APOLLO, *PAENITENTIA*, AND OVID'S *METAMORPHOSES*[1])

BY

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ABSTRACT

Through a comparison of several examples of divine repentance in Ovid's *Metamorphoses* to their closest human analogue (Apollo/Phaethon and Apollo/Coronis, each in book 2, Apollo/Hyacinthus and Cyparissus, each in book 10) this study attempts both to illustrate the characterization of Apollo in the poem and to raise questions about why Apollo is the god so portrayed. I will suggest that Apollo's *paenitentia* highlights a key difference between gods and mortals, and also that Ovid may be using the figure of Apollo to remark upon that of Augustus.

Recent work on the passions in Antiquity suggests the difficulty in translating an emotion-word (or an emotion) from one language to another, but also that the difficult attempt is worthy, insofar as studies of individual emotions themselves have a great deal to tell us about the diverse values of different societies. The emotions of *paenitentia* and of remorse and repentance (its modern relatives) have received little press in any field. *Paenitentia* itself has garnered little notice until very recently, and it is not clear whether indeed it can be identified with our own notions of remorse and repentance (although, for the ease of the reader, I will regularly gloss the Latin by the English).[2]) This article concentrates on the two examples of

1) Many thanks to John Marincola and to the audience at the Ovid session at the 2003 CAMWS meeting in Lexington, KY, at which the ideas of this paper were first aired in public. I am also grateful to John F. Miller and to Bob Kaster for access to the relevant chapter of his forthcoming book on Roman emotion.

2) I am much obliged to Kaster 2005 in my understanding of *paenitentia* (details *infra* and in n. 4). A brief definition of remorse and repentance: remorse is the bad feeling one gets after having performed an action that one now wishes not to have performed and for which one accepts some degree of responsibility. The aspect of remorse that distinguishes it from other similar emotions is the recognition that one has harmed another person and the accompanying wish (generally impossible) of making reparation for one's wrongdoing. At the same time, remorse is particularly interesting because it is an emotion susceptible of judgement and sometimes seen as indicative of morality; we are regularly interested in how and when other people display remorse. This moral and performative aspect of remorse will prove key to my reading of the figure of Apollo in the *Metamorphoses*. Repentance differs from remorse in common usage primarily in containing a religious overtone or broader focus. In practice, the two are virtually indistinguishable, and will be so treated here.

3) Three of the episodes in this article are also treated by Miller, who reads them as evidence of Apollo's "humanity" (and so incongruous divinity) (1998, 413, with bibliography in n. 1). I have benefited much from his careful study of the vocabulary of the passages. Fredricks treats the Coronis and Phaethon episodes, suggesting that they characterize Apollo as "react[ing] to every situation in an unthinking, stereotyped way" (1977, 248) and reveal his inability to fit into Ovid's poem.

4) A few examples will illustrate the flexibility of Latin usage: it is possible to *paenitet* missing a train (this relates to *utilitas*) whether the missing was your own fault for dawdling, was caused by an accident that blocked your path to the train station, or was caused by stopping to prevent a child from being run over; in this case the thing that *is* would be not being on the train as it leaves the station and the thing that is *not* is arriving at your destination at the time you had originally planned. It is, however, also possible to *paenitet* something relating more directly to *honestas*; say, the loss of face associated with the failure to properly manage the family finances (as apart from the inconvenience, which you may also *paenitet*). More regularly, *paenitentia* related to *honestas* will be internally caused, but it can also be externally caused (if, to take the example above, you have had money stolen by your bailiff and/or have lent money to your cousin, who has just lost an expensive lawsuit). In none of these latter cases are you strictly the *cause* of your lack of funds, but you will still *paenitet* the damage to your reputation involved in having to tell people that you cannot afford to pay your debts.

FOR DAN, WITH BEST!

divine *paenitentia* in Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, comparing them with a divine scene similar in structure and then with the human analogue to the divine scenes.[3]) The goal of this study is to illustrate the characterization of Apollo, so his behavior elsewhere in the poem will also be treated. My larger aim is to demonstrate the usefulness of emotion-studies in understanding authorial practices and ancient culture; specifically, Ovid's portrayal of (Apollo's) divine *paenitentia* highlights a key difference between gods and mortals, and raises the question of where in that dichotomy the emperor falls.

Kaster (2005) suggests that *paenitentia* is not the usual Latin term for our remorse, but that the word may nevertheless carry moral implications. According to Kaster, *paenitentia* arises when something that *is* the case is compared with something that is *not* the case and found wanting; his definition is broad enough to cover *paenitentia* for externally as well as internally caused things, and things that relate to one's *utilitas* as well as one's *honestas*—or, we might say, practical as well as moral regret.[4])

The two divine uses of *paenitentia* in the *Metamorphoses* both involve Apollo and both appear in Book 2;[5]) the rarity of *paenitentia* is in contrast with the frequent appearance among the gods of, to take one very common emotion, anger.[6]) There is an answer ready to hand for this infrequency: *paenitentia* may be seen as a uniquely human emotion, since it implies a lack of power; if you are a god and you want something that is not the case to become the case, you make it happen, which renders the feeling unnecessary. Despite the inherent unlikelihood of any god's feeling *paenitentia*, however, Apollo does so twice, and each time his actions show his (un-divine) fallibility.

In the first case, Phaethon comes to visit Phoebus Apollo seeking proof that he is indeed his son.[7]) The god offers to grant any wish of his offspring, whereupon the boy asks to drive the chariot of the sun (2.31-48). Apollo knows that this will be a disaster and begs the boy to reconsider, but as the god has sworn by the river Styx (2.45-6), he must keep his promise:

> paenituit iurasse patrem, qui terque quaterque
> concutiens illustre caput "temeraria" dixit
> "vox mea facta tua est. utinam promissa liceret
> non dare! confiteor, solum hoc tibi, nate, negarem;
> dissuadere licet: non est tua tuta voluntas!" (*Met.* 2.49-54)[8])
> 'His father repents having sworn, and shaking his luminescent head thrice and four times, said, "My utterance is made imprudent by yours. I wish I were allowed to break a promise! I confess, my son, I would have denied this alone to you; let me dissuade you: your wish is not safe!"'

Apollo then delivers the longest speech yet in the *Metamorphoses*, intended to dissuade his son, but to no effect. The boy remains adamant, and Apollo gives in. Although Apollo repents of his promise to allow Phaethon anything he wishes, he is limited by his divinity; having sworn by the river Styx, he cannot refuse to allow his son to drive the chariot that will bring his doom. Most critics see Apollo's behavior as injudicious.[9]) Be that as it may, Phaethon does indeed drive his father's chariot and soon loses control of it, scorching parts of the earth; Jupiter sends a thunderbolt to knock the chariot (and Phaethon) out of the sky. The narrative returns to Apollo, who has no part in the subsequent funeral of his son; as Anderson (1997, 265) notes, Ovid's audience may reflect on his rather more active role in other versions of the story, wondering what this Apollo has been up to. It turns out that he is in mourning, refusing to shine for an entire day (luckily, the fires from the chariot provide some light, 2.330-2).[10]) We later discover that he blames his horses for the death of his son and so punishes them with harsh whippings (2.399-400). As with the cases treated elsewhere in this article, Apollo's mourning is somewhat theatrical and, although he is a god, it brings with it no redemption of the sort our modern remorse-scenarios might lead us to expect: he does not become a better person, he does not improve anyone else's life, and he does not even, so far as we can know, decide to be more careful about swearing oaths in the future.

This is not the only place where Apollo proves both reckless and repentant for it, or where he punishes an innocent party, but he does not seem to learn from his mistakes. Book 2 of the *Metamorphoses* also contains the tale of the raven who discovers Coronis, Apollo's

5) *Paenitentia* also appears in the *Metamorphoses* at 4.614, 5.210, 10.461, and 15.278. The first and last instances do not provide the story to which they allude (Acrisius *paenitet* refusing to acknowledge his grandson Dionysus and the river Mysus is said to *paenituisse* his source and his previous banks, so changes his name and flows elsewhere; the reference serves as one of Pythagoras' examples of the changeability of nature). The second and third examples (Phineus *paenitet* fighting with Perseus over Andromeda and Myrrha *paenitet* her decision to sleep with her father) are given in slightly more detail, but none provides sufficient information about the behaviors associated with *paenitentia* to warrant treatment here and all are non-divine instances of the word. A similar example without *paenitentia* is offered by Pentheus at 3.718: *iam se damnantem, iam se peccasse fatentem.*

6) See, most recently, Feeney 1991, 201 on Juno's anger throughout the poem and, more thoroughly, Nagle 1984 on the gendered connections between divine *ira* and *amor* in the *Metamorphoses*.

7) See Anderson 1997, 228-9 and Otis 1970, 109-13 and 389-95 with bibliography on previous versions of the myth.

8) The text is Anderson's; translations here and throughout are my own.

9) Fredricks (1977, 247) characterizes Apollo as "speaking before he thinks". Cf. Anderson 1997, 226, who calls Apollo "rash" and "foolish" and notes that Jupiter had earlier "misused" an oath by the Styx. Otis describes the speech as a "weak father's unthinking attempt" (1970, 109). Galinsky, by contrast, explicitly excepts the Phaethon tale from his characterization of the gods' motives as "generally shallow" (1975, 169), but finds Apollo's grief over Phaethon "too overdone to be touching" (*ibid.*, 135).

10) For this, Otis finds fault with Apollo, observing that "even in grief, he remains the fatuous father" (1970, 115).

lover and the pregnant mother of his child, sleeping with another man:[11])

> laurea delapsa est audito crimine amanti,
> et pariter vultusque deo plectrumque colorque
> excidit, utque animus tumida fervebat ab ira,
> arma adsueta capit flexumque a cornibus arcum
> tendit et illa suo totiens cum pectore iuncta
> indevitato traiecit pectora telo.
> [. . .]
> paenitet heu, sero poenae crudelis amantem
> seque, quod audierit, quod sic exarserit, odit;
> odit avem, per quam crimen causamque dolendi
> scire coactus erat, nec non arcumque manumque
> odit cumque manu temeraria tela, sagittas,
> conlapsamque fovet seraque ope vincere fata
> nititur et medicas exercet inaniter artes. (*Met.* 2.600-5, 612-8)

> 'When the god heard of this treachery, his wreath fell off his head and his face, his quill, and his color all dropped; his heart grew hot with turgid wrath; he seized the weapons at hand and bent the curved bow and then let fly a faultless shot that pierced Coronis' breast, which had so often been joined to his own. . . . Apollo the lover repents his cruel punishment—alas, too late; he hates himself because he listened, because he raged; he hates the bird through whom he was forced to learn of the treachery, cause of his grief; he hates too his bow and his hand, and, along with his hand, his imprudent shafts. He warms fallen Coronis; he practices his useless remedies in vain, seeking to defeat death with his tardy help.'

Apollo expresses what we might call a textbook case of (modern) remorse:[12]) he *paenitet* as well as *se odit* (self-hatred is a frequent companion of remorse), and seems cognizant of the larger effects of his act; he even tries to fix his mistake.[13]) As above with Phaethon,

11) Ovid's sources for the myth are Callimachus' *Hekale* (see Keith 1992 for an extended comparison of the two), and some other (now lost) treatment; see Otis 1970, 381 and 388 for further details. Fredricks (1977, 247) compares this episode to the Phaethon story, noting that this "doublet' is designed to show the reader Apollo's "characteristic behavior." Cf. too Otis 1970, 119-20 on the similar emphases of the two.

12) And, apparently, ancient: see Sen. *De Ira* 2.6.2 on sorrow and *paenitentia* as the regular results of acting in anger.

13) So Galinsky, who observes that the god's remorse is "truly pathetic and leaves nothing to be desired in seriousness"; he sees the punishment of the raven as a discrepancy that "does not ruin the pathos, but detracts from it" (1975, 144).

Apollo is indirectly characterized as *temerarius*—indeed, the indirectness of the characterization is noteworthy: his own insistence that his *vox* and his *tela*, but not himself, were imprudent suggests that he may not be willing to accept full responsibility for his actions (Miller 1998, 415). In the case of Coronis, his lack of accountability is made especially clear; Apollo immediately turns on the raven, whom he considers the true cause of his actions, and changes her feathers from white to black as punishment. Those interested in the story (notably Keith (1992, 39-61)) have focused on this latter part, which is perhaps natural, given the larger context of Book 2 and also Roman imperial interest in the punishment of informers. While Apollo does not draw much scholarly attention, the critical opinion of him is unanimous here as above.[14])

But let us press Apollo's behavior further. As Anderson (1997, *ad* 2.613) notes, Apollo's "self-hatred and -blame end with this single line". Apollo returns to blame and punishment, the very same things that have just caused him such unhappiness.[15]) While human remorse, at least in its modern manifestation, typically brings with it some kind of change, either moral or material, divine *paenitentia* as here depicted does not. Punishment is, in any case, a more traditional mode for the gods than is self-reflection. But Apollo's behavior is especially disappointing because, by his *paenitentia*, he has raised the possibility of feeling—and doing—something less selfish. Feeney's explication of Apollo's conduct as similar to the Homeric Apollo's reaction to the prayer of his priest Chryses (*Il.* 1.43-7; Feeney 1991, 236) supports this inference—unlike in Homer, the action of the metamorphic Apollo is "unaccountable" and so "morally terrifying" (*ibid.*).

So much for the two divine instances of *paenitentia*. Apollo is associated with death elsewhere in the poem in circumstances where we might expect the occurrence of *paenitentia*. In Book 10 comes the story of Hyacinthus, for whose death Apollo is at least partially responsible:[16])

14) Anderson suggests that Apollo is a "foolish god, who should have known better", and Keith considers Apollo "rash" (1992, 54), as does Fredericks (1977, 245).

15) There may be an irony in the traditional longevity of the corax (Gk. *korone*) and the premature death of Coronis; cf. Dunbar 1995, 404-5 for citations.

16) The tale also appears in *Fasti* 5.223 ff.; Nicander's *Theriaca* 903; Euripides' *Helen* 1469 ff.; Lucian *DDeor.* 14; Apollod. 1.3.3; Serv. on *Ecl.* 3.63.

protinus inprudens actusque cupidine lusus
tollere Taenarides orbem properabat, at illum
dura repercusso subiecit in †aere† tellus
in vultus, Hyacinthe, tuos! expalluit aeque
quam puer ipse deus conlapsosque excipit artus
et modo te refovet, modo tristia vulnera siccat,
nunc animam admotis fugientem sustinet herbis:
nil prosunt artes; erat inmedicabile vulnus
[. . .]
"laberis, Oebalide, prima fraudate iuventa,"
Phoebus ait "videoque tuum, mea crimina, vulnus.
tu dolor es facinusque meum; mea dextera leto
inscribenda tuo est. ego sum tibi funeris auctor.
quae mea culpa tamen? Nisi si lusisse vocari
culpa potest, nisi culpa potest et amasse vocari.
atque utinam pro te vitam tecumque liceret
reddere! quod quoniam fatali lege tenemur,
semper eris mecum memorique haerebis in ore." (*Met.* 10.182-9, 196-204)

'Hyacinthus, reckless and driven by love of the sport, runs to pick the discus up. But the hard ground sends back the heavy bronze, striking you in the face, o Hyacinthus! The boy and the god are equally pale: he lifts your fallen limbs; now he tries to warm you, now to blot your cruel wound, now he delays your fleeing soul with applied herbs. His gifts do no good; that wound was incurable . . . "Spartan," Phoebus cries, "you fall, cheated of your youth; I see your wound, and I witness my own guilt; you represent my crime and my grief! My right hand should be branded with your fate: I am the cause of your death. And yet, what guilt is mine, unless it be called guilt to play and to love? If only I were allowed to die instead of and with you! But, since I am held fast by fate, you will always be with me, and your name will be on my mindful lips."'

Apollo here throws the discus too hard—an honest mistake, and the sort you might expect from a weighty god like Apollo[17]—and it bounces up from the ground and hits Hyacinthus (who is characterized as *imprudens*) full in the face. Apollo, again, cannot heal him, and he dies. Apollo takes the death of Hyacinthus more seriously than that of Coronis, at least if his willingness to die here is

17) See Miller on the emphasis of Apollo's forceful throw (10.181); his divinity is stagily played up, which Miller reads as in ironic and pathetic contrast with his human incapacity (1998, 418-9).

taken at face-value.[18]) We might well wonder about the benefit of being the god of healing if it never actually works, but let us merely note the witty variation on the (pastoral and then elegiac) paradox of the lover who cannot heal his own wounds.[19]) At line 199, Apollo accepts his guilt for Hyacinthus' death and shows what we might be tempted to call repentance (but without the vocabulary of *paenitentia*).[20]) In the very next line, however, he rationalizes away his responsibility (in a way that he could not do with Coronis or Phaethon). The fact that he may not be legally responsible seems to make him feel better.[21])

Yet in the line immediately following his statement of non-responsibility, he returns to one of the classic behaviors of repentance, wishing that he could die instead of or with Hyacinthus. Being divine, of course, he cannot, and so he turns Hyacinthus into a flower that will mourn forever and creates a cult for him.[22]) We might well read Apollo as very much affected by Hyacinthus' death, especially when we consider that this story is focalized by Orpheus, who has turned to pederasty out of misogyny, and so is likely to find the death of a beloved boy exceptionally tragic.[23]) The dual memorialization of Hyacinthus, flower and festival, adds to this characterization, and here, unlike in the two previous cases, Apollo has made a kind of reparation for his deed; indeed, this may account

18) The verbal parallels with the Coronis passage suggest that the two may usefully be read together: *(re)fovet, conlapsus (artus)*; see Miller 1998, *passim*. Here too, as in the story of Phaethon, Galinsky sees the story as full of "pathos" (1975, 161) and as "told movingly and without witticisms" (186).

19) Miller notes the poignancy of Apollo's powerlessness given his divinity, emphasized in the Coronis passage as well (1998, 415).

20) D.E. Hill (1985) suggests *ad loc.* that the line is intertextual with Verg. *A.* 4.458 (*funeris heu tibi causa fui?*).

21) Miller calls the lines "frenetic" in their attempt to locate blame (1998, 419). For further variations in the assignation of fault in an accidental sports accident, see Antiphon *Tetr.* 2, especially 3.2 (similar to the argument advanced by Apollo).

22) Some bracket 205-8 (e.g. Hill). Anderson supports them. The remainder of the story details the Spartan Hyacinthia, the three-day festival celebrated in Amyclae that seems to have been a combination of the Athenian Panathenaia and Adonia and which gave its name to a Spartan month (Hyacinthius). See Pettersson 1992, 9-41 and Bömer 1980, 67 on the Hyacinthia. Pettersson offers an allegorizing interpretation: the hyacinth is killed by the heat of the sun, which marks the beginning of summer (12).

23) Miller too notes the role of Orpheus in the shaping of the narrative (1998, 416-7).

for the absence of *paenitentia* in this passage, since he has actually done something to atone for his mistake. Yet these memorializing devices are, in a sense, impersonal and serve to separate Apollo even further from the mortal whose death he has caused.[24]) His divinity seems somehow to prevent Apollo from manifesting full repentance in the way that human beings do; none of these events mean very much to him in the end. And of course, there is something very un-divine about a chronically repentant—or even merely mournful—god.

In the three examples just described, Apollo's stance is briefly detailed, and, even though his emotions are apparently genuine, they have no effect on his future actions (as far as the poem allows us to know). I want now to contrast his *paenitentia* in Book 2 and sorrow in Book 10 with the tale of Cyparissus and his deer (the full story is told at 10.106-42):[25])

hunc puer inprudens iaculo Cyparissus acuto
fixit et, ut saevo morientem vulnere vidit,
velle mori statuit. quae non solacia Phoebus
dixit! ut hunc leviter pro materiaque doleret,
admonuit! gemit ille tamen munusque supremum
hoc petit a superis, ut tempore lugeat omni.
iamque per inmensos egesto sanguine fletus
in viridem verti coeperunt membra colorem
et, modo qui nivea pendebant fronte capilli,
horrida caesaries fieri sumptoque rigore
sidereum gracili spectare cacumine caelum.
ingemuit tristisque deus "lugebere nobis,
lugebisque alios aderisque dolentibus" inquit. (*Met.* 10.130-42)

'The boy Cyparissus recklessly pierced his stag with his sharp javelin, and, when he saw the stag dying from its fierce wound, he determined to die as well. Phoebus spoke words that did not console the boy, urging him to grieve lightly and in proportion to the situation. But the boy moaned still more; he begged the gods for this greatest gift: to let him mourn forever. And then, as his blood drained away with ceaseless tears, his limbs began to be turned to green hue, and the hair that used to hang upon his snowy brow became a bristly crown, and he began to look at the starry sky from his graceful peak. The sad god groaned and said, "You will be lamented by me, and you yourself will lament others, and you will be present when there are mourners."'

24) A brief comparison with Daphne in Book 1 adumbrates the difference: Apollo's association with the hyacinth is not as close as his association with the laurel (see, e.g., 2.600; he wears the spoils of Daphne as he punishes Coronis).

25) This story is told in Lactantius *Narr.* 10.3-4, Serv. on *A.* 3.680, and appears on Pompeian wall-paintings (Bömer 1969, 53). Like Hyacinthus (Bömer 1969, 76 *ad* 10.176), Cyparissus is sometimes connected with Zephyros and Boreas.

It is not at all clear that Cyparissus here expresses repentance as opposed to merely grief, but as this scene as a whole is a doublet of the Hyacinthus story and offers a closer parallel to the Apollo-scenes than the human manifestations of *paenitentia* in the *Metamorphoses*, let us see how Cyparissus' emotion compares. We are told of Cyparissus' metamorphosis into the cypress tree and then given the explanation: he once had a deer, remarkably tame (and clearly intertextual with Silvia's deer in *Aeneid* 7.475 ff.). Cyparissus, who was (like Apollo above) *imprudens*, accidentally hit his beloved stag with a javelin.[26]) He was inconsolable (and his grief is of course parodic of Silvia's and of Orpheus' earlier in Book 10 of the *Metamorphoses*) and begged the gods to be able to mourn for all time; indeed, the tree into which he is turned is the essence of mourning for the Romans.[27]) This passage, as with Hyacinthus above, does not use the word *paenitentia*, but Cyparissus' grief is sincere and shows him willing to assume the burden of a responsibility that may not truly be his; the fact that the two cases of accidental death are so similar points up the contrast in divine and human reactions.

Given that Apollo is not actually described as responsible for the boy's desired metamorphosis, we might wonder why he is present for this scene.[28]) Partly of course because it serves as yet another example of how the Apollo of the *Metamorphoses* has terrible luck in love.[29]) More importantly because, as this story is told less than twenty lines in the poem *before* Apollo's fatal wounding of Hyacinthus,

26) There is surely a kind of humor in the contrast between Apollo killing Hyacinthus and Cyparissus killing a deer; Apollo himself suggests that Cyparissus is silly to find a deer worth dying for. Miller suggests that Ovid "plays for laughs" in this episode (1998, 416).

27) Apollo does not seem to be especially associated with cypresses, but there is a grove of Apollo Kyparissios on Cos (Forbes-Irving 1990, 261).

28) Miller draws attention to Apollo's "impotence" to effect his will by contrast with the immediate granting of Cyparissus' request to grieve forever (1998, 416).

29) See Fredricks 1977, *passim*, on Apollo's imprudence and misfortune in object choice.

we might reasonably expect Apollo to learn something from Cyparissus' devotion, overdone and even absurd as it may be.[30])

Yet Apollo does not learn, because he cannot. Whereas Cyparissus' grief prompts him to beg for a permanent alteration in his state, Apollo's feelings are brief and inconsequential, even in Book 2, where he is described as feeling *paenitentia*. This is nowhere more in evidence than when Apollo attempts to convince Cyparissus to stop grieving (10.132-4); the boy feels his grief in a way that the god cannot fathom, and the god's injunction to grieve *leviter pro materia* displays his insensitivity and goes a long way toward explaining his own mourning practices.

Apollo's behavior elsewhere in the *Metamorphoses* is much of a piece with his behavior in the scenes just examined.[31]) To take a single example, the mortal Niobe has refused to worship Leto (mother of only two) because she herself has a dozen children (6.146-312). Leto summons her children to punish Niobe for over-boastfulness; Apollo's response to his mother's recital of woe is the characteristically hasty, "*desine!* [. . .] *poenae mora longa querella est!*" ('Enough! Lengthy complaint is but a delay of punishment!', 6.215). Apollo and Diana then kill Niobe's children one by one. As Apollo prepares to kill the last of Niobe's sons, the boy prays for mercy and *motus erat, cum iam revocabile telum / non fuit, arcitenens; minimo tamen occidit ille / vulnere, non alte percusso corde sagitta* ('the archer was moved, but his shaft was already too late to call back; nevertheless the boy

30) See Miller 1998, 419 and 420 for further points of verbal comparison between the two stories.

31) I will not treat each of the mentions of Apollo in the *Metamorphoses*, but here follows a list of his most memorable actions (excepting those already discussed): 1.452-567 Apollo chases Daphne and she is turned into a tree, which he appropriates (here he is hasty but not the direct cause of the end of Daphne's life). In 4.190-255 Apollo (as Helios) loves and so causes the death of Leucothoe (her father buries her alive; he tries to rescue her but is too late). Closely related to this is the story of Clytie, who, in jealousy of Leucothoe, spreads the story of her affair with the sun; as punishment the sun refuses to have anything further to do with her (4.256-70; here his rage is remarkably restrained). At 6.382-400, Apollo defeats the satyr Marsyas in a contest of the lyre and then flays his unsuccessful competitor. In 11.157-79, Apollo wins a second lyre contest with Pan, and punishes Midas for being a poor judge by giving him the ears of an ass. Nagle offers a characterization of Apollo in the *Metamorphoses* as impetuous and inept, with an "almost uninterrupted series of failures and frustrations" and suggests that his "lack of control and powerlessness" relates him to the goddesses of the poem (1984, 253).

died of a lesser wound, and the arrow did not strike his heart deeply', 6.264-6). Here as often in the poem, Apollo would like to undo his impulsive action but cannot, and the death of Niobe's final son is not much mitigated by being a more gentle deadly wound than the rest.[32])

Nagle (1984, 237) sees a pattern running through many of the metamorphoses of the poem, in which the *amor* of gods is a frequent cause of destruction for mortal women, both through inadvertency (as with Daphne) and through the consequent *ira* of a jealous goddess (e.g., most often, Juno). This gender distinction inheres in the gods' ability to overcome slights to their divinity, while goddesses cannot (*ibid.*, 241). Yet Apollo is uncharacteristic in that he acts out of both *amor* and *ira* and 'takes personally' an erotic rejection (viz. Coronis in book 2 with Nagle 1984, 252, who reads Apollo's remorse there as redemptive). The goddesses of the *Metamorphoses* are indeed more vindictive and vicious than Apollo, but this is of little comfort to the victims of his bumbling anger.

Evidence from the contemporary world suggests that, for criminal offenders, genuine remorse and repentance are very serious and frequently life-altering emotions (Harding 1999, 107-15). Without being too anachronistic about what remorse 'should' entail, it is nonetheless clear that we may find something to be desired in Apollo's behavior in the *Metamorphoses*. Like human beings, Apollo is unable to undo his actions: he tries and fails to save both Coronis and Hyacinthus. Yet, in both cases, he quickly finds someone else to blame. Cyparissus, even though the death he causes is equally accidental, accepts full responsibility for his actions. He cannot fix what he has done and is inconsolable; I would suggest that he thereby shows himself to be more fully a moral agent than Apollo. He chooses not to live as a way of making reparation for his offense. The case of Phaethon is even more distressing by contrast, for, other than asking the boy to free him from his promise, Apollo does nothing to prevent the tragedy; critics see even his mourning as self-absorbed.[33])

32) See Anderson *ad loc.*, who wonders why, if Apollo could alleviate the force of his arrow, he could not halt it altogether (1972, 188).

33) See, by contrast, Jupiter's (admittedly useless) attempts to mitigate the effects of the oath he has sworn to Semele, detailed at 3.289-309. The reader's sympathy for Jupiter is all-but assured by his efforts.

I suggest that Ovid's view of divine *paenitentia* opens up a possibility in addition to the one I proposed above: that *paenitentia* can be seen as a uniquely human emotion *not* in its implication of fallibility or incapacity (as I suggested) but in its inclusion of an ethical dimension. Apollo's *paenitentia* does not seem to bring with it a true recognition of responsibility; for him, no consequences ever result from his actions except sorrow over a lost loved one that, as the short space between Cyparissus and his replacement Hyacinthus teaches us, lasts barely twenty lines. With Phaethon, his son, his feelings lead him to no productive action, and with Coronis they cause further damage. The results of even this limited kind of divine *paenitentia* are far from unambiguously beneficial: a day-long eclipse and whipped horses, a change of color for the raven, and, if we can understand Apollo as feeling *paenitentia* about Hyacinthus, a new flower and festival, are surely not the best Apollo could do. In the case of Hyacinthus, Apollo's feelings are the cause of a metamorphosis that is of no benefit to the dead boy and which costs Apollo nothing; the irony is all the more bitter if Ovid was aware of the versions of the story in which Hyacinthus was given immortality.[34]) Thus, contrary to expectation, which might seek for (divine) *paenitentia* a recuperative force or a source of benefit for human beings, it is in the *Metamorphoses* rather another method—like their lust and anger—by which the gods show their moral inferiority to humans.[35])

The use of *paenitentia* and the depiction of divine repentance-like scenarios in the *Metamorphoses*, then, are in accord with what we would otherwise expect from Ovid. Several have seen the epic as a "questioning of divine morality" (Otis 1970, 132-3), and indeed it is difficult to avoid judging these anthropomorphized gods by human standards, particularly since they are at the start of the poem a *comparandum* for Augustus and the senators (Feeney 1991, 202, 199). Some think this "divine deflation" (Otis 1970, 108, 351) is designedly anti-Augustan, and others are not so sure.[36])

34) This version of the story is clearly analogous to that of Ganymede. Cf. Pettersson 1992, 34-5 with Paus. 3.19 and Nonn. *D.* 19.104-5.

35) Fredricks sees the "constant failure" of Apollo as reflective of his roots in the Olympian power structure, especially in contrast to Mercury's (Ovidian) willingness to try other options (1977, 248).

36) Otis 1970, 145, Segal 1969, 93-4. Galinsky (1975) feels that this conclusion goes beyond the evidence.

Ovid's treatment of Apollo's morality in the *Metamorphoses* may, however, take us beyond confirmation of a general conception about the gods as inferior to their human counterparts, toward an understanding of his poetics and perhaps even his politics. The *Metamorphoses*' concentration of rashness and *paenitentia*, however feeble by modern standards, in one god, Apollo, may be designed to reflect on Augustus, the self-appointed earthly representative of that god.[37]) This, of course, can be no more than an idea, as we lack any detailed evidence on this point. But it is suggestive that, like Apollo, Augustus has a great deal of power, and can harm those with whom he is angry (for instance, Ovid, in the year 8 CE). This may well render him quasi-divine, but Ovid may also hint that in his refusal to act as a morally responsible agent or to face the consequences of his actions in a constructive way, Augustus, like his patron Apollo, is less than human.[38])

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37) Cf. Suet. *Aug.* 70, where Octavian dresses up as Apollo and the location of his home on the Palatine, connected to the temple of Apollo (Suet. *Aug.* 29.1). Zanker (1988, 49-53, with bibliographic note at 347) discusses Augustus' association with Apollo (and his victory near the Apolline temple at Actium). See too Feeney 1991, 216-7 on *Met.* 15.864-5 and the poem's earlier connections between Apollo and Augustus.

38) Critical interest in Ovid's statement that the Metamorphoses were unfinished at the time of his exile (*Tr.* 1.7.13-4, 27-30; 2.63, 555; 3.14.21-2) may be assisted by my suggestion; the thoughtless punisher of Coronis in Book 2 is not so far off from the carelessly angry emperor of *Tristia* 1.

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DER SPRECHERWECHSEL ZWISCHEN APULEIUS UND LUCIUS IM PROLOG DER *METAMORPHOSEN*

VON

FRIEDEMANN DREWS

ABSTRACT

The prologue of Apuleius' *Metamorphoses* has been considered to be an unsolvable conundrum, especially as regards the identity of *the* speaker, supposed to be interrupted by the question: *Quis ille?* First, the article follows the outlines of some famous interpretations and explores their pros and cons. As several problems arise out of them, it is, second, suggested as a solution that a turn-taking takes place between two prologue speakers in *Met.* 1.1.3 already: I like to conceive of *quis ille?* as the end of the first prologue-speaker's (Apuleius') speech and of *paucis accipe* as the beginning of the second speaker's, i.e. Lucius' narrative. Consequently it will be argued that the structure of the whole novel consists of two frames, formed by the four chiastic metamorphoses of Apuleius into Lucius, Lucius into the ass and back again into Lucius, who finally becomes Apuleius in *Met.* 11.27 (*Madaurensem*). If Apuleius (as concrete and fictional author) is the speaker of the first words (including *sermone isto Milesio*), this interpretation furthermore allows to take the famous *propter Milesiae conditorem* in Book 4 as a hint pointing to Apuleius himself.

Die Frage nach der Identität des Prologsprechers der *Met.* ist in der Apuleiusforschung häufig diskutiert worden. In dem 2001 erschienenen *Companion to the Prologue of Apuleius'* Metamorphoses liest man am Ende der *Introduction* von Kahane und Laird:

> Controversies about literary issues are hardly ever resolved. The problem of the Prologue speaker's identity is a perfect example. Scholars have been debating it for years. However, at the end of our colloquium we were able, permanently and decisively, to settle the matter: The following motion was put to a vote: 'This House believes that the speaker of the Prologue is Lucius'. The motion was carried, twelve votes 'for', four 'against'. There were nine abstentions. (Kahane and Laird 2001, 5)