pp.1-18.
Walbank 1957 F.W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius* I, Oxford 1957.
Walbank 1967 F.W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius* II, Oxford 1967.

CHAPTER I

THEORIES OF HISTORICAL NARRATIVE

It has been observed that the discovery of the historical dimension of man was, for the Greeks, a poetic one[1]: as early as the seventh century B.C. the elegiac poet Mimnermus of Colophon, narrating the colonization of his native town and the wars which followed it, interpreted the misadventures of the present as expiation of ancient guilt, according to a principle of divinely imposed causality which tended to re-establish order in human affairs[2]. More generally, a recurrent element in archaic Greek poetry was the recounting of remote history together with recent and even contemporary events (the colonization of cities, wars, civil and political strife) in which, at times, the poet himself had been protagonist with a strongly partisan spirit. This was a pragmatic poetry, directly involved in the real problems of its own society but, at the same time, seeking to indicate its political-historical antecedents by recalling the past[3]. The sense of difference and the awareness of continuity — the two basic components of historical thought — were in fact, as the poetry of Homer and Hesiod clearly shows, already an acquired element of archaic Greek culture in its bi-polar conception of the two great epochs of mankind — that of heroes or demi-gods and that of men[4] — a division according to which the

1. Cf. Mazzarino 1966, I p. 38 ff.
2. Fr. 3 Gent.-Pr.: cf. Mazzarino 1966, *loc. cit.*
3. For a fuller treatment see Gentili 1972, p. 57 ff. A survey of elements of historical narrative in archaic poetry has been attempted by F. Lasserre, 'L'historiographie grecque à l'époque archaïque', *Quad. d. storia* 4, 1976, p. 113 ff.
4. Hom. *Il.* 12,23; Hes. *Op.* 160; frr. 1; 204, 97 ff. Merk.-West. Cf. Latte 1956, p. 3 f.

heroic past, notwithstanding the uniqueness inherent in its character of factual reality, had to constitute the archetypical model for the present, almost in a perennial return to the mythical and exemplary age of the origins. This mental attitude, although recognizing the importance of chance and diversity in man's actions and thoughts[5], does not emphasize in a historical event what is linear, unrepeatable and specific, but transforms it into a mythological category, according to a conception which tends to be cyclic, and which represents the meanings and aims of human history by ways of a constant relation between present history and the mythical world of its origins[6]. It is such a polarization which, even in the plurality of directions and tendencies, was destined to mould Greek historical thought, and to reappear with new clarity and force in the Roman historians of the archaic age[7].

Within the area of this basic approach the two fundamental problems of all ancient history are to be found: first, the problem of the causal link between past and present, and therefore

5. One may think of the notion of 'chance' (*symphorḗ, týchē*), which recurs in the Greek historians and, for the idea of diversity, that is that "no day produces one event similar to another" or that the thoughts of men are always changing, see Herodt. 1, 32; Archil. frr. 131-132 West = 107-108 Tard.; Pind. *Nem.* 6,6, *Pyth.* 8, 95 ff. On the sense of *ephémeroi* ("beings who change opinion every day") in the last two citations, cf. H. Fränkel, *Wege und Formen frühgriech. Denkens,* München 1960², p. 23 ff.

6. It is not opportune to go back to the old argument about the conception of time in classical historiography. It is certain that excessively rigid schematizing led to the idea of a sharp contrast between the cyclic conception of time in Greek thought and the linear conception of the Judeo-Christian cultural tradition, which is not corroborated by the complexity of attitudes of ancient thought. In fact, with the idea of "Historical Return" one sometimes associates even ideas relative to the evolutionary process; and above all the concept of "Return" does not imply complete similarity between historical events, but rather exemplarity, in the sense of "Return" to a mythical model in individual or collective behaviour and attitude. For a balanced and exhaustive reexamination of the problem cf. Mazzarino 1966, II 2 p. 412 ff.

7. The idea of origin still lives, although within the limits of a different conception of history, no longer cyclic but horizontal, in medieval Christian historiography. In particular, as far as regards the chronicles of single cities, cf. A. Carile,'Le origini di Venezia nella tradizione storiografica', in G. Folena, *Storia della cultura veneta* I, Vicenza 1976, pp. 135-166.

the search for causes, both remote and recent[8]; secondly, the problem of truth or likelihood: that is, of critical investigation ascertaining the veracity of the information which the historian acquires from oral transmission or written documents.

But it is just in dealing with the problem of causes that the contrast between two marked tendencies in the Greek historians begins to take shape. The legend of the Trojan war can be used by Herodotus[9] as a point of reference in giving reasons for the great dispute between the Greeks and the Persians, according to the same kind of causal link already noted in Ionic elegy, which showed that violence suffered must necessarily find recompensation in an equal and opposite action. For Thucydides[10] however, the return to that distant, mythical past of the struggle between the Greeks and the Trojans offers only a term of comparison by which to measure the greatness of the political and military proportions of the Peloponnesian war which was fought in his own time between the Athenians and the Spartans. Although keeping to a structural scheme which embraces the mythical past and the actual present, Thucydides finds "the real, but unstated cause", which made the war inevitable, at the political level, in the growing dimensions of Athenian power which had awakened fear and apprehension in the Spartans[11].

The discussion of truth and likelihood or probability brings the historiographic problem into the realm of the art of rhetoric and particularly of forensic eloquence, in the sense that the

8. "Causes" in the most obvious sense, in the sphere of a deterministic conception to which certain subtle distinctions of contemporary historiography, which substitutes the idea of "cause" with that of "function", are foreign. In other words, more than the problem of "why", we today are inclined to pose that of "how" a given event is inserted in the international logic of the situation. For more details on the concept of historical causality today see E.H. Carr, *What is History?,* London 1961, c.IV. On the idea of function and purpose which, in all sectors of contemporary culture, is substituting that of causality, cf. V. Therrien, *La révolution de Gaston Bachelard en critique littéraire. Ses fondements, ses techniques, sa portée. Du nouvel esprit scientifique à un nouvel esprit littéraire,* Paris 1970, p. 123 f.

9. 1, 1-5.

10. 1, 9-11.

11. 1,23,6.

historian, like the orator, must reconstruct the unfolding of events on the basis of testimony and evidence, which confirm the credibility of the declared thesis.

We read in Thucydides[12]:

> But as to the facts of the occurrences of the war, I have thought it my duty to give them, not as ascertained from any chance informant nor as seemed to me probable, but only after investigating with the greatest possible accuracy each detail, in the case both of the events in which I myself participated and of those regarding which I got my information from others. And the endeavour to ascertain these facts was a laborious task, because those who were eye-witnesses of the several events did not give the same reports about the same things, but reports varying according to their championship of one side or the other, or according to their recollection. And it may well be that the absence of the fabulous from my narrative will seem less pleasing to the ear; but whoever shall wish to have a clear view both of the events which have happened and of those which will some day, in all human probability, happen again in the same or a similar way — for these to adjudge my history profitable will be enough for me. And, indeed, it has been composed, not as a prize-essay (*agónisma*) to be heard for the moment, but as a possession for all time. [Translated by C. Forster Smith].

This programmatic affirmation, which expounds the criteria of a rigorous search for truth (or likelihood, where the control of the truth is not possible) and which lays the basis of the historiographic direction which Polybius, in the second century B.C., was to term "apodeictic," already had its antecedents in the Ionic historiography of Hecataeus of Miletus (6th-5th centuries B.C.) who relied on history, that is on his own experience and personal examination, for narration of facts and the criticism of myths[13].

Herodotus too, in setting out the results of his research (*historíēs apódexis*) always distinguishes carefully between information obtained by direct observation (*ópsis*) and information which he has instead derived from the words of others

12. 1,22,2-4.
13. Cf. *F. Gr. Hist.* 1 F 1; see Latte 1956, p.5.

(*lógoi*)[4]. However, in the latter case, although, as he himself states[15], he feels the need to report what he has learned, he does not feel obliged to believe it[16].

In Herodotus the premises both of the criticism of tradition and the theory of causes begin to be sketched[17]. But in Thucydides these hints of doctrine become the object of rigid and systematic theorizing, which goes so far as absolutely to reject any element which cannot be critically controlled and to adopt the idea of usefulness as the final aim of historical narration. The mythical and imaginary components present in the stories of the poets and in the prose history of the logographers were thus rejected in the name of historical truth as mere instruments of psychological pressure intended to attract the hearer[18].

But we must ask what in Thucydides' situation motivated this radical break with the preceding Herodotean historiography. The traditional explanation presents the age of Thucydides as the twilight of a still "primitive" type of mentality, when rationality in human thinking begins to be prevalent: this level of analysis presents a naive antithesis between the mythic and the logical mentality, which it views as successive moments in the evolution of thought. Such naiveté today seems untenable in the light of modern ethnological and anthropological research[19]. The explanation, if any, is to be sought in the field of the technology of communication and information and in relation

14. 2,99.
15. 7,152.
16. On the problem of sight and hearing as sources of historical information, see especially G. Nenci, 'Il motivo dell'autopsia nella storiografia greca', *Studi classici e orientali* 3, 1953, p. 14 ff.; M. Laffranque, *Rev. philos.* 153, 1963, p. 75 ff.; 158, 1968, p. 263 ff. The question should be reexamined in connection with the evolution of the technology of communication from the oral and aural phase to that of the production and diffusion of books.
17. Herodotus distinguishes between *próphasis* (the declared motive, the pretext), *aitía* (the real motive) and *archḗ* (the occasion, initial moment of military or political event): cf. J.L. Myres, *Herodotus Father of History*, Oxford 1953, p. 56.
18. 1, 21, 1.
19. Cf. Gentili 1969, p. 20 f.; Gentili 1972, p. 62 ff.

to the passage, which was under way in Thucydides' time, from an oral culture to one of written communication[20]. The analytical and rational method which Thucydide demanded in historical writing was not, in fact, applicable either to traditional poetry or to the history of logographers, because an oral culture, due to its direct, immediate relations with a listening public, has mental attitudes and means of expression which differ from those of a culture of written communication. In a predominantly oral culture there is an art of writing which, in its psychological aspect, can be said to aim, by means of clear and concrete language and through paratactic, not hypotactic, structure, at preparing attitudes of thought which are immediately perceptible to the hearer and arrest his attention. This is the stylistic structure which one meets in the fragments of Hecataeus[21] and the *Histories* of Herodotus, which were, in fact, composed for public hearing[22].

Thucydides' argument with traditional historiography, whether in poetry or in prose, appears in very precise terms in the clearly expressed criticism (1,22) against the hedonistic aim of oral narration, designed to amuse the hearer rather than for a rigorous investigation of the truth, as in his own historiography. This point of view also defines the aims and means of communication of his work, which is not composed for the brief duration of a public declamation before a passing audience, but to constitute a permanent intellectual acquisition based on the written word and careful reading[23].

20. Cf. E.G. Turner, *Athenian Books in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C.*, London 1952; Havelock 1963; Gentili 1969 and Gentili 1972; G. Cavallo, *Scriptorium* 26,1972, p. 71f.; *Libri, editori e pubblico nel mondo antico. Guida storica e critica* a cura di G. Cavallo, Roma-Bari 1977², p. XI ff.

21. Cf. Latte 1956, p. 5.

22. For a correct interpretation of the ancient evidence for the public readings held by Herodotus at Athens and Olympia, cf. Canfora 1971, p. 659 f.

23. This is the sense of "my history is a permanent possession (*ktêma es aei*), not a recital (*agônisma*) intended for the momentary listener". The word *ktêma* is not only and exclusively a metaphor, but preserves the normal meaning of "property" in a concrete sense which is referable to any object, the possession of which is lasting and inalienable. But if such is the value of *ktêma*, its direct

It is difficult to imagine a prose style more alien from the structural means and requirements of a public performance than that of Thucydides. Compact, compressed writing, tending to implicit rather than explicit thought, characterised by a tight, logical concatenation, it is a style which had difficulty in finding an audience disposed to follow the thread of the discourse with pleasure, requiring as it does by its very character an attentive reader alone with the text[24].

This critical attitude with respect to oral culture can be placed on the same level as Euripides' condemnation of all the poetry of the past[25] — "gastronomic" poetry, to use a metaphor of Bertolt Brecht's — in the sense that its principal aim was that of delighting, with the pleasure of song, the public of a banquet or a formal feast, rather than the more essential one of freeing man from sorrow[26]. Later Plato's objection to the poetry of the past, analogous to the Thucydidean criticism, placed the accent exactly on the absence of a rationalistic analysis of experience and of an appropriately dialectical development of thought[27].

contrast with *agônisma*, which is the performance presented with the aim of obtaining success before a public, induces one to think that the account here deals with the opposition between the transient *hic et nunc* of the performance and the lasting existence of the account consigned to the materiality of the written word, that is the book: cf.T.Kleberg, *Buchhandel und Verlagswesen in der Antike*, Darmstadt 1967, p.4 f. Certainly, Thucydides, as has been shown (Canfora 1971, p.657), foresaw (1,22,4) that his work would be read in public performances, according to the traditional practice; but the important fact is that he was not interested so much in the moment of the performance, as in the usefulness (*loc.cit.*) of his rational account to those who, in the future, would learn by reading it. The term *ktêma;* referring to the material property of the book, has a significant comparison in the use of the Latin *monumentum*, which could mean any monument in stone or bronze, but also a literary work in prose or verse, in the materiality of its written terms: cf. among the many examples Cato, fr. 83 Peter²; Cic. *De or.* 1,46,201; Hor.*Carm.* 3,30,1; Quint. 12,10,51.

24. Dion. Hal. *De comp. verb.* 22,II p. 108 Us.-Rad. explicitly affirms that Thucydidean prose does not respond to the requirements of a text intended for public recitation.

25. *Med.* 190 ff.

26. For more details cf. Gentili 1972, p. 63.

27. It has been the special merit of E.A.Havelock to have clarified in a definitive way that Plato's criticism of traditional poetry expresses the requirements of the new culture of written communication which was asserting

A different and opposite direction, which today we would call anthropological and ethnographic, has its antecedents in Herodotus and generally in the Ionic logographers. The assumption on which this historiography works is that the activity of the historian, like that of the dramatic poet, belongs to the sphere of mimesis, i.e. the faithful representation of human life. In the introduction to his *History,* Duris of Samos (3rd-2nd centuries B.C.)[28], arguing against his predecessors, Ephorus and Theopompus, pupils of Isocrates, because they had not known how to express the truth of the facts with sufficient efficacy, pointed out that this failure was due to their lack of interest in the mimetic aspect of narration and to the pleasure which it provoked in the public[29]. Ephorus and Theopompus, according to Duris, had pre-eminently turned their interest to the "written page" (*gráphein*), ignoring all those delightful elements which spring from a kind of mimetic narration which represents, through the influence of the words (*hēdonè en tôi phrásai*), the

itself in the second half of the fifth century B.C. In this sense Euripides, Thucydides and Plato are the bearers of a single, identical cultural message. All three place at the centre of their polemical propositions the rigid contrast between the usefulness (*ôphélimon*) of a rational account, and the pleasure (*hēdoné, térpein*), inherent in the practice of the performance. Thus for the first time that antinomy between the useful and the delight, which was destined to remain one of the typical characteristics of European culture, was outlined (cf. Havelock 1963,157 f.)

28. *F. Gr. Hist.* 76 F 1.

29. The meaning of Duris' formulation is clarified by a passage of Diodorus (20,43,7), from which it is evident that: 1) the aim of "mimesis" is the representation of the "truth" of the facts and of the pathos inherent them; 2) a historical account without pathos, which is the very substance of the facts, is, to be sure, still an "imitation," but one which falls short of the "truth." On the undoubted dependence of this theoretical declaration on Duris, cf. Ed.Schwartz, *R.E.* s.v.'Diodoros', col.687; s.v.'Duris', col.1855. The argument of Diodorus (Duris) regards the concept of the inadequacy of historical narrative, in that different actions which happened simultaneously are presented in an "unnatural" time sequence and not in their simultaneousness: therefore, an account which does not represent the truth of the situation in an authentic way. For more details cf. Strasburger 1968, pp. 79 and 85. On Mrs. Lefkowitz's misunderstanding of the passage in Photius (*Bibl.* 176 p. 121a 41) which introduces the quotation of Duris' phrase, cf. B. Gentili-G. Cerri, *Quad. Urb.* n.s. 21 (50), 1985, p. 136.

truth of human life. In other words, they had not felt the need for such a written word which could arouse in the reader the same delight which the spoken word awoke in the listener.

The nodal point of Duris' argument with the two Isocratean historians is in the distinct contrast between the spoken word (*phrásai*) and the written word (*gráphein*). The meaning of Duris' categorical affirmation that Ephorus and Theopompus were concerned only with writing is clarified by Isocrates himself in a well-known passage of the *Panathenaic* where the diverse activities of speaking in public and writing are compared: if one requires particular gifts of a psychic and physical nature — courage, polemical vigour, range and strength of voice — for the other aptitude for philosophical reflection, which can find its adequate and elaborate expression only in the assiduous act of writing, is indispensable[30]. Naturally, Isocrates, lacking, as himself declares, the natural, physical and psychic requirements necessary for public speaking (but perhaps also due to a deep-seated vocation), was obliged to orientate his choice towards the activity of writing. But recalling the examples of Homer and the tragic poets[31], he recognised however the validity of the spoken word and its emotional and psychagogic effects: a validity which naturally is developed at the level of delight, not at that of usefulness. But he proposed usefulness as the aim of his writing, in the sense that he tried to form an ethical-political consciousness in the reader through a rational development of the argument and the resources of a sober, flowing eloquence. This gives us elaborate writing, contrary to all psychagogic effects, but perfectly aware of its efficacy, characterized by long, solemn, harmoniously constructed sentences. As prose it is elegant and artistic, but sometimes monotonous and dull, intended mainly to scan the logical articulation of the thought with its rhythm. In short, "graphic" not "agonistic" eloquence, as Aristotle was to say, contrasting in his rhetorical doctrine the structures and functions of oral narration and the quite dif-

30. *Panath.*10-11.

31. *Ad Nicocl.* 48-49.

ferent ones of written narration: not intended to express emotion, more "precise", more attentive in connecting thoughts and in formal elaboration, but less alive, too narrow and sluggish for the ear[32].

As we can see, Aristotle here is delineating a real doctrine of communication: it establishes the implicit, theoretical premise of the polemical attitude of Duris who, in fact, reproached Ephorus and Theopompus for having given to historical treatises the same bookish foundation which Isocrates' eloquence had shown[33].

Dionysius of Halicarnassus[34], in setting out the aspects and tendencies of Theopompus' historiography, offers precise elements of ascertainment, which confirm Duris' remarks on the bookish character of his work: the philosophical and moralizing arrangement of the narration, with frequent digressions on human virtues, long, accurate, solemn sentences, attentive to the correct balance of the images and to the rhythmic movements of the sentence, only occasionally pungent and biting, where the moralistic attitude of the writer came to censure human vices and passions.

Certainly, the psychological characterization of historical characters, the description of surroundings and customs and also every element which arouses wonder and amazement, represent an essential component of his work, which Dionysius

32. *Rhet.* 3, 1413 b ff.

33. In fact it is not possible to understand Duris' formulation, in all the implications which pertain to the foundation of the historical narrative and its formal aspects, if we leave aside the antithesis *phrásai-gráphein* and the exact meaning of *gráphein*, which raises the whole problem of communication technology and the terms in which it was explicitly described, as we have seen, by the culture of the fourth century B.C. This requirement, up to now, does not seem to have been noticed by the critics and, even when attention has been paid to the value of *gráphein*, as in the recent analysis, quite penetrating on other points, by Strasburger (1968, p.79 f.), the word has been interpreted in a more formal than substantial key, in the exterior sense of "style"; since *gráphein*, in the meaning elaborated by Isocrates and Aristotle, takes in not only the argument of rhetorical figures and tropes, but the very structures of thought, in relation to the exact requirements of written communication.

34. *Epist. ad Pomp.* 6, II p. 244 ff. Us.-Rad. = *F.Gr. Hist.* 115 T 20.

terms *polymorphía.* A *polymorphía,* the primary purpose of which was to be useful rather than to influence the reader psychologically, since the knowledge of the customs, both of the barbarians and of the Greeks, of the laws, of the constitutions, of the *biographies*, of the doings, of the objectives, of the chance vicissitudes of men, amplified and deepened the understanding of human nature and was therefore useful to the wide public of cultivated men, engaged in the various fields of intellectual activity, whether they were politicians, rhetoricians or philosophers.

This representational polymorphic aspect, as we have noted, also entails a type of mimetic narration, but not in the sense desired by Duris, a type of dramatic mimesis, capable of bringing the events narrated back to life, with all their emotional force, so as to transform the reader into spectator[35]. Thus the historian becomes, like the dramatic actor, the creator of a mimetic intermediary between historic reality and the public which experiences it, in a close rapport of sympathetic identification.

It is in this emotional and mimetic relation that historical *truth* appears[36], that truth which, according to Duris, the followers of Isocrates had not been able to reach, at least, we could say, had tried to unfold through an abstract, moral evaluation of people and events[37]. But, if the ethical truth of Theopompus had usefulness as its goal — the same educational usefulness which was the aim of the publicly orientated writing

35. B.L.Ullmann, 'History and Tragedy', *Trans.Am. Philol.Ass.* 73, 1942, p.25 ff., is right in recognising already in Theopompus a form of dramatization of history and, therefore, the introduction to a type of mimetic historiography, but he is wrong in thinking that Duris' orientation is the direct continuation of that of the Isocrateans Ephorus and Theopompus. Apart from some apparent convergences, which meet in their common ethnographical and biographical interests, the nodal point of the divergence is precisely in the different meaning and function which the idea of mimesis assumes in Duris' historiographic thought and practice. Cf. the remarks made by von Fritz 1956, p. 126 ff. on Ullmann's thesis.

36. Cf. n. 29.

37. Cf. Dion. Hal. *loc.cit.*

of Isocrates — Duris' mimetic truth performed the hedonistic function of arousing emotion in the reader and of pleasurably enthralling him in the narrative, a function which belonged to the spoken word.

The notion of "pleasure" or "delight" (*hēdoné*) which words, joined with dance, gesture and song, can exercise on the listener, was one of the guiding ideas of all Greek poetry from Homer to the tragedians[38], and found its clearest and most explicit expression in the thought of Gorgias[39]:

I consider and define all poetry as speech in a metrical form. Into him who listens to it creeps a shiver of fear and compassion that induces tears and an intense desire which tends towards sorrow: before the happy and adverse fate of extraneous events and people, by the action of the words, the soul feels the emotions of others as its own ... The divine charm of the words awakens pleasure, banishes sorrow, identifying itself with the opinion of the soul, the power of enchantment betwitches, influences and transforms one with its magic[40].

38. The frequence of textual references does not permit an exhaustive documentation. It is sufficient to examine I. Latacz, *Zum Wortfeld "Freude" in der Sprache Homers*, Heidelberg 1966 and, more especially, Havelock 1963, p. 152 ff. and *passim*.

39. Fr. 82 B 11,9 f. D.-K. (II p. 290,20).

40. Regarding tragic "performance", Gorgias insists on the idea of the illusion exercised on the audience by poetry, presenting it as a mutual emotional rapport between the poet and the spectator: "he who deceives is *more just* than he who does not, and he who lets himself be deceived is *wiser* than he who does not" (fr.82 B 23 D.-K., II p.305,26). This interpretation was already suggested in the first edition of our book (1965) and also put forward by O. Taplin, *Greek Tragedy in Action*, Berkeley-Los Angeles 1978, p. 167 ff., who is one of the most sensitive scholars in dealing with problems of oral communication in tragedy. To understand the sense of this declaration, until now not completely understood, we must keep in mind that *díkē* and *díkaios* ("justice" and "just"), both at a cosmological level (cf. G.Vlastos, 'Equality and Justice in Early Greek Cosmologies', *Class. Philol.* 42. 1947, p. 168 ff; L.Sambursky, *The Physical World of the Greeks*, London 1956, p.8 ff.; J.-P.Vernant, 'Structure géométrique et notions politiques dans la cosmologie d'Anaximandre', *Eirene* 7, 1968, p.5 ff.) and at an amorous level (cf.B.Gentili, 'Il "letto insaziato" di Medea e il tema dell'*adikía* a livello amoroso nei lirici (Saffo, Teognide) e nella *Medea* di Euripide', *Studi classici e orientali* 21, 1972, p.500), imply the precise idea of equilibrium in the relationship of reciprocal actions amongst natural or human agents. The violation of this principle, in that it

But this relation of emotionalism, which established itself in the performance of a poetic text, would not be understandable without the idea of mimesis, which was at the base of Greek conception of poetic creation[41]: mimesis as bringing back to life through words, music, gesture and dancing, of a mythical or human action or a natural phenomenon. A mimetic process which transmits itself to the listener under the form of emotional participation.

But if pleasure becomes as one with emotionalism, which in its turn is related to mimesis, it follows that pleasure is one of the aspects or functions of mimesis itself. The relationship is clear from Aristotle's declaration on tragic poetry: "The (tragic) poet must procure, by means of mimesis, the pleasure which pity and fear arouse"[42].

It is clear then that "the pleasure inherent in utterance" (*hēdonè en tôi phrásai*) of which Duris speaks does not belong to the mere artifice of style which, on the contrary, characterizes the technique of composition directed only to the written word, but to the efficacy of the spoken word, in that it is the vehicle of expression for the mimetic message. In essence, Duris underlined the necessity for the written page to preserve the dramatic tension and concentration of the tragic performance — an undoubted transposition of tragic mimesis into the area of historical narrative. In this sense Duris is certainly travelling in the wake of Aristotle's *Poetics*, but with different theoretical connotations, in that he tends to identify the activities of the poet and historian in their means and aims which, on the con-

upsets a balance, is symbolized as an act of injustice (*adikía*), which necessarily brings a punishment intended to re-establish the norm of *díkē*. The "wisdom" of him who lets himself be deceived, that is, the public, spectators, is in his capacity to put himself on the same level as the poet and to take part emotionally in the situation proposed by the performance. The terms *sophía-sophós* still preserve in Gorgias the meaning of "ability", "capacity", "experience of an art", in this case the poetic art.

41. Cf. Havelock 1963, p. 20 ff.; B. Gentili, 'I frr. 39 e 40 di Alcmane e la poetica della mimesi nella cultura greca arcaica', in *Studi in onore di Vittorio De Falco*, Napoli 1971, p. 57 ff.

42. *Poet.* 1453 b; cf.also Plato *Resp.* 10,602c-608a.

trary, Aristotle[43] vigorously distinguishes, assigning to the first the task of narrating the "general" or what could happen according to likelihood and necessity, to the second the "particular" — what has really happened. But, once this identification of the two activities of poet and historian is declared, it is clear that the identification implicitly brings in its train a need that history too should have the category of the "general", which is, in fact, for Duris the mimetic *truth,* as a dramatic concentration of human passions[44].

In this antimony, between history as an account of the particular and history as individualisation of the general, are defined, in terms which today are still current, the duties of the historian as regards the facts, that is the problem of the particular and the general, of objectivity and subjectivity, which is as much to say the dialectical relation between facts and their interpretation.

This use of history, outside its complex, doctrinal relations with Aristotelism, had deep motivations in the cultural reality of the fourth-third centuries B.C. and precisely in the expressionistic tendencies of figurative art[45] and new forms of entertainment, that is the new dithyramb and solo-singing. The expressionistic mimetism of the new poetry and music is clearly outlined, even in its technical aspects and causes, in the pseudo-Aristotelian *Problems*[46]; the introduction of solo-singing, without strophes, in contrast with the strophic structure of the chorus, and relying on the technical ability of a new professional actor, responded to the new need to express human passions in their authentic truth, no longer within the limits of that "conventional character" which had marked choral singing in fifth century theatre. With its tendency for psychological analysis of the characters and a type of ethnographic investigation, mimetic historiography found a suitable background in the political life of the Hellenistic courts of the Diadochi characterized by the determining influence of the personalities of the rulers and princes[47] and the view of the multiform world of the non-Greek populations of the Hellenized Orient.

But, in fact, in the contrasts of such a way of elaborating historical "truth", intended to represent human life dramatically in all its baffling complexity, resurface those very methodological instances of a rigorous, objective search for the facts and their causes which, as we have seen, had characterized Thucydides' historical thought. These are the terms of Polybius' (2nd century B.C.) bitter polemic against Phylarchus, a follower of Duris' historiographical idea, concerning his dramatic ac-

43. *Poet.* 1451 a-b

44. Von Fritz (1956, p.107 ff.) has the merit of having clarified in what sense the Aristotelean category of the general, inherent in tragic mimesis, operated on the thought of Duris, who was Theophrastus' pupil: in substance he has restricted Schwartz's thesis concerning Duris' dependence on Aristotle to clear and precise limits. The most debated problem (cf.e.g. F.Wehrli, 'Der erhabene und der schlichte Stil in der poetisch-rhetorischen Theorie der Antike', in *Phyllobolia für P.von der Mühll*, Basel 1946, p.9 ff., and 'Die Geschichtsschreibung im Lichte der antiken Theorie', in *Eumusia, Festgabe für E. Howald*, Zürich 1947, p.54 ff. = *Theorie und Humanitas, Gesamm.Schrift.z. antik.Gedankenwelt*, Zürich und München 1972, pp.97-120; 132-144), if the program of Duris reflects the thought of Aristotle or Isocrates, is in reality, as F.W.Walbank has rightly commented ('Tragic History. A Reconsideration', *Bull. Inst. Class. Stud. Univ. London* 2, 1955, p.4 ff.), a false problem, characterized by a non-critical schematism. As we have shown, the question is not posed in terms of the alternative, Aristotle or Isocrates, but in the more concrete terms of a problem with many complex cultural implications.

45. One thinks, for example, of the famous mosaic of Alexander which depicts a battle between Macedonians and Persians (probably the battle of Isso), found at Pompei in the House of the Faun, now in the National Museum of Naples: a grandiose picture full of foreshortenings and efforts of colour, in which emerge, in a powerful dramatic concentration which does not neglect any detail of the scene, the psychological and emotive attitudes and reactions of the individual characters. Cf. A. Ippel, *Röm. Mitt.* 45, 1930,p. 80 ff.; G.E. Rizzo, *La pittura ellenistico-romana*, Milano 1929, tavv. 44-47; G. Lippold, 'Antike Gemäldekopien', *Abhandl. Bayer. Akad.* 33, 1951, tavv. 16,86; R. Bianchi Bandinelli, *Storicità dell'arte classica*, Bari 1973[3], p. 323; *Il problema della pittura antica. Grecia classica ed età ellenistica e romana.* Lezioni del corso di archeologia raccolte da E. Faini, Firenze s.d., p. 100 ff.

46. 19, 15.

47. Cf. Latte 1956, p. 129 f. in his discussion of von Fritz's paper. To stress these cultural and political implications is not to underestimate the influence of Aristotelean theory on mimetic historiography (R. Syme on the observations of Latte 1956, p. 132). Obviously no doctrine simply exerts its influence without a cultural support which motivates its application and function.

count of the fall of Mantinea[48]:

In his eagerness to arouse the pity and attention of his readers (*sympatheîs poieîn*) (Phylarchus) treats us to a picture of clinging women with their hair dishevelled and their breasts bare, or again of crowds of both sexes together with their children and aged parents weeping and lamenting as they are led away to slavery. This sort of thing he keeps up through his history, always trying to bring horrors vividly before our eyes. Leaving aside the ignoble and womanish character of such a treatment of his subject, let us consider how far it is proper or serviceable to history. A historical author should not try to thrill his readers by such exaggerated pictures, nor should he, like a tragic poet, try to imagine the probable utterances of his characters or reckon up all the consequences probably incidental to the occurrences with which he deals, but simply record what really happened and what really was said, however commonplace. For the object of tragedy is not the same as that of history, but quite the opposite. The tragic poet should thrill and charm his audience for the moment by the verisimilitude of the words he puts into his characters' mouth, but it is the task of the historian to instruct and convince for all time serious students by the truth of the facts and the speeches he narrates, since in the once case it is the probable that takes precedence, even if it be untrue, the purpose being to create illusion in spectators, in the other it is the truth, the purpose being to confer on learners. Apart from this, Phylarchus simply narrates most of such catastrophes and does not even suggest their causes or the nature of these causes, without which it is impossible in any case to feel either legitimate pity or proper anger. [Translated by W.R. Paton].

This page of Polybius forces itself on the attention not only for its polemical content but above all for the lucid synthesis in which he groups together all the theoretical aspects of the long debate on history as mimesis or as critical investigation, as art or as "science." The antimony between tragedy and history is to be seen in an elaborate system of semantics belonging to different means of communication and information, and thus to different thought structures and the different functions of the two types of narration. To the ideas (belonging to poetry in its oral contact with a listening public) of emotional participation

48. 2,56.

(*sympátheia*), illusion, likelihood, pleasure and momentariness, is opposed the truth, the usefulness and permanence of historical research which urges the intellectual diligence of the reader. It is a critical basis on which are united doctrinal motives already observed in Gorgias, Thucydides and in Aristotle and which confirms the sense of antithesis worked out by Duris between the spoken word (*phrásai*) and the written (*gráphein*)[49].

It is evident that Duris' and Phylarchus' historiography, as it aimed at a comprehensive representation of life in its multiple and varied characters, situations, etc., must necessarily have appeared to Polybius as lacking in that rigorous, unequivocal method which was the premise of his "pragmatic" and "apodeictic" history.

It is, therefore, a historiography "without method", this of Duris and Phylarchus, to which must undoubtedly be related the theory of Tauriscus[50], Crates' pupil, on the unsystematic character of the *historikón* or "historian" who deals with the *améthodos hýlē,* "a disordered matter", that is precisely a complex and multiform subject which is not susceptible to a controlled analysis by precise, methodical standards[51].

But it is just this absence of an unequivocal method, or at least of the method of Polybian historiography, together with the vitality of the existential content and the multiplicity of human interests which deprived this historiographical direction of reputation and reliability, so that it ended by being misunderstood even by the ancient critics[52], as a decadent tendency

49. The importance of Polybius' passage for the understanding of the *phrásai-gráphein* antithesis has not hitherto been adequately appreciated.

50. *Ap.* Sext.Emp.*Adv. math.* 1,252 f.= fr. 18 Mette, *Sphairopoiia*, München 1936.

51. In the passage, to which Sextus Empiricus refers, Tauriscus illustrates the three moments in which, in his opinion, the activity of literary critic is articulated: "logic", regarding the lexicon and grammatical tropes, "stylistics", on dialects and style, and finally *historikón*, on the contents of poetry and their mythological, historical, geographical implications — a subject for study, according to him, which cannot be reduced to a system, because, unlike language, it is not governed by methodical rules. It is the main merit of Mazzarino 1966, I p.484 ff. to have illustrated the implicit contrast between the Tauriscean conception of history and the apodeictic one theorized by Polybius.

towards romantic invention.

Plutarch's comment on the reliability of Duris' account of the return of Alcibiades to Athens is typical[53]:

> Duris the Samian, who claims that he was descendant of Alcibiades, gives some additional details. He says that the oarsmen of Alcibiades rowed to the music of a flute blown by Chrysogonus the Pythian victor; that they kept time to a rhythmic call from the lips of Callippides, the tragic actor; that both these artists were arrayed in the long tunics, flowing robes and other adornment of their profession; and that the commander's ship put into harbours with a sail of purple hue, as though, after a drinking bout, he were off on a revel. But neither Theopompus, nor Ephorus, nor Xenophon mentions these things, nor is it likely that Alcibiades put on such airs for the Athenians, to whom he was returning after he suffered exile and many great adversities. Nay, he was in actual fear as he put into the harbour, and once in, he did not leave his trireme until, as he stood on deck, he caught sight of his cousin Euryptolemus on shore with many friends and kinsmen, and heard their cries of welcome. [Translated by Bernadette Perrin].

But whatever weight we may give to Plutarch's judgement, always so much against Duris' historiography[54], it is a fact that the representation of the scene, in all its theatrical solemnity and ostentation, is within the dimensions of the character, his ways and attitudes, as we can see from the biography of Plutarch himself[55].

In essence this mimetic historiography, in the importance which it gives to every aspect of human behaviour together with the individualization even of its irrational components, contain-

52. Cf. E. Schwartz, *R.E.* s.v. 'Duris', col. 1855 f.

53. *Alcib.* 32 = *F. Gr. Hist.* 76 F 70.

54. Cf. *Per.* 28 (=*F.Gr.Hist.* 76 F 67) where Duris' account of the taking of Samos by the Athenians is defined as false and tendentious.

55. Plutarch affirms, as we have seen, that the particulars reported by Duris are not reliable, also because they are not verified in Theopompus, Ephorus and Xenophon, the other historians who related the account of Alcibiades' return to Athens. In fact the argument is without value: precisely because Theopompus, Ephorus and Xenophon did not follow a mimetic type of historiography, they considered irrelevant certain particulars which had, on the contrary, great importance for Duris. Duris' account is confirmed by, amongst others, the fairly similar one of Athenaeus 12, 535 c-d.

ed in itself deep implicit needs which we today would call ethnological, psychological and sociological. It was an expressionistic historiography which, outside the methodological limits of a strictly political historiography, tended to represent directly the face of life. If its approach was alien to the aim of usefulness in a Thucydidean sense or the moralizing and philosophic usefulness of the Isocrateans, even it, however, followed a precise propaedeutic aim which is implicit, according to Aristotle, in the *tragic* representation of the passions.

But the contrast between the two types of historiography operated at the level more of programmatic intentions and expressions than of narrative procedure, if one considers the numerous indications of dramatic representations in those very historians, such as Thucydides and Polybius, who, from a theoretical point of view, rejected any concessions to a hedonistic and psychagogic use of history[56].

In the critical view which we have outlined here, we would like to emphasize the need for revaluation of this historiography, above all now that contemporary thought, even with the assistance of new methodology and techniques of investigation, has reopened the debate on what history is and on the task of the historian[57].

56. See Strasburger 1968, p. 80 ff. and recently J. Percival, 'Thucydides and the Uses of History', *Greece a. Rome* 18, 1971, p. 199 ff.

57. On the ever closer relationships which are being formed today between methods proper to historical investigation and those peculiar to relatively recent disciplines such as ethnology, sociology, psychology, etc., see Jacques Le Goff, 'Les mentalités: une histoire ambigüe', in *Faire de l'histoire* III, sous la direction de J. Le Goff et P. Nora, Paris 1974, pp. 76 - 94. For a theoretical discussion of the meaning and method of historiography, cf. also P. Veyne, *Comment on écrit l'histoire. Essai d'épistémologie*, Paris 1971. Veyne's theses, sometimes debatable and in some cases even paradoxical, are, nevertheless, stimulating and in a certain sense even provocative by the extent to which they challenge the conception of history as a science and the possibility of enucleating a real, precise historiographic method. Certainly, a very interesting position, but equally risky, at least in the terms in which it is defined by the author. When he declares that "ideas, theories and conceptions of history are unfailingly the dead part of a historical work" (p.144), he seems to want to relaunch, in essence, a certain model (which really is dead) of erudite and positivistic historiography.

Polybius' polemic did not exhaust itself in the contrast between his own method of historical investigation and mimetically orientated historiography: no less bitterly and more widely, with precise, critical interventions on method and contents, it attacked above all the Isocratean historiographic orientation, represented, as we have seen, by Ephorus and Theopompus. In the introduction to book IX of his *Histories,* Polybius, once again with severity and clarity, expounds the principles which distinguish his historiographical point of view from the predominant Isocratean one:

> I am not unaware that my work, owing to the uniformity of its composition, has a certain severity, and will suit the taste and again the approval of only one class of reader. For nearly all other writers, or at least most of them, by dealing with every branch of history, attract many kinds of people to the perusal of their works. The genealogical side appeals to those who are fond of a story, and the account of colonies, the foundation of cities, and their ties of kindred, such as we find, for instance, in Ephorus, attracts the curious and lovers of recondite lore, while the student of politics is interested in the doings of nations, cities and monarchs. As I have confined my attention to these last matters and as my whole work treats of nothing else, it is, as I say, adapted to only one sort of reader, and its perusal will have no attraction for the large number. [Translated by W.R. Paton].

Thus, Polybius' history is essentially "pragmatic", limited, that is, by political events and excluding any discussion of an ethnographic or anthropological type which pertains to legendary traditions and to the founding of cities and colonies[58], those very events preferred above all by the Isocratean type of historian. It is an account which concentrates completely on the stating of contemporary facts and is thus always new and always different since it does not deal with the past, but with the present and, consequently, cannot draw on the statements of preceding historiographical models[59]. In defining the aim of his method of working, Polybius follows in the wake of Thucydides with a

58. Pol. 9,2.
59. *Ibid.*

rigid contrast between the usefulness (*ōphélimon*) of his own history and the pleasure (*térpsis*) which Isocratean historiography arouses in its readers.

But the terms of this polemic are specified with greater vividness and documentation in the very part of his work where he subjects to sharp criticism the work of his great predecessor, Timaeus of Tauromenium (4th-3rd centuries B.C.) who had related the adventures of the Greek West down to the beginning of the first Punic War: just where, in fact, Polybius' narrative began. The dominant themes of Timaeus' work, as can be deduced from the critical writings of Polybius himself, were the same as those which had characterized Isocratean historiography: colonies, foundings of cities, relationships, family histories, geographical digressions and the customs of different peoples[60]. That Timaeus' writings were characterized by Isocratean rules is explicitly stated by Dionysius of Halicarnassus[61] and indirectly confirmed by the judgment of Cicero on their "graphic" and not "agonistic" character[62], a point which is precisely verified in Duris' polemic against Ephorus and Theopompus whose interest was in *gráphein* rather than *phrásai*[63].

But other elements of structure and form also bring Timaeus back to the Isocratean way, through the frigidity of his writing, the prolixity of his account and that marked tendency towards philosophical reflection and sententious aphoristic language[64] which Polybius[65] bitterly censured, not so much for an aprioristic foreclosing as for a claimed superficiality or speculative incapacity on the part of Timaeus.

60. Pol. 12,26 d. On Timaeus, see Momigliano 1966, p. 23 ff. (with bibliography).
61. *De din.* 8 = *F.Gr. Hist.* 566 T 22
62. *De or.*2,14,58 = *F.Gr.Hist.* 566 T 20: *magnam eloquentiam ad scribendum attulit sed nullum usum forensem.*
63. Cf. pp. 15 and 105 sg.
64. Cic. *Brut.* 95,325 = *F.Gr. Hist.* 566 T 21; Dion. Hal. *loc.cit.*; Anon.*De Subl.* 4 = *F.Gr.Hist.* 566 T 23.
65. 12,25,6.

But, leaving aside every other aspect of Polybius' polemic on real or presumed historical and geographical errors[66], our aim is now to examine his basic objection to the bias inherent in the attitude of Timaeus' historical writings which mirrored the essentially propagandist aim of Isocratean publicity. This use of history tends to demonstrate a thesis and operates, therefore, like oratory, with the criterion of "probability" and not with the criterion of the truth, that is, that "truth" without which history, according to Polybius, becomes a vain and useless narrative[67].

In fact, Polybius, from his point of view, accuses Timaeus of falsifying historical truth not only due to the lack of direct knowledge of the places he deals with, the bookish attitude of his work, and because he has no real experience of any form of activity, public or private[68], but also and above all because he deliberately lies. Thus, with reference to Locri Epizephirii he observes, in the manipulation of the facts, that probability is a simple trick to disguise wilful lies[69]:

> Timaeus frequently makes false statements. He appears to me not to be in general uninformed about such matters, but his judgment to be darkened by prejudice, and when he once sets himself to blame or praise anyone he forgets everything and departs widely from his duty as historian ... I am even ready to concede that Timaeus' account is more probable [than Aristotle's one]. But is this a reason why a historical writer whose statements seem lacking in probability must submit to listen to every term of contumely and almost to be put on trial for his life? Surely not. For those, as I said, who make false statements owing to error should meet with kind correction and forgiveness, but those who lie deliberately deserve an implacable accuser. [Translated by W.R. Paton].

But the discussion on truth and likelihood still merits some

66. 12,3 ff.
67. Pol. 1,14; cf.12,12. For a precise and lucid analysis of the Isocrateanism implicit in Timaeus' "tendentiousness", see Levi 1963, p. 195 ff.
68. Pol. 12,25d, e, g, h; 27;28.
69. 12,7.

comments. If Ephorus had denied that epideictic oratory required more attention, diligence and preparation than historical works[70], Timaeus, specifying the terms of this distinction, put the accent on the superiority of history with an analogical argument[71] which clearly presupposes the Platonic theory of two different levels of mimesis in the field of man's artisan and artistic activities: the artisan, in constructing any object, uses a direct imitation of the idea of the object itself; the artist, be he painter, sculptor or poet, in finding the contents of his artistic function, makes, in his turn, an imitation of an imitation, that is, he reproduces the object of an artisan which is itself the reproduction of an idea[72]. For Timaeus there is an identical relationship between historical and epideictic narrative, which he compares respectively to the real constructions and furnishings which are the work of the artisan, and to figurative constructions and furnishings in pictorial art. This is an argument conducted along the lines of the distinction between one mimesis as a perfect reproduction of reality and a second mimesis which, like *skiagraphía*[73] and scene-painting[74], creates a perspective illusion by deforming reality, in that distant objects are represented as being small and the nearer ones as large: an art, this, of illusion, that is to say, an art of deceptive likelihood.

The polemic attacks, which Plato makes against poetry, in the tenth book of the *Republic*[75], emerge with sufficient clarity from his own theory of poetry conceived, like figurative art, as mimesis. There are three arts which exist of each object: the one which uses it, the one which manufactures it, the one which imitates it[76]. Painting and poetry, the former directed to the sight, the latter to the hearing, are pre-eminently imitative arts. But imitative activity does not involve knowledge of the objects im-

70. *Ap.* Pol. 12,28,8-9 = *F.Gr.Hist.* 70 F 111.
71. *Ap.* Pol. 12,28a = *F.Gr.Hist.* 566 F 7.
72. Plat. *Resp.* 10,597 ff.; 602c; *Soph.* 233b ff.
73. Plat. *Resp.* 10,602d.
74. Tim. *loc.cit.* n. 71.
75. 595a-607a.
76. 601d.

itated: the painter, for example, does not know how to discern whether the object he is painting is well made or not, nor has any experience or correct opinion of it. Imitation is really only a pastime or a game since it is two degrees removed from nature and does not create true reality but only its appearance or likeness. In portraying an object, the painter accomplishes a second degree mimesis in as much as he reproduces an objective reality which, in its turn, is a reproduction of the idea of the object itself through the work of the craftsman. He works on the thread of the reproduction of reality and a second mimesis which creates the illusion of perspective by means of the deformation of reality; representing distant things smaller and closer things larger, or using tricks of colour to represent objects folded or erect, concave or convex (chiaroscuro painting, *skiagraphía*)[77]. It is therefore an art of deceptive probability intimately linked to that part of us which is contrary to reason and which has no aim be it healthy or true. By means of chromatic artifices it upsets the soul of the beholder.

The activity of the poet, the craftsman of images[78], is analogous[78]. His mimetic creation is also two degrees removed from reality. He does not understand what is, but what appears to be; he only creates appearances of actions, of virtues and of everything else. If he had a knowledge of reality he would create rather than imitate, he would prefer to be the object rather than the author of a eulogy.

Within the suggestive power of meter, rhythm and music, the poet exercises the same seduction on the hearers that the painter communicates through figures and colours, so great is the natural fascination which these expressive means transmit. Stripped of its ornaments and colours, poetry is nothing more than pure and simple words[79].

But what are the actions at which poetic mimesis is aimed? Those actions, compulsory or voluntary, as a result of which

77. 602d.
78. 599d.
79. 601b; cf. *Gorg.* 502 c.

men consider themselves happy or unhappy, become sad or joyous. For, like the painter, the poet is naturally inclined to imitate that part of us which is unreasonable (*alógiston*), senseless and base and which has nothing healthy or true about it. He imitates all the painful or pleasant appetites of the soul that accompany our every action and lend themselves to numerous different imitations, whereas it is not easy to imitate the wise, tranquil, uniform character, nor, if imitated, can it be easily understood by the heterogeneous audience at a feast or a theatre. It is, therefore, evident that the poet does not have a natural propension for the rational part of the soul and is not even inclined to satisfy it if he wishes to obtain the assent of the crowd.

That of the poet-imitator is consequently a harmful art because it insinuates in each of us "an evil constitution, satisfying the senseless part of the soul, that is incapable of discerning more from less and judges now great and then small the same things, creating fantasms, and is very distant from the true"[80]. An art of deception, it is only capable of arousing passions in the listener through the pleasure of song and gesture and of involving him emotionally in the mimetic sphere of the story. Welcoming the pleasing muse of poetry, the state will entrust its power to pleasure and pain instead of to law and reason[81]. The cletic hymn to the gods and the song of praise for the brave are the only poetic forms that the state will be able to acknowledge for they do not involve an imitation of reality and consequently do not damage the citizen[82].

But this scheme of arguments, according to Polybius, turns back against Timaeus, since faithful reproduction of reality could not consist, as he declared, in the onerous task of the collection and study of the sources necessary for his historical narration, but rather in direct acquaintance with the places and personal experience of the situations[83].

80. 605 d.
81. 607 a.
82. Cf. *Leg.* 7, 801c-802a.
83. 12,28a,6

In my opinion the difference between real buildings and scene-paintings or between history and declamatory speech-making is not so great as is, in the case of all works, the difference between an account founded on participation, active or passive, in the occurrences and one composed from report and the narratives of others. [Translated by W.R. Paton].

Exactly in Timaeus' bookish technique of constructing a historical argument Polybius recognizes a reason even for involuntary errors; and on the occasion when Timaeus approaches the truth it is always an artificial rather than real truth. He works like "those painters who reproduce straw models": their exterior design coincides with the real one, but is not capable of rendering the vitality and animation of living creatures[84].

On the contrary, a historiography which wishes to adhere doggedly to the truth of the events which it relates must, according to Polybius[85], respond to three fundamental methodological requirements: the careful study and critical analysis of the documents, a visit to the places in question (*autopsía*), a direct knowledge of the political problems. It is a "pragmatic" (*pragmatikḗ*) historiography in content, inasmuch as its subjects are the political, military and other events of recent and contemporary history, "apodeictic" (*apodeiktikḗ*) in its method, in that it proceeds according to the principles of "scientific" demonstration[86].

84. 12,25h.

85. 12,25e.

86. It is necessary here to specify that the current use of the term "pragmatic" in the criticism of ancient historical thought is often equivocal: an equivocation which comes from the incorrect opinion that *pragmatikós* and *pragmatikḕ historía* imply methodological types of connotation in the work of Polybius (M.Gelzer, *Festschrift C.Weickert,* Berlin 1955, p.87 ff. = *Kl.Schriften*, p.155 ff.; cf. recently K.-E.Petzold, *Studien zur Methode des Polybios u. zu ihrer historischen Auswertung,* München 1969,p. 3 ff.). In fact, a semantic analysis, which is obviously impossible here, confirms the interpretation proposed by Balsdon *(Class. Quart.* n.s.3, 1953, p.158 ff.), by Walbank (1957, pp.8 n.6; 42) and by Pédech (*La méthode historique de Polybe,* Paris 1964, p.21 ff.), according to which *pragmatikḕ historía* describes, in Polybius, the history of political and military facts, in contrast with that of genealogy, foundings of cities, colonization, etc.; that is, it regards only the contents not the attitude of historical narrative. In this second sense Polybius uses the expression *apodeiktikḕ historía* about history which conforms to the rigid principles of a demonstrative method. For further details on historical method and polemics in Polybius, see D.Musti, 'Polibio negli studi dell'ultimo ventennio (1950-1970), in *Aufstieg und Niedergang der röm. Welt* I/2, (J. Vogt gewid.), Berlin-New York 1972, pp.1114-1181.

Two opposite uses of history which are both aimed at the preparation of a man of politics, but in different ways and at different levels: one, that of the Isocratean, proposing precise political and cultural objectives to be pursued; the other furnishing all the rigorously tested tools of political craft, of which the politician must be aware when making decisions, if he is to avoid falling into the errors committed in the past. The first is a partisan propagandistic historiography and in this sense it too is faithful to a reality[87], the second programmatically "impartial" and "objective", not politically involved, precisely because it is orientated towards the elaboration of a useful technique for politicians whatever their particular and incidental aims may be.

87. We are not, therefore, in agreement with certain tendencies in criticism, which reduce Timaeus' historiography and in general that of the Isocrateans to a simple historiography of erudite intellectuals, totally free from political intentions.

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