meissner (1951) documented *psuchē*'s organlike behavior in early Greek, suggesting that a distinction between organic and inorganic words begins to break down in Euripides, until *psuchē* is interchangeable with *kardia*.

[77] Intention and sense: *Il.* 5.461; Epich. 249; cf. *OT* 371; *Od.* 6.321; *Il.* 20.133; *OT* 550; *OC* 931; *Trach.* 553; *IA* 1139. Attending, enjoying: *Phoen.* 1418; *Or.* 1181; *Ion* 251; *Od.* 8.78; *Il.* 3.63. Handley (1956:208–9) looks at everyday fifth-century usage of *phrenes* and *nous* through Aristophanes: *nous* emerges as "attention, sense, intelligence, purpose, attitude."

[78] *Il.* 21.441; cf. Xenoph. fr. 25DK (KRS pp. 169–71 with n. 3). "The *phrēn* of *nous*": see Snell 1953:141, 316 n. 16. *Nous* with *mētis*: *Il.* 15.509; *Od.* 5.23; cf. *Il.* 23.149 (purpose, desire). See the crucial work of von Fritz 1943, 1945, and esp. 1946:30–31, which give the background to this usage (Anaxag. fr. 12DK). He concludes that usage of *nous* and *noein* changes after Parmenides. In early philosophy, the main function of *nous* and *noein* is to discover the "real" world. After Parmenides, *idein*'s range (used in Homer for thinking, realizing) is confined, while that of *noein* is enlarged. *Nous* appropriates the meanings of other words until it is used synonymously with *phrēn*, *mētis*, and *merimna*.

Thoughts are hidden "in" *nous*. *Cholos* swells it. Zeus's *noos* is "dense," "solid." People wish with their *nous* as well as with their tongue. Old age is "shed over" and damages their eyes and their *nous*. *Nous* suffers along with physical organs and faculties. Poets and philosophers treat it linguistically as they do the other innards. *Nous* pulls into itself a concreteness we associate with other innard-words.[79] The liver's associations show how gods are expected to signal their interest in innards. *Nous* shares this. Homer's Odysseus, a king disguised as a beggar, talks of human fortunes changing. When we are happy, we never expect to change. But "when gods decree trouble," a person

> bears this in his enduring *thumos*,
> for such is the *noos* of earth-born human beings,
> as is day, which the father of gods and men brings.

Our *nous* depends on the fortune and "day" that gods send, which change according to divine decision. These words reverberate throughout the Greek tradition, into and beyond the pre-Socratic idea that *nous* made the universe, yet *nous* is in us.[80] *Nous* brings out the thought that something inside human beings is divine, not (like *psuchē*) in the sense "immortal," but in the sense of sharing divine power or knowledge. Democritus speaks of *theios* (divine) *nous*. "*Nous* is to us in each of us a god" says Euripides in a contextless fragment of perfectly balanced ambiguity.[81]

Metaphor and "Anatomical Details"

> We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native language.
> —Benjamin Lee Whorf, *Language, Thought and Reality*

Heart, soul, mind, and spirit sharpen the issue of physical immediacy. I have brought up the question of whether the fifth century distinguished

[79] *Il.* 1.363, 9.554, 15.461; *OC* 936; Mimn. 5.8 (West). Zeus puts an *esthlos noos* in a man's breast, *Il.* 13.732. Sol. fr. 10 insults the Athenians by saying their *noos* is *chaunos*. Jaynes (1976:286) calls Solon on *noos* "the first real statement of the subjective conscious mind," but in fact Solon is of a piece with earlier and contemporary ideas of both *nous* and other innards. Aristotle is prepared to wonder whether *nous* has no essential connection with the body or any organ, *De anim.* 403A3–11, 429A24–27.

[80] *Od.* 18.136–37. *Ep'* is presumably separated from its verb, *ageisi*. *Ep' ēmar* is unlikely (*pace* Kelly 1979:227) to mean "each day." *Epi* with accusative of time means "throughout," "during." *Hoion* should go with *ēmar* and does not (unfortunately for ambiguity-prone translation) refer to *noos*. Archil. 131 (West—see Snell 1953:47, 313 n. 2) and Parm. fr. 16 (see Fränkel 1975:363 n. 37) both imitated the passage (see pp. 43 and 71 below). Cf. perhaps Heraclitus fr. 17DK (Fränkel 1975:372). *Nous* making the universe: see KRS pp. 362–66.

[81] Democrit. fr. 112DK; Arist. *De anim.* 404A28. With Euripides fr. 1018 (Nauck), cf. *Tro.* 884–88.

between literal and metaphorical. It is likely they did not, or not with the distinctions we make. Our distinctions rest on distinctions drawn first in the fourth century, in Aristotle's generation. Before Aristotle, scientists treat an image (the universe governed by justice, for example) as sufficient explanation of the phenomenon (that there is regularity and balance in the large-scale changes of the world). The image is not a vehicle for explanation. It *is* the explanation. Hippocratic writers, using figurative comparisons to state a theory about the body, often follow the "as" of the illustration by an emphatic "in this way," as if the comparison proved the theory. One Hippocratic writer explains how the body makes stones in the body by an image of "smelting." The image, a process similar to smelting, becomes the explanation. Its metaphorical status is not seen, or not as we perceive it. *We* take the Greek image of cosmic order as justice to be metaphor, an import from morality to cosmology, therefore not the *explanation* of cosmic order and relationships. Before Aristotle, to call it justice is to explain its working.[82]

The likelihood of a profound chasm here between "our" approach to metaphor and that of pre-Aristotelian Greeks has deep bearing on our response to tragic language of consciousness and feeling (Chapters 6 and 7). The words I have looked at either have a clear basic reference to a material organ or to breath or fluid ("heart," *cholos*), or behave intermittently as if they did (*phrēn*, *menos*, *thumos*, even *psuchē* and *nous*). We shall see that *theories* of the human interior assume that breath and fluid occupy the same channels of the body (Chapter 3). The poets do not put everything they say together at once as a "theory," to be "believed." They use their language and images flexibly, sometimes in what we receive as a metaphorical sense. We read phrases like "his *phrēn* was turned" as metaphors. We expect metaphors anyway in that type of context, since consciousness cannot be seen, and any account of "mind" and what happens to it must be framed in some metaphor or other. In our world, we knowingly substitute metaphor for observing that we cannot do.

Further, our own vocabulary, which we bring to these words and use in explaining them to ourselves, is not neutral. It incorporates centuries of philosophy in several languages, which began from, and then changed, these very words. Our sense of these Greek words as metaphors or as physical entities is invisibly but profoundly influenced by their semantic fortunes in major texts of philosophy and science from Plato onwards.

We often ignore the metaphorical status of apparently equivalent words. "Mind-blasting," we say. "Filled with fear." Or, more archaic, "heartsick." "Torn with grief." These are clichés so worn that they seem to describe. In

[82] See Chapter I, n. 19; Lloyd 1966:357–58, 1990:23–24; Vlastos 1947. "Justice" in cosmic order first articulated by Anaximander: see C. Kahn 1979:19; Lloyd 1979:247, 1990:20.

fact, they are metaphors that imply specific images for what is inside us. *Phrēn*, *kardia*, *thumos*, nebulously vessel-like, fillable, tearable, recognizably Greek, lurk behind these phrases, having directed centuries of European imagery, but in our language they are unmeaning fossils that do not match what we now believe is inside us.

Here is another core difference between "us" and fifth-century Athenians. We tolerate extraordinary dissociations between what we think is inside us and what we imply is inside us when we speak of our feelings. We, not they, are the cultural oddity. We inherit Greek vocabulary and imagery about thought and feeling but do not share the ideas about innards that inform their usage in the fifth century. When we meet an image like "my heart leapt in fear," we translate it into terms of our own world, where it has a different life, metamorphosed by Christian, Roman, mediaeval, Renaissance, eighteenth-century, and later associations. There is no reason to think the Greeks tolerated similar dissociations. The Ilongot do not seem to. The Greeks did not have, as we do, theories and literature from many different cultures and languages behind their use of these words.

Our own dissociated condition has brought about rifts in scholars' approaches to Greek language of consciousness and feeling. At one point, for instance, Aeschylus speaks of the heart "circling" against the *phrēn*. Some scholars have argued against seeing any physical reference at all. "Anatomical details," says one very great scholar, "should not be dragged in: they would obscure the meaning." Others have taken the opposite line, defending purely physiological meaning over any abstract or metaphoric resonances. *Phrenes* only means lungs, and no more. This second approach can end in bizarre claims. In one passage, Aeschylus's chorus, faced with ambiguous prophecies of Agamemnon's death, sings of its hopeless, painful forebodings:

> My *kardia* would say all this,
> outrunning tongue, but as it is
> it mutters in the dark,
> hurt in the *thumos*, not hoping—
> though my *phrēn* is on fire—
> ever to unwind any useful plan.

What does this chorus mean? How should we respond to its talk of *thumos*, *kardia*, and *phrēn*? One physiologically-minded critic argues that gods must have prescribed a precise physical relationship between heart and tongue, which it was perilous to ignore.[83] But to take this at only a "concrete" level seems perverse.

[83] See Fraenkel *ad Ag.* 996; Barrett *ad Hipp.* 1464; *Ag.* 1028–30; Earp 1948:174; Lloyd-

I suspect that all fifth-century uses of these words have some somatic tinge, more or less strong in different contexts, but always available, in direct relationship (here the contrast with us is very strong) with what Greeks believed was inside people. It is always hard to know if we rightly distinguish literal from metaphorical senses in another culture's use of words. Our own language is a window through which *we* see the world and ourselves, and look at other languages.[84] If tragedy's contemporaries did not articulate the distinction that we draw between literal and metaphorical usage, what matters is the pattern of relationship and the associations with which they imbued these words. (We can call this their pattern of imagery, provided we remember that what looks like an "image" to us may have been truth for them.) This overall pattern—"heart," for example, is mobile, *thumos* rises and fills our *phrēn*—shapes explicit philosophical speculation after the fifth century and may reveal its own psychological assumptions. Faced with an ancient foreign language whose speakers are inaccessible, our business is to reach for as many implications as we can in the words they used for feeling and how it is felt. These implications must be grounded in their associations, not ours. But we need to be aware that the arm with which we reach exists in, and will go on being part of, the twentieth-century world. The way in which it grasps is ours.

It has traditionally been part of a philologist's job to prise apart a word's "shades" of meaning in a particular passage. It is against philology's grain to say that a Greek word has simultaneously an abstract or metaphorical as well as a literal and concrete sense. But the shades of meaning we find will always be directed by the relationship between Greek and the language or languages in which we ourselves think, and it may be that our own languages are not the best ones through which to approach these words and the picture of consciousness they enshrine. "Every language is a vast pattern-system, different from others, in which are culturally ordained the forms and categories by which the personality not only communicates, but also analyses nature, notices or neglects types of relationship and phenomena."[85]

Ordained? Maybe not. But our language does predispose us to make assumptions that impede objective observation of how Greek uses its con-

Jones 1990 i. 328. Webster (1957:152) merges different approaches by speaking of the physical concentrate of psychological stress.

[84] See Steiner 1972:877–88, 1975:49–108.

[85] Whorf 1956:252. He argues that each person's thought is controlled by specific patterns, "the unperceived systematizations" of their native language. Whorf's hypotheses are controversial, but the work he did in comparing language families has much to offer classicists, especially in this area of words for equipment of thinking and feeling (cf. our inheritance of "dark" discourse of mind, and the "flow of feeling," pp. 76 and 84). See further Dilthey 1972:232; Wicker 1975:74–75; Steiner 1975:88–89.

sciousness-words, and to take our own linguistic categories as the norm when we interpret theirs. Suppose that for Aeschylus, as for the Ilongot using their word *liget*, *phrēn* and *kardia* have a concrete force (like "tongue") *and* an abstract force simultaneously? Our word "abstract" comes from the Latin *ab-traho*, "I drag away." (In modern Greek, *aphairēmenos*, "taken away, removed," strikes the same note.) What if Aeschylus's thought-world does not feel, as we do, that the meaning of *phrēn* in one passage, where English translators say "mind," is "removed" or distanced in any way from its meaning in another, where translators find something like "diaphragm" more "natural"?

The same words appear in both kinds of context. Scholars have different affiliations. Some are drawn to ban "anatomical details" from emotion-filled passages or the word "organ" from explanations of *phrēn* or *thumos*. Others investigate the precise bloodlike or breathy or lunglike "origins" of specific words.[86] But both have turned for support to a favorite heuristic device, the story. Chronological explanation of these words, evolving in the early twentieth century under pressure from the nineteenth-century search for "origins," has an outline roughly as follows.[87] Once, in a time to which even Homer cannot carry us back, but which existed before his work, these words did have simple original concrete meanings. But society grew up, wrote literature, thought about its own thinking, and gave these words metaphoric, abstract meanings. Concrete, literal meaning "came first." More sophisticated meanings grew upon them.

This vision rests, so far as one can trust *its* origins, on the "myth of origins," a biographic approach to ideas and institutions. The claim is that if we could find the *beginning*, the original kernel of a belief, institution, rit-

[86] *Phrenes* as lungs, *menos* as blood, *psuchē* as breath, spinal fluid, semen, or blood: Onians 1954:24–51. Claus (1981:7) rightly (I think) rejects "the analysis of these words by etymology and identification with specific physical organs." Sullivan (1988:7–8) thinks one could argue the views of both Snell ("analogous to organs," 1953, 1978) and Onians (see references in Sullivan 1988:16 n. 29) that these words refer to specific organs. But because "psychic terms differ from physical organs," Sullivan (see above, n. 67) avoids the word "organ" because it stresses the "physical basis." Snell (1953:15) found it "hard" to use "organ" for *thumos*. Sullivan suggests that over time the psychic terms lost their mainly physical connotations and became what we call "faculties." Explicitly, she rejects the chronological model (that the words once designated something physical, then came to designate something psychological), reminding us that in Homer our distinction between material and immaterial is not made. But implicitly she does follow the model, though she pushes it further back to a pre-Homeric period. By calling innard-words "faculties indeterminately corporeal," she removes vivid somatic force from their usage; and an entire, complex, post-Greek philosophy lurks in her word "faculty."

[87] On the "genetic approach" of early anthropology in the context of the nineteenth-century search for "origins" (of law, religion, species, etc.), see Evans-Pritchard 1962:10, 1972:37. Böhme (1929:2–11) commented that attempts to explain the psychological weight of a word like *phrenes* from earlier physiological usage had not worked.

ual, or verbal meaning, this would adequately explain the meaning and function of the belief, institution, or word when later societies use it. A related assumption, also potent in early anthropology, is that evolutionary patterns move from the simple to the complex, from primitive literalness and concreteness to abstraction.

Nowadays none of this will do. It is clear that early things are not necessarily less complex than later ones. Ancient Greek is more complex than modern, for instance. Each case must be argued separately, in biology, anthropology, theology, or grammar. The "original meanings" or "genetic" approach to Greek words of consciousness is now part of history, to be seen in *its* context: an expression of the nineteenth century's desire to "explain the nearer by the farther."[88] Yet even if the nineteenth-century dream were true, and it were possible to find out what *phrēn*, for example, was or might have meant in some inaccessible Greek past, this does not explain what it is, at work in living systems like Homeric and tragic language.

The "original meanings" account also fitted assumptions behind the mythic narrative embodied in Freud's distinction between "primary" and "secondary" thought-processes. He distinguished between metaphoric, imaginative thought-processes, which he called "primary," and rational, analytic ones, which he called "secondary."[89] This implied that the European experience of a transition from magical to scientific thinking was universal, whereas in fact it seems to be unique and does not necessarily illustrate a general principle.[90] Today, most psychologists and psychoanalytic theorists reject the story pattern implicit in "primary" and "secondary," as well as the assumptions that these two modes of thought are in fact separate, that babies start with one and acquire the other. Historians of science accept that magical and rational modes of thought can operate simultaneously in the same society or individual—in Herodotus and the Hippocratics, for instance[91]—and that even scientific theories are influenced by story shapes of contemporary fiction. Darwin's theory of the origin of species, for example, seems to have been influenced by narratives and explanatory patterns in George Eliot. The nineteenth and early twentieth century perceived the world as "story-shaped" in a specific way,[92] to which the hidden fiction of Freud's "primary" and "secondary" thought-processes belonged.

[88] Bloch 1954:29ff. Claus (1981:14) situates both Onians and Snell within this early anthropological belief that the evolutionary move is from simple to complex, concrete to abstract.

[89] Freud's "primary" and "secondary processes": see Laplanche and Pontalis 1973:37, 43, 102–10; Rycroft 1968:42–53. In the development of psychoanalytic theory, the "displacement" of meaning was always "from the physical to the psychical," E. Sharpe 1978:155–56.

[90] See Tambiah 1973:227–28.

[91] See Horton and Finnegan 1973:17–19; Lloyd 1979:5–7, 31, 49 (with reference to Herodotus and Hippocratic writers).

[92] See Wicker 1975; Beer 1983 (on the influence of George Eliot's narratives on the formation of Darwin's theories).

A story outline for the "development" of Greek mind-words explained away any need to follow through significant differences between ourselves and ancient Greeks. "Once, *phrenes* meant lungs, *menos* blood, *psuchē* breath or semen. Then they developed, i.e., came to mean things more like what we recognize: abstract things, like mind, vigor, soul."

But it is too simple to claim that in one passage *kardia* has an original and literal sense, while in another it has a "developed," nonorganic metaphoric meaning. It ignores the labor that has gone into semantics, and interpretation, and the roles of metaphor in the history and philosophy of science in our own century. I would summarize tragic "innards" words, without story-shaped preconceptions, on the following lines. In tragedy, *phrēn*, *phrenes*, *kardia*, *hēpar*, *cholē*, *cholos*, and arguably *menos* refer to physical parts and substances that behave as physical parts and substances do behave (or as Greek mentality perceives them as behaving). Words whose physiological reference we cannot catch, like *thumos*, *psuchē*, *nous*, seem (to us at least) to pull this concreteness into their own behavioral range. *Menos*, *thumos*, *psuchē* all sometimes stream into or out of the body as breath or liquid. *Thumos* and *psuchē* also sometimes act like vessels filled by breath or fluid, that beat and knock and can be physically hurt by emotion. *Nous* never behaves as a fluid, but often behaves like a vessel receiving emotion or sensation. *Menos* and *cholos* are the only ones that are not occasionally treated as organs or vessels. No word has a total monopoly over thinking or feeling. Concrete physical inner organs belong with ideas of psychological agency. Intellectual activity is inseparable from emotional activity.

When I speak of innards, I mean all this equipment of feeling and thinking. The poets treat these words fluidly as organs, vessels, liquid, breath. But I am not suggesting that tragedians "blurred" distinctions we make between mind and body, or that these words were ambiguous, or that the psychological "overlapped" the physical in Greek thought. These critical metaphors of blur and overlap would imply that the Greeks perceived two different things to blur, two meanings to slip between. If the distinctions and meanings are ours, not theirs, then there were no two things for them to blur or be ambiguous about. It is not useful to project semantic fields of our own words, like heart, soul, mind, or spirit, or to talk in terms of slippage.[93]

Our own semantic fields, however, are what we have to work with. We

[93] Webster (1957) says that "a physical part of the body can be a psychological agent," that it is hard to distinguish mind from thinking or thinking from thought: "There is an overlap of meaning." Oosten (1973), Steiner (1975:92), and Bremmer (1983:4) warn, in widely different contexts, against the assumption that other cultures operate with the same "semantic fields" as our own.

might say that the essence of this Greek material is its contradictoriness and slipperiness *in our own eyes*. *We* can talk of overlap in meaning, because we find our categories climbing over each other like lobsters in the basket of each Greek word. A Dinka or Ilongot might find a quite different range of resonances in them (provided the mediating influence of English, French, or German lexica was absent). If scholars find inconsistencies and anomalies in the usage of these words, these may or may not bear upon inconsistencies in Greek thought and linguistic usage. We should not wish these away. They are a product of the relationship we create between our own culture and language and the one we want to understand. We should mark them, as scholars usefully do.[94] But we should remember that they belong to this *relationship* between our different languages and cultures, not necessarily to Greek itself. An Ilongot might find others.

It might be worth the effort to imagine a use of language in which both the abstract and the concrete coloring of each word are part of its sense, spoken into a world physically familiar with innards whose visible markings tell human beings things about divinity they could not otherwise see for themselves. This association alone warns us how far we are from fifth-century ideas of innards, and therefore from the tactile background to their use of those words in accounts of feeling and thinking.

Concreteness of the Innards: *Poroi* and Pre-Socratics

"Mind-words" have a strongly concrete sense in theorizing about the interior that is contemporary with tragedy: scientific thought whose starting point was popular ideas and poetic language. The fifth-century philosopher Diogenes thinks air is both *psuchē* and *noēsis* (intelligence). "That which has intelligence is what human beings call air. All people are steered by it; it has power over everything." We smell with "air around the brain." Aristophanes parodies these ideas, ascribing them, absurdly, not to Diogenes but to Socrates:

> I would never have found out rightly
> how things are above,
> except by hanging my *noēma* [intelligence]
> and mixing my rarified thought
> with air similar to it.

[94] Claus (1981:15, 28–46) argues that all Homeric "soul-words" (except *kradiē* and *psuchē*) designate one of three things. He tabulates their meanings, including a nomadic category of "anomalous instances." He rightly stresses that we should approach usage empirically, though I think he does not wipe the slate of our receptivity clean enough (cf. above, nn. 66–70). Caswell 1990, a "synchronic formulaic analysis," examines *thumos* in five categories of context.

Clearly such theories were known at Athens, though not necessarily understood.[95] Aristophanes loves mocking both philosophic and tragic language about mind and feeling. The tragic poets constantly use words for the complexities of heart, soul, mind. When Aristophanes brings this vocabulary onto the comic stage, straining its concreteness into parody, the audience knows he is mocking philosophy, or tragedy, or both.[96]

The writing of Anaxagoras, the fifth-century philosopher resident in Athens, suggests a similar tangibility of soul or mind. *Nous* is "the purest of all things." Heraclitus offers the thought that a "dry soul" is "best": when drunk, you have a "moist soul" and do not know where you are going.[97] He also has a topographic vision of the soul: "You would not find out the boundaries of *psuchē*, even by travelling over every path, so deep an account does it have." By "every path," he seems to suggest paths both outside in the world and within the soul itself.[98]

By the late fifth century, a key word is *poroi*, "routes, channels, ways, crossings": the word that gives us "pores." *Poroi* provide "ways" into, within, and out of the body. In the fourth century, Aristotle will maintain that the *splanchna* are situated on the "veiny *poroi*" (that is, those of the "channels" which are veins). *Splanchna*, like mud from a running stream, are deposited by the ooze of blood through veins. The great early promoter of *poroi* was Empedocles, who invites his reader to think "wherever there is a *poros* to understand." "Grasping with hands," he says (by which he may mean "perceiving"), is the "greatest wagon-path of persuasion into the *phrēn*":

> Observe with every grasp
> by whichever [sense] each thing is clear.
> Don't hold sight more trustworthy than hearing,
> or noisy hearing than the passages of the tongue.
> Don't keep from trusting any
> of the body's other parts,

[95] See Ar. *Nub.* 227–30; Diogenes, KRS 605, pp. 442–45; 612, pp. 447–49; cf. 616, pp. 451–52: *noēseis ginontai tou aeros sun tōi haimati to holon sōma katalambanontos dia tōn phlebōn*.

[96] Handley (1956:220–24) argues that "mind-words" in Aristophanes had little role in everyday vocabulary but were words good to play with in comedy because of their usage in serious poetry. This implies, however, that "serious poetry" addressed thinking and feeling differently from ordinary language, and that we cannot know this "ordinary language" except through the slippery evidence of the comedies themselves.

[97] KRS 476, pp. 362–64; Heraclitus, KRS 230–32, pp. 203–5. C. Kahn (1979:251) thinks Heraclitus sees *psuchē* as "an atmospheric substance intermediate between water and fire"; see his whole discussion, pp. 245–54. He suggests that *logon echei* (KRS 232) means something like "has the right or capacity to speak."

[98] See C. Kahn 1979:128; cf. *OT* 67; *Ant.* 225–26; and Bachelard 1969:187–210 on the poetics of internal routes, internal "immensity."

wherever there is a *poros* for understanding:
recognize each thing by whatever way it is clear.[99]

In his theory of respiration, *poroi* play a more precise role. "Bloodless pipes of flesh are stretched over the body's surface." Blood and "bubbling air" rush in and out of the body through these pipes. Perception happens, "when something fits into the *poroi* of any of the senses. One sense cannot judge the objects of another, since the passages of some are too wide, of others too narrow, for the object perceived." *Poroi* can also be used for arteries and veins or any inner ducts. Plutarch calls the lungs *poluporoi*, "many-holed": they are "like a sieve, for the sake of liquids and solids." *Poroi* offer entry into the body from outside, and channels within, through which liquid can move.[100]

The notion of concrete entry into body and mind was expressed also by the fifth-century "atomists" in their theory of vision. Something *comes into* the eye. Later reporters of their work, like Epicurus, say they thought *eidōla*, "images," caused vision. *Eidōla* "stream off from the objects of sight and fall into the eye." Plutarch says the atomists thought "that perception and thought happen when *eidōla* come in from outside." The atomists themselves may have spoken in different terms: of bits of air, imprinted by something coming from the eye, or by something emanating from the object seen. Thoughts, visions, and ideas come from, or actually are, "images," air-imprints. They infiltrate the mind. They travel in through the body's passages.[101] This pattern of inward flow is also central to Greek medical theory (see Chapter 3).

Empedocles insists on concreteness not only of the routes but of the substance of thinking. Learning "increases *phrenes*." "Blood around the heart is *noēma* [thought, intelligence] for human beings." It is "especially

[99] Arist. *De part. anim.* 647A35–B4; Emp. KRS 396, p. 312, KRS 343, pp. 284–85. (I take *pēi* and *hēi*, 9 and 13, together rather than taking *pēi* as an indirect question, so that both refer to the means by which one grasps each thing. *Noēsai* must mean more than "perceive" here.)

[100] KRS 453, p. 341 (fourth-century report, not a direct quotation), 391, pp. 309–10; cf. *suringes*, fr. 100.2DK. Empedocles also used the traditional *poros humnōn* image, e.g., KRS 360, p. 296. On concreteness in Empedocles' ideas about thinking, see Long 1966:266–73. *Poroi* as veins: Arist. *HA* 510A14; Ap. Rh. 4.1647; perhaps *Aj.* 1412. Cf. references in Onians (1954:28–29), who suggests Homeric *lasion kēr* refers not to a hairy chest but to thickly branching innards. *Poluporos* lung: Plu. *Q. conv.* 7.1, 699B.

[101] Some have argued that the atomists explain in this way only certain kinds of vision. But Burkert (1977) proposed that in Democritus's "effluences" theory (reported in KRS 587–90, pp. 428–29), images were imprinted on the air (the medium between seen object and seeing eye). This is now generally accepted; see Barnes 1979, 2:175–76. Inward flow is basic to the theory in any interpretation. Cf. the testimonium on Heraclitus, DK 22A16, "In sleep the passages of perception are shut, and so the *nous* in us is separated from its natural unity with the surrounding medium": see C. Kahn 1979:294.

with the blood" that you "think."[102] Central here is the assumption that we are made, body and mind, of the same stuff as the world outside us. Anaximenes argues that air, the substance that "holds together" the outside world, also constitutes human intelligence. Empedocles thinks all matter (including us and our inner equipment) "came from" the same things:

From these things sprang all things
that were and are and shall be:
trees, men, women, beasts, birds,
water-nourished fish, and the long-lived gods.

The earth has "come together with" fire, moisture and *aithēr* (upper air). "From these blood and the forms of flesh arose."[103]

Empedocles locates our intelligence and thought in our blood, formed from the same stuff as the world. The idea of being the same fabric as the world was around much earlier. Already in the sixth century, Xenophanes said, "We all come from earth and water," and "all things that come to be, that grow, are earth and water."[104] The idea that the equipment of *thought* is the same stuff as the world is essential to the concreteness with which Greek speaks of inner organs. In a much-discussed fragment, Parmenides, another philosopher-poet, echoes Odysseus's words comparing the human mind to the "day" that Zeus brings on. He echoes also the lyric poet Archilochus, who reworked these words. Parmenides says that thought varies "according to whether hot or cold prevails":

For as each man has a mixture in his much-wandering limbs,
so is *noos* present for human beings.
For that is what thinks, the nature of limbs,
for all and everyone. What there is more of,
is thought (*noēma*).

This passage embodies the concreteness with which poetic and philosophic speculation approach what we call "mind." Mind is, or is in, or (a weaker version) is like, the body's limbs.[105]

I could quote many more illustrations from the pre-Socratics. I am not treating their work as theory, as the object of analysis, but listening to the imagery in the theories. Its concreteness resonates against the poets' language of mind and feeling. Both the theorists and the poets tell of a precise

[102] KRS 349, 394, 392, pp. 289, 311, 310.

[103] KRS 355, 373, pp. 392–94, 302. See Chapter 3, n. 4; Chapter 5, n. 10.

[104] KRS 373, 181–82, pp. 302, 175–76.

[105] There are alternative readings for Parm. fr. 16DK (e.g., *hekastote* for *hekastos*, *parestēken* for *paristatai*). This is my translation (cf. KRS 311, pp. 260–62). One alternative for lines 2–3 is, "the *phusis* of limbs is the same as what it thinks." For *Od.* 18.136 and Archil. 131 (West), see Fränkel 1975:123, above, n. 80.

pattern of relationship between the inside of the human being and the outside world. This pattern, I would say, is determined and disseminated by their culture and language. I assume that the poets' imagery for inner experience indicates implicit beliefs abroad in the culture about what is in people, how it gets there, and how it interacts with the world outside. Like the early philosophers, the tragedians got these beliefs from and through their language. It is not surprising that early theorizing about the world, and human relations with it, works with the same pattern of imagery as the poets, at a time when imagery is not a vehicle of explanation but embodies it. Emotional and intellectual events are not merely describable in the same terms as physical movement: they *are* physical movement. Aristotle attacks the pre-Socratics for believing that thinking (*to noein*) is "somatic," like perceiving (*to aisthanesthai*), and that "perceiving and thinking (*phronein*) are alike." Aristotle does not agree. But he implies that this is the correct interpretation of fifth-century views.[106]

Every writer has some story to tell or imply about mind and body. Languages outside the Western tradition also impel their users to think of self and mind in terms of the body as their cultures perceive it.[107] I am stressing, as something in fifth-century Greece that is alien to us, how concretely ideas about what we call mind are articulated. The pre-Socratics illustrate this concreteness in just the area we might expect it to be dimmed or removed: in "abstract" speculation.

Insight into Disunity

> World is crazier and more of it than we think,
> Incorrigibly plural.
> —Louis MacNeice, "Snow"

To this concrete Greek understanding of innards we now add their prophetic function. Innards are meaningfully marked and multiple. This concrete multiplicity, and its oddness in modern Western eyes, has inspired in our century some magnetically alienating approaches to early Greek images of self. The most influential approach compared early vase-painting, whose human figures have limbs separated from trunk and no "middle part," to both Homer's multiple words for the body in its different aspects and Homer's lack of a single word corresponding to our "body." A Homeric hero washes and puts armor on his "skin," moves his "limbs." Conclusion:

[106] See above, n. 82; Arist. *De anim.* 427A22–28, 427B6–7.

[107] See, e.g., Lienhardt 1980:76–79 on the bodily matrix in Dinka language of self; Rosaldo 1980:36–47 on Ilongot explanations of feeling and individuality through language of heart and breath.

no "grasp of the body as a unit." The Homeric body-image is fragmented, a bunch of independent parts.[108]

This argument has been enormously important in discussions of Greek ideas about self and mind. We are all indebted to it. But new work on body images makes the body side of this approach look too simple, and the theory has long been challenged on other grounds.[109] Early vase-paintings may show no "middle part" to the body, but that part is horribly present in the *Iliad*. Shields cover it, spears pierce it, guts fall out of it. The body's unity is central in a war poem, much of which consists in body combat and disintegration. So often we hear a phrase like "that shield did not keep out the spear," followed by the penetration and destruction of yet another body. Homeric poetry stresses the body's variousness, the diversity of bodily experience, especially damage. On the linguistic side, we know that languages can display an ebullient variety of terms for multiple aspects of a central object in their cultures' lives. They depend on a concept of this core thing for which they have no single word. The Esquimaux have multiple words for different sorts of snow and no single word for it, but their culture does not lack the concept, snow.[110]

A more positive, less ethnocentric approach is to stress what Homeric language has, rather than to start from what "we" have and to talk of its absence in Homer. What Homeric language has, abundantly, is "unity in multiplicity." This is evident in its accounts of physical experience and the external world.[111]

The "unity in multiplicity" approach is useful in dealing with the further issue, not of "body" but of "self." Can we see in Homer ideas of a cohesive emotional and personal self that resemble ours? The "no unified body-image" argument says that this too is missing. Homer's different innards are just "separate organs." Homer reveals no experience of self, of emotional and intellectual processes, that is not similarly disjointed.[112] Witness the

[108] Snell 1953:5–8.

[109] Sullivan (1988:18 n. 46) documents attacks on Snell since the 1930s. Recent work on ancient body-images: see P. Brown 1988; duBois 1988.

[110] Cf. the rich Dinka vocabulary referring to the "almost innumerable" colorings and shadings in the cattle round which their life revolves, Lienhardt 1961:10–16. What is important in that thought-world is the variety of oxen and ox-colors, not the general concept "ox-color." Cf. Argentinian gauchos' 200 words for different patterns of horsehide, which is as "vital to their economy" (Steiner 1975:87) as are the woundable body's different parts to the poetic economy of the *Iliad*. Shields do not keep spears out, *Il.* 5.538. Arms are cut off, tongues are split, eyes fall out, fighters are wounded in precisely designated sites, like "the hip joint where the thigh rotates (men call it the socket)," 16.741; see 5.82, 292, 305–8.

[111] "Unity in multiplicity": see Austin 1975:81–107. He compares multiplicity in Homeric accounts of time and space to multiplicity in Homeric language of body.

[112] Snell 1953:8–14, 28. Böhme (1929) argued that there is no single word in Homer for "the whole mental equipment." Adkins (1970) argued that any touch of a "unitary self" in Homer is "so lightly expressed that *thumos*, *kradiē*, hands, feet, may be felt as springs of ac-

common Homeric phenomenon of internal dialogue in which someone talks to, or is talked to by, their *thumos* or heart.[113] Conclusion: internal fragmentation.

This argument should be seen in its own context of a century assimilating Freud, increasingly attracted to ideas of a divided self and "fractured" consciousness. Especially when it can attribute these to others, to the mad, to past cultures. But increasingly aware also, as it studies "others," of multiplicity, split, disunity in its own self-image and in its own images of consciousness.[114] It may be that consciousness is simply the kind of thing that is fragmented, and that the twentieth century is peculiarly able to perceive this as a truth. Now that the perception has been expressed, it is also attractive to attribute it to other people whose thinking is interestingly unlike ours. Or we could say that fragmented is what *we* would feel, if we had to use Homeric language to express ourselves, while accepting that the language expresses sufficiently to itself a sense of a unitary self. When trying to understand another culture's version of consciousness, what matters is (to use a word appropriate to innards) the particular pattern of demarcation: the specific lines of fracture in the culture's understanding of self and world.

This is where Homeric "unity in multiplicity" helps. If we add multiple innard-words to internal dialogue, we reach, not the absence of any consistent idea of self, but something far more positive: Homeric "insight into the disunity" of mental and emotional experience[115]: a unified vision of an inconsistent thing.

tion" (p. 45); that only fourth-century philosophy, with difficulty, reached a united (which, of course, implies "our own") idea of "human nature." Jaynes (1976) denies that any Greek word meant "consciousness." (His argument is towards a history of the brain's development, not part of debate within classical scholarship, though it enriches it.) He studies seven innard-words and claims, "The translation of any of these as mind or anything similar is entirely mistaken and without any warrant in the *Iliad*" (p. 257). This begs the question addressed by his book, that consciousness was acquired, and that the *Iliad* represents a time before it was acquired. In discussing innard-words (pp. 261–71), Jaynes rightly attends to the physical activity associated with each, but his prior assumption (p. 258) is that Homer's account of this physical activity marks a point in development when hallucinatory experience (stimulus experienced from outside) diminishes. He assumes that a culture finds its impulse to act *either* from outside *or* from within, allowing neither for multiple stimuli (e.g., causality from both directions at once) nor for self-conflict and insight into the disunity this implies. He depends on the *Iliad* for his "development" argument, but the *Iliad* does not represent a specific stage of development, since its language is composed of layers from many different societies (see Snodgrass 1974). Even if it had represented a real, homogeneous culture, it could have had multiple words for similar things.

[113] Snell 1953:14. "Dialogue with innards": see above, n. 61.

[114] See Laing 1965; and Martines 1983:416–59, historian of Renaissance Italy, on the "concussed sixteenth century" with its "fractured consciousness."

[115] This is the phrase of Dover 1974:151 (with n. 5), which works well with the notion of "unity in multiplicity" (Austin 1975:81–107).

Hector at bay is a telling example of emotional disunity. At first he is steadfast, a coiled snake watching "with unquenchable *menos*." Then he talks to his *thumos*, regretting his decision to camp outside the city. Why not sling his shield behind him, talk to Achilles, offer him Helen, negotiate peace? Then he is outraged: his own *thumos* is making craven suggestions like those he rejected from his parents. "Why does my own *thumos* talk to me like this?" Appalling, that the cowardly prompting should come finally from within. He stays where he is. Achilles approaches, flashing, deadly. "Trembling" seizes Hector. He runs off. The two men are falcon and dove, hound and fawn. Hector is like weak, cowardly creatures. Then he realizes: "The gods are calling me to death." He turns, faces Achilles, wants "not to perish ingloriously," draws his sword. He is an eagle rushing down on a lamb or hare. Before death, he recovers his aggressive animal nature. He was snake, then dove and fawn, then, at the last, eagle. Animal comparisons track his emotional movements in contradictory, inconsistent impulses from bravery to fear to final glory.[116]

The narrative shows us one man over a short time, not as a bunch of separate voices, but as someone experiencing disorientation, self-conflict. Disunity and multiplicity are part of the coherence with which Homer presents a human being.[117] They are essential to Homer's concretely multiple vision of persons and life, of body and its innards.

Tragedy uses Homeric insight into the diversity of bodily and emotional experience, but focusses it elsewhere. Tragedy speaks of battle but does not stage it. Translating the physical battleground of the *Iliad* into its own preoccupation with more inward conflict, tragedy explores scission within the domestic house, and the self that this house so often represents. If you sit on the hillside above the theater of Dionysus, you see why inward rather than external experience matters to tragedy. In the physical performance, crowded by the bodies of thousands of other people, peering a long way down to the stage, a spectator was distant from the actors' bodies, which were hidden in their tokens of representation, the mask, the long costume.

[116] *Il.* 22.96, 111–20, 38–91, 136, 138–40, 189, 217, 304, 306–10. Greek animal comparisons: see pp. 147–52 below.

[117] For the "strong appearance of coherence" in spirit and personality among Homeric heroes, see Lloyd-Jones 1983:9–10, 168 (esp. nn. 38, 42). Odysseus keeps alive his identity and intention through changing situations and disguises, in the face of the world's attempts to break his continuity with his past or his future (see *Od.* 5.136; 7.314; 9.30, 94, 369; 10.132, 317; 12.41), thereby becoming the West's favored icon for the survival of personal identity against long odds. When he, or any Homeric hero, is disorientated, it is often because something in the world has changed (e.g., *Il.* 6.201–2, 22.197–99, 17.631–50; *Od.* 10.190–92). Cf. "your own" *nostos*, which you "lose" if you die abroad, *Od.* 23.68. Your hope of *nostos* is part of "you" through battle and travel. The ancient idea that *nostos* was cognate with *nous* (see Frame 1978:28–33) speaks to the Homeric sense of identity it represents: a return to your place.

These bodies were very small. What the spectators received were the external and rhetorical trappings by which tragic language made apparent what they could not see: the stage figures' inwardness. "Insight into disunity" here is insight into the variety of inner experience, especially inner damage. In the *Iliad*, multiplicity, and damage, is a condition predominantly of the external body, but from Homer onward, the *innards'* damage is seen as madness. Tragedy, unlike Homer, specializes in insight into the disunity of, and damage done to, mind.[118]

If the multiple innards speak to tragic insight into the disunity of human inwardness, they also answer to a condition of the divine universe, which, in being multiple and potentially divided, resembles *splanchna*. Theagenes in the sixth century matched different gods to different bits of *splanchna*. *Splanchna* are made of the same fabric as the physical universe. They also match and mirror qualities of the divinity that runs and pervades that universe. This correspondence was articulated by the Greeks themselves.

In the *Iliad*, disunity among gods has a fatal effect on human bodies and lives. In tragedy, divine conflict has a fatal effect not only on bodies and lives, but also on minds. Heracles, Orestes, and Io go mad because they exist in a universe in which one divinity opposes another.[119] The outer multiplicity of divinity, when divided against itself, causes the inner multiplicity of innards to be damaged, go mad.

Greek mind-words, in fact, suggest a unity in multiplicity somewhat similar to that which preoccupied Greek philosophers from the beginning, as they set out to give an account of inner and outer worlds in terms of the same material. They did so knowing, in Thales' words, that "all things are full of gods."[120] Even in the natural philosophers, divinity is part of the fabric of the world and the self. The same explanatory patterns carry through from biological (see Chapters 3, 4) to daemonological understanding (Chapters 7, 8) of the world and human beings. Divinity, too, manifests "unity through multiplicity," and through its own self-conflict brings about self-conflicting damage in human innards. Rulers of tragedy's divine world make their disunity felt precisely in the human mind and its multiple pain.

[118] Madness as damaged *phrenes*, tragedy's interest in madness: see Padel 1981:106, 124–25. Greek theater's physical expression of interest in what cannot be seen, the inside of fictional persons: see Padel 1990:336, 361–65.

[119] See Padel 1981:110–11. Cf. Zeus's divided *thumos* when Hera breaks the truce, *Il.* 4.38–43. Theagenes of Rhegium: see Stanford 1936: 119–20.

[120] At least in the Aristotelian formulation of Thales' cosmology, *Metaph.* A3, 983B6 (though KRS p. 94 queries the normal view of Thales' supposed assertion that "all things are water"). "All things full of gods": KRS 91, p. 95.

Chapter 3

DISEASE AND DIVINATION: KNOWING THE CAUSES OF PAIN

External and Internal Forces of Disease

> Pain is a natural and intended curse of the primal sin.
> Any attempt to do away with it must be wrong.
> —Zurich City Fathers, banning anesthesia

I ARGUED THAT in talking about what was inside them, fifth-century Greeks did not make a dissociation, as we do, between their imagery and what they really thought was inside. This argument has profound implications for their associations to the innards: above all, to their ideas about what goes wrong inside people, and why.

Suppose you are in the audience of *Equus*. What do you imagine is happening if suddenly, during the play, you feel violent inner pain? Appendix, dysentery, salmonella, heart? But suppose you are an original spectator of the *Hippolytus*, attacked by similar pain. What do you now think is happening? What relation is there in each case between the play, the way it represents causes of pain, and what you believe might be happening when you feel pain inside yourself?

Our own ideas about what is "really" in us are mostly based on reports of doctors and scientists. The equivalents for the tragic audience were doctors and diviners. These two groups were not distinct, as they are now. Spectators of the *Hippolytus* who found themselves in pain might have thought of daemonic sources, like the evil eye or an unpropitiated god. Something nonhuman had penetrated their innards. In the late fifth century ("Hippocratic" texts date from several centuries, but the earliest are probably from the late fifth century), doctors begin to offer explanations embodying more material, less animate relationships and causal sequences at work inside the body. But, though these mark the beginnings of an explanatory impulse that will eventually compete with the daemons, their underlying picture of innards in relation with the world and with the causes of disease is still propelled by divinatory arts and goes back to the *Iliad*.

Homer's heroes die from many kinds of wound, but innards are the first fear, like being "gut-shot." "Watch out, or as you run away, someone will catch you in the midriff with a spear." Pain of any kind is a stab through

In and Out of the Mind

GREEK IMAGES OF THE TRAGIC SELF

Ruth Padel

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY