body, and a woman's body is imagined as the geographical substrate, parcelled out by men into warring areas and states[10]. And yet it is Lysistrata herself, acting as a kind of *lena* or pander, who presents the figure of Diallage to the inspection of Spartans and Athenians, and exposes her to be carved up according to their desires. This is in conformity with the image of Lysistrata the statesman, who argues on equal terms with men like the *proboulos*, and who explains that even though she is a woman, she has *nous*, because she has listened to the discussions of her father and other elder men (1124-27). Women both are and are not like men in the *Lysistrata*. Making the two aspects cohere in a single plot is the achievement of Aristophanes in this comedy[11].

[10] Vegetti 1983: 41-58 («Metafora politica e immagine del corpo nella medicina greca») suggests that in the Hippocratic tradition the body is conceived of as an undifferentiated vessel for humors and the like to enter or exit, whereas Plato and Aristotle develop an «anatomical» image of the body as a kind of polis, in which the internal organs enter into the formation of a coherent structure. According to Vegetti, it is the latter conception that conforms to the ideology of the Athenian city-state. Perhaps the former underlies Aristophanes' use of the female body to represent Greece as a unified whole. We may contrast Menenius Agrippa's allegory of the revolt of the limbs against the belly (Livy 2.32.9-12; cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus *Antiquities* 6.44 ff.), with which he persuades the rebellious plebs to accept the authority of the aristocracy; here, the interdependency of the several parts of the body serves as a justification for the hierarchical ordering of society. No such hierarchical principle is implied in the division of Diallagê's body.

[11] I wish to thank participants in the Nottingham conference for helpful suggestions, and above all to acknowledge my debt to Elizabeth Bobrick of Wesleyan University, who clarified for me the fundamental thesis of this paper.

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The contest in Aristophanes' *Frogs*: the points at issue[1]

We might have expected Dionysus to contemplate a journey to the underworld for a good poet and then decide that Euripides is the one who will fill the bill. In fact, it is the other way round, as he explains it to Herakles: his reading of *Andromeda* aroused in him a desire at all costs to bring Euripides back, and the need for a δεξιὸς ποιητής is offered as a justification. This distinction between the actual sequence and a hypothetical alternative sequence may seem at first sight pedantic, and the choice of δεξιός in preference to other complimentary terms which are used of poets may not seem important; but both considerations have a bearing on the structure of the play and on the terms in which the contest is presented.

Herakles, on being told (72) that none of the poets remaining in Athens is any good, is surprised. Isn't Iophon, alive and well, good enough (73)? Well, he might be, but perhaps the good in his plays has all been the work of his father, Sophocles (73-5, 78f.). Then why not, if a dead poet is to be resurrected, bring back Sophocles himself (76f.)? Dionysus can only say that it would be impracticable to try to extract from the underworld a man likely to be content with his fate, wherever he is (80-2). Agathon? No longer in Athens (83-5). Xenocles, Pythangelus? Not worth considering (86f.). But if it is Euripides' style that Dionysus wants, doesn't Euripides have plenty of imitators (89-91)? Ah, but they can't produce the real phrase (97

[1] This paper is virtually identical with what will be Chapter III Part 2 of the Introduction to my forthcoming edition of *Frogs*, to be published by the Oxford University Press. Comic fragments are cited with the numeration of Kassel and Austin 1983-, but Alexis and Antiphanes from Kock 1880-88. Fragments of Sophocles are cited from Radt.

ῥῆμα γενναῖον), the bold image, the provocative idea neatly expressed in one striking line (96-102). Herakles is scornful, even incredulous (104); but, of course, Herakles in comedy is a robust glutton, slow-witted, preferring violence to reasoning, not a discriminating patron of the arts (55-65, 105-7; cf. above all *Av.* 1565-1693). The audience is not expected necessarily to take sides with *him* in the assessment of poets. Nor is it expected to go all the way with Dionysus, because the first fifty lines of the play have made it quite clear that this is the Dionysus familiar to audiences of comedy as an object of humour, and his halting, verbose paraphrase of E. *Hp.* 612 in obtrusively comic rhythm (101f.) does not enhance his reputation as a connoisseur. The most significant aspect of the dialogue in 52-107 is that Dionysus values a poet for the technical skill which generates pleasure and excitement in the audience. He is the kind of spectator deplored by Plato (*Grg.* 502bc, *Lg.* 657c-8 οἱ πλεῖστοι) but taken for granted by Aristotle, although for Aristotle stylistic skill is only one item in an aesthetic theory going far beyond anything envisaged in *Frogs.*

After 107, throughout the first half of the play, no allusion whatever is made to the purpose of Dionysus's journey. The conversation between the two slaves in 756-813 presents Dionysus's arbitration between Aeschylus and Euripides as a fortunate consequence of his arrival in the underworld, not as a means to the achievement of his purpose. The first explicit reminder of that purpose comes from Pluto in 1414, and Pluto gives the plot what is formally a new turn by saying, 'Whichever of the two you judge the winner, you can take that one back with you'. The point is: 'If you won't do as I ask and judge the contest, I won't do as you ask and release anyone from my domain'. Formally a new turn, but we may have seen it coming since Pluto's slave explained to Xanthias that in the underworld it is the criminals who champion Euripides, while Aeschylus has few supporters, because virtue is scarce there, as it is on earth (771-83). Having been told so plainly and emphatically that bad people like Euripides and good people like Aeschylus[2], members of the audience are not likely to think that Euripides will win the throne of poetry, and they may well wonder whether Dionysus in the end will wish to resurrect him[3]. We may recall also that Dionysus said he needed to bring back a δεξιός poet because there was no one left who was worthy of that term. Yet when he responds to Pluto's ultimatum, he says 'I came down here for a poet ... that Athens might be preserved to hold its festivals' (1418f.). σωθεῖσα, uttered in the perilous circumstances of 405, is a consideration to which Dionysus's original conversation with Herakles had made no direct reference[4]; only the characterization of Euripides as πανοῦργος (80) foreshadows ὁ τῶν πανούργων (sc. δῆμος) in 781, and in 80 it counts for nothing when weighed against the glories of Euripidean style[5].

δεξιότης and νουθεσία ('[poets] make people better citizens') are the two things which, as Aeschylus and Euripides agree (1008f.), constitute the grounds for admiring a poet. The scope of these two concepts, the boundary between them, and their relative importance, require investigation; so does the extent to which we can speak of 'suspense' or 'even-handeness' in the development of the contest; so also do the reasons for Aeschylus's victory, to which the chorus's comments on the outcome (1482-99) are of crucial relevance.

The contest is ἀγὼν σοφίας (882), a contest ἀνδροῖν σοφοῖν (896) to decide who is τὴν τέχνην σοφώτερος (780), and in his valediction to Pluto Aeschylus lays claim to supremacy in σοφία by saying 'Give my throne to Sophocles to look after, for him I judge second (*sc.* only to myself) in σοφία' (1516-9). There are passages of drama in which

[2] Erbse 1975: 52. 807f., 'Aeschylus didn't get on well with the Athenians' introduces an ingredient common in Aristophanes and exemplified in 274-6, vilification of the audience. That element, however, is usually brief, a momentary breach of dramatic illusion, and the development of the topic 'Villains for Euripides' by Pluto's slave is on a more extensive scale.

[3] On the outcome of the agon cf. Koch 1965: 106; but, as Professor MacDowell reminds me, an audience of *Clouds* which expected Right to triumph over Wrong would have got a surprise at the end of the agon there.

[4] Wilamowitz 1473f.

[5] Vaio 1985:97 discerns a strand of moral judgment adverse to Euripides in what Herakles says in his discussion with Dionysus; but κόβαλα (104) and παμπόνηρα (106) do not necessarily have moral connotations. πονηρός in particular can mean 'of poor quality' in respect of whatever function is under discussion, as in *Pl.* 220 πονηρούς ... συμμάχους, 'feeble (*sc.* though well-intentioned) allies'.

'wise' is an appropriate translation of σοφός[6], but we rarely predicate 'wisdom' of poets and artists; we speak of a *good* poet, a *good* painter, and the like, or, on occasion, of a *great* poet, though when we need an abstract noun to refer to their quality we avoid 'goodness' and speak rather of 'talent', 'ability', sometimes of 'greatness' or 'genius'. σοφός, like χρηστός (e.g. *Nu.* 8), καλός (e.g. S. *El.* 393) or any other positive evaluation, can be used sarcastically (as it is in 1154). It can also be used doubtfully and warily, as in *Nu.* 1369f., 'Recite something from the modern poets, ἅττ' ἐστὶ τὰ σοφὰ ταῦτα' (we must remember that at that point Strepsiades is not yet disillusioned and antagonized, but still trying hard to be proud of his son's sophistic education). There is no passage of Old Comedy in which it is necessary or even plausible to see in σοφός the derogatory connotations of the English word 'clever'[7]. In *Nu.* 1377-9, when Strepsiades is outraged by Pheidippides' recital from Euripides and Pheidippides has called Euripides σοφώτατος, Strepsiades exclaims σοφώτατόν γ' ἐκεῖνον, ὦ — τί σ' εἴπω; He is not admitting that Euripides is σοφός. and implying that σοφία is bad, but furiously denying that Euripides is σοφός. Aristophanes himself hopes to be thought σοφός (*Nu.* 520) and claims that *Clouds* σοφώτατ' ἔχειν τῶν ἐμῶν κωμῳδιῶν (ibid. 522; cf. *V.* 64-6). Clear evidence of the synonymy of σοφὸς ποιητής (*Pax* 799, Eup. fr. 392.3) and ἀγαθὸς ποιητής (84, cf. 74; and κακοί [72] is the antonym of ἀγαθοί) is to be found in 763 τὸν ἄριστον ὄντα τῶν ἑαυτοῦ συντέχνωῦ 766 τὴν τέχνην σοφώτερος, since ἄριστος is the superlative of ἀγαθός[8]. Interpretation of 1413 τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι σοφόν, τῷ δ' ἥδομαι and 1434 ὁ μὲν σοφῶς γὰρ εἶπεν κτλ must be accommodated to these data, and accommodation is in fact quite easy. In 1434 σοφῶς refers to 'Do not rear a lion-cub in a city' (1431), σαφῶς to 'I hate a citizen who ...' (1427), for the lion-cub is an αἴνιγμα, like the oak-tree of Pi. *P.* 4.263

[6] Dover 1974: 120f.

[7] In E. *Ba.* 395 τὸ σοφὸν δ' οὐ Σοφία the point is that what normally passes for σοφός is not to be confused with Sophia herself; cf. Dodds 1960: 121, Willink 1986: 218, Breitenbach 1934: 238 (the responsibility for personification is mine).

[8] It could be argued that in Pl. *Prt.* 325e (on education) ποιητῶν ἀγαθῶν there is a moral nuance in ἀγαθός, but that could hardly be said of 323a ἀγαθὸς αὐλητής ... ἢ ἄλλην ἡντινοῦν τέχνην.

ff.; cf. Pl. *R.* 332b ἠνίξατο ... ποιητικῶς, *Alc. Mi.* 147b ἔστιν τε γὰρ φύσει ποιητικὴ ἡ σύμπασα αἰνιγματώδης. Since ἀμαθής is the antonym of σοφός (e.g. *Ec.* 201, Pl. *Phdr.* 239a, *Smp.* 202a, 204b), 1445 ἀμαθέστερον ... καὶ σαφέστερον is perfectly in accord with the contrast of σοφῶς and σαφῶς in 1434; re-casting the abstract τὰ δ' ὄντα πιστὰ κτλ. (1444) as τῶν πολιτῶν οἷσι νῦν πιστεύομεν (1446) is less σοφόν, 'less poetic', and more σαφές, 'plainer'. Greek regularly expresses 'less x' as 'more $\bar{x}$', e.g. 'less beautiful' as 'uglier'[9].

In 1008f. δεξιότης and νουθεσία are recognised as the complementary ingredients of σοφία[10]. δεξιός as an evaluative term is on its way out from Attic at the time of *Frogs*, for it does not occur in Xenophon, the fourth-century orators or New Comedy, and it is rare in Middle Comedy (Alexis fr. 9.1, Antiphanes fr. 229.2) and in Plato (v. infr.). The conservative author of [X.] *Ath.* uses it as a highly complimentary term: speaking in assembly should be restricted, he says, to τοὺς δεξιωτάτους καὶ ἄνδρας ἀρίστους (1.6; cf. Ar. *Pl.* 387), whereas the democracy permits it also to τοὺς πονηρούς, and εὐνομία can be assured only when οἱ δεξιώτατοι make the laws and good men chastise the bad (1.9). 'Intelligent' seems to be an apropriate translation there; so too in Hdt. i 60.3, where it is contrasted with εὐήθης, 'simple (-minded)'. Aristophanes flatters his audience by calling it δεξιός (*Eq.* 233 τὸ γὰρ θέατρον δεξιόν; cf. ibid. 228, *Nu.* 521, 527). But to be δεξιός is not simply to possess a perceptive intelligence, the capacity for quick and deep understanding; in many instances it covers creative intelligence, skill or expertise, and so overlaps σοφός[11]. Poetry is one of τῶν τεχνῶν ὅσαι μεγάλαι καὶ δεξιαί in 762 (immediately before 763 τὸν ἄριστον ... τῶν ... συντέχνων, 766 τὴν τέχνην σοφώτερος). In Th. iii 37.3 δεξιότης is contrasted with ἀμαθία (v. supr.), and σοφός serves as well as δεξιός in flattery of the audience (*Nu.* 575, *Ra.* 700). Phrynichus Com. fr. 31.2, in a highly

[9] Gomme et al. 1945-81: iv 232.

[10] Our century is littered with the texts of plays whose authors earnestly sought to inculcate patriotism or piety in the young but did not have what it takes to attract an audience.

[11] In 1114 μανθάνει τὰ δεξιά the verb has the sense which it has in 195, 765 and 1169, and τὰ δεξιά are the words and actions of which an unintelligent spectator might say what Dionysus says in 1169.

encomiastic passage, calls Sophocles δεξιός and in Strattis fr. 31.2 Euripides' *Orestes* is δρᾶμα δεξιώτατον spoilt by a bad actor. The connotation of artistic skill is evident also in the only two uses of the word in the Platonic corpus: *Mnx.* 235c οὕτως ἡμῖν δεξιοὶ οἱ ῥήτορές εἰσιν, the culmination of an ironic passage describing the exalted state induced in the audience by a funeral oration, and *Hipparchus* 225c τῶν σοφῶν ῥημάτων ... ὧν οἱ δεξιοὶ περὶ τὰς δίκας καλλιεποῦνται.

We can see now why σοφός and σοφία were excluded from the conversation between Dionysus and Herakles, and δεξιός (71) was preferred; it was ῥῆμα γενναῖον, the product of δεξιότης, that Dionysus valued (97). 1009 makes it clear that δεξιότης and νουθεσία must be combined if poetic σοφία is to be attained, as it is by Aeschylus, and 1413 τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι σοφόν, τῷ δ' ἥδομαι, uttered when we are approaching the end of the contest, reminds us, if we need any reminder, that it is not uncommon to recognise the greatness of one poet while taking more pleasure in another whose δεξιότης is superior to his νουθεσία[12].

By contrast with didactic and paraenetic poetry, there is very little direct νουθεσία in tragedy or in narrative poetry. Choral moralizing, which dresses in striking and splendid imagery sentiments, often banal, which the audience already took for granted, was an inheritance from pre-dramatic lyric (e.g. Alcman *PMG* 1.36-9), and it is understandably ignored by Aristophanes, just as it is by Plato in his censure of poetry and by Aristotle in his analysis of the function and effects of tragedy. The moral and political advice given by tragedy and narrative is implicit. It has to be inferred from the behaviour of a fictitious character, who serves as a potential model for imitation in real life, or created by treating an opinion or sentiment uttered by a character in a particular context as if it carried the author's own recommendation.

This implicit νουθεσία is the substance of the formally structured agon which constitutes the first part of the contest[13], 905-1098; the

[12] One could say τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι σοφόν, τῷ δ' ἥδομαι with reference, e.g., to Mahler and Strauss (or, of course, Strauss and Mahler).

[13] Händel 1963:54 n. 14 makes the point that everything up to the agon has led us to expect that it will be concerned with style, not with morality.

second part, 1119-1413, concerns poetic and musical style, and the third, 1417-66, confronts the poets with questions which could equally have been put to Athenians who were not poets. In the agon neither poet adopts the view which we commonly denote by the phrase 'art for art's sake'; they agree without more ado on the importance of νουθεσία, and each deplores the moral effect of the other's poetry. Euripides' argument is that Aeschylus stupefied his audience by pretentious, unintelligible language (923-9), while Euripidean tragedy involved the audience in familiar issues and taught them to think and argue (945-61), not to gape at the spectacle of a remote and unfamiliar world (961-3). Aeschylus in reply claims to have inspired martial courage (1019-30, 1039-42), using heroic characters whose language matched their status (1059-61). He charges Euripides with promoting adultery by the portrayal of adulterous women (1043-56) and with engendering selfishness among the rich (1062-6), idleness among the young (1069-71) and indiscipline in the fleet (1071-3).

It would be unreasonable to deny (as some of our unreasonable contemporaries do) that the behaviour of a character in fiction and the behaviour of someone we know in real life have equal validity as potential models for our own conduct, and also that sentiments and arguments propounded by my neighbour over the garden fence *or* by some one whose utterance is reported to me at second hand *or* by a character in a play on television are all equally valid as potential determinants of my personality. Naturally not all such models are positive determinants; they may be strongly negative, and whether a fictitious character has a positive or negative effect does not turn on a 'happy' or 'unhappy' ending to the story, or on the author's own intentions and predilections; least of all does it depend on obtrusive moralizing by the author[14].

[14] In Evelyn Waugh's *A Handful of Dust* Brenda has a young son called John Andrew and an adulterous lover called John. A friend comes to tell her that the former, whom he calls 'John', has been killed in an accident. For an appalling moment she thinks it is her lover who has been killed. Then she realises that it is only her son, and cries, 'Oh, John *Andrew!* Oh, thank God, thank God!' No authorial comment is needed to help the reader to decide whether or not to take Brenda as a model.

There are, however, in addition to this general consideration, some distinctive features of the Greek attitude to literature which must be taken into account. One is that the substantial and widely diffused corpus of didactic poetry available in the fifth century had long implanted the conventional idea that the poet is a teacher. Aeschylus is able to exploit this idea (1030-6) by reciting the names of Orpheus, Musaeus and Hesiod (cf. Pl. *Ion* 536b), to whom prescriptive, didactic poems were attributed, joining with them the name of Homer, who was, to be sure, a narrative poet but (as we see from Pl. *Ion* 540e-1b) could be treated as implicitly didactic in so far as he offered models. Thus Aeschylus locates himself within a continuous tradition of teaching. Sufficient justification for calling such a notion 'conventional' can be found in the bare fact of Dionysus's confessed delight in those ingredients of tragedy which have no didactic significance, to say nothing of Plato's view of theatrical audiences and the strong archaic tradition of 'delight' as the aim of the narrative poet[15]. It may well be that many, perhaps most, Athenians would have assented to the general proposition that a tragic poet has a responsibility to 'make his fellow-citizens better people', but that is not to say that they actually went to the theatre in the hope of moral improvement.

To classical scholars the Greeks seem to have been curiously indifferent to the context of a poetic line or phrase. According to Arist. *Rh.* 1416a 29 a man engaged in litigation against Euripides attempted to argue that the author of *Hp.* 612 ἡ γλῶσσ' ὀμώμοχ' ἡ δὲ φρὴν ἀνώμοτος (exploited in *Ra.* 1469-73) could not be trusted. Evidently the fact that Hippolytus, after that outburst, kept his oath was immaterial. What mattered was that the thought could be entertained, formulated and pronounced aloud before an audience to some of whom it might seem rather a bright idea. We may be shocked when Socrates in Pl. *Smp.* 174c says that Homer 'represented Menelaus as μαλθακὸς αἰχμητής', because we recall that the phrase (*Il.* xvii 587) is used by Apollo, disguised as Phaenops, in an effort to encourage Hector[16]. We must however beware of comparing modern

[15] Sicking 1962:117f. Maehler 1963: 15, 25-31.

[16] Cf. Poll. ix 102, 'Eupolis replies ...', meaning 'Eupolis represents the other speaker as replying ...'(Eup. fr. 269).

scholars with ancient non-scholars. If we compare like with like, we may find that our contemporaries in general are no more scrupulous than the Greeks in their treatment of the original context and function of a well-known quotation[17].

We must also reckon with Aristophanes' readiness to caricature both sides in a debate. The character of Right in *Nu.* 889-1104 contains a conspicuous degree of absurdity[18], and it is very doubtful whether burning sincerity on Aristophanes' part inspired Aeschylus's claims that Euripides' portrayal of 'kings in rags' encouraged avoidance of liturgies (1065f.) or that deterioration in the character of minor officials and politicians was attributable to sexual improprieties in tragedy (1078-88). But topics which arouse genuine anxiety, above all sexual anxiety, can be a very powerful weapon in the hands of a critic. Aeschylus claims never to have portrayed a woman in love (1044)[19]. The Euripidean Phaedra whom he condemns is presumably the Phaedra of the earlier *Hippolytus*, since in the *Hippolytus* which has survived the prologue makes it plain that Phaedra is not an autonomous agent but a mere tool of Aphrodite's revenge[20]. We do not know how strongly in the earlier play Eros was represented as an invincible divine power (as in Sophocles' *Phaedra*, frr. 680, 684 [= 'E. fr. 431' Nauck]). The conflict between 'I couldn't help it' and 'Oh yes, you could' was a live issue in the fifth century[21], as we see from the argument between Hecuba and Helen in E. *Tro.* 914-1032 and from the vain attempt of Pasiphae in E. *Cretans* (fr. 82) to make her father listen. An audience of husbands, feeling threatened by adultery because they are husbands, takes the side of 'Oh yes you could' except when self-justification induces them to

[17] E.g. Jn 11.50, 'It is expedient that one man should die for the people', and Johnson's 'Patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel', though it must be admitted that Johnson did not make it easy for his hearers to follow his train of thought.

[18] Dover 1968:lxiii-lxvi.

[19] The modern reader exclaims, 'What about Clytaemnestra?', but probably the Athenian audience thought of her primarily as a murderess who had incidentally taken a lover — a view, supplanting Homer's, which the *Oresteia* imposes.

[20] We do not know how Eros was spoken of by Stheneboea.

[21] *Nu.* 1076-82 presents in comic form what is presented seriously in S. fr. 684.

take the other side. The gravamen of the charge against Euripides is that his models offer temptation to one part of the community and threaten another, the dominant part. There is a complementary phenomenon: a fictitious individual reinforces beliefs about a category, as the plot of *Thesmophoriazusae* demonstrates. Euripides 'slanders women' because Stheneboea communicates the message that women are licentious and treacherous[22]. Reaction to anxiety is perfectly illustrated by *Nu.* 1371-4, where Strepsiades describes how his son recited from Euripides a passage 'about this man — my God! — screwing his sister! Well, I wasn't going to stand *that* ...!' Strepsiades was not interested in the context or function of the speech, and still less did he care whether it was good or bad poetry. It broke a taboo; and it would be unwise, in the study of any culture, to underrate the power and violence of reactions to the breaking of taboos[23]. Just as one careless phrase can wreck the career of a politician, so one disturbing or horrifying moment in a play, film or novel, remembered when the rest of the work is forgotten, remains available for exploitation by hostile critics.

Since we have been told before the contest began that good people like Aeschylus and bad people like Euripides (771-83), it is reasonable to infer that enough people had been disturbed by monents in Euripidean drama often enough for such a moral judgment to be intelligible. Once having removed genuine suspense by that judgment, Aristophanes is free to play at suspense as much as he likes and to be confident of our co-operation in that game[24]. This is

[22] What message about *men* is communicated by most tragedies is a matter on which the ancient world is silent.

[23] I offer two modern instances. At one point in *The Golden Notebook* Doris Lessing alludes to the smell of menstrual blood. At that point my father ceased to read the book, would never again read anything by Doris Lessing, and did not like to have any book by her in the house. Ten years ago an experienced London magistrate was puzzled by the expression 'oral sex', and a lawyer had to explain it to him. As the magistrate appeared incredulous, the lawyer made it plain that the phenomenon is widespread among respectable people. The magistrate replied sombrely, 'If that is so, I am glad that I do not have much longer to live in this world'. It is not diffioult to divine what his reactions would be to much contemporary fiction.

[24] Dionysus is by no means unsympathetic to Euripides in the course of the contest (note 1209, 1228, 1399f.); Whitman 1964: 251 absurdly translates πονηρός as 'wicked' in

achieved by the characterization of Aeschylus, including the element of caricature in some of his arguments (v. supr.); by the comments of the chorus; and by Dionysus's own unwillingness and inability to reach a final decision.

The Aeschylus of the agon is a rather nasty old man, of a kind one would try to avoid meeting in real life: sulky (832), spluttering with rage (840-59, 917; cf. 993-1003), impatient, menacing, contemptuous, relentlessly abusive. The chorus, performing a role familiar to us from *Clouds,* holds the ring with conscientious impartiality (875-84, 895-904*a*, 1099-1119; 1100 is particularly important)[25]; at one point, where it addresses Aeschylus as κοσμήσας τραγικὸν λῆρον, it adopts the jocular, patronizing attitude of comedy to tragedy[26]. In the second part of the contest the tide runs in favour of Aeschylus; in the criticism of prologues and the parody of lyrics he progressively cools down, gets into his stride, enjoys himself, and mounts a counter-attack which succeeds because it is (tor most of us, anyway; our respect for the archaic is ingrained) funnier than Euripides' attack on him; and his victory in the weighing of lines is indisputable.

For all that, Dionysus declares himself in 1411-3 unwilling to give a decision. In uttering 1413 τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι σοφόν, τῷ δ' ἥδομαι Dionysus could of course indicate by look and gesture which is which, and no doubt did so if that is what Aristophanes wished, but dramatically it would be more effective if Dionysus spread his hands in a helpless gesture and turned his head from side to side while looking upwards, so that we are are not told which he regards

852 ὦ πόνηρ' Εὐριπίδη, though it is obviously sympathetic and protective, as in *Av.* 1648.

[25] Gelzer 1960: 62-4, 121-3. An exception to the impartiality of the chorus is the song 1251-60. The textual problem of 1257-60 is serious on other grounds, but the praise of Aeschylus's lyrics in 1251-6 is hyperbolic even if 1257-60 are obelized.

[26] Radermacher's interpretation (1954: 287) of λῆρον (or ληρόν?) as 'ornamentation', 'jewellery' (*sc.* of the robes of Tragoedia) is open to the objections that (i) we would expect a plural, λῆροι (or ληροί), as in *AP* vi 292.2 (Hedylus), Hsch. λ 895, Phot. 222.8 and Pherecrates' Λῆροι, and (ii) even if ληρόν were the right accent, it would be hard for the audience not to take it as a snide pun (cf. the pun on δημός and δῆμος in *V.* 39-41).

as σοφός in this ἀγὼν σοφίας[27]. Pressed by Pluto to decide, he puts the question about Alcibiades, and having heard the answers confesses himself still unable to give a verdict (1434); again, the action could be such that it is left to us to discern who answered σοφῶς. Finally compelled to a judgment by Pluto (1467), he declares that he will award victory to the poet whom his ψυχή wishes to see victorious. This is in effect one more admission of inability to decide; the ego of Dionysus puts the responsibility on to his 'soul', committing himself to following its guidance, not just heightening the suspense which he has created in us but himself sharing it. The imposition of distance between self and soul, rooted in forms of address (common in archaic poetry) to one's own heart, soul or spirit, is parodied in comedy by literalism (*Ach.* 480-8, *V.* 757), but parody is not the paramount ingredient here. We should think rather of passages in which someone speaks of τῇ ψυχῇ διδόναι (A. *Pe.* 841, Epich. *CGFP* 89.2, Theocr. 16.24), τῇ ψυχῇ χαρίζεσθαι (Simon. fr. eleg. 8.13 West) or τὴν ψυχὴν εὖ δρᾶν (E. *Cy.* 340). Dionysus follows what we would call 'the promptings of his heart'; an arbitrary, intuitive judgment, divorced from rational assessment of the poets' answers to the questions he has just put to them[28]. Some sixty lines from the end of the play, it displays a striking identity of concept, despite the reversal of direction, with what he said fifty lines from the start: 'a desire struck [his] heart'(53f.) and sent him off to the underworld. Now that he has heard Euripides and Aeschylus together, his ψυχή prefers Aeschylus.

The contest having been decided, the chorus acclaims the victor. 1482-99 tell us why Aeschylus has won; first in positive terms, then in negative. The first stanza congratulates him on ξύνεσιν ἠκριβωμένην (1483), εὖ φρονεῖν (1485), and attributes his victory to his being συνετός (1490). Both poets were credited with ξυνετὰς φρένας (876) in the song with which the chorus heralded ἀγὼν σοφίας, but the only other occurrence of such a term in the play is Euripides' prayer to Ξύνεσις (with Aether, the tongue and discriminating nostrils) in 892f. The chorus's verdict is that Euripides was mistaken; it is Aeschylus

[27] It is hard to see how Marr 1970: 53 can say, given the data on σοφός assembled above, 'Nor can there be any doubt that in σοφῶς εἶπεν Dionysus refers to Euripides'.
[28] Cf. Killeen 1978: 73, Handley 1956: 214f.

who is superior in σύνεσις. This 'intelligence' cannot have (in the narrower sense of the word) a political connotation, because the poets' answers to Dionysus's political questions were inconclusive and were recognised as such by his mode of decision. The σύνεσις of Aeschylus must be his understanding of what works in the theatre, what gives the audience the profoundest satisfaction, and that is what the second stanza proceeds to tell us: χαρίεν οὖν μὴ Σωκράτει παρακαθήμενον λαλεῖν. Χαρίεις is a word commonly used by the Greek literary critics; a passage of Demetrius (*Eloc.* 137f.; cf DH *Comp.* 11 [53]) shows, not surprisingly, that it means 'having χάρις' (cf. DH *Comp.* 9 [50]). Χάρις is that attribute of anything, including literary works, which evoke a response of gladness in the hearer or spectator; Demetr. *Eloc.* 180 couples it with ἡδονή, DH *Comp.* 11 (53) classifies it as one of the elements which generate ἡδονή, and ibid. (48) contrasts τραχύτερον ... καὶ οὐχ ἡδύ with χαριέστερον. The expected antonyms of χαρίεις are ἄχαρις, ἀχάριτος, ἀχάριστος (applied by X. *Hi.* 1. 24 to bad smells), and these words do indeed occur in the critics (e.g. Demetr. *Eloc.* 302), but the commoner antonym in practice is ψυχρός; in Demetr. *Eloc.* 121 χάρις is contrasted with ψυχρότης. That is familiar to us from Old Comedy itself (*Ach.* 138ff, *Th.* 170, 848, Eup. fr. 261); at any rate, the antonym of ψυχρός in this figurative sense is certainly not θερμός, for no Greek describes a good poem as 'hot'. Ψυχρότης is what alienates the hearer and fails of the effect for which the speaker or writer hopes; it includes jokes which fall flat and errors of taste (Arist. *Rh.* 1405b 35ff., Theophr. ap. Demetr. *Eloc.* 114, ibid. 121-3, 247, 304 ἄχαρι καὶ ψυχρόν)[29]. So the chorus prepares to tell us what it is in Aeschylus which captivates the soul of Dionysus.

Yet it tells us what Aeschylus did *not* do, and thus by implication what Euripides did wrong: 'to sit by Socrates and talk (λαλεῖν), discarding poetry (μουσική) and leaving out what matters most in the art of tragedy. To spend time idly on theorizing (ἐπὶ σεμνοῖσιν λόγοισι) and nonsensical quibbling (σκαριφησμοῖσι λήρων) is loony (παραφρονοῦντος ἀνδρός)'. The chorus thus rejects Euripides' argument that his tragedies improved the citizens of Athens by

[29] Wankel 1976: 1118-20.

teaching people to think about real issues, and it implies that it is just that insistence on thinking which has deprived tragedy of χάρις. The justification for translating σεμνοὶ λόγοι as 'theorizing' is in part the derogatory connotations of 'theory' in English[30], in part the implications of Lys. fr. 1.2, where the speaker confesses that he was deluded by the σεμνοὶ λόγοι on moral questions in which the Socratic Aeschines had participated into assuming that Aeschines would be a man of integrity in financial matters[31].

There are key-words in the stanza which relate it to issues raised in the course of the contest and elsewhere in Aristophanes. The name of Socrates is the most obvious. Reference to 'idleness' occurs twice in *Clouds*, once in the description of Socrates' deities, the Clouds themselves, as μεγάλαι θεαὶ ἀνδράσιν ἀργοῖς (316) and a second time (334) where ἀργός is an epithet of all the varieties of σοφισταί who are 'nourished' by the clouds while they 'do nothing' (οὐδὲν δρῶντας) — a contrast with the ἐργάτης λεώς, a phrase which in *Pax* 632 designates the farmers cheated by the politicians; compare the compliment σώφρων κἀργάτης in *Ach.* 611. λαλεῖν, which in the course of the fourth century became and remained the ordinary word for 'talk', 'converse' (e.g. Demetr. *Eloc.* 225), is commonly translated 'chatter' or 'babble', but that is sometimes too strong; λαλεῖν and λαλιά are more like what we mean by pronouncing the word 'talk' in a contemptuous or impatient way: talking too much, or talking when action would be more appropriate (e.g. *Nu.* 505), or talking out of turn when prompt and silent compliance is needed. In the first scene of the play Herakles, implying 'Why bring back *Euripides?*', says (89ff.). 'But surely there are thousands of young blokes here writing tragedies, who are miles λαλίστερα than Euripides?' The characters of Euripides are contrasted, as οἱ νῦν λαλοῦντες (917), with the famous silences of Aeschylus. Euripides claims (954) 'I taught people to λαλεῖν'. Aeschylus accuses him of precisely that (1069), the teaching of λαλιά and στωμυλία, which, says Aeschylus, 'has emptied the

[30] The connotations of 'philosophizing' are different, because 'philosophical' is mostly used of people who bear misfortune with resignation.

[31] In 1004 Aeschylus is characterized as πυργώσας ῥήματα σεμνά, but the σεμνότης of a ῥῆμα and the σεμνότης of a λόγος are very different things.

wrestling-schools and worn down the buttocks of the young men στωμλλομένων, and made the crew of the *Paralos* answer back ...'. This sentiment is very loud echo of the charges brought in *Clouds* against the evils of sophistic education. When Wrong says to Right, 'You're not going to teach this young man', Right replies, 'I certainly am, if he's going to grow up right and not just practise λαλιά' (930f.). Again, Right reacts to a clever argument of Wrong's by saying, 'That's the kind of thing that keeps the bath-house full of the young men λαλούντων all day, all the time, and leaves the wrestling-schools empty' (1053f.). And he promises Pheidippides that if he adheres to old-fashioned education, 'You'll spend your time in gymnasia, not στωμύλλων in the Agora' (1002f.). Talk is dangerous, because it takes young males away from physical exercise, encourages them to question their fathers' values and undermines the discipline which a city with its back to the wall needs[32].

Comparison with *Clouds* indicates that Aristophanes has assimilated the contrast between Aeschylus and Euripides to the generalized contrast between old and new, always a profitable line for popular comedy to take in respect of the arts[33], and profitable in other respects also at a time of privation and peril. That generalized contrast comes to the fore in the parabasis, where the difference between old and new political leadership is compared to the difference between the traditional silver coinage of Athens and the newly minted bronze coinage (718-37; cf. 890 κόμμα καινόν of Euripides' deities). Aeschylus's generation defeated the Persian invasion and created the empire. Euripides' generation had experienced a critical loss of power, wealth and population, and had come to a point at which one decisive naval battle could not only

[32] Each generation tends to believe that its children are the first rebels. X. *M.* i. 2.46 is a useful corrective: Pericles, trapped in an argument by the young Alcibiades, says, 'We were clever at that kind of argument when I was young!' Robert Louis Stevenson, as an Edinburgh student in the 1870s, joined a society whose declared purpose was to reject all the values of the older generation.

[33] The boundary between the new and the old may be different in different arts; in popular perceptions nowadays, 'modern art' goes back much further than 'modern music'.

deprive the Athenians of their remaining empire but endanger the continued existence of Athens herself.

Looked at from the standpoint of tragedy, Euripides' generation took over neatly from Aeschylus's in 455, the year in which Euripides first competed, because Aeschylus had died at some time during the previous two years. Hence it was understandable that by Aristophanes' time Aeschylus had become a symbol of Athenian power, wealth and success, Euripides a symbol of decline. When Pheidippides in *Clouds* refuses to sing Simonides, Strepsiades grudgingly offers him the alternative of a recitation from Aeschylus (*Nu.* 1363-5; he does not say 'Sophocles'). Dikaiopolis in *Ach.* 9-11 speaks of sitting in the theatre expecting Aeschylus (again, he does not say 'Sophocles'), and of his disappointment when Theognis was put on instead. That passage of *Acharnians* explains *Ra.* 868, 'My tragedies have not died with me', and the two together confirm the statement of *Vita Aesch.* 12 that a decree passed after the death of Aeschylus authorized the continued production of his plays. This fact is of great importance for *Frogs;* it means that for the audience the contest is not between a familiar style and a style known only to the oldest generation and a small number of people who read texts, but between two styles which were both put to the test in the contemporary theatre[34].

It is not unlikely that a large part of the audience of *Frogs* was induced by the second half of the play to give at least temporary assent to the νουθεσία implicit in its outcome. Since Aeschylus's career coincided with the great days of old, an error of logic which people find irresistible at a time of uncertainty and self-criticism oould easily generate a belief that revival of Aeschylus would *cause* a revival of the great days of old. Such a causal sequence is implied by the parting injunction to Aeschylus (1501) καὶ σῷζε πόλιν τὴν ἡμετέραν. Such assent, however, does not seem to have lasted long. In the fourth century it was Euripidean drama, not Aeschylean, which increasingly enjoyed the prestige of revival.

[34] On the revivals of Aeschylus see Cantarella 1974; 412 f., and on the *Oresteia* in particular Newiger 1961: 427-30. The data showing the extent of Aeschylean reminiscences in Old Comedy are given by Becker 1915.

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Kleophon and the restaging of *Frogs*

I begin with the two pieces of evidence we possess about public honours said to have been given to Aristophanes in connection with *Frogs.* The first appears in the prose Hypothesis to *Frogs* itself (Hyp. 1.39-40 Coulon), directly after the didascalic notice:

> οὕτω δὲ ἐθαυμάσθη τὸ δρᾶμα διὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ παράβασιν[1] ὥστε καὶ ἀνεδιδάχθη, ὥς φησι Δικαίαρχος.
>
> The play was so much admired because of the parabasis contained in it that it was actually restaged, as Dikaiarchos says.

The other appears in the principal ancient *Life of Aristophanes* (Aristophanes test. 1.35-39 Kassel-Austin), where the biographer, having asserted that the poet 'was greatly praised and cherished by his fellow-citizens', proceeds:

> τούτου οὖν χάριν ἐπῃνέθη καὶ ἐστεφανώθη θαλλῷ τῆς ἱερᾶς ἐλαίας, ὅς νενόμισται ἰσότιμος χρυσῷ στεφάνῳ, εἰπὼν ἐκεῖνα τὰ ἐν τοῖς Βατράχοις περὶ τῶν ἀτίμων·
>
> 'τὸν ἱερὸν χορὸν δίκαιον πολλὰ[2] χρηστὰ τῇ πόλει ξυμπαραινεῖν' [*Frogs* 686-7].
>
> On account of this he was officially commended and crowned with a wreath of sacred olive, which is reckoned equal in honour to a gold crown, when he had spoken those lines in the *Frogs* about the disfranchised: 'It is right that the sacred chorus should give much good counsel to the city'.

[1] Weil's conjecture κατάβασιν 'descent' (sc. to Hades), which Coulon prints, is refuted by the fact that the parallel notice in the *Life of Aristophanes* quotes precisely from the parabasis.
[2] In the text of the play itself the transmitted reading is δίκαιόν ἐστι.

Cover picture:
Paestan bell-crater. Museo Provinciale, Salerno.

TRAGEDY, COMEDY AND THE POLIS

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