

“*felicitas temporum*” and to let biography become an instrument of Imperial propaganda. Plutarch—so far as we can judge from his surviving biographies of Roman emperors—was no panegyrist. Tacitus wrote one biography only; it was not of an emperor. Suetonius wrote biographies of Caesars which applied to the emperors methods of description and documentation more usually meant to satisfy curiosity about literary men—common mortals.

It is pleasant to conclude by noting that Roman biography contributed to keeping emperors within the bounds of mortality.

Conclusion

Though our evidence for the fifth century B.C. is admittedly poor, the first Greek biographies and autobiographies seem to belong to the period between 500 and 480 B.C. and to be contemporary with the first works on genealogy and periegesis.

One of the spectacular features of intellectual life in the fifth century is the development of a new branch of research: history. History implies an attempt to put order into the knowledge of remote and recent events on the basis of rational principles of source criticism. Some items of information are found to be better than others. The notion of cause is systematically applied to human events and becomes an essential part of their interpretation. Three elements contribute to the new notion of history: doubt about traditional myths and genealogies; curiosity about foreign lands and institutions; interest in the variety of human types, within and without the same nation. But what gives historical research its distinctive flavour and maturity is increasing subordination of genealogy and travel accounts to the critical narration of political and military events—more specifically to recent Greek political and military events. Herodotus and Thucydides are of course the principal names associated with this development. Their prestige overshadowed all other achievements of fifth-century investigation of human affairs. The study of local history, institutions, customs, and vocabulary existed in the fifth century but was less influential and renowned than the study of political history.

Among the less conspicuous products of the new historical curiosity of the fifth century B.C. I place biography: less conspicuous not in terms of future development, but of immediate achievements. The little we know about biographical writing in that century seems to fall, roughly speaking, into one of three categories. There were accounts of remarkable contemporaries; and the accounts might be partly autobiographical. There was research about literary figures of the past which in some cases was meant to satisfy pure curiosity about the individuals concerned, but in other cases was connected with investigations into the nature and meaning of poetry or of wisdom. Finally, there were attempts to put some order into the lives of mythical heroes. We do not know whether some of these developments were suggested to the Greeks by their oriental neighbours. But we must bear in mind that Greek historiography first developed in a region ruled by the Persians. There are some indications that the Greeks knew oriental stories.

The philosophic and rhetorical schools of the fourth century developed the art of talking about individuals, including the most important of individuals—oneself. Rhetoricians created the prose encomium of the individual. Philosophers developed the idealized biography of the monarch and of the philosopher. Both rhetoricians and philosophers used apologetic speeches and letters to characterize a man. It was a development full of ambiguities. Fact and fiction were freely mixed by rhetoricians as well as by philosophers. Plato cared no more for historical truth than did Isocrates. Even historians like Xenophon with a philosophic education forgot about truth when they came to write encomia and idealized biographies. Either because of, or in spite of, these ambiguities, the exploration of individual lives made enormous progress in the fourth century. It covered new ground. The characterization of individuals, the art of portrayal, the study of human motives became more subtle. Great importance was attributed to the formative years of adolescence. Xenophon wrote portraits of generals in the *Anabasis*. Theopompus recognized

the importance of the individual as such and put one man at the centre of his historical narration in the *Philippica*. The historians of Alexander the Great followed his example. But biography and history did not merge.

Aristotle realized that careful collection of authentic facts about individual lives could contribute positively to the construction of his own philosophy, and more particularly of his poetics, morals, and politics. He made his pupils do historical research.

Aristotle himself never wrote biography, though he had a taste for anecdotes. It is arguable that full-fledged biography would never have entered the Peripatos but for the strange personality of Aristoxenus. What Aristoxenus learned in this respect from his previous Pythagorean masters, before joining the Peripatetic school, is a mystery. But he seems to have been the first to give biography a new shape. What we call Hellenistic biography with its distinctive features of erudition, scholarly zeal, realism of details, and gossip seems to be the creation of Aristoxenus rather than of Aristotle. Clearly it fitted into the new Hellenistic fashion of care for details, erudition, elegant gossip. Rhetoricians and philosophers still wrote apologies and encomia. But what was now called *bios* was a detached, slightly humorous account of events and opinions characterizing an individual. If the individual in question was a king or a politician, biography remained close to political history. Otherwise it served the double purpose of characterizing an individual philosopher, poet, or artist as well as the school to which he belonged.

Autobiography was not easily reconcilable with erudition. In the Hellenistic age kings and politicians seem to have monopolized autobiographical writing as an instrument of self-assertion and self-defense. Roman politicians borrowed autobiography from the Greeks in the second century B.C. for the same purpose. Members of the Roman ruling class, who were used to writing the elogia of their own ancestors, gladly took to writing autobiography. Biography seems to have reached Rome a little later, in the first century B.C. With

Cornelius Nepos and Varro it became a way of comparing Romans with Greeks and other foreigners. It helped to create a cosmopolitan civilization. Interest in biography was increased by this confrontation between Greek and Roman civilizations. I think it is not mere chance that so much biographical material, both Greek and Roman, has come down to us from the time of the Roman Empire. The element of gossip, of frivolous erudition, remained strong in biographies of the Imperial age. But on the whole we sense a new atmosphere. The writers of biographies created a meaningful relation between the living and the dead. The wise man, the martyr, and the saint became central subjects of biography in addition to the king, the writer, and the philosopher.

The Greeks and the Romans realized that writing about the life of a fellow man is not quite the same as writing history. Perhaps we can do better. Perhaps we can absorb biography into history without any residuum. But we must not be too hasty. By keeping biography separate from history the Greeks and the Romans were able to appreciate what constitutes a poet, a philosopher, a martyr, a saint. They were also able to appreciate what remains human in a king or in a politician. That dim figure, Skylax of Caryanda, the explorer of the Indian coasts and the first biographer, has left us with a problem.

Second Thoughts on Greek Biography

I

In the last twenty-five years two of the most inspiring books on biography have come from Holland: J. Romein, *De Biografie* (1946) and S. Dresden, *De Structuur van de Biografie* (1956). Behind them is the great Dutch tradition of exploration of the forms of historical thinking which can be epitomized in the noble and beloved name of Jan Huizinga. My first duty is therefore to acknowledge my lasting debt to the historians and scholars of this country—a debt which goes much beyond what I have learned from them in the matter of history of historiography. Let me say that no honor has touched me so profoundly as the election to foreign membership of the Royal Dutch Academy. But my immediate purpose is to take quite shameless advantage of the opportunity I have for submitting to our president, Professor Dresden, some problems about Greek biography which I have not been able to solve. I am sure that Professor Dresden in his great kindness will not say to me what the Hegelian philosopher G. J. P. J. Bolland wrote to Benedetto Croce in 1907 when they were discussing the notion of Idea in Hegel. I am compelled to translate from the Italian translation by Croce of the original German letter from Bolland: "Unfortunately, Mr. Croce, you have not yet penetrated into the depths of the Idea, and I am asking myself whether this will ever be possible for an

Italian thinker . . . I speak myself a language which is more subtle than German—a language which is perhaps the only one in which everything that is intelligible becomes intelligible.”¹ Croce perhaps did not deserve Bolland’s reproach. But I have come to appreciate that Dutch is indeed a subtle language—and that Professor Dresden for one has analyzed the structure of biography with exacting standards of literary and philosophic power.

I have called my remarks “Second Thoughts on Greek Biography” because they are likely to appear later than a little volume called *The Development of Greek Biography* which represents my Jackson Lectures at Harvard in 1968. But the difficulties, the *Aporiai*, which I am going to examine today, were the first spring of my research on Greek biography and represent my “First Thoughts” on the subject. At Harvard, however, it seemed to me preferable to concentrate on the main facts and to leave in the background what I consider to be most doubtful and controversial. What I shall try to explain here today is why I am reluctant to see a direct influence of Aristotelian philosophy on the growth of Greek biography in the Hellenistic period.

As we know, St. Jerome in *De viris illustribus* almost certainly repeats Suetonius when he mentions the names of “Hermippus peripateticus, Antigonus Carystius, Satyrus doctus vir, et longe omnium doctissimus Aristoxenus musicus” as the masters of literary biography. I must emphasize the point that St. Jerome here confines himself to lives of writers—and so must Suetonius have done in his own *De viris illustribus*: “Hortaris, Dexter (says Jerome) ut Tranquillum sequens ecclesiasticos scriptores in ordinem digeram et, quod ille in enumerandis gentilium litterarum libris fecit inlustribus viris, ego in nostris hoc faciam.” The fact remains that three of the four names mentioned by Jerome (and presumably by Suetonius before him) take us into the Aristotelian school. Hermippus, who lived about 200 B.C., is declared “Peri-

pateticus” by Jerome himself; Aristoxenus passed from the Pythagorean school to the Peripatus and was considered for the succession to Aristotle in the direction of the school. Satyrus is called Peripatetic by Athenaeus (VI, 248 D; XII, 541 C). Only Antigonus of Carystus cannot possibly be treated as Peripatetic: whether or not we follow Wilamowitz in the reconstruction of his personality, he moved in his youth in the circle of Menedemus of Eretria.

Three members of the Peripatus out of four biographers are enough to create a presumption of a special relationship between biography and Peripatus. Although St. Jerome speaks only of literary biography, we must recognize that neither Hermippus nor his contemporary Satyrus confined himself to writing biographies of literary men. Hermippus wrote on legislators and Satyrus on monarchs and statesmen. Thus, the door is open to the more general question whether there was a Peripatetic school of biography concerning itself with various kinds of people and whether Aristotle can be considered the creator of Greek biography altogether. This is precisely the double question which was answered positively by Friedrich Leo in his classic book published seventy years ago: *Die biographische Forschung hat Aristoteles selbst in die Wege geleitet, auf literarischem Gebiet, aber auch auf dem der politischen Geschichte*.² Leo’s theory, after many discussions, has found new support in the important study by A. Dihle, *Studien zur griechischen Biographie* (1956), which indicates Plato’s *Apology* as the primary model of Greek biography, but finds Aristotle’s *Ethics* to be the main influence on later *bioi*. Dihle’s results have been accepted by two scholars who rightly rank among the most authoritative students of Greek philosophy

² *Die griechisch-römische Biographie*, p. 316. Cf. Wilamowitz, *Antigonos von Karystos*, p. 151, “indess das vierte Jahrhundert tat den Schritt zur Biographie nicht.”

¹ B. Croce, *Aneddoti di varia letteratura*, IV, 2 ed. 1954, p. 393.

in our time, K. von Fritz³ and Olaf Gigon:⁴ both, however, have important reservations which will claim our attention later.

Neither Leo nor Dihle nor their followers have of course ever maintained that biography sprang fully armed and uttering her war cry from the head of Aristotle. Predecessors have been allowed—most conspicuously Isocrates and Xenophon, in the *Euagoras* and the *Agésilas*, the model encomia of the fourth century.

It may, however, be argued that not enough allowance has been made for the variety and importance of the experiments in biography during the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. before Aristotle. It may also be argued that the implications of these experiments for Hellenistic, post-Aristotelian biography have been underrated. I have discussed these points at length in my Jackson Lectures, and I do not intend here to return to them, except for a remark to which I attach some importance. The loss of almost all the historical literature of the fifth century, with the exceptions of Herodotus and Thucydides, makes it impossible to characterize the account of Heraclides, tyrant of Mylasa, written by Skylax of Caryanda about 500 B.C. Nor do we know anything about the work on the life of Homer by Theagenes of Rhegium, which seems to belong to the same period. Equally unknown are the many works on poets, musicians, and wise men which circulated in the fifth century, especially in its latter half. We know a little more, but not very much, about the autobiographical memoirs of Ion of

³ *Gnomon* 28, 1956, pp. 326–332. Cf. *Histoire et historiens dans l'antiquité*, Fondation Hardt, Vandoeuvres 1956, pp. 104–106, 133–135. It is not part of my argument here to discuss the question of whether all the Peripatetics shared the same theory of history. If Duris reflected Peripatetic thinking (F.Gr.H. 76 Fr), it was not the thinking of his teacher Theophrastus (Cic. *Orat.* 39). On this F. Wehrli, *Eumusia E. Howald*, 1947, pp. 54–71 is fundamental. Cf. also F. Walbank, *Historia* 9, 1960, pp. 216–234; C. O. Brink, *Proceed. Cambridge Phil. Soc.* 186, 1960, pp. 14–19.

⁴ Article "Biographie" in *Lexikon der Alten Welt* (1965): the brevity of this article should not conceal its importance. The useful paper by A. J. Podlecki, "The Peripatetics as Literary Critics," *Phoenix* 23, 1969, pp. 114–137, does not distinguish between biography and other forms of literary criticism. My greatest debt is to R. Pfeiffer's *History of Classical Scholarship* (1968) for its clear delimitation of true Aristotelian scholarship.

Chius and about the biographical sketches contained in a pamphlet by Stesimbrotus of Thasus—both fifth-century writers.

Yet this very vague information is sufficient to indicate that biographical and autobiographical writing appeared on the Greek scene more or less about the time in which the first books of geography, genealogy, and political history came into circulation. Skylax and Theagenes are the contemporaries of Hecataeus; indeed Skylax, like Hecataeus, also wrote on geography. The literary historians Metrodorus of Lampsacus, Glaucus of Rhegium, Damastes of Sigeum, not to speak of Stesimbrotus and Ion, are roughly the contemporaries of Herodotus, Thucydides, and Charon of Lampsacus. Biography and autobiography are neither earlier nor later than the other historical genres dealing with mythical events of the remote past and political and military events of the recent past. Biography and autobiography began on their own and developed on parallel lines to political history: they were never submerged in it. The separation between biography and history (which meant political history) was theorized in the Hellenistic period, but was already a reality in the fifth century.

We need not here ask the troublesome question: Why did historiography first develop in Greece in the fifth century B.C.? But we have to recognize the fact that the dichotomy of biography and history is as old as Greek historiography itself. Whatever philosophical or sociological meaning we may attribute to the dichotomy, the dichotomy itself is earlier than Aristotle. A whole series of experiments in biography during the fifth and fourth centuries presupposes the awareness that history is something different. The historian was supposed to tell the truth. When he was forced to report unchecked rumors, he was supposed to say so. This was the rule established by Herodotus and Thucydides—a rule often broken, but always recognized as valid. History in the fourth century was dominated by Thucydides. Even those who tried to run away from him, such as Ephorus and Theopompus, had to reckon with his presence. One may doubt whether the

Thucydidean or even the laxer Herodotean criteria on evidence were ever applied to biography. Biography was written without reference to Thucydides. In the fourth century its principal form was the encomium—not a form Thucydides would have approved of. Other forms hovered between fact and fiction, most notably the biographical novel which was perfected, if not invented, by Xenophon in his *Cyropaedia*. If anything characterizes the exploration of human life in the fourth century, it is that it often takes biographical and autobiographical forms, but without a constant and clear distinction between reality and imagination. Sometimes the autobiographical account is strictly factual, for example, in Xenophon's *Anabasis*. But biography and autobiography may take the form of an imaginary speech, such as Plato's *Apology of Socrates* or Isocrates' *Antidosis*. The reporting of conversations and *obiter dicta* was also conceived in a spirit of creative imagination. Nobody bothered to decide whether Plato's dialogues or Xenophon's *Memorabilia* were faithful records of Socrates' conversations. This was not a problem. Autobiographical letters became fairly common in the second part of the fourth century; Plato is supposed to have written the most famous of them, if you are prepared to accept the Seventh Letter as authentic. Alexander certainly wrote some letters to his mother about his expeditions. The least we can say is that propaganda and self-justification played a large part in these autobiographical letters.

Biography and autobiography were also ingredients of authentic forensic speeches: Isocrates' speech *De Bigis* gives us the earliest biographical sketch of Alcibiades, whereas Demosthenes' *De Corona* is largely autobiographical. In neither case do we expect truth to be the speaker's only concern.

Thus we must allow for the fact that some forms of biographical and autobiographical accounts existed in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. In the fourth century, about which we know more, some of the products were characterized by a disturbingly vague demarcation between truth and fiction. Having established that much, we can ask ourselves what was

new in Hellenistic biography and whether what was new was due to Aristotle's philosophy.

II

Before we try to answer these two questions, we have to face the limits of our evidence. As a result of the discovery of *Oxyrhynchus Papyrus* 1176 we now possess a substantial fragment of the life of Euripides by Satyrus—a writer of the late third century. Apart from it, we have only scattered quotations from Hellenistic biographers. The most numerous come from Hermippus, but the most substantial are those of Antigonus of Carystus—important in themselves and because they were studied so penetratingly by Wilamowitz. What we have of Hermippus, Aristoxenus, Neanthes, Aristo of Ceus, Sotion, and others is not enough to allow us to reconstruct the form of their biographies, though it may give us an idea of their contents. For the form or forms of Hellenistic biography we must turn, beside *Oxyrhynchus Pap.* 1176 and the fragments of Antigonus, to Cornelius Nepos and to Nicolas of Damascus. Each of them presents his own problems. Cornelius Nepos wrote in Latin about 35 B.C. and modified his biographies after the death of his protector Pomponius Atticus in 32 B.C. He was certainly well acquainted with Greek biographical writers, but he also had Latin biographers before him. He cannot be taken as a representative of Hellenistic biography *sic et simpliciter*. His biographies of Greek statesmen are too short to give us precise indications of the structure of his sources. The most instructive biographies are those of Cato and Pomponius Atticus, which may reflect contemporary Latin humanism rather than Hellenistic ideas of three centuries before. Nicolas of Damascus' long fragments of the life of Augustus clearly have a better claim to represent Hellenistic forms. The author thought in Greek and was a Peripatetic philosopher. He may be expected to have used Peripatetic models. For the moment all I want to point out is that we do not know how much we have of his biography of Augustus. It has been maintained by R. Laqueur and W.

Steidle that he wrote after the death of the emperor and must have written a complete biography. In this case we would have a minimal part of his work, because the extant fragments, though long, do not go beyond 44 B.C. Without wishing to reopen the question here, I shall simply say that in my opinion the evidence is in favor of the hypothesis that Nicolas wrote a partial biography, perhaps not later than 20 B.C., with the intent to describe the formative years of Augustus.⁵ There were plenty of precedents for books on the *Lehrjahre* of kings, beginning with Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* and the books by Onesicritus and Marsyas on the education of Alexander.

This survey of the evidence is meant to cast doubts on the starting point of F. Leo, who used Latin and Greek biographers of the second and third centuries A.D. in order to draw conclusions about the nature of Hellenistic biography. In 1901 Leo began his book with an epoch-making analysis of the differences between Suetonius' and Plutarch's biographies, between biographies which systematically and statically describe the various aspects of a man's personality and biographies which tell his life in chronological order with an emphasis on his moral will. Leo thought that both the Plutarchean and the Suetonian types of biography went back to Peripatetic models. He never made it entirely clear how that happened, but substantially he maintained that a pupil of Aristotle, most probably Aristoxenus, introduced the Plutarchean type, while later somebody else belonging to the same school—perhaps Heraclides Lembus—adapted biography to the needs of literary history and produced the Suetonian scheme. It was Leo's opinion that Suetonius himself was the first to use the Suetonian scheme to describe men of action, such as the Roman emperors, whereas before him this type of biography had been considered suitable only for writers and thinkers, men of *vita contemplativa*.

Even at first sight, Leo's conception is not entirely satisfactory. As far as we know, Aristoxenus, who is supposed to have

invented the Plutarchean type for men of action, wrote only lives of philosophers (Pythagoras, Archytas, Socrates, Plato). No doubt we could argue that Archytas was a man of action, a politician as well as a philosopher. But I wonder whether this excuse is good enough. However, it is difficult to perceive what was specifically Aristotelian in the Suetonian type of biography. I can see how the Plutarchean type may be presented as a by-product of Aristotelian ethics. The virtues of character, according to Aristotle, are the result of training begun in early youth. The Plutarchean biography is well suited to show how a man of action acquired his virtues by steadily doing the right thing. But the Suetonian scheme presupposes virtues and vices as data, gives a static description of a human being, and does not allow any emphasis on discipline and exercise. I am not surprised that Professor Dihle in his most valuable monograph has amply drawn on Plutarch to defend and clarify Leo's view, but it is exactly this insistence on Plutarch that makes me suspicious. The fact remains that there is no immediate and obvious connection between the Suetonian type of biography and Aristotelian ethics.

Furthermore, is this connection really obvious even in the Plutarchean type? That is to me the crux of the matter. Leo and Dihle assumed that Plutarch as a biographer thought in Aristotelian terms under the influence of previous Peripatetic biographers. This proposition seems to me open to doubt in both its parts. I am not sure that Plutarch did write biography in strict Aristotelian terms; nor am I sure that, if he did, he was under the influence of Peripatetic biographers. As K. von Fritz has already observed, Aristotelian ethics, insofar as it has emphasized the importance of continuous moral choice and therefore of habit in shaping the character of a man, reflected general attitudes of Greek morality.⁶ Plutarch's analysis of moral behavior can hardly be called specifically Aristotelian. As Dihle admits, it is not couched in consistent technical terminology of Aristotelian origin. Nor can we easily believe that Plutarch, a thinker in his own right, would merely

⁵ Cf. B. Z. Wacholder, *Nicolaus of Damascus*, Berkeley 1962, p. 25.

⁶ *Gnomon* 28, 1956, p. 330.

accept and repeat what previous biographers had said. In many cases we have good reason to think that Plutarch did not even use previous biographers as his source. The very penetrating analysis by Dihle of the life of Cleomenes as a Peripatetic conception proves little for previous biographers if Plutarch used a historian, Phylarchus, as his main source.⁷ The counter-proof is provided by one case in which we can be reasonably certain that Plutarch followed a biographical source rather closely. Long ago it was seen that Hermippus must have been the main source of Plutarch's Life of Solon. Plutarch quotes Hermippus three times (2; 6; 11), and the majority of the other sources he quotes are earlier than Hermippus and known through Hermippus. Furthermore, the story of the visit of Anacharsis to Solon, for which Plutarch does not give the source, is quoted with the same details and very similar words as the account from Hermippus in Diogenes Laertius (I, 101). Peter von der Mühl in an important paper concluded that Plutarch summarized Hermippus throughout his Life of Solon.⁸ This is not entirely demonstrable and, for the long section on the laws of Solon, for which Plutarch quotes Didymus, not even probable. But the story of Solon's youth, his travels, his relations with the other Wise Men, and his political activity must come from Hermippus. Now there is no trace in these sections of an evaluation of Solon's character in strict philosophic terms. An allusion to the *emporikos bios*, the habits of a trader, in chapter 3 can hardly rank as a piece of Peripatetic thinking about the various types of lives. There are characteristic elements of early Hellenistic biographical style in these sections—the exploitation of Solon's poems, a certain number of frivolous and gossip details—but there is nothing which could have been said only by a pupil of Aristotle. In other words, where we can be fairly certain that Plutarch followed a Peripatetic biographer of the third century B.C., we find nothing specifically

⁷ Cf. for instance T. W. Africa, *Phylarchus and the Spartan Revolution*. Berkeley 1961, p. 41, and above all E. Gabba, "Studi su Filarco," *Athenaeum* 35, 1957, p. 49.

⁸ *Klio* 35, 1942, pp. 89–102.

Aristotelian; one can, however, make a case (even if not a very convincing case) for the presence of certain elements of Aristotelian ethics in the Life of Cleomenes which was built up by Plutarch himself.

A direct and profound influence of Aristotelian philosophy could be admitted only if two conditions were satisfied: 1) that Hellenistic biographies could be proved to be largely uniform; 2) that what is left of them could be proved to contain a great deal of typical Aristotelian thought. In my opinion, neither of these two conditions has been satisfied.

If anything has become clear in the seventy years since the appearance of Leo's book it is that Hellenistic biography cannot be confined to the two main types he so brilliantly analyzed. The discovery of Satyrus' life of Euripides in *Pap. Oxyrb.* 1176 showed a biography in the form of a dialogue which nobody had expected; it also indicated that Hellenistic literary biography was far more elegant and sophisticated than Leo had thought. After this discovery it was of course easy to perceive that the dialogue biographies of Late Antiquity by Palladius, Sulpicius Severus, and Gregory the Great must have had earlier models. Later, the discovery of *Papyrus Hauniensis* 6 showed another unexpected type of biography: short biographies probably kept together by a genealogical tree. My unforgettable friend Mario Segre immediately suggested a comparison with the *Anecdota Holderi* by Cassidorus—a strange little family book of the sixth century A.D.⁹ Whether or not Segre was right, *Pap. Hauniensis* 6 was typologically different from any other biographical production of the Hellenistic age. Finally, we have had *Pap. Oxyrb.* 2438, a new short biography of Pindar. Though the papyrus was written in the second to third century A.D., the biography it contains must have been composed several centuries earlier. It is Hellenistic in its references to literary texts and to documents but has none of the fanciful and ludicrous details we usually associate with Hellenistic literary biography.¹⁰

⁹ *Rend. Accad. Pontif. Archeol.* 19, 1942–43, pp. 269–280.

¹⁰ I. Gallo, *Una nuova biografia di Pindaro*. Salerno 1968.

Even the traditional evidence on Hellenistic biography shows a far greater variety of types than the theory of its Peripatetic origin would allow. We can now appreciate the implication of Professor Gigon's remark that there is no exclusively Peripatetic form of biography. If anything can be learned from Cornelius Nepos, it is that not all the lives written by the same author were of the same type. Leo himself recognized with exemplary fairness and acumen that Nepos's little book contains samples of various genres.

The fourth-century *encomium* continued to prosper, presumably in both the varieties represented by Isocrates' *Euagoras* and Xenophon's *Agésilas*. Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, too, remained an influential book in its encomiastic elements. Some of the earliest Hellenistic writers of *encomia* were pupils of Isocrates who went over to the Peripatus in search of a better philosophy—or of a better rhetorical theory. Philiscus, who wrote about his contemporary Lycurgus, exemplifies the transition; and Theodectes, who wrote the *encomium* of Alexander of Epirus, seems to have followed his father from the Isocratean to the Aristotelian camp. This suggests some link between Isocratean *encomium* and what we call Peripatetic *bios*. We may therefore ask whether the *encomia* of Plato by Speusippus and Clearchus were modeled on Isocrates. Polybius wrote an *encomium* of Philopoemen in three books. What he says of it in his *Histories* (10, 21) seems rather to suggest a connection with Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*. Cicero, *De oratore* 2, 341, alludes to the many *encomia* (*laudationes*) of Greek men which were still circulating in his own time.

We must also assume considerable variety in the biographies of kings and politicians. No doubt many people thought that a simple account of the military and political actions of a king was not what one would call a *bios* or an *encomium*. This was the opinion of Polybius and, later, of Cornelius Nepos. But I am not sure that everybody was agreed on that. Cicero's letter to Luceius (*Ad fam.* 5, 12) seems to regard the monograph on an individual historical event (his own consulship) as something very similar to the account of a

life of an individual: "at viri saepe excellentis ancipites varique casus habent admirationem, expectationem, laetitiam, molestiam, spem, timorem."

In practice, it must have been very difficult to keep a rigorous distinction between politico-military history centered on a king and ordinary biography. Unfortunately, we know almost nothing about the biographies of Attalus I by Neanthes the Younger and of Antiochus IV by Timochares, and therefore we do not know how they differed from, say, the monographs on the wars of Pyrrhus by Timaeus and on the wars between Antiochus Soter and Ptolemy Philadelphus by Demetrius of Byzantium. The several books on Ptolemy IV by Ptolemy, son of Agesarchus of Megalopolis, would be equally illuminating. They were certainly concerned with the private life of this king, but was this their only concern?

One simple example can show how unjustified it would be to assume any great uniformity in Hellenistic biographical writing. We know that Epicurus's friend Idomeneus wrote two biographical books: one on demagogues, the other on Socratic philosophers. The book on demagogues naturally reminds us of the famous excursus on demagogues by Theopompus in his *Philippic Histories*—the comparison points to a pre-Aristotelian type of biographical writing. However, the book on Socratic philosophers, which was polemical, can hardly have been inspired or guided by the Peripatetic notion of character. Since Idomeneus was a leading personality in the Epicurean school we must assume, until the contrary is proved, that he spoke in Epicurean and not in Aristotelian terms.¹¹

What we can read of Antigonus of Carystus, thanks to the feat of reconstruction by Wilamowitz, stands outside any philosophy.¹² Here we have a writer who enjoys talking about philosophers as interesting and amusing human beings. Antigonus does not commit himself to any theoretical evaluation of philosophic systems or of philosophic virtues and vices. His

¹¹ See F. Jacoby in *Pauly-Wissowa*, s.v. Idomeneus.

¹² E. Rohde's criticism of Wilamowitz (*Kl. Schriften* I, pp. 356–361) is not convincing.

Peripatetic Lycon is just a "bon viveur." Wilamowitz properly reminded us that, after all, Lycon was quoted elsewhere for what must have been considered a model description of a "Katzenjammer" (fr. 26 Wehrli).

Most of what we know about Menedemus of Eretria comes from Antigonus: it is a humorous and sympathetic account of a philosopher who had unorthodox habits of teaching and who used to entertain his guests with the maximum of good conversation and the minimum of good food.

Antigonus, of course, is sensitive to the consistency of theory and practice in a philosopher. His skeptic Pyrrho takes no precaution against carts, dogs, precipices, or anything else, but is kept out of trouble by friends who follow him closely (Diog. Laert. IX.62). Antigonus' portrait of Zeno the Stoic defies logical analysis: it is not the description of a philosophic attitude, but of a restless, rude, utterly honest and unpretentious immigrant who captivated the Athenians and gained the friendship of Antigonus Gonatas. The other lives confirm that Antigonus must have taken an interest in the position of philosophers in society. He had a vague notion of what nowadays we call "intelligentsia."

Only the latest Hellenistic biographer, Nicolas of Damascus, shows clear signs of a classification of virtues according to the Peripatetic system, which was after all his own philosophy. But Nicolas superimposes his system, as far as he can, on a pre-existing biographical scheme—probably that of Augustus' autobiography. The substance of the account is the rise of young Octavian to the position of heir to Caesar. The death of Caesar occupies a disproportionate amount of space—almost an *excursus*—just because it is an essential part of the story of how Octavian avenged his adoptive father. The story of young Octavian existed, and was told in writing, before Nicolas of Damascus intervened to give it an encomiastic shape which might please Augustus himself. There would be no justification in saying that the Peripatetic scheme is what keeps this biography together. The scheme can easily be removed, leaving the story practically unaffected.

We can apply to the Hellenistic biographers the remarks which F. Wehrli recently made about the alleged relations between Menander and the Peripatus.¹³ The fact that literary tradition makes Menander a pupil of Theophrastus and a friend of Demetrius of Phalerum is not sufficient reason for presupposing that his comedies were inspired by Aristotelian ethics. Peripatetic influence must not be assumed; it must be demonstrated. Supporters of this theory must find in Menander the precise technical language of the Peripatus, not just vague similarities in language and thought. In the same way one ought to be able to prove that Aristotelian ethics was the guiding principle of Hellenistic biography, the element without which Hellenistic biography becomes unintelligible and almost inconceivable. It is this demonstration which seems to me difficult to produce.

It is not a matter of chance that Aristoxenus was a Peripatetic of some sort and that several other important writers of biography were called Peripatetics. The Peripatetic school was the only philosophic school with a real interest in historical research. It was engaged in the examination of the various types of lives and used episodes and anecdotes for the characterization of types. It was involved in polemics against other schools and used biographical details as a weapon for attack and defense: the virtues and vices of individual philosophers were brought into assessments of the merits of their schools. Finally, and most emphatic, Aristotelian ethics was easy to handle as an instrument for classifying the modes of conduct of individuals. It was founded on wide empirical experience and was close (as we have said) to the feelings of ordinary fourth-century educated Greeks. All this gave the Aristotelians a prominent part in biography and explains why the most successful type of Hellenistic biography was probably introduced by an Aristotelian, Aristoxenus. But biographies had been written before Aristotle. Even Aristoxenus had come late to the Peripatus, from the Pythagorean school which was interested in psychology, and soon got tired of his fellow

¹³ "Menander und die Philosophie" in *Ménandre*. Fondation Hardt, Vandoeuvres 1970, pp. 146-152.

Peripatetics. The moral characterization we find in the fragments of Aristoxenus, Hermippus, and Satyrus is not exclusively and specifically Aristotelian: it can usefully be compared with that of poets, historians, and essayists who lived outside the Peripatus. Even less was erudition the exclusive prerogative of Aristotelians. Callimachus was a scholar in his own right.

Aristotelianism was neither a necessary nor a sufficient presupposition of Hellenistic biography. Hellenistic biography was far more elaborately erudite than any previous biographical composition. It was also far more curious about details, anecdotes, witticisms, and eccentricities. It never felt bound to tell the truth in the way Polybius told the truth, but we must remember that even among historians Polybius was the exception. Insofar as it supported one philosophy against another and helped its readers to understand writers and artists, it can be said to have pursued professional aims. Philosophers of various schools and unphilosophic critics and scholars were involved in it. No doubt it also served political propaganda more often than we can surmise from the scanty evidence available. But ultimately we must reconcile ourselves to the idea that men did not write biography because they were philosophically minded or because they were engaged in some kind of intellectual or political controversy. The educated man of the Hellenistic world was curious about the lives of famous people. He wanted to know what a king or a poet or a philosopher was like and how he behaved in his off-duty moments. When the information was not directly available it had to be supplied by guesswork: the unscrupulous biographers added invention to their ingredients. Fundamentally it was a Greek curiosity about Greek men—the more so because so many Greek men now lived among barbarians. The Romans extended their curiosity to the Greek world, and from them Plutarch learned how to compare Greeks and Romans. The contact with the Romans seems to have made Greek biography less frivolous in tone. Perhaps the work of Nicolas of Damascus is indicative of a new departure. In any case, Hellenistic biographers kept biography Greek, with few

exceptions. The work on the Magi by Hermippus did not count as biography. As long as the history of the Greek world remained political and military history, there was an urge to provide the other side of the picture: the great man seen as an individual or at least as a type. An epigram might try to define the meaning of life in a few verses. The *bios* did the same on a larger canvas. Grace of presentation and the amusement of the reader were never overlooked, except in the brief biographical introductions to texts. The utmost we can say for the Peripatetic school is that it favored biography, and thanks to Aristoxenus it produced one of the successful and lasting types of Greek biography, the lives of philosophers.

The question "What made people write so many biographies in the Hellenistic period?" is one which I should prefer not to answer. But if I were compelled to answer, I should repeat Professor Dresden's words: "De biograaf speelt ernstig, *severe ludit.*"

The Development of Greek Biography

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Arnaldo Momigliano

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