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A STROLL WITH LUCILIUS: HORACE, *SATIRES* 1.9 RECONSIDERED

JENNIFER L. FERRISS-HILL



Abstract. This article argues that the “bore” who pursues Horace in *Satires* 1.9 should be read as Lucilius, the inventor of Roman verse Satire. This reconsideration of the interlocutor allows certain previously puzzling aspects of the poem, in particular Horace’s failure to escape from his companion, to be understood in programmatic terms. The poem literally enacts the complex and timeless dance between successor and model: as long as he is writing satire, Horace cannot be free of Lucilius’ presence, and yet to succeed as a satirist he must struggle for a certain measure of independence from his predecessor.

SATIRES 1.9 PROVOKES IN THE READER A SERIES OF QUESTIONS: Who is the irksome figure who attaches himself uninvited to Horace as he strolls through the Forum? Why can Horace not extricate himself from his unwelcome companion’s clutches? On what charge has the interlocutor been summoned to appear in court? What is the import of the closing line, *sic me servavit Apollo*? These problems and others can, I believe, be resolved by answering only the first question: who is the interlocutor? Many scholars have engaged with this problem, and their approaches have traditionally been twofold: the interlocutor is presumed to be either a living contemporary or wholly imaginary.¹ Some have argued that this boor/bore² is a contemporary fellow-poet, with Propertius and Fannius being the favored candidates,³ while more recently the preference has

¹Henderson 1993 and 1999 alone seems to move beyond this dichotomy, suggesting that the pest be taken as a manifestation of a younger, more flawed Horace. Cf. also Gowers 2003, 86.

²Mazurek 1997, 1, calls the interlocutor “boorish,” while the latter term, “bore,” is commonly applied to the interlocutor in the English tradition (cf., e.g., Wickham 1891, 91; Rolfe 1949, 220; Fraenkel 1957, 112; Palmer 1961, 219; Brown 1993, 175; Schlegel 2005, 117: “the poor fellow, whom English critics are pleased to call the Bore”).

³According to Palmer 1961, 219–20, Vulpius (*non vidi*) was the first to identify him as Propertius, and Bothe (*non vidi*) to suggest that he might be Fannius. Wickham 1891, 91, Lejay and Plessis 1911, 232, Palmer, and Rudd 1961, 79–80, all object to the former suggestion on chronological grounds, while Orelli 1844, 148, simply finds it improbable that the

been to assert that he is no one at all, “not an individual, but a type.”⁴ In my view, however, the interlocutor is neither a living contemporary nor wholly imaginary: he should, I argue, be read as Lucilius, Horace’s model for the genre of Roman Satire. The poem is thus not simply a satirical vignette (whether real or imagined) in which the poet encounters a troublesome acquaintance bent on pestering him for an introduction to Maecenas, but rather a physical instantiation of the tensions that necessarily exist between a poet and his generic predecessor. *Satires* 1.9 rightfully belongs among such programmatic poems as 1.4, 1.10, and 2.1, all of which engage with Horace’s struggle to be both distinct from Lucilius, and yet recognizably satirical.

Lucilius is *prima facie* vital to *Satires* 1.9. Prominent Lucilian echoes frame the poem: the closing line, *sic me servavit Apollo* (“thus Apollo saved me,” 78), recalls Lucilius fragment 238, τὸν δ’ ἐξήραζεν Απόλλων (“Apollo carried him off”), while Horace’s opening words, *Ibam forte via Sacra* (“I happened to be going along the Sacred Way”), borrow from fragment 1159, *ibat forte domum* (“he happened to be going home”).⁵ Indeed, as Iltgen was the first to argue, Horace seems to have modeled his poem on a satire in Lucilius’ sixth book.⁶ According to Fiske’s

interlocutor might be Propertius since Horace does not name him anywhere (though he is alluded to at *Epist.* 2.2.91–101), nor does Propertius ever mention Horace in his poetry.

⁴Rolfe 1949, 200, who also brands him “a social climber.” Similar are the opinions of Lejay and Plessis 1911, 232, Fraenkel 1957, 113 (“there is no hint at any particular person”), and Kiessling and Heinze 1961, 144 (“Horaz zeichnet offenbar nicht ein Individuum, sondern ein Typus”), while Morris 1968, 121, vacillates (“it is not at all likely that Horace had in mind a definite individual”; but, contradictorily, the man may be “a mere acquaintance”). Brown 1993, 175, stating (albeit incorrectly: see n. 13) that “he is given no individual distinguishing features,” similarly brands him an “immediately recognisable, universal type,” concluding that “his identity is thus irrelevant to the appreciation of the poem” (a statement that seems to allow that he may in fact, in Brown’s view, have a specific identity). Finally, Schlegel 2005, 119, makes much of the anonymity of this figure: it is “as if the poem were saying ‘he is no one.’” Wickham 1891, 91 (“Horace is probably dramatizing an imaginary situation, or at least improving some slighter incident; but attempts have been made to guess the particular person intended”), and Rolfe 1949, 221 (“Horace does not name him and the whole incident is probably fictitious”), both emphasize the fictionality of the poem’s narrative, but the fact that the incident may be fictitious surely does not negate the possibility that an intended person may lurk behind this interlocutor.

⁵Fr. 1155–59, in which the *sektor* is named and the abuse heaped upon him detailed, is included by Krenkel 1970 among the *dubia*, but Fiske 1920 would, I think rightly, assign it to Book 6. Note that I employ Krenkel’s numbering of the fragments throughout, rather than that of Marx, as used by Fiske. All translations are my own.

⁶Iltgen 1872. It is not clear which poem in Lucil. Book 6 might have been Horace’s model: Krenkel 1970, 68–69, analyses the book as consisting of four poems, but the frag-

reconstruction, Lucilius' poem depicted a *sectator* ("follower"), who "sought to enroll himself among the followers of Scipio at a time when Lucilius and the other members of his suite were escorting him home."⁷ This unwelcome companion is abused by Scipio, who sarcastically calls him *deliciae* ("darling") and *lux efficta* ("image of the sun"), as well as the more obviously insulting epithet *cinaedus* ("catamite"). The points of contact between the two texts that Fiske adduces as evidence for the connection between them include: the instruction to the follower that he need not accompany the speaker any longer as the latter intends to visit someone not known to the former (fr. 264, *non te porro procedere porcent*, "they do not prevent you from proceeding any further," and fr. 229, *salvere iubere salutem est mittere amico*, "'to order to be well' is 'to give greetings to a friend,'" with *Sat.* 1.9.16–17); the follower's declaration that obstacles only inflame his desire to become close to the great man to whom he seeks an introduction (fr. 230, *hortare, illorum si possim pacis potiri*, "you encourage me to see if I can attain the goodwill of those men," and *Sat.* 1.9.53–54); the fact that the day on which the events described occur is a holiday (in Lucilius, the "slaves' holiday,"⁸ fr. 234–35, and in Horace the mysterious thirtieth Sabbath,⁹ *Sat.* 1.9.69); and finally, the reference to Apollo apparently saving the day. Fiske's argument is somewhat vitiated by its overuse of *Satires* 1.9 as a template onto which the existing fragments of Lucilius' poem must be fitted,¹⁰ but nevertheless, even if the more fanciful aspects of his reconstruction are discounted, the textual links between Horace *Satires* 1.9 and a poem in Lucilius' sixth book remain persuasive.

In addition to this likely modeling by Horace of his poem on one by his predecessor, the interlocutor of *Satires* 1.9 also displays certain

ments adduced by Fiske 1920 as evidence of a connection between Horace and Lucilius span the entirety of the book. Parallels for *Sat.* 1.9 and its model in Lucil. Book 6 have also been seen in Theophrastus (*Char.* 3 and 7; cf. Orelli 1844, 148; Lejay and Plessis 1911, 230–31; Fiske 1920; Rudd 1961, 79).

⁷Fiske 1920, 331.

⁸*Servorum festus dies* seems to denote August 13, rather than, e.g., the Saturnalia (cf. Krenkel 1970, 193).

⁹This reference remains opaque and a number of solutions have been proposed but, due to the numerological gymnastics involved in each, none is wholly convincing (cf. Feldman 1989–90 and 1993, 509–10, for the clearest summaries of each argument, and his own proposed solution, namely, that it is a new moon festival).

¹⁰Anderson 1956, 148, finds it an "imaginative reconstruction," while Rudd 1961, 90–96, attempts (unsuccessfully, in my view) to refute the existence of any connection between *Sat.* 1.9 and a work of Lucilius.

strikingly Lucilian traits, foremost among them verbosity.¹¹ Horace had earlier described Lucilius as “chatty” (*garrulus*), likening his verses to a muddy river, overflowing with lexical detritus (*Sat.* 1.4.8–13):

durus componere versus.
nam fuit hoc vitiosus: in hora saepe ducentos,
ut magnum, versus dictabat stans pede in uno.
cum flueret lutulentus, erat quod tollere velles,
garrulus atque piger scribendi ferre laborem,
scribendi recte.

He lacked refinement in composing verses. For in this he was full of vice: in one hour he would often dictate two hundred, standing on one leg, as if this were a great feat. Since he flowed muddily, there was much that you would have wanted to remove. He was chatty and too lazy to bear the task of writing—of writing properly, that is.

The reappearance of the adjective *garrulus* from line 12 above and its complementary verb, *garriret*,¹² twice in close succession in *Satires* 1.9 (lines 33 and 13, respectively) lends the poem a persistent echo of Lucilius.¹³ The interlocutor of *Satires* 1.9 holds forth on his prolific poetic production, presenting it as a great accomplishment, just as Horace, with the phrase *ut magnum* (1.4.10), scathingly accuses Lucilius of doing (1.9.22–24):

¹¹ Schlegel 2005, 108–26, presents a thorough discussion of the interlocutor’s Lucilian attributes. Welch 2001, 175, also notes the similarity between *Sat.* 1.9.22–25 and 1.4.9–13.

¹² Just as the programmatic term *garrulus/garrire* connects *Sat.* 1.4 to 1.9, the former poem is also connected by another such term in the lines quoted above, *lutulentus*, to *Sat.* 1.10: *cum flueret lutulentus, erat quod tollere velles* (1.4.11) anticipates *at dixi fluere hunc lutulentum, saepe ferentem / plura quidem tollenda relinquendis* (“and I did say that he [Lucilius] flows along muddily, often carrying many more things that should be removed rather than left behind,” 1.10.50–51). These lines themselves reiterate the theme of the opening words of the poem (1.10.1–2): *nempe incomposito dixi pede currere versus / Lucili* (“yes, I did say that the verses of Lucilius run with a sloppy foot”). On the scatological undertones of *lutulentus* and *stans pede in uno* (1.4.10), cf. Hunink and van den Broek 2010.

¹³ Although other figures in Horace—Hermogenes Tigellius (*Sat.* 1.3.1–8), Crispinus (1.1.120, 1.4.14–16; Kiessling and Heinze 1961, 147, suggest that the interlocutor’s boast at *Sat.* 1.9.23–24 recalls Crispinus), and Fabius (1.1.13–14)—also display the vice of excessive talkativeness, the term *garrulus* is never used to describe them, and thus seems reserved for Lucilius alone (though it is used once of an anonymous type, 2.5.90). The verb *garrire*, which seems less personal and pointed than *garrulus*, is used of Fundanius’ literary style in his comedies (1.10.41), and of Cervius as he relates old wives’ tales (2.6.77–78). It is compelling, therefore, to connect the *garrulus* of *Sat.* 1.9 with the only named figure that is elsewhere described by this marked term: Lucilius.

si bene me novi, non Viscum pluris amicum,
non Varium facies. nam quis me scribere pluris
aut citius possit versus?

If I know myself at all, you won't consider Viscus or Varius a better friend.
For who can write more verses than me, or more quickly?

Thus the interlocutor's verbosity—and his misplaced pride in it—brings Lucilius to mind as we read *Satires* 1.9. Schlegel says that the interlocutor is “Lucilius’ stylistic echo” and that Horace’s predecessor “haunts this poem,”¹⁴ but she stops short of actually identifying this figure as Lucilius, as I propose be done. With the markedly Lucilian quality of the interlocutor established, I now set forth my reconsideration of *Satires* 1.9.

The poem opens with Horace walking along the Via Sacra, in what is said to be a habitual activity:¹⁵ *Ibam forte via Sacra, sicut meus est mos, / nescio quid meditans nugarum, totus in illis* (“I happened to be going along the Sacred Way, as is my custom, thinking over some poetic trifles, totally absorbed in them,” 1.9.1–2). Horace is thus already in a satiric frame of mind as the poem opens, for the *nugae* which he ponders as he walks are not just any thoughts, but rather, as they have been since Catullus,¹⁶ poetic compositions, and specifically, in the Horatian context, satiric ones.¹⁷ In

¹⁴Schlegel 2005, 125, and 110, respectively. Likewise employing phantasmal imagery (albeit in another context), Hooley 2007, 69, says that Horace “raises the ghost of Lucilius.”

¹⁵It is grammatically unclear whether *sicut meus est mos* describes *Ibam forte via Sacra* or *nescio quid meditans nugarum*. Most editors (Orelli 1844, 149; Wickham 1891, 91; Rolfe 1949, 221) prefer the latter (though Brown 1993, 176, says that “*sicut meus est mos* qualifies *meditans* as much as *ibam*”), but like Morris 1968, 121 (“with *ibam*, not with *meditans*”), I take Horace’s customary activity to be the stroll along the Sacred Way. Wickham objects that such a reading contradicts *forte*, but I understand *forte* as anticipating the arrival of the interlocutor in line 3.

¹⁶Catullus 1.4, in the dedication of the *libellus* to Cornelius: *namque tu solebas / meas esse aliquid putare nugas* (“for you were accustomed to think my *nugae* something”). Orelli 1844, 149, Rolfe 1949, 221, Palmer 1961, 220, Morris 1968, 121, Brown 1993, 176, and Schlegel 2005, 110, all make the connection between Cat. 1.4 and *Sat.* 1.9.2, and take *nugae* to mean “poetry.” Porphyrio likewise declares, *sic verecunde poetae nugas et risus solent adpellare versiculos suos*. Welch 2001, 179, n. 50, also notes the poetic undertones of *meditari*, citing Virg. *Ecl.* 1.2.

¹⁷Pseudo-Acro saw this meaning in *nugae*, explaining, *satis verecunde versus (suos?) more Satiricorum nugas dixit, quia Satirici solent etiam sese carpere*. Schlegel 2005, 100, concurs: “Alongside the Catullan sound of *nugae*, and Horace’s own use of the word referring to poetic triflings (*Epp.* 1.19.42), *nugae* also connote the satiric realm.” Cf. also *Sat.* 2.1.73, in which the verb *nugari* is used of the style of conversation between Scipio, Laelius and Lucilius, where the presence of Lucilius may suggest that the chatting of these men is not

this way these opening lines intimate that the ensuing poem—the very *nugae* being thought into existence—might well be read programmatically. What could be more natural than that, as Horace saunters through the Forum composing satiric nuggets in his head, he should be joined by Lucilius, the *inventor* (1.10.48) of Roman verse Satire?

At this moment the interlocutor approaches Horace: *accurrit quidam notus mihi nomine tantum* (“a certain man, known to me only by name, ran up,” 1.9.3). Two crucial details of this description have, I believe, been persistently misread. First, given that the interlocutor is said specifically to be *quidam*, “a certain man,”¹⁸ and that he is explicitly said to have a name that is known to Horace (*nomine* seems to invite the reader to supply one), it seems perverse (though apparently fashionable) to insist that he is no one in particular, only a type. Second, Horace’s portrayal of his interlocutor as *notus mihi nomine tantum* has been taken to mean that he knew the man only slightly.¹⁹ The Latin, however, pointedly says *nomine*, “by name,” and Horace deserves to be read carefully: when he says that he knows someone *nomine tantum*, we should understand that “by name alone” (though this term may encompass the broader concept of reputation) is meant (with no indication at all of how well Horace knew this man). Horace knew Lucilius’ name and was intimately acquainted with his persona for, as he tells us at *Satires* 2.1.30–34, Lucilius had poured out his whole life into his books; but he could not have recognized him by his appearance, since his predecessor had of course died over thirty years before Horace was born.²⁰ The phrase *notus mihi nomine tantum* thus describes Horace’s acquaintance with Lucilius perfectly. Although Horace does not recognize his companion’s face, he instantly knows who he is (as indicated by his immediate attempt to escape) and, in typical satirist’s fashion, teases his reader to unravel the mystery.

Gowers is right to call the phrase *notus mihi nomine tantum*, “the best joke of *Satires* 1.”²¹ That the identity of the interlocutor should be

only informal and playful, but also satirical; and *Sat.* 2.6.43, where the *nugae* that comprise Horace’s small talk with Maecenas perhaps indicate that the poet is sharing his work in progress with his patron.

¹⁸*Quidam* can, from the point of view of the speaker, denote both a definite and an indefinite individual (Gildersleeve and Lodge 1997, 198–99, section 313), and while the marked preference of previous commentators has been to understand it indefinitely, the context and the presence of the arresting term *nomine* serve to support the definite reading I propose.

¹⁹So Morris 1968, 121: “notus . . . tantum: *i.e.* a mere acquaintance.”

²⁰Lucilius was born around 180 B.C.E. and died 101/2, whereas Horace was not born until 65 B.C.E.

²¹Gowers 2003, 59.

a puzzle for the reader ought not to be surprising,²² and an apt parallel for the games Horace plays in *Satires* 1.9 can be found in Theocritus' seventh *Idyll*.²³ Bowie sets forth the following criteria as necessary for an identification of Lycidas in this poem as Theocritus' predecessor and model, Philetas:

- (1) A Hellenistic reader should be able to identify Lycidas.
- (2) Such an identification should be assisted by the proper name, ethnic and description offered by Theocritus at lines 12–19.
- (3) It should be intelligible that Simichidas not only recognises Lycidas without difficulty but knows details about him (such as name and ethnic) over and above what is immediately obvious from his appearance.
- (4) The identity of Lycidas should be compatible with those features of his meeting with Simichidas which suggest a divine epiphany.
- (5) The identity of Lycidas should be compatible also with the way he and Simichidas behave to each other in the rest of the poem, and in particular with the apparently significant gift of the staff.
- (6) The category of being into which Lycidas falls should be intelligible within the practice of ancient poetry.²⁴

Of particular relevance to the present discussion are points 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 (4 can be omitted, as Horace does not choose to figure the appearance of Lucilius as a divine epiphany). To answer each in turn: (1) I believe that a Roman reader would have been in a position to identify the interlocutor as Lucilius (2) on account of the marked terms (e.g., *garrulus*) with which Horace describes him; (3) nevertheless, the reader's identification of the interlocutor as Lucilius is not as instantaneous as that of Horace's character in the poem, who immediately recognizes his companion and behaves accordingly (that is, by trying to get away), so it is clear that the character of Horace possesses information that his reader does not (though we are gradually able to supplement the description given of the interlocutor in *Satires* 1.9 with information imported from descriptions of Lucilius elsewhere in the *Satires*); (5) Horace and his interlocutor behave towards one another throughout *Satires* 1.9 exactly as might be expected of the founder of a literary genre and his faux self-conscious successor; (6) and finally, encounters with poetic predecessors and dreams of divine inspiration are a commonplace in ancient literature: in addition to Theocritus' encounter with Philetas in *Satires* 1.9, Homer famously appears to Ennius in a dream, and poets frequently purport to have visited (in a

²² Cf., e.g., the veiled references to Propertius at *Epist.* 2.2.91–101 and to Maecenas at *Sat.* 1.10.76.

²³ I am grateful to the anonymous reader at *AJP* for alerting me to this comparandum.

²⁴ Bowie 1985, 69.

dream or otherwise) a location of literary significance.²⁵ Horace's decision to abandon the dream-motif and to give physical form to the tensions that exist between himself and his generic predecessor seems entirely in keeping with the conventions and predilections of Roman Satire.

The exchange that follows in *Satires* 1.9 supports this reading of the interlocutor as Lucilius, and begins to make apparent the characteristics of the relationship between successor and model that Horace strives to portray in this satire and throughout his *Satires* (1.9.4–8):

arreptaque manu “quid agis, dulcissime rerum?”
 “suaviter, ut nunc est” inquam, “et cupio omnia quae vis.”
 cum assectaretur, “numquid vis?” occupo. at ille
 “noris nos” inquit; “docti sumus.” hic ego “pluris
 hoc” inquam “mihi eris.”

Having grabbed my hand, he said “How are you, my dearest friend in the whole world?” “Fine, as things are now,” I replied, “and I wish for all the same things as you do.” Since he kept following me, I cut in first: “Was there anything else?” But he simply said, “You ought to know us, we're part of the literati.” To this I replied, “And for that you're all the dearer to me.”

The interlocutor's attempt to reintroduce himself at line 7 with *noris nos*²⁶ . . . *docti sumus*²⁷ suggests that he thinks Horace has failed to recognize him, but Horace's immediate attempt to get away from his irri-

²⁵E.g., Hes. *Theog.* 22–23, Callim. *Aet. fr.* 2, Virg. *Ecl.* 6.64–73, Prop. 3.3.1–2, Hor. *Carm.* 3.4.9–20; cf. also Pers. *prol.* 1–3.

²⁶The form *noris*, a syncopation of *noveris*, may be either future perfect indicative (“you will have learned us,” i.e., “you will know us”) or perfect subjunctive (far more likely). As the latter, it may be read as an exhortation, “may you know us” (cf. Rolfe 1949, 222, and Morris 1968, 122), a tentative introduction, “you may know us” (cf. Orelli 1844, 150, and Wickham 1891, 92), or, as I translate it (following Lejay and Plessis 1911, 234, “tu dois me connaître,” and Kiessling and Heinze 1961, 145, “du solltest doch unsereins kennen”), a statement of fact: “you ought to know us.” Although sometimes translated simply “you know us/me” (Henderson 1999, 209; Schlegel 2005, 112), the phrase does not naturally have this sense. Pseudo-Acro and Brown 1993, 176, take it rather differently, suggesting that the phrase is an abbreviated response to Horace's *numquid vis?*, and in its full form would have been preceded by, e.g., *volo ut*. However interpreted, it seems clear that the interlocutor erroneously believes that Horace has not yet recognized him.

²⁷In reintroducing himself, the interlocutor claims for himself the title of *doctus*, an epithet that has definite Lucilian resonances. Not only does Horace accord this title to those who are like Lucilius in their criticism of literary giants (*Sat.* 1.10.51–55), but both Horace (1.10.73–90) and Lucilius (fr. 591–94) express a common desire for their poetry to be enjoyed by *docti*. Rolfe 1949, 222, and Morris 1968, 122, see a negative sense in the term *doctus*, but such an interpretation is not borne out by the evidence: *doctus* is in both satirists clearly a term of approval (cf. Lejay 1911, 235).

tating companion constitutes a sure sign that he in fact has. The evident displeasure displayed by Horace at the appearance of the interlocutor is not at all surprising if the latter is understood to be Lucilius and the scene read in programmatic terms.

Throughout the preceding poems, as well as those to come, Horace evinces a deeply conflicted attitude towards his predecessor. He calls Lucilius “charming and urbane” (*comis et urbanus*, 1.10.65)—terms of high praise—and “more elegant than the author of a style of poetry that was crude and untouched by the Greeks might be expected to be, and more elegant than the crowd of older poets” (*limatior . . . / quam rudis et Graecis intacti carminis auctor / quamque poetarum seniorum turba*, 1.10.65–67), while also attacking his verbosity: “content with this alone, he was pleased that he had written two hundred verses before dinner, and as many again after dining” (*contentus amet scripsisse ducentos / ante cibum versus, totidem cenatus*, 1.10.60–61; *ducentos / . . . versus*, 1.4.9–10). At one moment, Horace brands Lucilius “muddy” (*lutulentus*, 1.4.11, 1.10.50–51; cf. also the echo of *limus*, “mud,” ironically present in *limatior*, “more elegant,” 1.10.65), railing against his unwillingness or inability to invest the time necessary to hone his works to perfection (1.4.9–13), but then sets to wondering whether this apparent fault in the man himself might not simply be an effect of the age in which he lived and wrote (1.10.67–71).²⁸

Overall, however, Horace’s attitude towards his model is one of reverence: he calls him “wise” (*sapiens*, 2.1.17) and “witty, with a refined palate” (*facetus, / emunctae naris*, 1.4.7–8), admires his “freedom of speech” (*libertas* 1.4.1–6; cf. also 2.1.62–65), and professes his own relative inferiority (*infra Lucili censum ingeniumque*, “[I am] inferior to Lucilius in social standing and talent,” 2.1.75; and *nostrum melioris utroque*, “better than either of us,”²⁹ 2.1.29). Unwilling to name the genre of satire outright, Horace develops various circumlocutions for it that often incorporate his predecessor’s name: *ego quae nunc, / olim quae scripsit Lucilius* (“[these things] which I now write, and Lucilius once wrote,” 1.4.56–57); *me pedibus delectat claudere verba / Lucili ritu* (“it delights me to close up words in feet in the manner of Lucilius,” 2.1.28–29); and *cum est Lucilius ausus / primus in hunc operis componere carmina morem* (“since Lucilius was the first to dare to write poems of this type,” 2.1.62–63).

²⁸The interlocutor of *Sat.* 1.9 reveals his capacity for hard work, and his potential to live up to Horace’s unforgiving prescriptions, when he declares *nil sine magno / vita labore dedit mortalibus* (1.9.59–60).

²⁹*Utroque* refers to Horace himself and Trebatius, his interlocutor in *Sat.* 2.1.

These periphrastic genre terms and Horace's fixation on Lucilius throughout his *Satires* reveal two facets of the former's relation to his model: as (in his own view) the second Roman satirist, Horace must necessarily both imitate the writings of Lucilius (to produce poetry that is recognizably of the same genre) and innovate, producing something distinctively his own. Indeed, Roman Satire makes an art of (and out of) this anxiety. Thus, as long as he is writing satire, despite any desire to the contrary, Horace cannot be rid of Lucilius. And so, when Lucilius appears in *Satires* 1.9 and proceeds to appoint himself Horace's walking companion for the day, the chilly reception he receives is to be expected. In this poem, as his debut collection draws to a close, Horace strives, through his urgency to escape from his interlocutor, allegorically to define *sermo*, the genre established by Lucilius, as his own.

Equally to be expected is the interlocutor's deliberate tormenting of Horace. He is certainly "a pushing fellow," exhibiting "offensive familiarity," and even "gushing overfamiliarity," but not, I believe, because he is vulgar and seeking to gain entry to Maecenas' circle.³⁰ His undeniable "want of tact" does not result from "obtuseness;"³¹ rather, it is a pose crafted to make Horace squirm, and squirm he does. Horace's desperation to escape is manifest: *misere discedere quaerens* (1.9.8), he varies his pace, sometimes stopping and whispering something to his slave, all the while sweating, presumably out of frustration and anxiety (*ire modo ocius, interdum consistere, in aurem / dicere nescio quid puero, cum sudor ad imos / manaret talos*, 1.9.9–11). Horace, mumbling to himself, proclaims a certain Bolanus³² "fortunate on account of his quick temper" (*cerebri /*

³⁰ Rolfe 1949, 221; Palmer 1961, 219; Brown 1993, 175–76.

³¹ Wickham 1891, 91.

³² Although Orelli 1844, 151, warns, *pro nomine ficto certe haberi non debet*, not even the scholiasts have attempted to guess the identity of this person. There may be in this name a reference to either Lucilius or Scipio (in which case Horace would be bemoaning the fact that he cannot recreate the abuse heaped by these figures upon their own *sectator* in the poem from Lucil. Book 6 that is his model for *Sat.* 1.9), but the allusion remains murky. Tantalizingly, Ogilvie 2003, 608–9 (commenting on Livy 4.49.3), notes that "at the end of the Republic a branch of the Vettii proclaimed by the *cognomen* Bolanus their origin from the town [sc. of Bola]. The earliest known Vettius, a *contemporary of Lucilius* (Quintilian 1.5.56), came from Praeneste which is not far away" (italics mine). Nevertheless, a firm connection between Horace's Bolanus and Lucilius cannot be established. Indeed, even the location of Bola is unknown (Ogilvie states that "it must have lain in the upper Sacco Valley, near Labici and Tolerium," and Orelli 1844, 151, that it is in the territory of the Aequi). Cicero speaks of one M. Bolanus at *Fam.* 13.77 and Tacitus at *Ann.* 15.3 of a Roman governor of Britain by this name, but there does not appear to be a connection with either. Reading Bolanus as a reference to Lucilius, or perhaps to another famed inventor

felicem, 1.9.11–12), while his own reticence forces him to put up with his interlocutor's incessant and inane prattling (*cum quidlibet ille / garriret*, 1.9.12–13).³³ The interlocutor, far from being oblivious to Horace's discomfort, explicitly reveals his awareness that Horace wishes to escape, and declares that he has no intention of allowing this to happen (1.9.14–16):

“misere cupis” inquit “abire,
iamdudum video, sed nil agis; usque tenebo.
persequar³⁴ hinc quo nunc iter est tibi.”

“You desperately wish to get away from me,” he said: “I’ve noticed this for some time now, but you don’t act, and so I will continue my hold on you. I will follow you to wherever you are headed.”

The interlocutor thus spends the entire poem trying to rankle Horace, not because he does not realize that such behavior is tiresome, but precisely because he does. Far more shrewd and complex a figure than has generally been realized,³⁵ his over-familiarity towards Horace is not a social gaffe, but rather deliberate sadism. This reading of *Satires* 1.9 inverts previous interpretations of the power dynamic between Horace and his interlocutor: what had been the polite attempts of a well-bred, diffident poet to be rid of a pushy boor/bore, become a disciple's reluctant, but unavoidable, submission to his elder, who is in turn determined to make certain that his successor does not, indeed cannot, forget that he is second in every sense.

As resigned as Horace is to the presence of his unwelcome companion, the interlocutor must be equally certain that Horace will not succeed in shaking him off, as he confidently declares, *usque tenebo. / persequar*

of a genre, would allow Horace to exclaim that poets who do not have to struggle to define themselves in relation to their model (both as distinctively belonging to the same genre and yet as sufficiently innovative to receive praise for their own merits) are most fortunate, in contrast to the situation in which he finds himself mired.

³³The substance of the interlocutor's monologue (*vicos, urbem laudaret*, 1.9.13) may also hint at his identity as Lucilius: not only was Lucilius, as Horace pointedly notes, *urbanus* (*Sat.* 1.10.65), but he could also reasonably be expected to show amazement at how the city has changed since his day.

³⁴Shackleton Bailey prints *prosequar* (“to escort, accompany”), the reading transmitted by the six manuscripts in the Ψ class and by Bentley, whereas all others give *persequar*. Although I elsewhere follow Shackleton Bailey's text, I find *persequar* (*OLD*: “to follow persistently; to follow with hostile intent”) the preferable reading here, as it contains a fitting implication of harassment, in addition to the idea of simply following or accompanying.

³⁵Henderson 1993 and 1999 has also observed this.

hinc quo nunc iter est tibi (1.9.15–16). The key terms, *usque* and *sequor*, reappear a few lines later when, in response to Horace's feeble attempt to escape by claiming that he must visit a sick friend (1.9.16–18), the interlocutor reiterates: *usque sequar te*. His confidence is matched by Horace's acquiescence: *demitto auriculas, ut iniquae mentis asellus, / cum gravius dorso subiit onus* ("I let my ears droop, like a grumpy ass, when an overly heavy burden has been placed on its back,"³⁶ 1.9.20–21). This moment of surrender prefigures another later in the poem: in response to the interlocutor's declaration that he would rather accompany Horace than respond to the lawsuit for which he is legally obliged to appear in court under penalty of forfeiture (1.9.43–44), Horace, defeated, concludes, *ego, ut contendere durum / cum victore, sequor* ("I, since it is difficult to argue with your better, follow him," 1.9.42–43). Whence the interlocutor's calm self-assurance and Horace's curious inaction (*nil agis*, 1.9.15) and eventual submission? I read these poses as an instantiation of the complex dance between the poet and his predecessor. In what Freudenburg has aptly termed Horace's "Lucilius problem,"³⁷ Horace cannot both write satire and rid himself of Lucilius—the situation literally embodied in *Satires* 1.9. Lucilius, the interlocutor, is certain that Horace will not (at least not just yet) abandon the genre of satire (*tenebo*), and Horace is resigned to the fact that as long as he is writing satire, he remains under the sway of Lucilius. In this way, throughout *Satires* 1.9, while overtly reluctant at being harassed, Horace is nevertheless complicit in his continued harassment—a predicament that seems paradoxical unless read programmatically.³⁸

There remain a number of aspects of the poem to be elucidated in light of this re-reading of the interlocutor. Following Horace's asinine submission (*demitto auriculas, ut iniquae mentis asellus*, 1.9.20), the inter-

³⁶Schlegel 2005, 112–23, sees poetic undertones in this image: in likening himself to an overburdened donkey, Horace seems to be foreshadowing the warning he is to give at *Sat.* 1.10.9–10 against tiring a listener's ears with excessively wordy—i.e., Lucilian—poetry.

³⁷Freudenburg 2001, 2, and *passim*.

³⁸I find previous explanations—e.g., Wickham 1891, 92; Morris 1968, 123; and Brown 1993, 177, which attribute to Horace's good breeding his reluctance to send away his companion—unconvincing. The emphasis that commentators such as Wickham and Morris place on this quality seems to retroject nineteenth- and twentieth-century Anglo-American mores onto first-century B.C.E. Rome, and indeed Horace has no trouble at all being direct, even rude, when the occasion requires it (cf., e.g., his critique of Hermogenes Tigellius in *Sat.* 1.3, or his portrayal of the witches at *Sat.* 1.8.23–26 and in *Epod.* 5, and of the women in *Epod.* 8 and 12). Furthermore, Aristius Fuscus does not appear to invite condemnation for his rudeness in managing to extricate himself from Horace's grasp.

locutor explicitly identifies himself as a fellow poet: *si bene me novi, non Viscum pluris amicum, / non Varium facies* (1.9.22–23). This declaration can be read in programmatic terms: Lucilius declares his confidence that Horace will continue to prefer satire (represented by himself, *si bene me novi*) over epic and tragedy (represented by Varius) and over the genres practiced by Viscus.³⁹ Horace responds with another desperate and ineffectual attempt to shake off his pursuer: *interpellandi locus hic erat: “est tibi mater, / cognati, quis te salvo est opus?”* (“this was the moment for me to interrupt: ‘don’t you have a mother, or relatives, who care whether you’re alive or dead?’” 1.9.26–27). The interlocutor’s response to this question seems peculiar: *haud mihi quisquam; / omnis composui* (“actually, I don’t have anyone: I’ve buried them all,” 1.9.27–28). He seems quite unconcerned at being alone in the world, and Horace’s reply, *felices! nunc ego resto* (“Happy are they! Now only I am left,” 1.9.28), although generally taken as a lament that he alone is left for the interlocutor to annoy,⁴⁰ in the context more naturally means, “only I [sc. of all your relatives] am now left.” Horace’s aside can therefore be read as an acknowledgement that he is Lucilius’ only living *cognatus*—a generic one. In addition, Horace’s initial question (1.9.26–27), while certainly alluding to the fact that, since Lucilius is long dead, he has no living parents or siblings, also underscores the latter’s status as the inventor of Roman Satire: as the first practitioner, Lucilius has no direct literary ancestors.⁴¹

The aspect of *Satires* 1.9 that receives perhaps the most reconsideration in light of this re-reading of the interlocutor is the introduction

³⁹This Viscus is unknown outside the several mentions of him in Horace (*Sat.* 1.10.83, where he is named, probably with his brother, in the form *uterque Viscorum*, and *Sat.* 2.8.20), and thus his generic affiliations are unfortunately unclear (not even the scholiasts venture to make any suggestions). The lines that follow, *quis [sc. possit] membra movere / mollius? invidet quod et Hermogenes ego canto* (“who could move their limbs more sensuously? Even Hermogenes would envy my singing,” 1.9.24–25) are, admittedly, problematic. They do not obviously serve to further characterize Lucilius’ literary style, but rather simply suggest that he is to be regarded with distaste as given to histrionics and effeminate behavior, rather like Hermogenes Tigellius, the much-maligned singer of *Sat.* 1.3.

⁴⁰So Porphyrio (*ait autem, se superesse, quem ille occidat per inportunam garrulitatem*) and Pseudo-Acro (*nunc ego resto. ut me occidas*), and all commentators since (Orelli 1844, 153; Rolfe 1949, 224; Palmer 1961, 223; Morris 1968, 125; Brown 1993, 178).

⁴¹That *mater* might mean “poetic ancestor” is plausible, as the word can be used metaphorically of a creator or source as at, e.g., Stat. *Theb.* 7.483–84, *impia belli / mater*, or Varro *Rust.* 2.5.5, *apes, mellis matres* (*TLL s.v. mater* 438.18–20 and 445.33–34, respectively; cf. also *OLD s.v. mater* 9). *Pater* might, however, have been the more natural term: it can be used to denote the first practitioner or inventor of an art or way of thinking (*TLL s.v. pater* 683.60–79; cf. also *OLD s.v. pater* 8)—for example, Epicurus (*tu, pater, es rerum*

to Maecenas that Horace's companion supposedly desires. Traditionally it has been assumed that the interlocutor, who at line 43 suddenly asks Horace, *Maecenas quomodo tecum?* ("what terms are you on with Maecenas?"), is angling for an invitation to the great man's home, and, ultimately, into his circle.⁴² In this exchange between Horace and his interlocutor (1.9.43–60), it has long been taken for granted that one or the other party must be speaking ironically, and this role of ironist has traditionally been assigned to Horace (particularly at lines 54–56). By simply inverting this dynamic, however, Lucilius, the interlocutor, becomes the dominant figure in the exchange, and Horace is relegated to the position of the self-conscious inferior—a reading consistent with how he portrays himself throughout the poem. Thus when Lucilius expresses an interest in Maecenas, far from desiring entry into Horace's circle of fellow poets and their patron, he is actually taunting Horace by reminding him that he, unlike Lucilius, requires a patron: the son of a freedman (*Sat.* 1.6.45–46) is made acutely aware of his position by a wealthy aristocrat.⁴³ This exchange serves, once again, to highlight Lucilius' position as *primus* (*Sat.* 2.1.63) in the genre of Roman Satire, and Horace's as *secundus*. As Pseudo-Acro notes (*Satirici solent etiam sese carpere*; see n. 17, above), the satirist typically displays an imperfect persona to his reader, and Horace does so on multiple occasions, notably in *Satires* 1.5, where we see him in all his squinty (1.5.30–31, 49), digestively troubled (1.5.49), sexually frustrated (1.5.82–85) glory. Commenting on *Satires* 1.9 specifically, Gowers speaks of the "undignified caricature of the speaker" all but necessitated by the genre, and Zetzler of Horace's (deliberately staged) bumbling incompetence and the "inability of his persona," which

inventor, Lucr. *DRN* 3.9; *pater veri doctus*, Petron. *Sat.* 132.15), Chrysippus (*Sat.* 1.3.126–27), Ennius (*Ennius ipse pater [sc. poetarum Romanorum]*, Hor. *Epist.* 1.19.7), Isocrates (*pater eloquentiae*, Cic. *De Or.* 2.10), Herodotus (*patrem historiae*, Cic. *Leg.* 1.5), or, in perhaps the most pertinent comparandum, the inventor of comedy, Eupolis (*Thespis tragoediae primus inventor et comoediae veteris pater Eupolis*, Euanth. *de com.* 1.5)—or the author of a book or poem (*TLL s.v. pater* 684.20–24: *quaerebam fratres, exceptis scilicet illis, / quos suus optaret non genuisse pater*, Ov. *Tr.* 3.1.65–66; *virginis pater chartae*, Mart. *Spect.* 1.66.7).

⁴²Henderson 1993, 75 ("it may or may not be a scandal that there is no warrant for this in the text"), and 1999, 212 ("there is no warrant in the text for the traditional assumption that Horace has all along been just the smart way to the Great Man, so that storming Horace is just the preliminary objective, and only now do we move on to the master-plan"), agrees.

⁴³Although Lucilius was, like Horace, an *eques*, his family belonged to the senatorial class (his brother may even have been a senator) and owned large estates. Associated with Laelius and Scipio, he nevertheless did not require a patron to support his poetic career, as Horace did.

is “cowardly and helpless.”⁴⁴ Horace’s self-portrayal as second in every way to Lucilius is entirely in keeping with the conventions of the genre. It should be remembered, however, that this is nothing but a pose: the satirist’s modesty is of a false kind, and, though he overtly insists on his own inferiority, Horace remains at his core unshakably confident of his own greatness and preeminence.

From the beginning of the exchange that begins at line 43, Horace adopts a defensive posture, his concern being to justify his situation. He describes Maecenas respectfully as “a man of exclusive company and a sound mind” (*paucorum hominum et mentis bene sanae*, 1.9.44),⁴⁵ and the interlocutor responds, “you would have an invaluable assistant, one who could play second fiddle, if you were willing to introduce yours truly” (*haberes / magnum adiutorem, posset qui ferre secundas, / hunc hominem velles si tradere*, 1.9.45–47). These are the first lines of the interlocutor that I propose to read ironically: Lucilius professes to desire an introduction to Maecenas, offering himself as a useful sidekick to Horace, but he can easily be understood to mean quite the opposite: as the *inventor* of Roman Satire, Lucilius is confident that it is Horace who would play second fiddle to him, were Maecenas presented with both at once. The interlocutor’s offer of himself as a *magnum adiutor* is nothing if not disingenuous, and Horace mutters irritated in reply, “god help me if you wouldn’t have pushed everyone [sc. including me] out of the way” (*dispeream ni / sum-mosses omnis*, 1.9.47–48),⁴⁶ for Horace, like Lucilius, suspects that it is

⁴⁴Gowers 2003, 85; Zetzel 1980, 77, 71, 66.

⁴⁵These lines are attributed by most editors (including Orelli 1844; Wickham 1891; Lejay and Plessis 1911; Rolfe 1949; Morris 1968; Brown 1993; and Shackleton Bailey 2001) to the interlocutor, but I (like Kiessling and Heinze 1961, 150) prefer to follow Porphyrio in assigning them to Horace (Palmer 1961, 225, is also convinced of the correctness of this solution: “that *paucorum hominum et mentis bene sanae* are the words of Horace I have not the slightest doubt”). This allows the interlocutor’s question, *Maecenas quomodo tecum?* to be met with an answer (as opposed to never being answered at all), and an appropriately defensive one at that. It is of less import who speaks line 45: *nemo dexterius fortuna est usus*, (“no one has made better use of his fortune”), and it could easily go to either Horace or his interlocutor (again, Palmer 1961, 225, agrees that either would “give equally good sense”). The words that follow, *haberes / magnum adiutorem, posset qui ferre secundas, / hunc hominem velles si tradere*, certainly belong to the interlocutor. Orelli 1844, 156–57, presents clearly the various permutations of how these lines may be assigned.

⁴⁶I seem to be alone in assigning the words *dispeream ni / sum-mosses omnis* to Horace. Rolfe 1949, 227, understands it as a comment from the bore that if Horace had previously made the introduction, the latter would already “be supreme in [Maecenas] favor.” Brown 1993, 180, similarly takes this as an offer from the bore “to help the poet to rise still further in his patron’s esteem.” But the logic of such interpretations is not

he who would end up playing second fiddle to Lucilius in Maecenas' circle, rather than the other way around, as Lucilius has teasingly (and rather unkindly) offered. Indeed, Horace would have his reader believe that, despite occasional acknowledgement of Lucilius' flaws (1.4.8–13, 1.10.1–5, 1.10.56–71)—though these pointedly leave unstated Horace's implied superiority—he remains fundamentally insecure about his position as the second (in all senses of the word) satirist. Indeed, what other satirical pose could he have adopted, given that the entire existence of the genre he practices is predicated on Lucilius having come before him to invent it? Horace continues defensively (1.9.48–52):

“non isto vivimus illic
quo tu rere modo. domus hac nec purior ulla est
nec magis his aliena malis. nil mi officit” inquam,
“ditior hic aut est quia doctior; est locus uni
cuique suus.”

“Things there are not as you imagine: no home is purer than his, nor less of a stranger to these evils; it matters to me not at all,” I say, “whether someone is wealthier or more learned; there is for each man his own place.”

Horace's claim that it does not matter to him, or to his patron, whether others in Maecenas' company are superior, either intellectually or financially, seems suspect: on what grounds would a patron evaluate the artists he supports if not skill? Furthermore, why should these two criteria (*ditior* . . . *doctior*) in particular be those that Horace professes not to care about? Lucilius fits well this description of someone who is both more learned and wealthier than Horace, and these two traits form the core of Horace's anxieties in relation to his predecessor. In *Satires* 1.6, Horace famously obsesses over his standing as the son of a freedman (*libertino patre natus*, 1.6.6, 45, 46) and, in language that closely mirrors his description of himself at *Satires* 1.9.51, he says at *Satires* 2.1.75 that he is *infra Lucili censum ingeniumque* (“below Lucilius' rank and talent”), where *censum* echoes *ditior* and *ingenium doctior*. Likewise, Horace explicitly states at *Satires* 2.1.75 that, despite his material disadvantages, he, too, has secured the favor of great men—a boast that reeks of insecurity. Horace's point at *Satires* 1.9.48–52 is not a general one about how fairly Maecenas treats people (*est locus uni / cuique suus*), but a specific one

compelling: why would Horace, with the interlocutor as his sidekick, be able to rise to the position of pre-eminence in Maecenas' esteem?

highlighting the distinction he claims exists—in terms of both wealth and talent—between himself and Lucilius. Horace’s hope expressed in lines 51–52 is that even if Maecenas were introduced to Lucilius, Horace would still be able to keep his own place there, but the claim rings hollow after lines 47–48, and Horace seems aware of this hollowness. The interlocutor’s response, *magnum narras, vix credibile* (“your story is amazing, scarcely believable,” 1.9.52) is traditionally read as revealing his genuine and increasing eagerness to meet Maecenas, whereas I would take it as yet another teasing dig at Horace’s second place, a place of which the latter is very much aware. Traditionally, Horace’s response, “you have only to want it; your virtue is such that you will break through to him; and he is the sort of man who can be won over, and for this reason he keeps introductions difficult to come by” (“*velis tantummodo, quae tua virtus, / expugnabis; et est qui vinci possit, eoque / difficilis aditus primos habet,*” 1.9.54–56), is read as sarcastic in tone: he is thought to be goading on the interlocutor’s hopes, while knowing full well that he will either never receive an introduction, or, if he does, inevitably fail to impress Maecenas. But one may take these words as an unironic admission from Horace that, if Maecenas had known Lucilius, he would, Horace fears, have recognized his *virtus* (Horace makes it clear elsewhere, e.g., *Sat.* 2.1.70, that this is an attribute valued by Lucilius), and Horace would have been relegated in his patron’s eyes to the second place that he pretends to worry he already occupies in the genre of Roman Satire.

The interlocutor draws the Maecenas-episode to a close by uttering what are to be his last words in the poem (*Sat.* 1.9.56–60):

haud mihi deero:

muneribus servos corrumpam; non, hodie si
exclusus fuero, desistam; tempora quaeram;
occurram in triviis; deducam. nil sine magno
vita labore dedit mortalibus.

I will not fail myself: I will corrupt his slaves with gifts; if I am not admitted today, I will not cease; I will seek out opportunities; I’ll accost him at the crossroads; I’ll join his retinue. For life never gave anything to mortals without hard work.

It is hard to see how these words could ever have been taken seriously, even as evidence of the interlocutor’s stupidity: the list of tactics outlined is nothing if not facetious in its excess and culminates in an impossibly hackneyed proverb. In addition, these final words of Lucilius, if indeed this proverb is an utterance of the oracle of the Branchidae (οὐδὲν ἄνευ καμάτου

πέλει ἀνδράσιν εὐπετὲς ἔργον), would seem designed to trump Horace's own native Italic prophecy embedded earlier in the poem (1.9.29–34).⁴⁷ Lucilius exits the poem on a taunting note, having even voiced the implication that Horace may have employed the *gauche* methods listed above to secure his own place in Maecenas' retinue.

Following this exchange, a new character unexpectedly arrives on the scene: *haec dum agit, ecce / Fuscus Aristius occurrit, mihi carus et illum / qui pulchre nosset* ("while he was saying these things, behold, Fuscus Aristius appeared, a man dear to me, and one who also knew him well," 1.9.60–62). The words here that have, in my opinion, received insufficiently close attention are *et illum qui pulchre nosset*. Commentators, concerned with pointing out that *pulchre* means *bene* ("well"), *vel sim.*,⁴⁸ perhaps even an ironic "only too well,"⁴⁹ have not shown any interest in what it might mean that Aristius Fuscus knows the interlocutor well: in fact, why should he know him at all, let alone well, given that Horace himself has described this man as known to him *nomine tantum*? Fuscus was, we know, a literary man: Horace dedicates *Odes* 1.22 and *Epistles* 1.10 to him, and counts him among the "select few" whose approval he professes to desire at *Satires* 1.10.83. It is not known whether he was a dramatic poet or a grammarian,⁵⁰ but a practitioner of either genre

⁴⁷ Kiessling and Heinze 1961, 153, note the connection with the oracle. I am grateful to the anonymous reader at *AJP* for pointing out the possibility that the interlocutor may with these words be trumping Horace.

⁴⁸ Orelli 1844, 160; Rolfe 1949, 228; Palmer 1961, 226; Morris 1968, 128. *Pulchre* seems, however, rather more effusive than simply *bene*, suggesting intimate knowledge (though to Lejay 1911, 245, it is informal).

⁴⁹ Wickham 1891, 96; Brown 1993, 181.

⁵⁰ Pseudo-Acro and Porphyrio both state that he is a *grammaticus* (*grammaticus doctissimus illius temporis* and *praestantissimus grammaticus illo tempore . . . fuit*, respectively), though in their notes to *Epist.* 1.10 Pseudo-Acro calls him *scriptorem tragoediarum* and Porphyrio *scriptorem comoediarum*. These various, and perhaps contradictory, identifications suggest that the scholiasts are inferring information about Fuscus from Horace's text, but it is upon this suspect information that all later commentators nevertheless rely, with the exception of Orelli 1844, 160, who presents the title of the one work by Fuscus that has been transmitted to us, *Aristii Fusci liber ad Asinium Pollionem*, as evidence that he was a grammarian. For Gowers 2003, 86, Aristius Fuscus represents the man Horace would like to be, as the former smoothly and successfully extricates himself from Horace's grip in much the way that Horace himself would have liked, but has failed, to extricate himself from his interlocutor. She thus reads *Sat.* 1.9 as Horace presenting the ghosts of his own past and future: the pest "has a brash style Horace shudders to think his own might once have looked like" (cf. also Henderson 1993 and 1999 and Welch 2001, 181), while Aristius Fuscus is "a portrait of the ideal satirist for the new regime," Horace's "memo to himself to do better next time."

could reasonably be described as being well acquainted with the writings of Lucilius—the true sense, I believe, of the phrase *illum qui pulchre nosset*.⁵¹ Significant in their exchange is that Fuscus' refusal to rescue Horace from his interlocutor's clutches, despite the latter's ardent pleas (*vellere coepi / et pressare manu lentissima brachia, nutans, / distortuens oculos, ut me eriperet*, "I began to pluck at his unresponsive arms with my hand, nodding, indicating with my eyes that he should snatch me away," 1.10.63–65; *certe nescio quid secreto velle loqui te / aiebas mecum*, "certainly you were saying that you wanted to talk about something in private with me," 1.10.67–68), can be read in programmatic terms. What appears to be simple malice (*male salsus*⁵² / *ridens dissimulare*, "the wickedly funny man, grinning, pretended not to understand," 1.10.65–66) is in fact Fuscus' amused realization that he cannot help: only Horace himself can engineer his own escape from Lucilius—by moving on to a genre other than satire. In this way Horace's literary concerns once again find themselves given physical form in *Satires* 1.9.

The final mystery of *Satires* 1.9 that may receive some clarification in light of the re-reading of the interlocutor presented here is the lawsuit so casually introduced at the poem's halfway point.⁵³ After Horace's report of the old Sabellic fortune-teller's prophecy,⁵⁴ the narrative of the journey resumes once more: *ventum erat ad Vestae, quarta iam parte diei / praeterita* ("we had come to Vesta's temple, with a quarter of the day already gone," 1.9.35–36). With a rapid transition of topic so typical of satire, the lawsuit pending against the interlocutor here makes its unexpected appearance: *et casu tum respondere vadato / debebat; quod ni fecisset, perdere litem* ("and by chance he was due to appear in court,

⁵¹The many fragments of Lucilius preserved in Varro's *De Lingua Latina* and Nonius' *De Compendiosa Doctrina* demonstrate that this satirist was an important source for grammarians, while the connections between comedy and satire in Horace's mind are evident at, e.g., *Sat.* 1.4.1–7.

⁵²The word *salsus* brings the programmatic possibilities of Fuscus' behavior to the surface, for this word is strongly associated with the genre of satire throughout Horace's writings: cf., e.g., *Sat.* 1.10.3–4, *sale multo / urbem defricuit*, and *Epist.* 2.2.60, *Bioneis sermonibus et sale nigro*, where the reference is to iambs, closely akin to satire.

⁵³For the importance of this placement and its deliberate nature, see Mazurek 1997, 7, and Brown 1993, 179 ("it is unlikely to be coincidence that the court-case, Horace's eventual source of deliverance, is introduced at the half-way point of the poem").

⁵⁴Henderson 1993, 78, is right to say that "the mock-oracular gypsy *Sabella* plays epic *Sibylla*." There seems to have been a precedent in Lucil. Book 6 for such epic parody (cf. Fiske 1920, 332–33): *quem neque Lucanis oriundi montibus tauri / ducere protelo validis cervicibus possent* ("whom neither the bulls that arise in the Lucanian mountains are able to lead with their mighty necks in tandem," fr. 250–51).

with bail already given⁵⁵; and if he had not done this, he would lose the lawsuit,” 1.9.36–37). Scholars do not seem to have wondered what the substance of this lawsuit might be (beyond noting that it must be a civil suit⁵⁶), but it seems to recall, or rather anticipates, another potential lawsuit to be mentioned shortly.

Horace begins his second book of *Satires* with a plea to the jurist Trebatius for advice (*quid faciam? praescribe*, 2.1.5), making the dubious claim that he has come dangerously close to running afoul of a *lex saturae*: “there are those to whom I seem too fierce in my satire, and to strain my efforts beyond the law” (*sunt quibus in satira videar nimis acer et ultra / legem tendere opus*, 2.1.1–2). Roman Satire seems to like toying with the idea that it is continually about to transgress a law against libel or slander (perhaps on the model of Old Comedy, which, the tradition holds, met its demise when the speech of its famously vitriolic chorus was restricted). Which law the satirists might have been in danger of breaking, however, is not altogether clear, as that against *mala carmina* found in the Twelve Tables seems to have governed the casting of spells rather than slanderous speech.⁵⁷ As Lowrie argues, Horace may well be exploiting the dual sense of *carmen*—both “spell” and “poem”—to emphasize, on the one hand, satire’s transgressive nature and, on the other, the fact that, as a poem, it belongs to a genre and thus is governed by certain laws.⁵⁸ In any case, Horace’s claim at *Satires* 2.1.1–4 is dubious because it is hard to see how anyone could have found his first book of satires *nimis acer*: he names no living contemporaries, and his satirical attacks are directed entirely against types, not individuals. In addition, this extreme insecurity and uncertainty suddenly manifested at the opening of *Satires* 2.1 and Horace’s apparent distress over the poor public reception of his work stand in sharp contrast to the confident declaration which concludes *Satires* 1.10—that the opinion of the public at large is of no importance to him. The immediate context of *Satires* 2.1 is, therefore, the first indi-

⁵⁵ *Vadato* may be either a one-word ablative absolute, as I have taken it, meaning “with bail having been given” (so Rolfe 1949, 225, and Morris 1968, 125), or a dative, denoting the person who had paid the surety (Orelli 1844, 155, Palmer 1961, 224, and Brown 1993, 179, note both possibilities).

⁵⁶ Wickham 1891, 94; Brown 1993, 179. Mazurek 1997, 7, n. 23, concurs, explaining that the formulaic phrase *respondere vadato* forms the grounds for understanding this as a civil suit.

⁵⁷ Cf. Fraenkel 1957, 148.

⁵⁸ Lowrie 2009, 332–48.

cation that the desperate plea for advice to Trebatius is not to be taken altogether at face value.

If, as I have argued, the interlocutor of *Satires* 1.9 is not only a specific person, but a far more important character both within the poem and to Horace's poetic program as a whole than has been previously recognized, then his court case, too, should be both specific and vital to the reading of the poem, and to our understanding of Horace's view of his relation to Lucilius. Just as Horace fears legal repercussions for himself (2.1.1–2), he similarly portrays Lucilius as having come under attack for overstepping the bounds of *libertas*. Such an interpretation is plausible given Horace's emphasis elsewhere on the vitriolic nature of Lucilius' satire: *sale multo / urbem defricuit* ("he rubbed down the city with a great deal of salty wit," 1.10.3–4) and *cum est Lucilius ausus / primus in hunc operis componere carmina morem / detrahare et pellem, nitidus qua quisque per ora / cederet* ("since Lucilius was the first to dare to write poems of this type and to peel away the outer mask with which each man, neatly covered, goes about in public," 2.1.62–65). Horace's initial refusal to help Lucilius (*inteream si / aut valeo stare aut novi civilia iura, / et propero quo scis*, "may I perish if I am either strong enough to stand in court or if I know civil law; and besides, you know where I'm rushing off to," 1.9.38–40), despite the latter's earnest plea (*si me amas . . . paulum hic ades*, "if you love me at all please be present here a little longer," 1.9.38), momentarily threatens the position of Horace as beholden and subservient and that of Lucilius as the one in control, but Horace quickly adopts the role of follower (*ego, ut contendere durum / cum victore, sequor*, 1.9.42–43), forced to do so by the interlocutor's apparently reckless decision to abandon his lawsuit and instead keep Horace company ("*non faciam*" *ille, / et praecedere coepit*, 1.9.41–42). Remarkably, for the first time in the poem, Horace, rather than the interlocutor (1.9.16, 19), here utters the verb *sequor*. This transference of a crucial term (used by Horace also at *Sat.* 2.1.34 to describe his relation to Lucilius) from superior to inferior signals that Horace has ceased to struggle: his decision to follow his victor declares his rank as the *secundus* in the genre of Roman Satire. Whereas their roles had been reversed in the first half of the poem, with Lucilius, the inventor, following Horace, as the latter naïvely assumed that he might be able to be rid of the former, upon Horace's acceptance of his dilemma each now resumes his rightful place, with Lucilius leading and Horace reluctantly following.

The lawsuit is momentarily forgotten as quickly as it entered the poem, interrupted by the conversation about Maecenas and then the

arrival of Fuscus Aristius, which sets in motion the penultimate vignette of the poem. It is eventually reintroduced at 74 by the chance arrival of yet another new figure (*Sat.* 1.9.74–78):⁵⁹

casu venit obvius illi
adversarius et “quo tu, turpissime?” magna
inclamat voce, et “licet antestari?” ego vero
oppono auriculam. rapit in ius: clamor utrimque,
undique concursus. sic me servavit Apollo.

By chance his opponent came our way at that moment and bellowed at him, “Where are you going, villain?” and to me said, “May I call you as a witness?” I offered him my ear, and he dragged me⁶⁰ off to court. There was a great uproar from every direction and chaos on all sides. Thus it was that Apollo saved me.

The poem closes with a quotation borrowed from Lucilius (τὸν δ' ἐξήραζεν Ἀπόλλων,⁶¹ fr. 238), which is itself a quotation from Homer (*Il.* 20.443).⁶² By translating the phrase into Latin, Horace seems once again to be indicating his disapproval for the habit (which he excoriates at *Sat.* 1.10.20–35) of mixing Latin and Greek,⁶³ as well as closing the poem on

⁵⁹ It seems typical of satire that the appearance of every figure in the poem is described with an adverbial expression that indicates chance: *forte* (1.9.1) for the interlocutor, *ecce* (1.9.60) for Aristius Fuscus, and *casu* (1.9.74) for the *adversarius*.

⁶⁰ The verb *rapit* (in the phrase *rapit in ius*) does not, of course, have a direct object, creating ambiguity as to whether the interlocutor is intended or, as I interpret it, Horace. It is perverse, in my view, to understand it as the interlocutor, when he has not been mentioned for several lines (last at *illi*, 1.9.74, and *turpissime*, 1.9.75), and the last person specified is Horace (*ego*, 1.9.76).

⁶¹ Horace has changed τόν, “him,” to *me*. Porphyrio seems to suggest that while Horace is overtly saying “thus Apollo saved me,” he is also thinking of Lucilius’ quotation, which would fill in the complementary sense, “so Apollo snatched him [the interlocutor] away” (*significat Horatius, se sic liberatum ac recreatum, dum illum molestum adversarius suus rapit, Apollinem imitatus*). Unfortunately, little can be deduced about the context of the Lucilian fragment, since we only have it preserved in Porphyrio’s commentary. Fiske’s 1920, 335–36, conclusion, therefore, that fr. 238 is one of the last in the poem, while attractive, is unverifiable.

⁶² Cairns 2005, 50, must be right in saying that Horace’s reminiscence of Homer is “probably indirect,” and that the primary model he had in mind was Lucilius. Schmitzer 1994, 26, has also suggested, however, that Horace might rather be thinking of *Il.* 20.450, νῦν αὐτέ σ' ἐρύσατο Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων, where ἐρύσατο is closer to Horace’s *servavit* than is ἐξήραζεν. For a summary of the various interpretations devised for why Horace appears to be imitating Lucilius, cf. Anderson 1956, 149–50.

⁶³ For this view, see Fiske 1920, 335, Fraenkel 1957, 118, Brown 1993, 182, and Schlegel 2005, 110–11.

a poetic, specifically Callimachean, note.⁶⁴ But this intertext also signals the seminal role played by Lucilius in the poem. Mazurek has argued convincingly that the ending of *Satires* 1.9 had been thoroughly misunderstood.⁶⁵ Horace is not saved by Apollo at all,⁶⁶ since he is obliged, having once offered himself as a witness, to accompany the plaintiff and the interlocutor to court straightaway.⁶⁷

What, then, does it mean if Horace is not “saved” at the end of *Satires* 1.9? Yet again, the conclusion of the poem is sound if read in

⁶⁴For Apollo as the protector of poets in general, cf. Wickham 1891, 98, Rolfe 1949, 230, Anderson 1956, 149–50 (who further points out that this reference brings us back to the poetic *nugae* with which the poem opened), Morris 1968, 130, and Brown 1993, 182; for the Callimachean undertones, cf. Schlegel 2005, 118. The mention of Apollo has also been read as a reference to the fact that the court case was to take place at or near the Temple of Apollo (cf. Orelli 1844, 164, who mentions this possibility only to refute it, and Anderson 1956, 150–51, who discusses in detail the topographical difficulties involved in such an interpretation). Anderson, beginning with an analysis of the Homeric context of this line (Apollo’s rescue of Achilles from an attack by Hector), and then considering the martial language that pervades the poem, advances the interesting argument that Horace and his interlocutor are figured as an opposing pair of warriors throughout *Sat.* 1.9—and who else, in my view, would be Hector to Horace’s Achilles but Lucilius?

⁶⁵Mazurek 1997, 1: “this study will show that the traditional interpretation of the poem’s ending, which has prevailed since Porphyrio’s time, is incomplete and misleading: the satirist does not truly escape from the Pest. . . . Apollo has not saved the satirist in the manner generally assumed by Horatian scholarship; rather, he has entangled him in a tumultuous lawsuit.” Freudenburg 2001, 66–67, follows Mazurek in this interpretation, though Cairns 2005 is skeptical.

⁶⁶Mazurek 1997, 15, further argues that “Apollo” is to be understood as a playful reference to Fuscus: the latter’s name means “dark” (thus figuring him as an anti-Apollo), and so Horace exclaims that, with Fuscus’ refusal to help, “a dark sun” has risen for him (*huncine solem / tam nigrum surrexe mihi*, 1.9.72–73). In addition, the verb *eriperet* (1.9.65), used by Horace in his plea to Fuscus for help, seems to be a more literal translation of Homer’s ἐξήραζεν than the *servavit* given later in the poem’s final line.

⁶⁷Mazurek 1997 provides as evidence for his assertion that Horace must immediately proceed to court comparanda from New Comedy. In the *Poenulus* and *Curculio*, the formulaic legal terms *licet antestari* and *in ius vocari* are also employed (Mazurek notes Horace’s familiarity with the genre of New Comedy, as well as his knowledge of legal terminology from his experience as a *scriba quaestorius*, 1997, 6). He concludes: “the summons scenes in the *Poenulus* and *Curculio* demonstrate that a seizure witness must appear immediately *in iure*” (5). It should be noted that Cairns 2005 argues vociferously against Mazurek’s interpretation of the relevant scenes in Plautus (citing as proof for Mazurek’s supposed misreading of them the fact that the second edition of Kaser and Hackl, 1996, 65, n. 10, no longer proffers such an interpretation; contrast Kaser 1966, 48, n. 8), and thus against his reading of the end of *Sat.* 1.9 and the conclusions he draws from it about the tone on which the satire concludes. Nevertheless, I find Mazurek’s interpretation of Plautus plausible, and his reading of *Sat.* 1.9 persuasive and attractive.

programmatic terms: Horace cannot escape Lucilius until he abandons the genre of satire (which he is still some way from doing).⁶⁸ Nevertheless, the poem ends with a victory for Horace: he is dragged off to court, where he will be required to give testimony in a lawsuit against Lucilius on charges of having overstepped the bounds of the law in his satires. Indeed, this is what Horace proceeds to do in the subsequent poem. Consider the opening of *Satires* 1.10 (1–5)⁶⁹:

Nempe incomposito dixi pede currere versus
 Lucili. quis tam Lucili fautor inepte est
 ut non hoc fateatur? at idem, quod sale multo
 urbem defricuit, charta laudatur eadem.
 nec tamen hoc tribuens dederim quoque cetera.

Yes, I did say that the verses of Lucilius run with an uneven foot. Who is such an unqualified admirer of Lucilius that he would not admit this? But the same man is praised on the same page, because he rubbed down the city with a great deal of salty wit. Nevertheless, while granting him this one good quality, I would not also grant him all others.

Although Horace professes to consider Lucilius' vitriol a good thing, coming so hard on the heels of *Satires* 1.9, the testimonial quality of these words seems compelling.⁷⁰ In addition, the fixation on Lucilius

⁶⁸Horace's first book of *Satires* was followed immediately by the second. *Sat.* 2.1 certainly opens with the fiction that there has been a hiatus between the publication of *Sat.* 1 and the composition of this first poem of the second book, as Horace purports to be reacting to criticisms made against the first collection as a whole, but it seems implausible that Horace paused fully between *Sat.* 1 and 2 (in fact, it seems most likely that he was writing poems for both collections, as well as for the *Epodes*, simultaneously). Conventionally, c. 30 B.C.E. is the date assigned for the publication of the *Epodes* and *Sat.* 2, on the basis of the fact that there are no references in any of the poems to events that post-date this period. The date of publication of *Sat.* 1—which contains many poems that overlap in date with the *Epodes*—is by similar logic fixed at 35/34 B.C.E. A recent discussion of the chronology of Horace's life and works can be found in Nisbet 2007.

⁶⁹The eight lines sometimes attached to the beginning of *Sat.* 1.10 (*Lucili, quam sis mendosus . . . ut redeam illuc*) are clearly spurious, though the declaration in them (in markedly legalistic vocabulary: *teste, defensore, pervincam*) of Horace's intent to prove the inferiority of Lucilius' verses (*Lucili, quam sis mendosus, teste Catone, / defensore tuo, pervincam, qui male factos / emendare parat versus*, "Lucilius, I will prove what a liar you are, with Cato, your defender, as my witness; Cato, who is preparing to emend your poorly written verses," [1]–[3]) is perfectly suited to the legal note on which *Sat.* 1.9 ends (cf. Freudenburg 2001, 67).

⁷⁰For a similar view, see Schlegel 2005, 112–13: "the poem that follows this one, *Satires* 1.10, provides a poetic handbook against which to measure the verbal disposition of the

throughout *Satires* 1.10—an explicitly programmatic poem and, as such, a companion-piece to *Satires* 1.4—seems to support this reading of the interlocutor as Lucilius. If *Satires* 1.9 is indeed, as I have argued, an enactment of Horace’s “Lucilius problem,” then it serves to herald the imminent end of the book.

As the poem ends, although Horace seems to portray himself once again as subservient and as not in control of his destiny, his poetic triumph is evident. Using a poem of Lucilius as his starting-point, he has produced a satire in which he places his generic predecessor in the undesirable role of the *sectator*—a clear demotion from the role he played in his own original, in which he seems to have been the ally of Scipio, who heaped abuse upon their follower. Most importantly, *Satires* 1.9 ends with the anticipation of a legally sanctioned verdict of the superiority of Horace’s brand of milder satire over Lucilius’ vitriol.⁷¹ Horace himself is given the opportunity to testify against the inventor of his genre, whose influence has caused him such anxiety. It is as if the second practitioner of Roman verse Satire thereby declares that he has made peace with the fact that his brand of satire is less scathing: not only is this wiser, gentler Horatian satire, written by one who is *infra Lucili censum ingeniumque*, just as good as the original—it is better, and ultimately, the reader is led to anticipate, victorious. *Satires* 1.9 is thus a uniquely Horatian imagining of a successor’s literary unease and belongs among the programmatic poems of the collection.⁷²

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interlocutor in 1.9. Using Lucilius as his springboard, Horace will articulate [sc. in 1.10] what a poet should and should not do.” Gowers 2003, 84, though not prepared to comment on the substance of the lawsuit, suggests that the entirety of *Sat.* 1.9 reads “retrospectively as the evidence [Horace] is about to give in court” as the poem ends. Interestingly, what is implied here (though left unstated) is that Gowers, like Mazurek and myself, believes that Horace does not escape from the interlocutor as the poem ends, but is in fact forced to give testimony in court, rendering *Sat.* 1.9.78 ironic in her view, too.

⁷¹Although he does not theorize about the substance of the court-case, Mazurek 1997, 13, agrees that the poem ends with Horace about to enjoy “the satisfaction of seeing the Pest humiliated in public.”

⁷²I am grateful to Richard Thomas and John Kirby for their incisive comments on an early version of this article, and to John Paul Russo for casting his expert editorial eye over a later one. I would also like to thank the anonymous readers and the editor at *AJP* for encouraging me to elucidate in greater detail the poetic and programmatic aspects of *Sat.* 1.9 that emerge from the re-reading of the poem I propose here.

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