In the preceding pages, we have seen that Horace's catalogue of Pindaric genres is selected and sequenced to exhibit in an economical yet powerful way the dithyrambic *manner* of the Pindaric lyric as poetry rooted in inspiration or natural genius, the range of its *subject-matter*, which traverses the universe, and its *function and power* of celebrating greatness in such a way as to confer upon that greatness immortality in fame.

Horace's *Ode* 4.2, as we remarked at the beginning, has been an influential document in shaping the portrait of Pindar for subsequent generations. As such, it manifests the simultaneous preservation and betrayal that are the double aspects of tradition. In assigning Pinder to one side of a body of critical distinctions for classifying poets and their work whose roots, indeed, go back to Pindar himself, *Ode* 4.2 preserves the awareness of the grandeur, range, and power of Pindar's work, but—such is the logic of the critical polarities—denies it artful care, measure, control. Faced with the ode, one may raise the question, as Fraenkel did in a passage quoted earlier, of whether Horace assented to this implication.[16] The evidence seems to me to suggest that with regard to meter he did;[17] beyond this, the text is silent. However, the recognition of the extent to which Horace's portrait of Pindar is structured by the conventional polarities of contemporary Roman critical discourse and governed by the rhetorical imperatives of the *recusatio* invites the reader to transcend it in a fresh encounter with the inspired *and* artful poetry of Pindar.

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16. E. Fraenkel (supra n. 1) 435.
17. Supra n. 7.

Personality in Hesiod

HESIOD IS frequently described as the first self-conscious voice of European literature.[1] The flesh-and-blood, opinionated farmer-poet of the *Works and Days* is contrasted with the objective, anonymous Homer; and most of us have been taught to believe that Hesiod, in introducing his own voice and personality into his poetry, is making a sharp and significant break with earlier tradition.[2] The purpose of this article is to call some aspects of this view of Hesiod into question; to suggest that the techniques of self-reference in Hesiod belong to traditions much older than Hesiod himself and shared by other early Greek poets; and to attempt to refine a little our appreciation of the conventions surrounding the different authorial stances appropriate to different kinds of Greek poetry. I will argue that Hesiod's personal and autobiographical remarks always serve a specific and necessary function within the contexts in which they occur, and should be viewed in these terms rather than as gratuitous self-revelation and reminiscence.

1. Although this article does not deal with a lyric poet, it is concerned with the "lyric I" and with certain conventions of early Greek poetry, and so seems not out of place in this volume—especially since the influence of E. L. Bundy will be easily discerned. An earlier version was given as a lecture at Harvard University in October 1981: I am grateful to my audience there, and also to Professors Robert Renehan, Thomas Rosenmeyer, and Friedrich Solmsen for their criticisms; none of them should be held to agree with all that follows.

2. So, e.g., among recent critics, Fränkel (1975) 112–13, Versenyi (1974) 43–44, Østerud (1976) 13–14, Stroh (1976) 85, Trypanis (1981) 61, Janko (1981) 18. Apparently Achilles, Hector, and Helen in the *Iliad*, or Odysseus and Demodocus in the *Odyssey*, are not "self-conscious" or "individual" enough to count. Kranz's (1961) useful survey of self-references in Greek poetry is handicapped by the same assumption, especially pp. 4–6, 13–16. See too Misch (1950) 73–75.

It is not difficult to see why the prevailing misconception of Hesiod became so popular. The organization and structure of both poems (but especially *WD*) are in many respects puzzling, at least to modern scholarly minds, and it was tempting to look to the peculiar attitudes and personality of the poet himself as an explanation, especially since he introduces himself and his family so frequently into his work. So we are asked to try to define the "idiosyncrasy which informs Hesiod's poems."[3] The modes of thought and organizational techniques characteristic of early Greek poetry may at times seem alien to us; and it is all too easy to slip into the habit of regarding them as primitive or haphazard. But we should know better by now. The associations of ideas in Hesiod or Tyrtaeus or Solon are by no means as random and pointless as is implied by the term "idiosyncrasy"; rather, certain consistent patterns and techniques can be seen at work (in many cases directly related to those of traditional oral composition).[4] To characterize Hesiod's poems as mere "collections of anecdotes, . . . etc.," is seriously to underestimate the unity and plan of both poems (especially of the *Theogony*); yet such a remark is typical of an approach to Hesiod which has flourished for over a century, and which is part of a larger system of critical attitudes toward early Greek poetry that is long overdue for revision—and is indeed already in the process of being revised.

A critical orthodoxy emerged from the nineteenth century and found elegant and persuasive expression in the works of scholars such as Werner Jaeger and Bruno Snell.[5] This orthodoxy represents epic, didactic, and lyric poetry as three successive stages in the evolution of Greek culture—and of Greek consciousness. Homer, Hesiod, and Archilochus are seen as increasingly sophisticated and self-aware literary artists, their growing moral sensibility[6] accompanied by a correspondingly greater concern for themselves as personalities and authors of their own works. Thus Hesiod is both the first poet to concern himself seriously with the justice of Zeus (i.e., with the religious, historical, and moral foundations of Greek society)[7] and the first autobiographical voice in European literature. This

3. Østerud (1976) 14; on the same page, "It seems futile to look for a unity of action in Hesiod's poems, which may be characterized as collections of anecdotes, autobiographical data, maxims, practical advice, and conventional thoughts"; in contrast to the "objective" Homeric poems, "the Hesiodic poems are more subjective, inasmuch as they betray throughout the mind of their author. . . . It is the author's association of ideas which make up the principle of composition."

4. See especially H. Fränkel (1924), van Groningen (1958), West (1966) 31–39, (1978) 41–59. Also Solmsen (1949) 3–123; T. Krischer, *Formale Konventionen der homerischen Epik* (*Zetemata* 56, 1971); D. Lohmann, *Die Komposition der Reden in der Ilias* (Berlin 1970); M. N. Nagler, *Spontaneity and Tradition* (Berkeley 1974) 1–63.

5. Jaeger (1945) 72–73, 112–33, Snell (1953). Further, e.g., Woodbury (1952); M. Treu, *Vom Homer zur Lyrik* (*Zetemata* 12, 1955), Versenyi (1974). Snell begins his chapter on the "Rise of the Individual in the Early Greek Lyric" with this statement (p. 43): "It is generally agreed nowadays that the various poetic genres which make up the literatures of the West, the epic, lyric poetry, and drama, coexist side by side. Among the Greeks, however . . . the genres flourished in chronological succession." Influential too has been Misch (1950) 59–95.

6. Here the influential studies of Dodds (1951) and Adkins (1960) have come into play.

7. Cf. Hdt. 2.53.2 and, e.g., Solmsen (1949) 3–100, Kirk (1970) 172–205, 226–51 with further references.

approach is the outcome not only of post-Hegelian *Geistesgeschichte* but also of Romantic literary taste and theory, which dominated the interpretation of Classical poetry at least until the 1950s, and is still strong today: in place of the Classical (rhetorical) model, concentrating on the audience and the effects of literature, Romantic criticism looks to the author, and evaluates a poem according to its expressiveness—i.e., the intensity of emotion, "sincerity," and spontaneity that it demonstrates. The Classical canon of "imitation" (the poet as "mirror" of life) is downgraded in favor of the "lamp" of poetic imagination and originality.[8] Biographical study of the poet becomes a more popular mode of interpretation than study of the tradition and conventions in which he worked. Art comes to be regarded (with a little help from Freud and his disciples) as almost synonymous with self-expression.

In such a critical climate, it is no wonder that the view of Hesiod as a rustic pioneer of self-expression, a rough nugget of an amateur poet,[9] found much favor. Both in his autobiographical references, and in his sometimes rather freely associated sequences of thought, Hesiod may appear to be writing in order to reveal, whether consciously or not, his true self and his innermost beliefs in a way that Romantic critics would fully approve.[10] By these standards, the more Hesiod lets us know about himself as a person, the higher may we rank his spontaneity and expressiveness as a poet. If his poems appear to lack unity and a clear artistic plan, even this lack may be taken as evidence of the "idiosyncrasy" of his thought, of his unique personality at work.

Over the last twenty or thirty years, Classical rhetorical theory has come somewhat back into vogue. Questions of genre, convention, audience and occasion, rhetorical stance, intentions, and effects are once again admissible, even fashionable.[11] This his been especially salutary and fruitful for the study of Greek lyric poetry, and we have seen a veritable revolution in critical attitudes, most notably toward Archilochus and Pindar.[12] Where previously critics had

8. The terms are those of M. H. Abrams, *The Mirror and the Lamp* (New York 1953), who traces the evolution of the Romantic approach, with its theoretical roots in Longinus. See too W. J. Bate, *New York Review* 29, 18 (November 1982), reviewing J. Engell, *The Creative Imagination*; and W. C. Booth, *Critical Understanding* (Chicago 1979) 139–94.

9. West (1966) 48 states baldly, "He was no professional singer," unlike the "trained rhapsodes": yet his victory at the games of Amphidamas (*WD* 654–59) and the tradition of the *Contest of Homer and Hesiod* argue otherwise. Studies of language, dialect, and formulaic technique of composition have not demonstrated major differences between Homeric and Hesiodic versification: see Edwards (1971), Nagy (1982) 69–72, and even Peabody (1974); likewise, Janko (1982) concludes that the Hesiodic poems, though post-Homeric, are comparable products of oral composition (p. 188 and passim). Generally it has been the structural peculiarities, the subject-matter and moral tone, and the autobiographical references that have led critics to view Hesiod as a genuinely *pastoral* poet, in contrast to the blind and/or itinerant court poet Homer and the Homeridae. Solmsen (1982) 11 gives a good summary of the issues, with further references.

10. "Poetry . . . is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feeling": William Wordsworth, Preface to the Second Edition of the *Lyrical Ballads* (1800). Of course, Wordsworth never intended this as a license for incoherence or solipsism.

11. See supra n.8 and, e.g., Bundy (1962), Cairns (1972); also now W. R. Johnson, *The Idea of Lyric* (Berkeley 1982) 24–38, 71–75.

12. On Archilochus, see Dover (1964), West (1974) 1–39, Nagy (1976) (together with the rest of

traced the gradual emergence of a "personal voice" from Hesiod, through the blind bard of Chios, to the bold first-person utterances of Archilochus, Alcman, and Alcaeus and the proud self-advertisement of Theognis and Solon,[13] nowadays we have learnt to recognize better some of the differences between the conventions of lyric and epic. Most of us are now prepared to acknowledge, first, that various forms of Greek lyric are at least as old, and probably older, than hexameter epic narrative;[14] and, second, that a poet may adopt different authorial stances, different personae, according to the occasion and genre in which he is writing, and if we are ignorant of the occasion and the attendant conventions, we run the risk of misjudging the author's tone and intentions.[15]

In the case of the epinician poet—whose first-person references and expressions of apparently idiosyncratic opinions and advice were seen by former generations of scholars (indeed, by several ancient commentators too) as marks of a temperamental and erratic genius, struggling to rise above the mundane constraints of his duty and pursue issues closer to his heart—the conventions of the genre have been studied more carefully, and the significance and function of the personal references are now better understood.[16] We find, indeed, that the praise-poet is expected to define his own position in some way: in Aristotelian terms, he will introduce his own ἦθος as an essential element in the process of moving the πάθη of his audience and convincing them of the truth or probability of his words[17]—in this case, of the excellence of the victor and his family. The poet has a χρέος (an "undertaking" or "contract") to deliver proper praise of the victor, without arousing disbelief or envy in the audience.[18] A successful song of praise

that issue of *Arethusa*), Seidensticker (1978). On Pindar, especially Bundy (1962); D. C. Young, "Pindaric Criticism," *Minnesota Review* 4 (1964) 584-641 (reprinted in *Pindar und Bakchylides*, ed. W. M. Calder and J. Stern = *Wege der Forschung* 134 [Darmstadt 1970]); Lefkowitz (1963); H. Lloyd-Jones, *JHS* 93 (1973) 109-37; Hamilton (1974); Slater (1977).

13. So, e.g., Woodbury (1952) 21 speaks of "the increasing self-consciousness of the Greek poet" from Homer to the fifth century; see supra n.5.

14. See Dover (1964); M. L. West, "Greek Poetry 2000-700 B.C.," *CQ* 23 (1973) 179-92; G. Nagy, *Comparative Studies in Greek and Indic Metre* (Cambridge, Mass. 1974), and "On the Origins of the Greek Hexameter," *Festschrift for Oswald Szemerenyi*, ed. B. Brogyanyi, Amsterdam Studies in the Theory and History of Linguistic Science IV, Current Issues in Linguistic Theory 11, (Amsterdam 1979) 611-31; also M. W. Haslam, "The Versification of the New Stesichorus," *GRBS* 19 (1978) 29-57; A. M. Bowie, *The poetic dialect of Sappho and Alcaeus* (New York 1981). (The theories of West and Nagy are challenged by A. Hoekstra, *Epic Verse before Homer: Three Studies* (Amsterdam 1981).

15. See especially Kroll (1924), Cairns (1972) 34-97. N.b. too C. Calame, *Les Choeurs de jeunes filles en Grèce archaïque*, 2 vols. (Lausanne 1977), with special reference to Alcman *PMG* 1 and 3. But for a valuable reminder that some of these occasions and audiences may have been very specific and transitory, see W. Rösler, *Gnomon* 52 (1980) 609-616 (review of O. Tsagarakis, *Self-Expression in Early Greek Lyric* = *Palingenesia* 11 [1977]), with further references. Recognition of the poetical personae of the Roman elegists and satirists is less recent.

16. Schadewaldt (1928), Bundy (1962), Lefkowitz (1963), Maehler (1963), Hamilton (1974) 16-17, 113-15. Also Young (supra n.12); E. Thummer, *Pindar: Die Isthmische Gedichte* (Heidelberg 1968) 1, pp. 82-102.

17. Aristotle *Rhet.* 1.2.3.1356a1 ff., and passim.

18. Schadewaldt (1928) 20, Bundy (1962) 40-41, 63, Hamilton (1974) index s.v. *Poet's task*.

glorifies both victor and poet: the two depend on one another—no victory, no song; no song, no memorial of the victory.[19] Thus a special, reciprocal relationship of gratitude and obligation (χάρις) is established between them; and it is in this context that it is natural and proper for the poet to introduce himself.

> Ἱέρων, σὺ δ' ὄλβου
> κάλλιστ' ἐπεδείξαο θνατοῖς
> ἄνθεα· πράξαντι δ' εὖ
> οὐ φέρει κόσμον σιω-
> πά· σὺν δ' ἀλαθείαι καλῶν
> καὶ μελιγλώσσου τις ὑμνήσει χάριν
> Κηΐας ἀηδόνος.
>
> (Bacch. 3.93-98)

> Hieron, you showed forth the finest flower of success to mortals; and for one who is successful, silence is inappropriate. But, together with the true and unforgettable record of your fine achievements, people will sing too of the *charis* of the sweet-voiced nightingale of Ceos.[20]

Bacchylides' personal voice (that of the "Cean nightingale") is here no gratuitous self-expression or advertisement, but a conventional part of the process of defining his correct relationship with the victor. Just as custom required that the prosecutor in a criminal case demonstrate that he had personally been injured by the defendant,[21] so, conversely, it was expected of an encomiast that he justify his bold words of praise by demonstrating his obligation and connection to the *laudandus*.

What has all this to do with personality in *Hesiod*? More than might at first appear. If Pindar and Archilochus have benefited from the shift away from biographical and Romantic criticism, the study and appreciation of Hesiod have remained largely enveloped in Romantic cobwebs. The first-person references are still all too often taken at face value, and in isolation, and are valued as evidence about Hesiod's life and times rather than as essential elements of the contexts in which they occur; the poems are enjoyed and discussed for what they reveal about Hesiod, rather than the other way round. There has still been little effort to draw up for him any sort of grammar of self-referential conventions, as has been done for lyric. Hesiod is still compared with Homer as if he is up to something new, exciting, and challenging in thus talking of himself. The purpose of this paper is to show that this is mistaken, and that Hesiod and Homer (and other early Greek poets) are generally found in this respect to be working within similar conventions.

19. E.g., Arrian *Anab.* 1.11, cf. Propertius 2.1.1-16, 39-56 (and 2.5.5-8, 24.1-10); also Gzella (1969.²) 171-73. We may compare the relationship between god and mortal implicit (sometimes explicit) in Greek prayers (infra, p. 48, and, e.g., Aesch. *Th.* 69-77, Soph. *OT* 897 ff., Plato *Euthyphr.* 14c-e). See too Horace *Od.* 4.9. 25-33.

20. I have over-translated ἀλαθείαι (96) to bring out the twofold sense of "true" and "unforgettable"—on which see M. Detienne (1973). For καλῶν, see Jebb's n. *ad loc.*

21. E.g., Lysias 12.2. This requirement applied only to private cases, of course; cf. Dem. 21.25.

Our brief preliminary look at the conventions of epinician poetry has already started us on the right track. There, it is clear that first-person references are usually to be explained in terms of a second person (the *laudandus*): where there is an ἐγώ, we generally find a σύ. There may also be a third-person audience, in the form of the sympathetic and understanding celebrants (Pindar's συνετοί), contrasted with the tasteless and carping outsiders who cannot appreciate the victory or the song.[22] This model, of χρέος and χάρις, of interdependence between first and second person, between poet and addressee or audience, will help us when we turn to Hesiod. But before we finally arrive there, we need to turn aside once more, to deal with a closely related problem that will shed some further light on these conventions, that of the much-discussed σφραγίς, or literary "seal," in early Greek poetry.

Κύρνε, σοφιζομένωι μὲν ἐμοὶ σφρηγὶς ἐπικείσθω
τοῖσδ' ἔπεσιν—λήσει δ' οὔποτε κλεπτόμενα,
οὐδέ τις ἀλλάξει κάκιον τοὐσθλοῦ παρεόντος,
ὧδε δὲ πᾶς τις ἐρεῖ· "Θεύγνιδός ἐστιν ἔπη
τοῦ Μεγαρέως"· πάντας δὲ κατ' ἀνθρώπους ὀνομαστός·
ἀστοῖσιν δ' οὔπω πᾶσιν ἀδεῖν δύναμαι.
οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν Πολυπαΐδη· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς
οὔθ' ὕων πάντεσσ' ἀνδάνει οὔτ' ἀνέχων.
σοὶ δ' ἐγὼ εὖ φρονέων ὑποθήσομαι, οἷάπερ αὐτὸς
Κύρν' ἀπὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν παῖς ἔτ' ἐὼν ἔμαθον.
πέπνυσο, μηδ' αἰσχροῖσιν ἐπ' ἔργμασι μηδ' ἀδίκοισιν
τιμὰς μηδ' ἀρετὰς ἕλκεο μηδ' ἄφενος.
ταῦτα μὲν οὕτως ἴσθι· κακοῖσι δὲ μὴ προσομίλει
ἀνδράσιν, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔχεο·
καὶ μετὰ τοῖσιν πῖνε καὶ ἔσθιε, καὶ μετὰ τοῖσιν
ἵζε, καὶ ἄνδανε τοῖς, ὧν μεγάλη δύναμις.
ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄπ' ἐσθλὰ μαθήσεαι· ἢν δὲ κακοῖσι
συμμίσγηις, ἀπολεῖς καὶ τὸν ἐόντα νόον.
ταῦτα μαθὼν ἀγαθοῖσιν ὁμίλει, καί ποτε φήσεις
εὖ συμβουλεύειν τοῖσι φίλοισιν ἐμέ.
(Theognis 19–38)

In these lines, Theognis moves from the last of his series of short introductory prayers to divine patrons (Apollo, Artemis, and the Muses) into his opening words of address to Cyrnus, the recipient of his ὑποθῆκαι, "precepts." It is customary to print 19–26 as a self-contained unit, and to refer to it as the "seal" of Theognis' whole collection; and it is usually treated more or less in isolation.[23] Discussion has generally been focused primarily on the question of *what* the seal

22. Bundy (1962) 40–41.

23. So, e.g., Hudson-Williams (1910) 108 : J. Carrière (Budé, 1948); Thesleff (1949) 124; Woodbury (1952); D. A. Campbell, *Greek Lyric Poetry* (London 1967) 79. Correctly, van Groningen (1966); West (1971).

is supposed to be identifying or protecting, and *how*. But if we bear the wider context in mind we can see better how the seal fits into the overall structure and plan of the collection, and appreciate that the poet's main concern here is not authenticity or the publication of his name (though these are incidental considerations), but his relation to his addressee and to his wider audience, who are to benefit from his special kind of wisdom.

Later, at 237–54, Theognis reminds Cyrnus (and us, his public audience, or fellow-symposiasts) of the reciprocal interdependence and gratitude that should obtain between poet and patron. This passage is not merely, as it is often taken to be, a general statement about the power of song, and his own genius, but a particular reproach (σχετλιασμός) directed at Cyrnus: to paraphrase, "*I* have given you wings (237 σοὶ μὲν ἐγὼ . . . , emphatic), i.e., eternal fame in men's mouths at banquets; but *you in return* (253) show no respect (αἰδώς) toward *me* (αὐτὰρ ἐγών . . . παρὰ σεῦ . . .)." The χάρις that should be shared between poet and *laudandus* (as between lover and beloved, teacher and student), the reward that a patron should give to a poet who has properly fulfilled his χρέος, is not being granted.[24] Theognis' own person and accomplishments are mentioned here because they are relevant to his relationship to Cyrnus; and by reminding Cyrnus that *others* have appreciated his poetic genius properly, Theognis lays claim to a more receptive ear from him in the future.

Similarly, in the *sphragis*-section (19–38), Theognis is presenting, not a guarantee of authenticity of all or part of the Theognidean corpus,[25] but a confident appeal to Cyrnus to treat his poetry with the respect it deserves. The main point of the lines lies, not in 20–23 (which are parenthetical, as West rightly prints them), but in 19 and 23–28. In 19–20 there is no ἥδε to modify σφρηγίς, and the verb is imperative, not indicative: "Let a seal be placed on these precepts, Cyrnus," i.e., don't lose them or adulterate them, because they are the best you can find (so 19 σοφιζομένωι); put a label on them ("Theognis of Megara made these"), then you can keep track of them, and nobody of any sense will let inferior ones be substituted for them (any more than you would let anyone replace your Chippendale with a Macy's sofa, or an Exekias with a Boeotian jug). Theognis, *sophos* as he is, is famous all over the world; so people will continue to seek out and follow his precepts, if they can. "Yet [24 δ', picking up 19 μέν] many of the citizens here do not recognize me as *sophos* [these being equivalent to the unenlightened and jealous outsiders in epinician poetry]. But for *you* [27 σοὶ δ'],

24. Cf. 1263–6.

ὦ παῖ, ὃς εὖ ἔρδοντι κακὴν ἀπέδωκας ἀμοιβήν,
οὐδέ τις ἀντ' ἀγαθῶν ἐστι χάρις παρὰ σοί·
οὐδέν πώ μ' ὤνησας· ἐγὼ δέ σε πολλάκις ἤδη
εὖ ἔρδων αἰδοῦς οὐδεμιῆς ἔτυχον.

Here encomium and instruction are replaced by simple pederasty: but the conventions are much the same.

25. This would be a futile claim, as the present state of Theognis' text, and of scholarly debate over it, proves; cf. Hudson-Williams (1910) 1–4, 16–35, West (1974) 40–61.

sc. in the hope that you have better sense, like me [εὖ φρονέων here, as often, bearing the double sense of "good intentions" and "sound mind"], for *you* I *shall* give my precepts—just as I once learnt them myself from the best possible source, the *agathoi*."

An epic or theogonic poet will usually base his claim to authority on the Muses and/or Apollo.[26] Theognis has already invoked his divine patrons (1-18); now, like many wisdom-poets and moralists, he chooses, rather, to emphasize his direct access to the best *human* source, here the "best kind of people [ἀγαθοί]." (Horace, likewise, in his *Satires* (1.4) looks back to his father; and Theognis himself in 1049 says that he will give his precepts "like father to son."[27] We should bear this in mind for later, when we turn to Hesiod and *his* family.) So 19-30 establish Theognis' credentials as expert. These will in turn (*if* Cyrnus responds correctly; that is the point of the *charis*-motif of 24-27, like that of 1263-66) earn for both of them, worldwide fame. And so he launches himself into his program (31-39) for the whole set of ὑποθῆκαι, based on the principle that one learns best from those who know best (28, and cf. 31-38); so Cyrnus will learn best from Theognis. That is why Theognis emphasizes his own name and talents here. The young protégé Cyrnus, on the brink of his career in Megara, is faced with a choice between the company and advice of Theognis, drawn from years of association with the ἀγαθοί, and the inferior advice and company of those who now prevail in the city.

This dramatic setting, real, imaginary, or a mixture of both,[28] adds an urgency and pathos to the collection that would be lacking if the precepts were simply published as advice for the world at large. By characterizing himself as the famous sage whose wisdom is admired throughout Greece yet neglected at home, and by addressing a young disciple and friend whose mind is also susceptible to the claims of rivals, Theognis provides a contextual background and human interest that add depth and warmth. It is this choice of dramatic setting, and of particular addressee, seen in relation to a wider audience of misguided citizens and more enlightened readers (or symposiasts), that brings Theognis thus to introduce himself and his own claims.

This same principle—that the poet's person is introduced, not as gratuitous self-advertisement nor out of mere pride of ownership or impulse to self-expression, but in order to establish the correct relationship with his immediate, specific audience or addressee—is clearly exemplified in the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo*. As the Delian section of the hymn approaches a conclusion,[29] the poet describes in some detail the celebrations held on Delos by the Ionians, focusing above all on the maidens with their epic songs, praises of Apollo, and amazing mimicry (157-64).[30] Then, as he takes his leave of Apollo, and the maidens (his twin audience/addressees on Delos), he reminds them of the χάρις that they now share (166-67 χαίρετε . . . ἐμεῖο δὲ καὶ μετόπισθεν / μνήσασθε, cf. 153 χάριν): so do you remember me, and spread my fame abroad just as I have praised you, and will continue to praise you, all over the world (174-75)—both you and Apollo (177-78).

165 Ἀλλ' ἄγεθ' ἱλήκοι μὲν Ἀπόλλων Ἀρτέμιδι ξύν,
χαίρετε δ' ὑμεῖς πᾶσαι· ἐμεῖο δὲ καὶ μετόπισθε
μνήσασθ', ὁππότε κέν τις ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων
ἐνθάδ' ἀνείρηται ξεῖνος ταλαπείριος ἐλθών·
ὦ κοῦραι, τίς δ' ὔμμιν ἀνὴρ ἥδιστος ἀοιδῶν
170 ἐνθάδε πωλεῖται, καὶ τέωι τέρπεσθε μάλιστα;
ὑμεῖς δ' εὖ μάλα πᾶσαι ὑποκρίνασθ' ἀμφ' ἡμέων·
τυφλὸς ἀνήρ, οἰκεῖ δὲ Χίῳ ἔνι παιπαλοέσσηι,
τοῦ πᾶσαι μετόπισθεν ἀριστεύουσιν ἀοιδαί.
ἡμεῖς δ' ὑμέτερον κλέος οἴσομεν ὅσσον ἐπ' αἶαν
175 ἀνθρώπων στρεφόμεσθα πόλεις εὖ ναιεταώσας·
οἱ δ' ἐπὶ δὴ πείσονται, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐτήτυμόν ἐστιν.
αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν οὐ λήξω ἑκηβόλον Ἀπόλλωνα
ὑμνέων ἀργυρότοξον ὃν ἠΰκομος τέκε Λητώ.
(*Hymn. Hom. Ap.* 165-78)

Once again, ἐγώ (166, 177) or ἡμεῖς (174), plus the τυφλὸς ἀνήρ of 172, are juxtaposed with ὑμεῖς, ὑμέτερον κλέος, and with the other object of praise, Apollo (cf. 146 σύ, 165, 177 Ἀπόλλων).

This hymn, or part of a hymn,[31] is peculiar among the extant *prooimia* or hymnic preludes in specifying a particular place, occasion, and audience.[32] The other prooimial hymns to gods and goddesses are of a more general application,

26. Lanata (1963); Maehler (1963); and A. Sperduti, "The Divine Nature of Poetry in Antiquity," *TAPA* 81 (1950) 209-40; W. M. Minton, "Homer's Invocations of the Muses," *TAPA* 91 (1960) 292-309; P. Murray, *JHS* 101 (1981) 87-101.

27. σοὶ δ' ἐγὼ οἷά τε παιδὶ πατὴρ ὑποθήσομαι αὐτὸς / ἐσθλά. For different levels of elevation in descriptions of a poet's calling, cf. Kambylis (1965) passim, and, e.g., Persius *Prologue*; Callim. fr. 1.21 ff., Ovid *Am.* 1.1.

28. See West (1974) 65-71 (with further references) for discussion of the life and times of Theognis; cf. Gregory Nagy's article in the present volume.

29. For my purposes, it makes little difference whether or not the "Delian Hymn" was originally a separate poem. For arguments in favor of the unity of the whole hymn, see Andrew Miller, *The Homeric Hymn to Apollo* (Diss. U.C. Berkeley 1977); *contra* (most recently) Janko (1981) 16-19, (1982) 199 and passim.

30. The precise reading of 162 κρεμβαλιαστύν / βαμβαλιαστύν, and the nature of this mimicry, are not certain; some sort of competition seems to have been involved (Thuc. 3.104.3-5); cf. *Hymn. Hom. Apollo* 19-20.

31. See supra n.29. On the origin, form, and nature of these hymnic preludes, see especially Allen-Sikes-Halliday (1936), Koller (1956), Richardson (1974) 3-12, Janko (1981).

32. Contrast *Hymn Hom.* 1 to Dionysus, where various alleged birthplaces for the god are introduced as foil, only to be rejected in favor of the remote Nyse; in that case, the particular location has nothing to do with the present occasion of the song. Nagy (1982) 48-49, 55-57, however, sees this, and likewise Hes. *Theog.* 1-103, *Hymn. Hom. Ap.*, as examples of the adaptation of local traditions to serve a pan-Hellenic purpose.

appropriate to all sorts of places and occasions and not tied to any one in particular. But Demeter, with her strong connections with Eleusis, is similarly addressed in her hymn (490–95).[33] Elsewhere the poets leave open the matter of their relationship to the addressee and *laudandus*, confining themselves to a noncommittal χαῖρε or χαίρετε. No dramatic setting is given; no human audience is involved, apart from mankind in general; the poet remains anonymous—and in so doing, perhaps, makes his poem available for others to use as and when they think fit.[34] But in front of a particular crowd of Ionians, on Apollo's own island, the poet may define his own relationship to the festivities and remind those present of the mutual benefits involved: the god is reminded of their interaction and reciprocal obligation (146 ff., 165, 177–78), the Delian maidens of the poet's past, present, and future benefactions, in return for which they will spread *his* fame abroad; this reminding (ὑπόμνησις) is an essential motif of hymnal poetry.[35]

A similar relationship, with an amusing twist, is established between Demodocus and Odysseus in *Od.* 8.487–98. Here Odysseus (whose identity is as yet unknown to the singer, but who was actually an eye-witness to the events of which Demodocus has just sung) is able to testify to the perfect accuracy of Demodocus' account (λίην κατὰ κόσμον κτλ.) He goes on to invite him to sing of "the Wooden Horse, which Odysseus took into the city as a trick. . . . If you tell me all about that in due order (κατὰ μοῖραν), I shall tell all mankind that god most generously endowed you with song." The audience of the *Odyssey* smiles to hear Odysseus, still unknown to his hosts, thus promise to return the χάρις due to a praise-singer. If Demodocus praises Odysseus correctly (albeit unwittingly) and thus spreads Odysseus' reputation all over the world, Odysseus will return the compliment.

This brings us directly to the celebrated "anonymity" of the epic poet (which turns out to be by no means as universal as was once thought).[36] The reason Homer does not mention his own name or introduce his personality into the narrative is simply that his audience and the occasion for his song are never specified. It is not that he lacks self-awareness. On the contrary, he is a highly self-conscious artist.[37] There is no reticence in the *Odyssey* about the poetic art or about a poet's consciousness of what he is up to. I should imagine that when

33. See too *Hymn Dem.* 270–74, 295–300, 473–82, and further Richardson (1974) 5–11. A copy of the *Hymn to Apollo* was later hung on the wall of the Delian temple of Artemis; see Allen-Sikes-Halliday (1936) lxxxvi.

34. Koller (1956) 167–70, 173–74; cf. Allen-Sikes-Halliday (1936) 191. Presumably the Homeridae shared a common store of material that included a range of proems for different occasions.

35. C. Ausfeld, *De Graecorum precationibus quaestiones*, *Philol. Suppl.* 28 (1903) 525 ff.; Meyer (1933) 4–6.

36. Finnegan (1977) 201–206. See too Lord (1960) 13–29; C. M. Bowra, *Heroic Poetry* (London 1952) 404–442.

37. Marg (1957) passim; J. B. Hainsworth, *JHS* 90 (1970) 90–98; Jensen (1980) 62–80, 116–21. The opening lines of the *Margites* (which was commonly ascribed in antiquity to Homer) suggest that in that poem, poets and poetry were prominent themes:

Homer[38] on particular occasions faced a group of local noblemen or traveled to compete in a poetic festival, he would often preface his particular (shorter) version of the *Wrath of Achilles* or *Return of Odysseus* with a suitable proem, or perhaps end it with a *sphragis*, in which he might establish his connection with the god whose festival it was or with the family at whose court he was singing, thus assuring his addressee of the mutual benefit derived from this song. In fact, we do not even have to imagine this: we are told that the *Iliad* and *Odyssey were* preceded by introductory proems—usually, it seems, in the form of a hymn.[39] The extant *Homeric Hymns* may be relics of some of these: certainly the *Hymn to Apollo* was so regarded by Thucydides.[40] But in the main body of the narrative, there is conventionally no place for the poet's personality to intrude—any more than in the narrative and descriptive body of a hymn or catalogue.

And so we have come—at last—to Hesiod. For of his two great poems, one (*Theog.*) is a hymn of sorts, while the other (*WD*) is altogether a different kind of poem. And although critics often write as if autobiographical references were scattered with equal liberality throughout both poems,[41] this is far from being the case. In one, Hesiod observes the conventions of hymnic and encomiastic poetry; in the other, his "personal" voice is that of a "wisdom-poet," from a quite separate tradition. This is not to deny that many features of the two poems are similar, nor that they share some uniformity of style (and even content)[42]—after all, they share some of these with the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, too—but the elements of autobiography are *not* the same, and we should recognize that the functions and conventions of the personal voice are essentially different in the two poems.

In the *Theogony* the only point at which Hesiod introduces himself is in the Proem (1–115); and here his self-reference fits nicely with our model of inter-

ἦλθέ τις εἰς Κολοφῶνα γέρων καὶ θεῖος ἀοιδός,
Μουσάων θεράπων καὶ ἑκηβόλου Ἀπόλλωνος,
φίλην ἔχων ἐν χερσὶν εὔφθογγον λύραν.
(Homer OCT vol. 5 Allen, p. 156)

38. In this paragraph, by "Homer" I mean no more than "the poet who did the most to give the *Iliad* and/or *Odyssey* its present form."

39. Crates *Life of Homer* p. 32 Wilamowitz; see Pindar *N.* 2.1–3, Allen-Sikes-Halliday (1936) lxxxvi–xcv, and further Koller (1956) 174ff. Curiously enough, we have a similar situation with regard to the opening of Virgil's *Aeneid*. The ancient but probably not Virgilian proem (*Ille ego, qui quondam . . .*, etc.) is not necessarily in violation of epic convention (even though it *is* rather a feeble beginning to such a poem); cf. R. G. Austin, ed., *Virg. Aen.* 1 (Oxford 1971) *ad loc.* Of the two alternative openings to the *Iliad* (see OCT Homer vol. 1, *app. crit.*), Apellicon's could represent the beginning of a full-scale proem, whereas Aristoxenus' looks like a transition-device from *Cypria* to *Iliad*; see, e.g., B. A. van Groningen, "The Proems of the *Il.* and *Od.*", *Med. Kon. Akad. Wet. Amsterdam* 9 (1946) 279–92.

40. Thuc. 3.104.5.

41. E.g., Mazon (1964) 22, Versenyi (1974) 43–44, Østerud (1975) 13.

42. Style and metrics: West (1966) 72–101, Edwards (1971) passim. Content: O. Lendle, *Die Pandorasage bei Hesiod* (Würzburg 1957); West (1966) on *Theog.* 507–616, (1978) on *WD* 47–105, etc.; also, for the dominant role of Zeus, Solmsen (1949) 47–58, 80–100.

acting first and second persons. The description of the Muses' appearance to Hesiod on Mount Helicon, introduced by the conventional hymnic relative clause (22 αἵ νύ ποθ' Ἡσίοδον . . .),[43] is both an illustration of their special powers (in converting a greedy shepherd into an inspired sage and singer) and a reminder from the author of their special connection with him. So, too, at the end of the Proem, he will appeal to them (104 ff.), "χαίρετε (= both "farewell" and "take pleasure and feel gratitude for my song," as in the *Hymn to Apollo*), daughters of Zeus, and grant me desirable song; sing of the race of gods, . . . etc." Thus the section on the Muses' epiphany serves in part as a kind of ὑπόμνησις: you helped me in the past, and promised that I should be a poet and sing theogonies; so now especially come to my assistance in the present song, seeing that I have just sung your praises.

The question of whether this epiphany of the Muses is literally and autobiographically true cannot be answered, but we can say that, even if it is a true account of what this poet (or even a predecessor in the tradition) believed that he had experienced, the details of the call to poetry appear to be of a conventional kind found elsewhere in Greek and in many other cultures.[44] For our present purposes, however, what is important is not whether the episode actually happened but why and how the poet uses this description to enhance his poem.[45]

The point of the Muses' claim to be able to grant or withhold access to the truth is not to make a distinction between different *kinds* of poetry,[46] nor to warn

43. F. Adami, *Philol. Suppl.* 26 (1901) 242ff.; Meyer (1933) 4, 9. For the hymnic character of the Proem, see especially Friedländer (1914), West 1966) 150-52, Janko (1981) 20-22.

44. See the discussion and references in West (1966) 158-61. Of Greek examples, particularly relevant is Archilochus' absurd calling, for which see W. Peek, *Philol.* 99 (1955) 4-50; M. Treu, *Archilochos* (Munich 1959) 42-45, 207-208. Of course, this could be a direct parody of Hesiod; but more likely both belong to a well-established type (especially in the light of the allusive and undeveloped nature of Hesiod's description).

45. I do not doubt that an archaic poet might believe that he had experienced something like what Hesiod describes: Empedocles, Aristeas, and others were not adopting *purely* conventional postures (and where do conventions come from, if not from common human experience?). But on the other hand, the stories of Thamyris and the Muses (Hom. *Il.* 2.594-600) and of Archilochus and his cow (supra n.44) are more likely to be fictitious and recognized as such by their audience. Hesiod's successors were apparently untroubled by a convention which had them identify *themselves* as the recipient of the Muses' gifts (24 με, 30, 31 μοι, 33 με), yet mention Hesiod in the third person (22 Ἡσίοδον). There may be a parallel with the "blind bard of Chios" in the *Hymn to Apollo*, if he is implying that he is himself Homer; see infra n.82.

46. Many critics see ψεύδεα as referring to Homeric epic, as opposed to "truthful" catalogue poetry: so, e.g., Latte (1946) 159-62; W. Luther, *Wahrheit und Lüge* (Leipzig 1935) 124-26; W. J. Verdenius, *Mnem.* 25 (1972) 225-60, esp. 234; P. Murray, *JHS* 101 (1981) 91. But this cannot be so; verses 44-52, 99-101 are enough to show that heroic narrative is viewed as on a par with religious poetry, and both are considered equally appropriate for the entertainment of Zeus: so Koller (1956) 169, West (1966) 162; cf. Jensen (1980) 78-79. The *Theogony* itself runs on into the *Catalogue of Women*, i.e., into heroic material that overlaps considerably with that of Homeric poetry; and in any case, the κλεᾶ ἀνδρῶν that comprise the subject-matter of epic are generically similar to the deeds of gods that are described in hymns. Nagy (1982) 48 suggests that Hesiod is here asserting the claims of pan-Hellenic ("true") rather than local ("false") theogonic poetry; but the Muses do not mention any such distinction, and at this point in the Proem they themselves are still curiously local and Heliconian.

us of the unreliable nature of poetry in general;[47] it is simply a bald reminder of their special powers and discrimination, such as is often made by (or for) a divinity. Gods give, and take away,[48] and we should not trust the poet who tries to sing without the Muses' blessing;[49] whereas Hesiod himself, as he goes on to describe (30-34), has unique proof of their favor.[50]

Later in the Proem, Hesiod reminds us once again of his special relationship with the Muses. At 94-103, he suggests an interdependence between kings and poets, the former directly patronized by Zeus, the latter by Apollo and the Muses; then he continues (96): "blessed (ὄλβιος) is he whom the Muses love. . . . Through the singer, servant of the Muses (Μουσάων θεράπων),[51] men forget

47. So Pucci (1977), amplifying the more subtle observations of Detienne (1973) 51-80, esp. 77 on the ambiguity of language. Stroh (1976) likewise suggests that the "plausible fictions" of the Muses refer to parts of Hesiod's own poem, but that he is by no means ashamed of them (see especially pp. 97ff., with references to previous scholarship, including Wilamowitz and Wade-Gery). Svenbro (1976) interprets the "bellies" of 26 as referring to itinerant poets who sing to feed their stomachs (cf. Hom. *Od.* 14.124 ff.), and distort the truth to curry favor from their hosts in ways that Hesiod will not. But the text says nothing of *poets'* bellies, only of *shepherds'*. (Svenbro's further example, *Od.* 7.213 ff., is irrelevant, since there is no question there that Odysseus will be driven by hunger to tell lies, only that he will be unable to speak at all; cf. *Il.* 19.216-37.)

48. So Zeus in Hes. *WD* 3-8; Hom. *Il.* 20.242-43; Hecate in Hes. *Theog.* 442-43 (where n.b. 443 ἐθέλουσά γε θυμῷι, and cf. 29 εὖτ' ἐθέλωμεν). Apollo is god of healing and of disease, Demeter of fertility and barrenness. (See too Detienne [1973] 75-80.) The closest parallel to the statement of the Muses in *Theog.* is perhaps Apollo's speech in the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes* on the establishment of his oracle:

ἀνθρώπων δ' ἄλλον δηλήσομαι, ἄλλον ὀνήσω,
πολλὰ περιτροπέων ἀμεγάρτων φῦλ' ἀνθρώπων.
καὶ μὲν ἐμῆς ὀμφῆς ἀπονήσεται ὅς τις ἂν ἔλθῃι
φωνῆι τ' ἠδὲ ποτῆισι τεληέντων οἰωνῶν·
545 οὗτος ἐμῆς ὀμφῆς ἀπονήσεται οὐδ' ἀπατήσω.
ὃς δέ κε μαψιλόγοισι πιθήσας οἰωνοῖσι
μαντείην ἐθέλῃσι παρὲκ νόον ἐξερεείνειν
ἠμετέρην, νοέειν δὲ θεῶν πλέον αἰὲν ἐόντων,
φήμ' ἀλίην ὁδὸν εἶσιν, ἐγὼ δέ κε δῶρα δεχοίμην.
(*Hymn. Hom. Herm.* 541-49)

Here too the god reminds us that his, and his alone, is the power over truth and falsehood.

49. Likewise Pindar's criticism of (unnamed) rival poets serves largely as foil to his own claims: e.g., *O.* 2.87, *N.* 3.80-83; and cf. Gzella (1969) 175-79. This kind of priamel is not uncommon in archaic lyric: e.g., Stesichorus *PMG* 193, Xenophanes fr. 1.19-24 West/Gentili-Prato/DK (cf. B 11 DK); Solon fr. 20 West (= fr. 26 Gentili-Prato); Aesch. *Ag.* 749 ff.; Semonides fr. 7.1 West (cf. Hes. *Theog.* 590); Theognis 699-700 (cf. Tyrtaeus fr. 12 West (= fr. 9 Gentili-Prato)).

50. The scepter, and the fact of his current performance of an "unforgettable" song, remind the audience of the validity of this guarantee (see infra n.54).

51. Nagy (1979) 296-97 and (1982) 49-50 suggests that such phrases (θεράπων Μουσάων, Ἄρηος, κτλ.) are used of a special relationship between hero and god; so that, in the case of Hesiod, the poet "assumes the ritual dimensions of a cult hero." It is true that Hesiod and Archilochus (cf. fr. 1.1-2 West θεράπων . . . Ἐνυαλίοιο . . . καὶ Μουσέων) were honored with hero-cults after their deaths (as were, e.g., Aeschylus and Pindar in Classical times); but θεράπων is used in many non-ritual contexts too, and there is little else in Hesiod's stance here that is "heroic." The evidence from later cult and from ancient biography of the poets has to be treated with extreme caution: see J. Fairweather, "Fiction in the Biographies of Ancient Writers," *Ancient Society* 5 (1974) 231-75; M. R. Lefkowitz, *The Lives of the Greek Poets* (London 1981), especially 1-11; R. Scodel, "Hesiod *redivivus*," *GRBS* 21 (1980) 301-20.

their troubles: the gifts (103 δῶρα) of the goddesses quickly distract them"; and immediately he passes on to his own claim on the Muses' χάρις: "Fare-well-and-be-grateful (χαίρετε), daughters of Zeus, and give me (104 δότε) song," i.e., make *me* blessed (sc. as you did once before on Helicon).

The personal reminiscence of his calling and the description of the essential role of the poet in his community, both appropriately contained within a hymn of praise to the Muses,[52] serve to reestablish Hesiod's credentials as their servant, or agent. Perhaps, too, the Proem may be serving a special function in negotiating Hesiod's position vis-à-vis his human audience:[53] as a shepherd or ex-shepherd addressing kings, he has made a good case in his Proem for the kings' taking him seriously as a partner in the business of ordering a healthy society. He too has his σκῆπτρον.[54] Even if the author of the *Theogony* was not actually himself a shepherd in his youth, before becoming a poet, still the choice of this motif (whether invented, or adopted from an older tradition) would have the effect of broadening the range of the poem's appeal and increasing the poet's prestige.[55] Zeus and the Muses, kings and poets, need one another; and Hesiod presents himself as a uniquely gifted poet, with a special relationship with the Muses. And so, with his credentials duly established, he can remove himself from our view. He does not belong in the catalogues and narrative of the divine families, and according to the conventions of heroic and hymnic poetry, we should not expect him to intrude himself or his personal opinions there.

Nor does he. The main body of the *Theogony* does not contain any self-reference by the poet, nor does it present any idiosyncratic or personal views motivated by private concerns or feelings. But this last statement needs to be defended, since there is a long and striking episode in the poem which has been taken by most scholars as an intensely personal statement by Hesiod of his own religious beliefs, a sort of private and personal gospel.

52. On the hymnic elements of *Theog.* 1–115, see Friedländer (1914), Janko (1981) 20–22. But I cannot agree with Nagy (1982) 53–54, that the whole of *Theog.* 1–963 is "from the standpoint of form a hymn to the Muses" (with "significant modification" to include all the rest of the Olympians). If the *Theogony* is a hymn, it is clearly to Zeus, or to all the gods (as the Muses insist, *Theog.* 34, 66–67, and cf. 105–115); and it is to sing such a hymn that the Muses are invoked in the Proem.

53. If the autobiographical details from *Theog.* 22–34 (and those from *WD*) are broadly true of Hesiod himself, then his status among kings and peasants is curious; see infra n.55, Stroh (1976) 101–103, and (on the question of the social position of archaic poets in general and Hesiod in particular) E. Will, *REG* 78 (1965) 542–56, Svenbro (1976).

54. Cf. Hom. *Il.* 1.234–39, 10.321–28, F. Solmsen, "The Gift of Speech in Homer and Hesiod," *TAPA* 85 (1954) 1–16; West (1966) 163–64; Nagy (1982) 52–53.

55. We may compare Horace's frequent reminders of his humble parentage (*Sat.* 1.6.45, etc.): in his case, Maecenas' generosity, as well as his own poetic genius, earned him fame and even a measure of authority; Hesiod, likewise, it is implied (*Theog.* 80–103), has the ear of kings and is a source of power within his community. For both of them, their lowly origins disarm possible resentment, since they have no political ambitions outside their poetry (see infra p. 000, on Hesiod's self-characterization as a nightingale); cf. D. R. Shackleton Bailey, *A Profile of Horace* (London 1982) 14, and infra n.87. In the case of Archilochus, his iambic persona included base birth (from a slave-woman, Enipo), which helped to characterize him as "good-for-nothing" (φαῦλος); see West (1974) 28–29, Seidensticker (1978) 19–20.

In *Theog.* 409–452, as he completes his account of the children of the Titans, Hesiod describes the birth and functions of Hecate, daughter of Asterie and Perses. The length and, even more, the content and style of this episode have led many scholars to suspect interpolation.[56] The list of Hecate's powers and privileges (τιμαί) on earth and sea and in heaven—everywhere, in fact, except where we might most expect her, underground—and the description of her readiness to help all sorts and conditions of mortals (warriors and fishermen, herdsmen and judges alike) amount to a virtual hymn of praise to the goddess; and they have struck many readers of the poem as exaggerated and inappropriate. The conclusion generally drawn is that either a previously independent Hymn to Hecate has been clumsily adapted and interpolated here[57] or Hesiod himself is indulging in a personal crusade on behalf of his favorite goddess.[58] Why else would she be given so many attributes and interests otherwise unattested of her? Is not the very extravagance of the style here[59] evidence of Hesiod's burning faith and missionary zeal?

Does the Hecate-episode give us, then, an insight into Hesiod's private beliefs and religious practice? Or is he at this point acting both as theologian and as representative of his social class, in using all his poetic powers to try to win for Hecate a more exalted position in Greek worship than she had hitherto been accorded by the aristocratic audiences of the Homeric epics (which ignore her completely)?[60] And is it not significant that Hesiod's father chose to give his son the same name as Hecate's father, Perses (whom Hesiod characterizes as "outstanding among all for his wisdom": πᾶσι μετέπρεπεν ἰδμοσύνησιν)? As Mazon puts it, in defending the passage against the charge of interpolation: "Why shouldn't this devotee of Hecate be Hesiod himself? Isn't it natural that, in a poem whose author lets his personal ideas and tastes show so frankly, he has set aside a place for his local deity?"[61]

Hardly. If Hesiod felt so strongly, because of his personal ties to her, that a

56. E.g., Wilamowitz, Jacoby; see Solmsen (1949) 51n.169, West (1966) *ad loc.* with further references. Kirk (1962) 80 describes it as "as bizarre in expression . . . as it is surprising in content."

57. E.g., U. Wilamowitz, *Glaube der Hellenen* (Berlin 1931) 1.172; Kirk (1962).

58. E.g., Mazon (1964) 20–24; West (1966) 276–80; W. Burkert, *Griechische Religion* (Stuttgart 1977) 266.

59. Lines 435, 439, 444 ἐσθλή . . . ; 419, 438, 443 ῥεῖα . . . ; 411 περὶ πάντων, 415 μάλιστα, 422 ἁπάντων, 449 πᾶσι. N.b. too the jingling repetitions: 419 ὧι πρόφρων γε; 429 ὧι δ' ἐθέλῃι; 430 ὃν κ' ἐθέλῃσιν; 432 οἷς κ' ἐθέλῃσι; 439 οἷς κ' ἐθέλῃσιν; 443 ἐθέλουσά γε θυμῶι; 446 θυμῶι γ' ἐθέλουσα; and 429 παραγίνεται . . . 432 ἔνθα θεὰ παραγίνεται; 436 ἔνθα θεὰ . . . παραγίνεται . . . , κτλ. Such superlatives, jingles, and repetitions are characteristic of hymnic address (cf. *WD* 1–10, and infra nn.65, 66); see further Norden (1929), Wünsch (1914), Friedländer (1914) 13n.2, and (1913) 560n.1, Solmsen (1982) 8–9.

60. So Pfister (1928).

61. Mazon (1964) 22; similarly West (1966) 277, "She is the chief goddess of her evangelist." There is no evidence that Hecate was popular in Ascra or Thespiae, or even in Boeotia as a whole in the eighth and seventh centuries B.C.; see A. Schachter, *The Cults of Boeotia*, *BICS Suppl.* 38, 1 (1981) 231–32; Marquardt (1981) 250–59 with bibliography. (The two Boeotian vases that Marquardt reproduces (cf. Mazon, p. 22) do not coincide with Hesiod's description of Hecate in more than a few respects: only the fish on the skirt of the first is unusual for a standard Πότνια Θηρῶν [cf. *Theog.*

special place must be "set aside" for this divinity, even at the cost of disrupting his whole poem, and if her cult was indeed so important in his neighborhood, why does he not say so? There is not a word about any personal or local connection between himself and Hecate. Yet it would not have been at all difficult to introduce her, if he had chosen, along with the Muses and Zeus in the Proem, which *is* specifically addressed to the glory of his patron—and local—deities. After all, as we have seen, it is generally expected of the author of a hymn or encomium that he should demonstrate his connection with the *laudandus*, whether through *hypomnesis* of past favors or through the direct appeal of the song itself (as in *Theog.* 104–115). If Hesiod really felt strong personal or familial connections with Hecate, it seems almost inconceivable that he should have omitted to mention and exploit this shared χάρις, which would have benefited both himself and Hecate. (He might also have included among her τιμαί some interest in poetry?)[62]

But if this is not after all Hesiod's personal "gospel," and if it is not a crude interpolation from a religious zealot with a set of beliefs unparalleled in the ancient Greek world,[63] what *is* this climactic and striking episode doing at this point in the *Theogony*? The answer depends on our looking at the episode in relation to the whole *Theogony*: for the prominence and the special characteristics that Hesiod has given to this relatively minor deity turn out to be well motivated and artistically satisfying.

Throughout the episode, Hesiod emphasizes Hecate's closeness to Zeus. Her τιμαί are all either given, or confirmed, by him.[64] In 443 her powers recall those of Zeus described in the Proem to the *Works and Days*;[65] and her dominion over all three areas of the world may perhaps remind us of the threefold division by Zeus and his brothers (though there Hades received the Underworld, and all three shared the earth). Zeus, of course, pervades the whole *Theogony*. The poem

440–43]; and in the second, the deer and the branches sprouting from the goddess's crown correspond to nothing in Hesiod's poem. In neither case is identification with Hecate at all likely.) West (1966) 278 suggests that Hesiod's father, although an Aeolian and thus based far from the center of Hecate-worship in Asia Minor (Caria: cf. Marquardt, pp. 250–51), may have come into contact with Hecate in Miletus in the course of his trading, and then introduced her worship to Ascra. This is a very long shot. Equally so, perhaps, is Solmsen's suggestion, (1982) 8: "a sudden 'invasion' of her cult, which spread like wildfire through large regions and disappeared as fast as it had conquered".

62. Just as Hesiod ends his list of competing craftsmen in *WD* 23–26 with *singers*, so here it would have been easy enough to have included singing competitions among the activities of men that Hecate may choose to reward with success (*Theog.* 429–39), or to have mentioned Helicon or the Muses and thus reminded us of the Proem. If Hecate could work closely with Demeter in *Hymn. Hom. Dem.* (see Richardson (1974) 155–57, 293–95), she could presumably cooperate with the Muses too, if needed.

63. T. Kraus, *Hekate* (Heidelberg 1960), and M. Nilsson, *Geschichte der gr. Religion* (3rd ed. Munich 1967) 1, pp. 722–25, both confirm that no comparable picture of Hecate is given by any other Greek source. The term *gospel* is West's: (1966) 276.

64. *Theog.* 412–15, 426–28, 450–52; n.b. too 423–25.

65. *Theog.* 447 ἐξ ὀλίγων βριάει καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν μείονα θῆκεν; *WD* 5 ῥέα μὲν γὰρ βριάει, ῥέα δὲ βριάοντα χαλέπτει . . . κτλ.; see supra n.59.

recounts his birth, his accession to Olympus, his nature and works, including an impressive epiphany in the glorious defeat of Typhoeus; and although it would not be wholly accurate to call the poem a "Hymn to Zeus," the story of his rise to power is undeniably the main theme, the connecting link for the work (even granted that Hesiod is also trying to incorporate much else).

The description of Hecate and her powers is the last episode before the birth of Zeus (453 ff.); and it is well chosen to begin the transition from the old order to the new. Most representatives of the old order resist Zeus' rise to power: they are duly suppressed and rendered more or less impotent. The Zeus who dominates the second half of the poem consequently displays a clever, strong, and ruthless nature; his works[66] consist of the ambush and defeat of his father, the outwitting of Prometheus, the eventual overthrow of the Titans, and the brilliant *aristeia* of his combat with Typhoeus. Then, once peace has been established and the poem nears a close,[67] we at last see Zeus with his succession of socially acceptable wives (Themis, Eurynome, Demeter, Mnemosyne, Leto, etc.), on whom he can father such benign and charming spirits of the modern world as the Horae and Charites, Persephone and the Muses, Artemis and Apollo. But by this point in the poem the tension has slackened:[68] in neat, three-line packages, the kingdom of heaven is being parceled out to the Olympians and their friends, and the whole process is rather perfunctory. If Hesiod wants us to get a sense of the immediacy of the gods' power in the world of mortals, a sense of their intimate—and largely benevolent—involvement in our daily lives, a sense of Zeus' rule as it actually operates (rather than of the violence of the struggle through which he came to establish it), then he needs to introduce this at some earlier point in the poem. That is surely what the Hecate-episode does: it shows how Hesiod's theology actually works for mankind.

But why Hecate? Granted that Hesiod had good reason to include somewhere in the middle of his poem an enthusiastic description of the gods' benevolent dispensation for mortals (as he did in the Proem), why did he select this particular deity for that honor? The answer, I think, is (appropriately) threefold.

First, Hecate's very absence from the Homeric pantheon, with its compartmental separation of divine functions and spheres of activity, made it easier for her to be given a wide range of interests here. She can overlap with some of the Olympians (notably Poseidon and Hermes) without causing offense. Second, she

66. On the characteristic hymnic division into "nature" and "works" see Friedländer (1914) 7–11, Wünsch (1914) 147, Janko (1981) 11–15.

67. The *Theogony* as we have it does not have a proper ending, nor can we be certain that it ever did: see West (1966) 48–50, with references. In general, early Greek poetry shows less concern about endings than about openings, perhaps because the conditions of performance usually required some flexibility on the part of the poet; so van Groningen (1958) 70–77, Janko (1981) 10, 22, Solmsen (1982) 23–25.

68. See West (1966) 397–98, on *Theog.* 881–1020: he objects to the "homogeneously bare and characterless style which seems to aim at according approximately equal space to each item. . . . This style sets in suddenly at 901."

is female, and thus a more suitable and less competitive associate for Zeus than some of the possible male alternatives.[69] Thus Athena, in particular, is often granted extraordinary powers, in Homer and elsewhere, as virtual deputy of Zeus.

But Athena would not do here for Hesiod: she is too young. This is the third and main reason for the choice of Hecate and for the placement of this episode within the whole poem. Hecate embodies the continuity of the old order in the new. Just before the lengthy account of Zeus's rise to power and demolition of the regime of Kronos, we are given a glowing picture of divine stability incorporating old and new in perfect harmony.[70] The retention and augmentation of Hecate's τιμαί through Zeus's generosity demonstrate his cooperative and diplomatic talents, which might otherwise be overshadowed by his competitive and military achievements later in the poem. Throughout the Hecate-episode, Hesiod constantly reminds us that her extensive powers are Zeus's *reward* to her for her allegiance to him. Indeed, the preceding episode on Styx and her children, Kratos and Bia, makes exactly the same point on a smaller scale:

> [Kratos and Bia live with Zeus always] because this was Styx's intention, on that day when Zeus called the gods to Olympus and said that any who should fight on his side against the Titans would lose none of their privileges, but each would retain the position of honor that he had before; and those who were without privilege and honor under Kronos would receive them from him, as was right. So Styx was the first to come to Olympus with her children. . . . And Zeus rewarded her with power and gifts. So did he fulfill for her what he had promised.
>
> (*Theog.* 385–403)

Styx and her grim children are hardly suitable vehicles for divine benevolence and activity on the scale that Hesiod wishes here. Hecate, another member of the ancient regime who chose to join Zeus and was duly rewarded, is better equipped

69. When such figures as Dionysus or Heracles became objects of intensive cult and literary celebration, they threatened at times to appear as potential successors to Zeus, in continuation of the cycle of sons overthrowing fathers to gain the kingdom of heaven: see J. A. K. Thomson, "The Religious Background of the *PV*," *HSCP* 31 (1920) 1–37. But it is perhaps no mere coincidence that Hecate is immediately preceded by Leto (406–408), whose kindness to gods and mankind is emphasized (. . . μείλιχον αἰεί, ἤπιον ἀνθρώποισι καὶ ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι . . .) and whose role as mother of Apollo and Artemis is inevitably present in our minds, even though they are not introduced at this point (only at 918–20). The two children of Leto are regularly seen as obedient and cooperative representatives of Zeus's will, and their powers range widely throughout the whole realm of human activity; and Artemis overlaps with Hecate in many respects, even to the point of being identified with her: cf. Heckenbach *RE* 7.2 (1912) s.v. *Hekate*, 2769–71; Solmsen (1949) 58. Thus we are half-prepared for a description of a philanthropic deity at this point, even if we do not anticipate that it will be Hecate.

70. See too Brown (1953) 28–33, who draws attention to the similar function of the sections on the Nereids (240–64; n.b. their father's kind and helpful nature, 235–36) and the Oceanids (337–70; their "allegorically significant names . . . refer either to features of the sea or to favourable influences on the life of man"). He suggests further a contrast between Hecate, the good mediator between mankind and gods, and Prometheus, the bad mediator—the one absorbed into Zeus's regime, the other repressed: the characteristic Hesiodic polarity of good and bad is thus maintained. Similarly Klausen (1835) 457; and cf. Solmsen (1949) 71–72.

for this role; and Hesiod repeatedly emphasizes that she owes her eminent position to this choice: 411–12 Ἑκάτην τέκε, τὴν περὶ πάντων / Ζεὺς Κρονίδης τίμησε· πόρεν δέ οἱ ἀγλαὰ δῶρα—echoing 399 on Styx: τὴν δὲ Ζεὺς τίμησε, περισσὰ δὲ δῶρα ἔδωκεν—423–25 οὐδέ τί μιν Κρονίδης ἐβιήσατο οὐδέ τ' ἀπηύρα, / ὅσσ' ἔλαχεν Τιτῆσι μέτα προτέροισι θεοῖσιν, / ἀλλ' ἔχει, ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἔπλετο δασμός; 450–52 ὕῆκε δέ μιν Κρονίδης κουροτρόφον . . . κτλ.

In sum, so far from distorting his poem for private reasons to give a special place to a personal favorite or to a deity of the downtrodden farming folk of the area, Hesiod has specifically tailored and developed his Hecate to fit the requirements of his poem. What he personally felt and believed about Hecate, we do not know. He may have been a devotee; but he may equally well from one month to the next never have crossed the street to offer her a barley-cake or incant a prayer. Her role in the *Theogony*, at least, is a poetic, not a personal, matter.

It is really from the *Works and Days* that we draw our picture of Hesiod's personality, his life and opinions. And of course the *Works and Days* is a very different kind of poem from the *Theogony*, involving correspondingly different conventions and authorial stance. Whereas the epic or hymnic poet is mostly occupied in narrative and devotes a relatively small amount of time and space to his relationship with his addressee, the wisdom-poet, or giver of instruction, will constantly put himself forward as the expert, in relation to a less experienced, or morally inferior, audience which requires his advice or correction.

We have already seen, in the case of Theognis, how we are presented with a dramatic setting for his instruction: a Megara torn by civil discord, with the aristocratic society of the old *agathoi* crumbling and the young Cyrnus faced with a choice between the true wisdom of his mentor (Theognis) and the specious lure of wealth and false friends. At some points in his collection, Theognis speaks as if Cyrnus has already succumbed to these temptations; at others, as if he is still paying due heed to good advice. Thus Theognis' tone can range from the reproachful and bitter to a more good-humored, even erotic, celebration of true comradeship.[71] Other Greek instruction-poems seem to have followed similar patterns. The *Precepts of Chiron*, ascribed to Hesiod,[72] were presented in the form of advice from the centaur Chiron to the young Achilles; unfortunately, we do not know how far the dramatic possibilities of the setting were developed, nor

71. See supra p. 43; and contrast, e.g., 237–54, 595–602 with 97–100, 355–60, 1225–26, 1235–38, 1249–56. But it is noticeable that the advice or criticism offered to Cyrnus (or to the "boy" or "fellow" who is addressed) is seldom at all specific: rather, a generalized *gnome* is presented in bare conjunction with the vocative Κύρνε, and the particular application is left unexpressed. Thus the *gnome* retains the maximum possible range of applications in the minds of the audience.

72. Hesiod frs. 283–85 M.-W. The poem began (fr. 283) with second-person instructions and an ethic dative μοι. At some point in the poem, the view was expressed that children are not fit for instruction before the age of seven (Quintilian 1.1.15 = fr. 285); cf. Solon fr. 27.1–2 West (= fr. 23 Gentili-Prato). See further Friedländer (1913) 571–72.

how far the personalities of Chiron and his young ward were brought out in the poem; but it might be appropriate to bear in mind the episode in book 9 of the *Iliad* in which Phoenix gives quite extensive personal reminiscences, as he reminds Achilles of his special, almost paternal, relationship to him, before delivering the rather Hesiodic advice about the *Litai* and the instructive paradigm of Meleager.[73] Once again, autobiography is a part of *hypomnesis*, a reminder of a special connection between speaker and addressee.

As for "Orpheus," "Demodocus," and other semi- or wholly fictional authors, we really have no idea whether they were given poetic personalities in the works ascribed to them, but of course these names brought with them ready-made life histories and backgrounds of distinction, which would lend their sayings special authority. One might consider too the techniques by which later authors such as Xenophanes and Empedocles interweave autobiography (sometimes quite extravagant) with instruction.[74]

Outside Greece, there is abundant comparative evidence that wisdom-literature was regularly set in a dramatic context, sometimes fictitious, sometimes historical, sometimes a mixture of the two.[75] Often a scribe will instruct his son, or a king his successor (though we may doubt in this case whether the king himself actually composed the piece). In one of the most vivid and "personal" extant pieces, the *Instruction of King Amenemhet I*, from Middle Kingdom Egypt,[76] the king warns his successor about the perils of rule; the climax of the work is an account of his own misjudgment one night, when he was caught unawares by a palace conspiracy. We realize, then if not before, that the *Instruction* that is being uttered by this king must in fact have been composed after his assassination, during the reign of his son and successor, the addressee (Sesostris I). The author realized how much more effective the advice would be if put in the mouth of the dead king—who learnt the hard way, and too late to save himself.

In another Egyptian text, from the New Kingdom,[77] the recipient of the advice turns, in an Epilogue, to argue with his instructor: "The scribe Khonshotep answered his father, the scribe Any, 'I wish I were like you, as learned as you. . . . A boy cannot follow the moral instructions, though the writings are on the tongue!' The scribe Any replied, 'Do not rely on such worthless thoughts. . . .I judge your complaints to be wrong . . . ' etc."

73. *Il.* 9.432–605. The autobiographical details are most intimate (485–95) at the point where Phoenix confesses the mutual dependency between the two of them. Cf. too Nestor at *Il.* 1.254 ff., esp. 266–74, Hephaestus at 1.590–94, Achilles to Thetis at 1.396–407.

74. E.g., Emped. B 112, 113 DK, Xenoph. B 2.1–12, 7.1, 34.1–2 DK, plus the testimonia to their lives, and their outspoken criticism of rivals and predecessors.

75. See West (1978) 3–25, with further references. It is of course debatable how far we may use Near Eastern (or other) parallels to early Greek poetry. Clearly, Hesiod himself knew nothing of, e.g., Egyptian literature (any more than Archilochus knew any of the parallels quoted by Dover [1964]). But it seems likely that at least some of the parallels reflect a common origin, or a typology shared, from a date many centuries earlier than the eighth century B.C.

76. Lichtheim (1973) 135–38.

77. Lichtheim (1976) 135–46. Lichtheim remarks on the novelty of this Epilogue: "By making the son disinclined to learn and obey, the author of the work introduced a new dimension into the concept of didactic literature: the thought that instruction might fail to have an impact. The thought is introduced in order to be refuted." For further examples of unusually "dramatic" frames for instruction, see *The Instruction Addressed to King Merikare* (Lichtheim [1973] 97–109, esp. 103–105; *The Eloquent Peasant* (Lichtheim [1973] 169–84; *The Instruction of Ptahhotep* (Lichtheim [1973] 61–80; *Be a Scribe* (Lichtheim [1976] 175–78), including a list of great writers of the past who have achieved immortality (cf. Timotheus *PMG* 791.221–40); from a later period, *The Instructions of Onchsheshonqy*; see P. Walcot, *JNES* 21 (1962) 215–19; for the *Story of Ahiqar*, see West (1978) 13.

But whereas most of the wisdom-literature from the Near East places the actual advice within a separate frame ("This is the advice of X, which he gave to his son Y when . . . , etc."), and the contextual detail is confined to the beginning and end of the piece, Hesiod in the *Works and Days* is more subtle. The context of his poem only emerges as he goes along; and, in a strange and tantalizing way, the occasion, or dramatic setting, of the *Works and Days* manages to be at the same time immediate and vivid in outline, yet obscure and Protean in detail. Debate still continues over the question of whether the lawsuit between Perses and Hesiod lies in the past or the future—or even in the present; whether the kings were corrupted by bribes or merely accepted normal fees; whether Perses' present financial problems are due to legal costs, or his idleness as a farmer, or both; and so on.[78] Some even see the poem itself as a pamphlet issued by Hesiod in an attempt to influence the outcome of the case;[79] others see the whole situation, including the figure of Perses, as imaginary, with Hesiod adopting a conventional stance in accordance with ancient traditions of wisdom-poetry.

Once again, it cannot be proven one way or the other, whether Perses existed, and whether a farmer-poet called Hesiod once had a long-drawn-out dispute with his brother over their father's property. What is clear enough is that the details that we are given of the dispute are neither very specific, nor self-consistent: in one part of the poem we are required to believe one thing, in another, another, about Perses' behavior. Hesiod has conflated the events (real or imaginary) of many years into one dramatic moment; the character and behavior of Perses vary according to the rhetorical point that Hesiod wishes to make.[80] Whether Perses and the events surrounding him are nevertheless historically authentic does not matter much either way, except to biographers of Hesiod.[81] What we can conclude with confidence is that Hesiod has constructed for himself, whether from

78. West (1978) 33–40 summarizes the problems. For a determined recent attempt to establish a real occasion, see Gagarin (1974), with further references.

79. So B. A. van Groningen "Hésiode et Persès," *Med. Ned. Akad. Wet.* 20 (1957) 153–66; H. T. Wade-Gery, "Hesiod," *Phoenix* 3 (1949) 81–93; cf. F. Solmsen, *Gnomon* 52 (1980) 212–13, esp. n.8.

80. See Wilamowitz (1928) 133–35, 142, 144–46, Dornseiff (1934) 132–34 (who compares Isocrates' *Antidosis*, with its fictitious legal setting).

81. For the original audience, of course, it may have been more important to know who Hesiod and Perses were. If Hesiod was an inhabitant of Ascra, whose father was remembered by older members of the community, then a wholly fictitious account of his family's fortunes might undermine the credibility of his claims to truthfulness and wisdom, unless the convention of a fictitious persona were already established (as perhaps for Archilochus and Hipponax; cf. West [1974] 22–39, Nagy [1976] 192–4). But if he was an itinerant professional singer, drawing on a long tradition of

personal experience, or from the experience of another poet earlier in the tradition,[82] or entirely from his own imagination, or (perhaps the most likely) from a combination of all three, a dramatic situation or series of situations that allows him both the widest and most inclusive choice of subject-matter and also the most immediate appeal to his audiences.

For the *Works and Days* is directed at no fewer than four audiences. First, and most obviously, at Perses, who is introduced in line 10, and addressed constantly in 27–300 and occasionally thereafter. Second, at the kings: addressed indirectly at 202, directly at 248 ff., 263 f., they are implicitly to be taken as at least overhearing everything that Hesiod has to say to his brother. Third, at the audience of spectators or neighbors who are to be imagined as (inevitably) listening to Hesiod as he addresses his complaints and recommendations to his brother and the kings, and whose own opinions and conduct will naturally be affected by what they see and hear. This audience clearly corresponds, more or less, to the Greek audiences which might listen to recitals of the *Works and Days* in later

hexameter wisdom-poetry and creating his own persona and dramatic occasion to suit his purposes, then nobody in his audience would find any difficulty in suspending any disbelief they might feel concerning the authenticity of his autobiographical details (any more than a modern audience insists on the literal truth of every "My mama told me . . . " or "My daddy was a . . . " from the lips of a popular singer).

82. I prefer to speak of "poets within a tradition" rather than of the tradition itself creating the poet, as Nagy does ([1979] 5–6, 296–97): "The Hesiodic compositions determine the identity of their composer. . . . The composer must surely be presented as the ultimate poet and sage who has all of tradition under his control. This ambition even motivates the generic function of the poet's name at *Theog.* 22: *Hēsiodos* 'he who emits the voice' "; cf. too Nagy (1982) 49–53. For, although the Homeric and Hesiodic poems clearly embody a vast amount that is highly traditional, on both a large and a small scale, it is equally clear that archaic Greek poets were constantly competing with one another with innovations, corrections, alternative versions, palinodes, parodies, etc. There was never a single "tradition," accepted by all, into which a singer was required to submerge himself—at least not until certain poems became fixed and unalterable; and even then there were always *other* poems for the creative singers to compose. Greek epic and didactic poetry was largely secular (unlike, e.g., the Indic Vedas), and the material gathered by Radlov, and by Parry and Lord, shows how much room for innovation and personal preference there is even in formulaic and "traditional" poetry (cf. Hom. *Od.* 1.350–52, Jensen [1980] passim). It is possible that "Hesiod" is a traditional name for any singer of a *Theogony* (though, e.g., Hermes sings *in propria persona, Hymn. Hom. Herm.* 425–33), and "Homer" of an *Iliad*, just as "Stesichorus" may have been for the composer of choral lyric; or the names may have been noms de plume, each adopted by a particular singer as part of his persona. (The ancients speculated as to Homer's real name: Melesigenes, Melesianax, Melesagoras, etc.; cf. *Vitae*). Alternatively, they may have been real names held by particular poets who left decisive marks on each of the traditions, such that all subsequent singers of "their" song continued to credit them with authorship (cf. Lord [1960] 19–20, on Cor Huso), or in some sense even impersonated them in performance. An analogy perhaps exists in American Blues music. Upon the premature death in 1947 of "Sonny Boy" Williamson, a renowned harmonica-player and singer, his name was quietly adopted by a performer of similar style, Rice Miller, who continued to make records and perform as "Sonny Boy Williamson" until his death in 1965. (He also changed his account of the place and date of his birth, and seems genuinely to have come to believe that he was himself the original.) Likewise, Brownie McGhee was for several years billed as "Blind Boy Fuller no. 2" (though he was no relation, and not himself blind). Albert King (born Albert Nelson) and A. C. Reed (born Aaron Corthen) are believed by many members of their audiences to be the brothers of B. B. King and Jimmy Reed, respectively.

months and years; and to ourselves. Many of the unspecified second-person imperatives and imperative infinitives, of instruction and advice, will be taken as addressed as much to them as to Perses; as the poem proceeds, indeed, Perses almost becomes assimilated into this wider audience, as if he imperceptibly absorbs some of Hesiod's corrective criticism from earlier in the poem.

So far, the analogy with Theognis and his audience is close, with Perses corresponding to Cyrnus, the kings to the misguided citizens now lording it in Megara, and the general public looking critically on and appreciating the poet's wisdom and skill. But Hesiod has added a fourth element to his audience: Zeus. In the Proem, he is first described (2–8) and then addressed (9–10): "Take heed, look, and listen; and do *you* direct your decisions justly while *I* tell truths to Perses" The enjambement adds emphasis to the juxtaposition (τύνη· ἐγὼ δέ, slightly reminiscent of the puzzling τύνη of *Theog.* 35–36). Here in the *Works and Days*, Zeus's function is to humble the mighty and exalt the lowly, in accordance with justice; Hesiod's is to enlighten Perses about Zeus's rules for life, i.e., how one may scratch a living from the soil and how one should live justly and frugally in the sight of Zeus. For Zeus is never far from our minds in the poem; he is especially prominent in the episodes of Prometheus and the Five Ages, and in the long section on Dikē and Hybris (213–85); but he shows up too in the almanac for farmers, mostly in the background but occasionally in the forefront.[83] He hears what Hesiod tells the kings and the advice he gives to farmers; and it is he who guarantees that hard work and just dealing will ultimately, if grudgingly, be rewarded.

This multiple audience could in fact be further subdivided. There are, for instance, two distinct categories of kings, the ones who think (202 φρονέουσιν) and the greedy ones (cf. 38–39); and Perses himself appears, as we noted above, in different guises, according to whether he has already squandered his patrimony or is only threatening to do so; whether he has already bribed the judges; whether he is seen as sitting pretty on his ill-gotten gains or as turning desperately to Hesiod for help after failing as a farmer. So the poem acquires a richness and depth in its dramatic setting that allow Hesiod, without losing his audience, to strike different poses and cover a wide variety of topics from a number of different angles. Recrimination over the past, urgent pleas about the present and immediate future, stolid advice about the long term, are all appropriate to his multiple context.

Hesiod first presents himself to us as a kind of junior partner to Zeus in straightening out mankind (9–10); thence he goes into his discussion of good and bad ἔρις (the spirit of competition). His final example of good ἔρις is of poet competing against poet. The next paragraph begins, "O Perses, pay attention, and don't let the bad Strife keep *you* from work." Once again the juxtaposition of "I/you" ("I" here implicit in ἀοιδός) emphasizes the connection that ought

83. E.g., *WD* 465–78, 483–84, 661–62, 667–69, 724–26, 765–69.

to exist between the two of them but which is here threatened by Perses' quarrelsome and idle nature. (The same point is made again at 286: σοὶ δ' ἐγὼ ἐσθλὰ νοέων ἐρέω, μέγα νήπιε Πέρση. . . .)

In the first part of the poem, Hesiod continues, as wisdom-poet, to explain Zeus's order to mankind (e.g., in the stories of Prometheus and the Five Ages), and, as brother and litigant, to contrast his own amenable and fair-minded nature with that of his good-for-nothing brother. By having as his addressee a brother, rather than a son or young protégé (as in Theognis and the *Precepts of Chiron*, and in most Near Eastern wisdom-literature), Hesiod has given himself a rather less elevated position; and this is emphasized by his dependence on the verdicts of the kings. Instead of handing down self-evident truths from a position of lofty superiority (like the scribes and kings of Egypt and Sumeria), he has to mix entreaty with warning, and temper his criticisms with tactful reminders to the kings that there are others still more powerful watching over them. His attitude, or role, is that of the nightingale in his *ainos* (202–212): all she can do is "cry piteously" (205–206 ἐλεὸν . . . μύρετο) as she is carried off in the hawk's talons, hoping that someone, either the hawk or someone else stronger, may pay attention. At first glance, the fable seems to imply that the nightingale is quite powerless to affect the situation. The hawk sneers, "Singer though you are, you'll go wherever I take you; I'll make you my dinner, or let you go, just as I please. It is mad to oppose oneself against those stronger." But Hesiod's mode of opposition is not ineffectual: Zeus at least will hear when a great uproar involving Justice arises (cf. 220 ff.); and we learn shortly that, even if birds and animals may eat one another, Zeus's law for mankind is different: Dikē, not Hybris, wins out in the end (276–81), and Zeus specializes in humbling the mighty (3–8). Hesiod leaves open the possibility that the hawk will relent, i.e., that the kings will listen to his pleas, for he addresses the *ainos* to "kings who have sense too" (βασιλεῦσιν . . . φρονέουσι καὶ αὐτοῖς); but by giving the hawk the last word in the debate, he also allows less enlightened kings to think that they can act as they please, and he then slides back unobtrusively to addressing Perses: "Do you, Perses, listen to Dikē, and don't practise Hybris" (213). It is up to Perses how *he* interprets the fable, and whether he sides with the songstress or the hawk: but Hesiod's "piteous shrieking" should have made its impression.

From 286 onward, Hesiod's instruction is concerned more with work and farming than with litigation or larger issues of justice and morality. He is now speaking as technical expert, closer to the normal Near Eastern pattern, rather than as poet and victim. Perhaps for this reason he barely intrudes himself at all during this central portion of the poem—until the issue of sailing crops up (618 ff.). Then, suddenly, autobiographical details about his father, his own experience of sailing, and his poetic calling crowd in.

Sailing was always a touchy subject to the ancients—necessary on occasion, but always risky, and perhaps morally suspect.[84] Hesiod's treatment of the topic

84. Cf. *WD* 236–37, West (1978) 313–14, and R. G. M. Nisbet and M. Hubbard, *A Commentary on Horace Odes Book I* (Oxford 1970) 43–44, on *Od.* 1.3.

is typically ambivalent, and he uses the personal references skillfully to make the points that he needs to make with the greatest dramatic impact on his audience. The key words of the section are ὡραῖος (630, 642, 665), μέτρον (648, 694), and καιρός (694): knowing exactly how seldom to sail, and, when necessary, at what season one may venture on the sea without Zeus's foul weather undoing you. Hesiod acknowledges that a prosperous farmer will sometimes use ships to increase his wealth through trade; but he emphasizes the risks involved and reminds us (or Perses) repeatedly that sailing is no sort of alternative to farming. This is the context in which their father makes his appearance:

> Wait until the right season for sailing comes; *then* drag your ship down to the sea, and load up your cargo inside, so that you may bring a profit back home—just as my father and yours, Perses, you fool, used to sail in ships in his yearning for a decent livelihood. And one day he left Cumae and actually arrived here, in flight not from wealth and prosperity but from foul poverty, which Zeus gives to men. And he settled below Helicon in a miserable village, Ascra, nasty in winter, rough in summer, never good for much. So you, Perses (τύνη), remember the due season for everything, but especially for sailing.
>
> (*WD* 630–42)

The father of Hesiod and Perses (as it were, of a good and bad ἔρις) was an habitual, professional sailor (634 πλωίζεσκ' ἐν νηυσί) and hoped to make a good living out of it. He failed, and had to settle in an inhospitable inland village—where his sons (at least one of them) have done somewhat better as farmers. M. L. West takes 638 (. . . πενίην, τὴν Ζεὺς ἀνδρεσσι δίδωσι) as absolving Hesiod's father from blame for his failure. More likely, I think, we are to take it as another reminder that reliance on the sea for a livelihood is courting disaster; his father was at least half as misguided (νήπιος, 633) as his son Perses. Hesiod even appears to exaggerate the drawbacks of Ascra (which by other reports is quite a pleasant and fertile area):[85] as Menander Rhetor explains a thousand years later, one can take rhetorical advantage of the defects of a place, and, if you live in Ascra, you can praise it for making people hardy and philosophical.[86]

Whether or not Hesiod's father did follow a career such as he outlines, and move from Aeolian Cumae to Ascra, and whether or not Ascra is as unpleasant as Hesiod asserts, within the context the message is clear. The father is a negative paradigm of a man who unwisely looked to the sea for prosperity but was finally driven to realize that a hard life on the land was more dependable. He learnt the hard way: Perses (641 τύνη δ', ὦ Πέρση) now has the chance to learn the right

85. Pausanias 9.29.2, with J. G. Frazer's n. (London 1913) 5.149–50.

86. Men. Rhet. 1.347.27–30 ed. D. A. Russell and N. G. Wilson (Oxford 1981): εἰ δέ τινες τὴν Ἀσκρην οἰκοῖεν, ἐχρῆν αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἰς ἐγκώμιον λαμβάνειν, ὅτι φιλοσοφεῖν ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἐνοικοῦντας καὶ καρτερικοὺς εἶναι. At Hom. *Od.* 17.419–44, Odysseus' story involves a change of fortune comparable to that of Hesiod's father: from success on land (419–23) to beggary resulting from unsuccessful sea-faring (piracy, 425–44). In this case too, Zeus is supposedly involved (424–6; but cf. *Od.* 1.32–34).

occasions for sailing, from an expert. In effect, "Do not as our father did, but as I say." Whereas usually in wisdom-literature a father can be expected to provide sound advice or a positive paradigm of behavior,[87] Hesiod presents us with a father who is *less* expert than his son, but whose example is still useful to those who will learn from it.

Hesiod himself learnt what he knows about sailing, not from his father but from the Muses (660–62): "They taught me to sing, [and hence] I will tell you of the mind of Zeus" (i.e., how to avoid trouble at sea). The passage 646–62 presents Hesiod's credentials for such a claim. His one sea-voyage, of less than a hundred yards each way, was on his way to a poetic competition—which he won. It began and ended at Aulis, famous as the starting point of the great epic expedition to Troy. His description of the prize that he won serves to demonstrate that the gifts of the Muses, enabling a poet to understand Zeus's mind, are worth far more than the practical experience of a sailor (who is by definition something of a fool anyway).[88] A wise poet (cf. 649 σεσοφισμένος) can tell you when not to sail (i.e., most of the time) and how to minimize your chances of meeting with disaster. That is all you really need to know.

Was Hesiod himself a farmer? He never actually says so, though in both poems he tells us with pride that he is a distinguished poet; and he implies (in the Proem to the *Theogony*, recalled by *WD* 658–59) that he was once a shepherd. But he never says that he personally has worked the land, as he recommends Perses should. His original local audience will have known; to us, who do not know him personally, he consistently presents a farmer's attitudes and opinions (just as the author of the *Instructions of Amenemhet* presents us with the suspicions and bitterness appropriate to a king who has been murdered by his subjects). It is easy to believe that the misogyny, stinginess, self-reliance, superstition, lack of humor, and other characteristics which pervade the *Works and Days* are Hesiod's own, but of course they are typical enough and easily paralleled elsewhere in archaic Greek poetry. Above all, though, they are wholly appropriate to the context of the poem. There is no room here for good cheer, sex, military exploits, and the other subjects of song mentioned in the *Theogony*.[89] Even at

87. For Near Eastern examples, see West (1978) 3–25; for early Greek examples, compare Nestor and Antilochus (probably developed further in the *Aithiopis*), Tydeus and Diomedes, Phoenix and Achilles (supra n. 73), Hector and Astyanax, from the *Iliad*; Odysseus and Telemachus in the *Odyssey*; Ajax and Eurysaces in Sophocles' *Ajax*. In later literature, cf. Horace *Sat.* 1.4.105 ff. (in contrast to the role of Apollo in the vocation of Augustan elegists, after Callimachus); Persius' father-figure is Cornutus (5.19–51).

88. See supra n.84. Most critics have seen Hesiod as relying on his father as a positive source of wisdom, i.e., as having learnt from him how to sail; West (1978) even detects telltale Aeolicisms here, unconsciously reproduced from his father's words (666, 683, 693 nn.). But Hesiod insists that it is the *Muses* who have instructed him (662), and it is *Zeus's* mind that he can speak of (661): these are far superior to personal experience (660 πεῖρα); cf. Hom. *Il.* 2.484–92, *Od.* 22.345–48, where divine inspiration is clearly preferred to human instruction.

89. *Theog.* 3–8, 39 ff., 55, 63–67, 94–103; cf. *Hymn. Hom. Herm.* 418–502, where work and the pleasures of song are contrasted.

WD 582 ff., where Hesiod, in a passage closely paralleled in Alcaeus,[90] describes the time of year in which relaxation, wine, and feasting are called for, he does not talk of the pleasures of song.[91] The power of poetry to make men forget their troubles, so emphatically and evocatively described in the Proem to the *Theogony*, has no place in the *Works and Days*.

In each poem, then, Hesiod selects those aspects of himself, his family, and background—real or fictitious—that suit his purposes, and presents them accordingly. His "personality" is different in the two poems—just as Horace's is different in the *Epodes* and in the *Odes* (and as Homer's may have been in the *Odyssey* and the *Margites*). Simple George Hesiod (together no doubt with his predecessors and successors)[92] put much care and labor into designing a suitable setting for the *Works and Days*; and he did not neglect the persona of the author. He is just as he ought to be, and never speaks a line out of character. The Muses taught him well.

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90. Alc. fr. 347 LP (= *Lyrica Graeca Selecta* 162, ed. D. L. Page [Oxford 1968]).

91. Unless the cicada of *WD* 582–84 is intended to suggest to us the voice of the poet (as later in Callimachus fr. 1.29 ff. Pfeiffer); but there is little in Hesiod's text to support this idea.

92. See supra nn. 45, 82.

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