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THE AIMS OF ALEXANDER¹

By P. A. BRUNT

SIR William Tarn wrote that 'the primary reason why Alexander invaded Persia was, no doubt, that he never thought of *not* doing it; it was his inheritance'. The invasion had been planned and begun by Philip. It was, in name, a Panhellenic enterprise, to exact retribution for the devastation wrought by Xerxes in Greece and to liberate the Greeks of Asia Minor.² These aims Alexander faithfully fulfilled. From the spoils of the Granicus he dedicated three hundred Persian panoplies to Athens' tutelary goddess; he sent back to Athens the statues of Harmodius and Aristogiton which Xerxes had carried off to Susa; and he excused the burning of Persepolis as a reprisal for the sack of Athens.³ The Panhellenic war was then over, and Alexander sent the Greek contingents home (A. iii. 19. 5). In general he freed the Greek cities of Asia from the control of satraps; they were to pay no taxes, to receive no garrisons and to live under their own laws.⁴ By expelling tyrants or oligarchs and setting up democratic governments, he not only removed the partisans of Persia from power but did homage to the growing tendency in Greece to equate freedom with democracy.⁵ The gratitude of the liberated cities was long-enduring; it was here that his cult survived into Roman times.⁶ In reality of course they were as much subject to his will as less privileged subjects. And to Greek cities that opposed him he was less accommodating. Halicarnassus and Aspendus, which certainly counted as Greek, were subjected to his satraps.⁷ They could be treated as disloyal to the Panhellenic cause, like the captive mercenaries who fought against him at the Granicus and who were sent back in chains to forced labour in Macedon. But Alexander was not always so merciless. He spared the mercenaries who were holding out against him on an island in the harbour of Miletus, and enlisted them in

¹ I thank Professor Badian for comments on an earlier draft; any errors or misinterpretations are my own. I have sought in general to illustrate statements in the text with references to sources that depend on undoubtedly contemporary authorities; this does not imply that I regard the 'inferior' tradition as worthless, or the contemporary authorities such as Ptolemy as reliable at all points. Plutarch is cited from the Loeb edition.

² Polyb. iii. 6. 8 ff.; D. xvi. 89. 2; 91. 2; xvii. 24. 1; A. ii. 14. 4.

³ A. i. 16. 7; iii. 16. 7-8; 18. 11-12; vi. 30. 1.

⁴ Cf. Badian, p. 169.

⁵ A. H. M. Jones, *The Greek City from Alexander to Justinian* (Oxford, 1940), ch. x.

⁶ *Inscr. von Priene* 108, 75; *OGIS* 3.

⁷ A. i. 23. 8; 27. 4. Halicarnassus Greek (*contra* Tarn ii. 218), Hdt. ii. 178; vii. 99.

his own army; it would not have been easy to take the island by force.¹ Sentiment and principle gave way to his own interests, as they always did.

Polybius says that Philip launched the crusade against Persia to win goodwill in the Greek world.² If he entertained such a hope, it was plainly delusory. The persistent propaganda of Isocrates for a national war against Persia had fallen on deaf ears. Since 412 all the leading Greek cities had vied with each other in seeking Persian subsidies or diplomatic support. None had any reason to fear Persian aggression; like the Romans after Augustus' death, the Persian kings were content with their *finis imperii*; bent on restoring control over Asia and Egypt, they had been very willing to promote internal discords among the Greek cities under the name of 'the freedom and autonomy of every city, great or small'. The sense of natural antagonism between Greeks and barbarians can easily be exaggerated,³ and in any event to Greeks of the fourth century, even to Isocrates, Macedonians too were barbarians (though the ruling dynasty had a recognized claim to be regarded as Greek),⁴ and it was they, not Persia, whose power menaced Greek freedom. Demosthenes and king Agis took Persian gold,⁵ and the Thebans in 335 called on their fellow Greeks to fight for liberty in concert with the great king.⁶ They were right; in his last year Alexander showed that he meant to be master in Greece. Between 336 and 322 most Greek cities were in arms at one time or another against the Macedonian power.⁷ Alexander himself suffered no illusions;⁸ he knew that he could not in 334 rely on a Greek fleet to dispute the mastery of the seas with the Persians, and the Greek contingents in his army played only a subordinate role in the fighting, apart from the Thessalians who owed Philip special gratitude for restoring peace and order in their country. The Panhellenic crusade was a fiction for everyone but modern scholars who suppose that Isocrates' pamphlets were widely admired for anything but their languid eloquence.

¹ A. i. 16. 6; 19. 6.

² Polyb. iii. 6. 8 ff.

³ The grant of privileges to Sidonians at Athens and the foundation of cults of Isis there (Tod 139; 189) are revealing.

⁴ Isocr. v. 107-8 (cf. Hdt. v. 20-22; viii. 137-9). Arrian's sources also distinguish Greeks and Macedonians, e.g. *Ind.* 18. 6-7 (Nearchus).

⁵ Aeschin. iii. 239 ff.; Dinarch. i. 10; 18; Plut. *Dem.* 20; A. ii. 13. 6.

⁶ D. xvii. 9. 5; cf. 62 (Agis).

⁷ Some cities saw in Philip or Alexander a protector against powerful and aggressive neighbours, cf. Polyb. xviii. 14; thus Argos and Messene were pro-Macedonian from fear of Sparta, but they too rose against Macedon in the Lamian war, when Sparta was prostrate, as did the Thessalians (D. xviii. 11).

⁸ A. i. 18. 8; 29. 6; ii. 17, etc.

Even Isocrates had envisaged a war with a different purpose. Retribution for long distant wrongs hardly interested him;¹ he even showed surprisingly little concern for the 'enslaved' Greeks in Asia.² In the *Panegyricus* he had urged that it was folly for the Greeks to contend with each other over a few barren acres, when the wealth of the Persian empire was theirs for the taking. In 346 he had recommended Philip to win fame by conquering lands in Asia for the surplus population of Greece. Philip had sufficient power and wealth already; his reward was to be glory, and the material fruits of his victories were to enure to the Greeks.³ At Pella this can only have evoked ridicule. For attacking Persia Philip had a Macedonian as well as a Panhellenic pretext, that by aiding Perinthus in 340 the Persians had broken a treaty concluded with him,⁴ and he surely intended to annex Persian territory himself. Certainly this was Alexander's purpose from the first. As soon as he had won the battle of the Granicus, he appointed satraps and imposed tribute on the king's Asiatic subjects.⁵

We cannot say how far Philip intended to go. Perhaps he could not have said himself. In 332 Darius offered to cede all his territory west of the Euphrates. Parmenio declared that he would close with the offer, if he were Alexander. 'So would I', replied Alexander, 'if I were Parmenio.'⁶ It is often supposed that Philip would have agreed with his old general rather than with his son. There is no warrant for this belief. Philip was an opportunist and his ambitions expanded with his successes. Wilcken thought that he would have been content to make his existing possessions secure by conquering the whole or the greater part of the seaboard of the eastern Mediterranean. But the Macedonians were not a maritime or commercial people, and it was natural for their king to entertain continental ambitions. All his contemporaries knew that the Persian empire was weak in everything but money. Outside Iran, where the nobility shared in the imperial government, the king's subjects in general were discontented, or at best indifferent to a change of masters; kings and satraps had depended heavily on Greek mercenaries who might be seduced by Panhellenic propaganda and were in any event not superior to the Macedonian phalanx; the chief strength of native armies lay in the Iranian cavalry, which had threatened the survival of the Ten Thousand and limited the successes of Agesilaus, but which Alexander's Macedonian and Thessalian horse had a good chance of beating easily; and

¹ But see iv. 155; 183; 185; v. 124-6 (?).

² But see iv. 181; xii. 103; *ep.* ix. 8.

³ iv. 131-3; 174; 182; 187; v. 9; 84-85; 107-8; 112; 120-2; 129-45.

⁴ A. ii. 14. 2.

⁵ A. i. 17. 1 and 7.

⁶ A. ii. 25.

no one with a distant recollection of the triumphs of Cyrus the Great, whose forces were probably no more numerous at first than Alexander's, could assert that the army Alexander inherited from Philip, well-trained, confident, and by ancient standards large, was incapable of doing what Cyrus had once done.

There is then no difficulty in supposing that when Alexander cast a spear on the Asian shore, he meant to symbolize his intention of conquering Asia, that is to say, the whole Persian empire;¹ to Isocrates (v. 76; 100) 'Asia' is a synonym for the king's dominion. The story indeed comes from Diodorus and the source is poor. But it was Aristobulus, a well-informed authority,² who told how early in 333 Alexander untied the Gordian knot and offered sacrifice in thanksgiving to the gods for manifesting by this sign that he was destined to rule over Asia. All the evidence suggests that Alexander was a deeply religious man, sedulous in performing the ceremonies sanctioned by custom,³ and that he came to believe that he was upheld in his victorious career by the favour of the gods.⁴ After Gordium then he can have been in little doubt that he was destined to rule over Asia. He proclaimed this aim before Issus, in his negotiations with Darius in 332, and again before Gaugamela. That victory seemed decisive, and he was then apparently acknowledged as king of Asia by the army.⁵ A change soon came over his attitude to Darius. In 332 he had castigated him as a usurper; after his death, he paid him respect as the legitimate ruler, and seems to have represented himself in some peculiar way as the heir of the Achaemenids, whose tombs he was zealous to restore.⁶ This was natural enough; he had seen the loyalty and courage of the Iranian nobility in defending their king, and he wished to bind them to himself by similar sentiments.

It is not likely indeed that Alexander was guided at any time in his life by purely rational calculations. Devoted to the reading of Homer, he conceived himself as a second Achilles,⁷ born

αἰὲν ἀριστεύειν καὶ ὑπείροχον ἔμμεναι ἄλλων.

The spirit of heroic adventure mingled with an insatiate curiosity. The oft-recurring phrase that he was seized with a longing to do or see things that no one or only a few had done or seen before seems to come down

¹ D. xvii. 17. 2. For another view cf. Badian, pp. 166 ff.

² Cited in A. ii. 3. 7.

³ A. iii. 16. 9; 25. 1; vi. 3. 1, &c.

⁴ A. ii. 7. 3; 14. 7; iii. 3. 4; v. 3. 1; 29. 1. The story in Callisthenes (Jacoby, *Fragm. d. griech. Hist.* no. 124) F 31 that the Pamphylian sea miraculously receded to allow Alexander's march past Mount Climax was in all histories of Alexander (Jos. *Ant. Jud.* ii. 348), cf. A. i. 26. 2, and obviously found favour with him.

⁵ A. ii. 7. 6; 12. 5; 14. 8-9; iii. 9. 6; P. 34.

⁶ Contrast A. ii. 14. 5 with iii. 22. 1; vi. 29, &c.

⁷ A. i. 12. 1.

from Ptolemy and Nearchus, who were among his most intimate companions.¹ His almost uninterrupted successes engendered in him the conviction that he was permitted to achieve what was denied to ordinary mortals. More than once we are told that the more impracticable a project appeared, the more he was determined to undertake it;² though at other times, it is true, he was ready to adopt the prudent courses that caution recommended,³ this unparalleled audacity served him well by making enemies surrender at the mere terror of his name. In the Indian campaigns a new motif comes to the fore in the emulation of Heracles and Dionysus. The Macedonians, misinterpreting what they heard of local legends, thought that they had found traces that Heracles and Dionysus had preceded Alexander on his march. This idea was very congenial to Alexander. At the rock of Aornus he even found himself able to do what Heracles had failed to do. When he heard of Dionysus' presence at Nysa, and of his foundation of the city, he *wanted* the story to be true and conceived the hope that he might also outstrip the god. Many such stories come from inferior sources and may be disbelieved; but the particular incidents mentioned (and indeed others) were recorded by the best authorities and must be credited.⁴ Tarn indeed ridicules the whole tradition on the ground that it makes Alexander into an imitative character.⁵ This is a very curious view. To excel the achievements of beings who were thought to have attained to godhead by their terrestrial beneficence was an ambition that could be entertained only by a man conscious of his own transcendent powers, and to Greeks might well have been the basis of a charge of *hybris*. Again, it was Nearchus who told that Alexander sought to outdo Cyrus and Semiramis by traversing the desert of Baluchistan; and this must be believed against the official apologia for an enterprise probably hardly less disastrous than Napoleon's Russian campaign. Here *hybris* was indeed attended by *ate* and *nemesis*.⁶

¹ V. Ehrenberg, *Alexander and the Greeks* (Oxford, 1938), ch. ii.

² A. ii. 26. 3; iv. 21. 3; vi. 6. 3; 24. 3.

³ A. i. 18; ii. 17; iii. 9. 1 and 4; but Arrian's own reflections in iii. 10. 3-4 illustrate how Alexander's conduct should *not* be interpreted, in view of the evidence in 10. 2.

⁴ A. ii. 16; iii. 3; iv. 28; 30. 4; v. 2; 3. 2; vi. 3. 4-5; 14. 2; vii. 20 (all from Ptolemy or Aristobulus or both). Tarn ii. 45 dismisses A. v. 2 as a mere *logos* of the inferior tradition, but wrongly; the first section in *oratio recta* guarantees what follows down to section 7 in *oratio obliqua* as coming from one or both of the main sources (cf. ii. 12. 3-6 for their account in the form of a *logos* in *oratio obliqua*); in section 7 a change of source is explicit.

⁵ Tarn ii. 51 ff. wrongly ascribing the tradition to Clitarchus.

⁶ A. vi. 24. 2 f., cf. Strabo xv. 1. 5. On the Gedrosian march cf. H. Strasburger, *Hermes* lxxx (1952), 456 ff. A. vi. 21. 3-22. 3; 23. 1-24. 1; 27. 1 come from an official, apologetic source (presumably Ptolemy) which rationalized Alexander's motives and minimized the disaster; 22. 4-8 from Aristobulus, and 24. 1-26. 5 either from him or, as Strasburger argues, from Nearchus, a reliable source whichever view be adopted,

Long before this, Alexander had been addressed at Siwah by the prophet of Ammon as 'son of Zeus' and, if we may adopt a plausible suggestion of Tarn, had been told within the sanctuary the sense in which he, the new Pharaoh, was of divine filiation.¹ As son of Zeus or Ammon—the identification was not new²—he did not cease to be the son of Philip; he never denied his earthly paternity. But he had heard that there was some mystical sense in which he could claim a divine origin too. Perhaps he was not at once convinced; but at Gaugamela he prayed for the help of the gods 'if indeed he was the son of Zeus', and the help came.³ The prayer is attested by Callisthenes, and (despite his final quarrel with Alexander) that court historian must be supposed to have written either what was true or what he knew would please the king; whichever hypothesis we adopt, we must conclude that the claim to be the son of Zeus was one that Alexander made, if not before the battle, then at least by the time that Callisthenes wrote. Callisthenes also recorded that Apollo at Branchidae and the Sibyl of Erythrae confirmed the prophet of Ammon; we may surmise that Callisthenes gave the interpretation placed officially on ambiguous responses.⁴ Probably Alexander's prolonged victories made him more and more certain that he was in some sense divine. There is indeed no proof of this in his unsuccessful attempt to impose *proskynesis* on his Macedonian and Greek entourage; this was an act of respect due in Persian society from inferior to superior, and, living in the country, Alexander cannot have continued to share the mistaken view prevalent in Greece that it was a recognition of divinity. His aim must here simply have been to establish uniformity in court etiquette.⁵ But his deification at the end of his reign is another matter. The evidence that he himself demanded acknowledgement of his godhead from the Greeks, slender as it is, seems to me sufficient in the absence of any directly conflicting testimony;⁶ and it ought not to be rejected simply on the ground that he had no rational motive for such a demand; Tarn was certainly wrong in holding that as a god a king could have a legitimate excuse for intervening in the affairs whose account agreed with all others and with modern travellers' descriptions of the desert; Strasburger reckons that Alexander lost three-fourths of the army that went with him.

¹ Strabo xvii. 1. 43 (Callisthenes), cf. Tarn ii. 353 ff.

² Tarn's objections (ii. 348 ff.) cannot stand against the texts of Pindar he cites and Hdt. ii. 42; 55. A Greek could not be certain of the true name of Zeus, cf. Aesch. *Agam.* 160 ff.

³ P. 33.

⁵ J. P. V. D. Balsdon, *Historia* i (1950), 353 ff.

⁶ See esp. Dinarch. i. 94; Hyper. *contra Dem.* 31; *epitaphios* 21 (on which cf. E. Bickermann, *Athenaeum* xli (1963), 70 ff.; in my view the present ἀναγκαζόμεθα relates not to Athens, but to Greece generally, or rather cities not yet freed).

⁴ Strabo xvii. 1. 43.

of cities whose autonomy he had guaranteed.¹ But the evidence from Greece is powerfully confirmed by what we know of his emulation of Heracles and Dionysus, by the statement of Eratosthenes that the Macedonians were apt to invoke τὸ θεῖον to please Alexander,² and above all by the explicit testimony of Aristobulus that Alexander expected to be acknowledged, like 'Dionysus', as a god by the Arabians.³

The Greeks did not make the sharp distinction between the divine and the human which we have derived from Jewish thought. But the traditional view that it was proper for mortals θνητὰ φρονεῖν was not extinct; it was only after Alexander that apotheosis became a conventional honour for kings or benefactors in Greece, and in Macedon it was not claimed by later kings. Even if we make the initiative for Alexander's deification come from Greeks who felt gratitude to him or wished to flatter him, it is hard to explain the choice of this still strange mode of doing him honour except on the assumption that it was believed to correspond to his own desires. Arrian's conjecture that he sought apotheosis to enhance his dignity (vii. 29) is not satisfying. A man so devout would hardly have aspired to divinity unless he had felt that he had a religious justification. Long ago Empedocles, one of the most religious of Greek thinkers, had written: 'I go among you as an immortal god, no mortal now, honoured among all as is right, crowned with fillets and flowery garlands.'⁴ Why should we not suppose that Alexander too was imbued with a sense of divine inspiration, power and beneficence, sown in his mind by the teaching of Ammon and other oracular responses and confirmed by his superhuman achievements which made him feel himself to be the equal of Dionysus, entitled to the adoration of mankind? He knew of course that he would die, or rather quit this life;⁵ but that had been the fate of Heracles and Dionysus. At any rate the belief in his divinity was accepted even by his proud Macedonian officers; for after his death his former secretary, Eumenes, induced them to set up a golden throne in the camp, before which they all did daily sacrifices and obeyed themselves to Alexander as a god, taking counsel from his divine will and ever-living spirit.⁶ Like Caesar,⁷ and unlike any other deified king, Alexander commanded genuine veneration.

To a god upon earth the allegiance of all mankind was rightly due. In India Alexander expected universal submission and treated resistance

¹ E. Bickermann, *CPh.* xlv (1950), 43 (review of Tarn).

² A. v. 3. 1.

³ A. vii. 20. 1; Strabo xvi. 1. 11; cf. L. Pearson, *Lost Histories of Alexander the Great* (New York, 1960), 184.

⁴ Diels, *Fragm. d. Vorsokratiker* I⁶ B 114.

⁵ μεταλλάττειν, *OGIS* 4; D. xviii 56. 2.

⁶ D. xviii. 60-61; Plut. *Eumenes* 13.

⁷ Suet. *Caes.* 88.

as revolt,¹ even when he had passed beyond the confines of the empire the Achaemenids had once ruled.² Some held that he aimed at reaching the mouth of the Ganges and the encircling Ocean stream.³ Even on Eratosthenes' later reconstruction of the eastern hemisphere he was not seemingly so far distant from this objective when he had reached the Hyphasis.⁴ Here mutiny turned him back; but he had not forsworn conquests, and took his army homewards by a devious route that involved more fighting and brought him to the Ocean at the Indus delta. Certainly he did not (as Tarn holds) abandon any of his Indian acquisitions; the principalities of Porus and Taxilas were still regarded as parts of the empire after his death, and their status was not different in principle from the kingdoms of Cyprus and Phoenicia.⁵ After his return to Mesopotamia he was still bent on more wars; he promised his veterans at Opis to give them rewards enough to incite the new Macedonian drafts to be ready to share the same dangers and exertions.⁶ His immediate projects comprised the exploration of the Caspian, surely as a prelude to the deferred campaign against the Scyths,⁷ and the conquest, not the mere circumnavigation, of Arabia; Aristobulus said that he intended to take possession of the country and found colonies there as part of a design to be 'lord of all'.⁸ We are told that he left behind him memoranda for a gigantic plan of conquest in the west that would have taken him along the southern shore of the Mediterranean to the Ocean at Gibraltar (where Heracles once again had preceded him) and then along the northern shore back to Macedon.⁹ Arrian has nothing of this, but then he has nothing about *any* plans of Alexander (except for the Caspian and Arabian projects). And Arrian himself had no doubt that Alexander would never have been content with what he had already conquered.¹⁰ The authenticity of Alexander's reputed memoranda has been questioned, but in my view on quite insufficient grounds. The plan attributed to him is in keeping with all that we know of his character. It would have marked a new stage in the attempt to reduce the whole

¹ A. vi. 15. 5; 17. 1-2, &c.

² Persian rule had once extended to the Indus (Hdt. iv. 44; A. *Ind.* 1), not beyond; nor in Alexander's time so far (Strabo xv. 1. 26); even the Indus country was no longer known, A. vi. 1; *Ind.* 20; 32.

³ A. iv. 15. 5-6; v. 26 (but the reliability of this speech is called in grave doubt by D. Kienast, *Historia* xiv (1965), 180 ff.).

⁴ J. O. Thomson, *Hist. of Anc. Geography* (Cambridge, 1948), 135.

⁵ A. v. 29. 4-5; C. x. 1. 21; D. xviii. 3. 2; 39. 6; xix. 14. 8.

⁶ A. vii. 8. 1.

⁷ A. vii. 16, cf. iv. 15.

⁸ A. vii. 19. 3 ff., cf. Strabo xvi. 1. 11.

⁹ D. xviii. 4; C. x. 1. 17-19. Tarn's criticisms are answered by F. Schachermeyr, *Jahreshefte der österr. arch. Inst.* (1954), 118 ff.

¹⁰ A. iv. 7. 5; vii. 1. 4.

inhabited world, bounded by the Ocean, a world which in the west as in the east appeared much smaller than we know it to be.¹

A prudent ruler, governed by rational calculations, would clearly not have embarked on such an enterprise. Large tracts of the old Persian empire were still not pacified.² Whatever administrative changes in its ramshackle structure be ascribed to Alexander, the conduct of some of his satraps during his long disappearance behind the barrier of the Hindu-Kush had shown that their independence could still, as under the Achaemenids, threaten the stability and unity of the empire. Greece was smouldering with discontent; even the loyalty of Macedon and its vice-gerent, Antipater, who did not comply with Alexander's summons to his court in 324, could not be counted on.³ To secure the gains he had already made, Alexander needed decades of patient organizing work. It was not enough to remove or punish (as he did) officials whom he suspected of infidelity or oppression. But there is no sign that he had any taste for the humdrum routine of administration.

Not that he lacked statesmanlike views. He sought to turn nomads into settled, peaceful cultivators of the soil,⁴ to foster economic development,⁵ and to create cities as centres of civilization.⁶ In some, but not all, of his foundations there were Greek and Macedonian settlers; as, even in these, natives were brought within the walls and the Greeks and Macedonians were no doubt expected to solace themselves with native wives, mixed communities were likely to be formed, in which the culture would surely be Hellenic, as in the older ethnically mixed cities of Ionia,⁷ and from which Hellenic ideas would radiate to barbarians, as in fourth-century Caria and Lycia.⁸ Alexander himself was devoted to Greek culture, and I suspect that he never thought of his realm as being other than fundamentally Hellenic; it is said that he had Greek taught to Darius' family and to the children his soldiers had had by native women.⁹ Not that he despised barbarians. We are told that he rejected Aristotle's advice to treat barbarians as enemies and to behave to them as a master might towards slaves; experience showed him, as indeed it

¹ Thomson, *op. cit.* 139 ff.

² Perdiccas conquered Cappadocia after Alexander's death (D. xviii. 16); Armenia remained unsubdued.

³ E. Badian, *JHS* lxxxii (1961), 16 ff.

⁴ A. *Ind.* 40. 7-8 (Nearchus). For the motive cf. Tac. *Agr.* 21.

⁵ A. iii. 1. 5 (cf. P. 26); iv. 25. 4; vi. 15. 2; 21. 5; vii. 21; Strabo ix. 2. 18; xvi. 1. 9-11.

⁶ Jones (*op. cit.* in n. 5, p. 206), ch. 1. Native towns, e.g. A. ii. 27. 7; iv. 28. 4.

⁷ Hdt. i. 146.

⁸ Tod 138 (Caria); A. T. Olmstead, *Hist. of the Persian Empire* (Chicago, 1948), 348-50; 360; 391-2; 405-6 (Lycia).

⁹ D. xvii. 67. 1; P. 47. 3 (cf. A. vii. 12). For Alexander's culture see P. 4. 1 and 6; 7-8; 10. 4; 11. 6 (= A. i. 9. 10); 26. 1; 29. 1-3 (cf. A. iii. 6. 1); A. i. 12. 1, &c.

showed Aristotle, that the distinction between natural masters and slaves was not to be equated with that between Greeks and barbarians.¹ Phoenicians, Iranians, Indians, all rendered him valuable services; he needed Orientals to fill the ranks of his army and to administer subjects with whose languages and customs they were familiar. He recognized local laws, left natives to manage local affairs, and even appointed Iranians to satrapies and admitted them to his entourage. To reconcile them to his rule, he progressively adopted Persian dress and court ceremonial. All this aroused opposition among old-fashioned Macedonians. Alexander was prepared to crush it without mercy, but he wished also to effect a genuine union of hearts. The notion of Tarn that he originated the concept of the brotherhood of men is indefensible; the concept was not new and it was not Alexander's.² What he prayed for at Opis was harmony between the old ruling class of the Persian empire and the Macedonians; it was *their* lives, customs, and marriages he proposed 'to mix as in a loving-cup'.³ He approved of his soldiers having children by native women, though they were to be brought up in Macedonian ways.⁴ He himself married two Iranian princesses and virtually forced his chief officers to do likewise.⁵ Overriding all resentment, he went ahead with plans to incorporate Orientals both in the Companion cavalry and in the phalanx.⁶ He always assumed that his invincible will would surmount every obstacle, of sentiment no less than of armed resistance. His colonies illustrate this: established in sites carefully chosen for strategic or commercial value, they were designed to become great cities and by their names to perpetuate his own; for the feelings of conscribed settlers who 'yearned for the Greek way of life and had been cast away in the extremities of the kingdom'⁷ he cared nothing. Admirable as these aims were, one may yet feel that he did not possess 'le tact des choses possibles'. But who can say what his iron resolution might not have achieved, if fate had not denied him the long life needed to bring his purposes to fruition?

His early death would have mattered less if he had had an able successor to carry on his work. The rise of Macedon to power had long been retarded by disputes over the succession and by the turbulence of the nobility. Philip had attached the great nobles more closely to the court,⁸ but the danger of dynastic quarrels remained, and it was not

¹ E. Badian, *Historia* vii (1958), 440 ff.

² Badian, *op. cit.* 425 ff.; P. Merlan, *CPh.* xlv (1950), 161 ff.

³ A. vii. 11. 8-9; Plut. *Mor.* 329.

⁴ A. vii. 12.

⁵ A. iv. 19; vii. 4.

⁶ A. vii. 6; 11; 23.

⁷ D. xviii. 7.

⁸ e.g. Alexander the Lyncestian, Leonnatus, and Perdiccas (cf. Berve's biographies); see also A. iv. 13. 1.

unreasonable for Demosthenes and other Greeks to hope, after 346 and even after 338, that Macedonian power would disintegrate. Alexander's old advisers, Antipater and Parmenio, had pressed him not to invade Persia before he had married and begotten an heir.¹ He rejected the advice, and at his death he still had no child. Roxane was indeed pregnant, and her unborn son was recognized as the future king. But like all minors who ascended the Macedonian throne, Alexander IV was not suffered to survive for long. The chief Macedonian generals were bent on securing their own power, if necessary at the expense of the unity of the empire; no less independent and ambitious than their ancestors, in the world that Alexander had transformed, they could aim at the acquisition of kingdoms or empires rather than petty principalities. But they had to take more account than Alexander had done of the prejudices of the common soldiers on whose support they relied, prejudices which indeed most of them probably shared; and if some of them adopted his plan of settling Greeks and Macedonians in the east, it was to assure themselves of a supply of fighting men rather than to promote the diffusion of a common and mainly Hellenic culture in their kingdoms, though Hellenization was naturally a result of their policy. The deliberate attempt to found a world-empire based on reconciliation and unity between Macedonians and Iranians faded in their incessant wars.

According to Plutarch Alexander had sought to be 'a governor from God and a reconciler of the world; using force of arms against those whom he failed to bring together by reason, he united peoples of the most varied origin and ordered . . . all men to look on the *oikoumene* as their fatherland, the army as their citadel and guardian, good men as kin, and wicked as foreigners; he taught them that the proof of Hellenism lay in virtue and of barbarism in wickedness.'² This objective could be achieved only by blood and iron, and by the will of a despot who was prepared to override the sentiments of his subjects; and though the world was to be united in government and culture, there is no concept here of the brotherhood of all men as sons of a common Father, but at best only of those who possessed *arete*. Neither Alexander nor anyone else realized the objective, and it may be doubted if in his own mind it was so clearly defined as in Plutarch's ideal description. But his work tended in this direction and helped to inspire not only perhaps Stoic philosophers but the Romans, who were also to transcend national differences and to conceive that Italy had been marked out to unite scattered empires, to humanize customs, to give mankind a common speech, and to become 'una cunctarum gentium in toto orbe patria'.³

¹ D. xvii. 16.

² P. 329.

³ Pliny, *NH* iii. 39.