three such statements occur in the *Life of Galba*, which is more concerned with matters of personality and character than the *Life of Otho*.

In conclusion, then, the *Lives of Galba and Otho* are both similar to, and different from, the corpus of *Parallel Lives*. In his introductory remarks, Plutarch's comments suggest that the *Lives of Galba and Otho* will be more given to facts than to moral instruction. This would appear to mark a significant divergence from his practice in the *Parallel Lives*. As we have seen, however, Plutarch does not fully adhere to his statement of intent: the *Life of Otho* is indeed different from the *Parallel Lives* . The *Life of Galba*, however, with its moralizing preface, its series of comparisons, its self-contained development, its emphasis on ethics and character and its use of physiognomy in the service of morality, is clearly a less distant relative of the *Parallel Lives*.

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11

Plutarch and Platonist Orthodoxy*

JOHN DILLON

The question of the place of Plutarch within the Platonic School is still a live one, but it has changed its nature somewhat in recent years, especially in view of the successful demolition of the Platonic Academy as an institution in his day,[1] and the inevitable fall-out from that in terms of positing a coherent doctrinal tradition within Platonism. The removal of the actual institution which might maintain (or propound) orthodoxy does not in itself, it would seem, dispose of the general concept of a Platonic orthodoxy, the alternatives to which are necessarily "heresy" or "eclecticism." Plutarch in his day has been accused of both of these deviations. The concept of orthodoxy itself, then, and the standing of Plutarch within the Platonic School, both still merit examination.

Plutarch's position in the Platonist tradition cannot be properly evaluated, however, it seems to me, so long as the notion of an "orthodox" Platonism is maintained, whether propounded by an official Platonic Academy, or not. Heinrich Dörrie, in an article published in 1971,[2] before Lynch and Glucker had published their books (with which, however, he would not necessarily have agreed),[3] distorts the position of Plutarch by postulating something that he calls "Schulplatonismus," which he sees represented by such figures as Taurus in Athens, and Albinus in Smyrna (Plutarch's teacher Ammonius he is not too sure about, *op. cit.* p. 36, n. 1). But in fact we have no indication that there was in Athens at this time—let

*This article originated in a talk to be given to the Plutarch Conference held in Athens in June 1987, but not delivered then. It will appear also, in slightly different form, as an essay, "Orthodoxy and Eclecticism in Middle Platonism and Neopythagoreanism," in *The Question of Eclecticism: Studies in Later Greek Philosophy*, ed. J. Dillon and A. A. Long (Berkeley and Los Augeles 1988) 103–25.

[1] I refer to the works of John Lynch, *Aristotle's School* (Berkeley and Los Augeles 1972), and John Glucker, *Antiochus and the Late Academy*, (Göttingen 1978).

[2] "Die Stellung Plutarchs im Platonismus seiner Zeit," in *Philomathes*: Studies and Essays in Memory of Philip Merlan, ed. R. Palmer and R. Hamerton-Kelly (The Hague 1971) 36–56.

[3] We will see before long what he felt about this, when the later volumes of his history of Platonism, *Der Platonismus in Antike* (Vol. I, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstadt 1987), appear.

us say, 70 to 120 A.D.—anything like a "regular" Platonic School for Plutarch to be contrasted with.[4]

John Glucker has done us the great service of "re-drawing the map" of Middle Platonism,[5] showing that what we are dealing with in the period after about 80 B.C. is no more than a series of individual teachers, in various centres, including Athens, but also Alexandria and the great cities of Asia Minor, identified as Platonists, and bound to the tradition (and to varying extents to each other) through their own teachers, who were in turn dependent on their teachers. To this extent only did the "Golden Chain" of Platonic philosophy continue during this period. Individual philosophers knew whether they were Platonists or not. So did their pupils, and so did the general public. The ancient Mediterranean intellectual élite was a small world, by modern standards.

It is strange, therefore, that Glucker should boggle,[6] even to the extent that he does, at certain admittedly troublesome remarks which Plutarch makes about the Academy in the course of his writings.[7] In a well-known passage of the dialogue *On the E at Delphi* (387F), for example, Plutarch describes himself as "devoting myself to mathematics with the greatest enthusiasm, although I was destined soon to pay all honour to the maxim 'Nothing to Excess', when once I had come to be in the Academy (ἐν Ἀκαδημείᾳ γενόμενος)." This to me certainly indicates a recognition by Plutarch of a period in his intellectual development when he would not have described himself as being in the Academic tradition, but rather, perhaps—to judge from the context —as a Pythagorean. The context, after all, is that one Eustrophus of Athens (whom Plutarch seems here to claim as a particular associate[8]), utters a very Pythagorean encomium (388E), first, of Number in general (as the basis and first principle of all things divine and human), and then of the number Five in particular, to which Plutarch himself assents enthusiastically (εἶπον οὖν κάλλιστα τὸν Εὔστροφον τῷ ἀριθμῷ λύειν τὴν ἀπορίαν, 387F).

[4] The Epicurean, and *perhaps* the Stoic, Schools seem to have survived into the second century A.D. (evidence usefully assembled by Glucker, *op. cit.* pp. 364–73), but there is no comparable trace of a definitive Platonic (or Peripatetic) School. Rather, there were, if anything, a multiplicity of them (in Athens, Alexandria, Smyrna, and so on), each with their own *diadochoi*, possessing a precarious continuity for a generation or so, and not aspiring to any *exclusive* orthodoxy, though naturally all feeling themselves to be part of the intellectual "succession."

[5] To borrow a phrase of his from his review of my book *The Middle Platonists* in *CR* 30 (1980) 58.

[6] *Antiochus and the Late Academy*, ch. 6, 256–80.

[7] Particularly, *De. E* 387F; *Def. Or.* 431A; *De Sera* 549E; *Quaest. Conv.* IX 12, 741C; *De Facie* 922F.

[8] This I take to be the significance of the rather coy statement (388F) ταῦτα πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἔλεγεν οὐ παίζων ὁ Εὔστροφος, ἀλλ' ἐκεὶ τηνικαῦτα προσεκείμην τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἐμπαθῶς, κ.τ.λ.

Now Glucker takes the phrase ἐν Ἀκαδημείᾳ γενόμενος to mean that at the time of this conversation Plutarch, although already a pupil of Ammonius, did not regard himself as yet being "in the Academy." Since he, like me, does not wish to postulate a philosophic institution of that name, he is forced to the desperate suggestion—which, as he says (p. 271), he offers "not without compunction"—that somehow Plutarch means by this, joining the Academy as a *gymnasium*, in connection with serving as an ephebe (which foreigners could certainly do early in the next century, at least), and that a reverence for the more sceptical traditions of the Academy could have resulted from this.

But I do not see that the phrase must be construed in such a way as to imply that Plutarch did not then yet see himself as "in the Academy." The force of the participle may after all be quasi-concessive, i.e. "although I was destined soon to pay all honour to the maxim 'Nothing to Excess', *seeing as I had now joined the Academy*," or "such as was proper for one who had joined the Academy." It is plain, after all, from Ammonius' own remarks that he regards Pythagorean numerology with considerable irony. Plutarch, as a new member of "the Academy," has not at this stage (66–67 A.D.) yet moderated his youthful enthusiasm for it.

I must apologise for dwelling so long on such a detail, in what is after all almost a private argument with my good friend Glucker, but this is a potentially troublesome passage, which, yet, correctly interpreted (as I hope it now has been), is of considerable interest for our picture of Plutarch's intellectual development and standing within Platonism.

One other aspect of this passage (and of some others, such as those listed in n. 7 above) is important, however, and that is Plutarch's attitude to Academic scepticism. As we know, later Platonists, after Antiochus of Ascalon, could, and did, take one of two possible attitudes to the New Academy and its philosophical methods. The one was to condemn it as a deviation from true Platonism, a view propounded forcefully by Antiochus himself, in his dialogue *Sosus*[9] (and doubtless elsewhere), and developed eloquently and amusingly by Numenius in his polemical treatise *On the Unfaithfulness of the Academy to Plato*;[10] the other was to accept the view of Antiochus' predecessor Philo of Larisa that the Academic tradition was one and unbroken, with at most a difference of emphasis manifested in the New Academy.[11] This was certainly the line taken by Cicero, and also by

[9] As reported in Cicero, *Acad. Pr.* 11 ff.

[10] Frr. 23–28 Des Places.

[11] Philo himself is possibly the source of what is no doubt a pious fiction, certainly widespread in later Platonism (cf. Sextus Emp. *PH* I 234), that "The New Academy had a habit of concealing their opinions, and did not usually disclose them to anyone except those that had lived with them right up to old age" (Aug. *Contr. Acad.* 3. 20. 43, quoting a lost part of Cicero's *Academica*).

Plutarch, though in neither case does this make them sceptics to any serious degree.[12]

Undoubtedly Plutarch had an interest, and a sympathetic interest, in the New Academy. The works of his that would exhibit this most clearly, unfortunately, are all lost, but from their titles we can learn a certain amount. *On the Unity of the Academy since Plato (Lamprias Cat.* 63) places him firmly in the tradition of Philo of Larisa; *On the Difference between the Pyrrhonians and the Academics (ibid.* 64) presumably argued that the Academy had a positive doctrine behind its scepticism, or at least that their scepticism was not complete.[13] On the other hand, the essays *That there is no such thing as Understanding* (συνιέναι) (158) and *Whether he who suspends judgement* (ὁ ἐπέχων) *on everything is condemned to inaction* (210) sound distinctly sympathetic to Scepticism, and that *On Pyrrho's Ten Tropes* (158) probably was so also.

In the surviving works, too, we have a number of passages indicating that Plutarch accepted a view of the Platonic tradition which included the New Academy. At *De Facie* 922F, for example, he allows the Stoic Pharnaces to reproach his brother Lamprias as follows:

> "Here we are faced with that stock manoeuvre (τὸ περιακτόν) of the Academy; on each occasion that they engage in discourse with others they will not offer any accounting of their own assertions but must keep their interlocutors on the defensive lest they become the prosecutors."

Lamprias has just been satirising the Stoic theory of the moon's substance. Such complaints go back, of course, to the interlocutors of Socrates,[14] but we may still take this, I think, as a good indication that Plutarch recognises New Academic methods of argument as a proper part of a Platonist's armoury.

On the other hand, Lamprias goes on to present a positive theory as to the moon's composition, which serves to show that Plutarch draws on the "Socratic" tradition of *elenchus* primarily as a weapon in inter-school controversy, not as an integral part of this philosophical method, which was predominantly expository and dogmatic.

He makes use of the Academic tradition of "suspending judgement" also, I suspect, when he wants to save himself the trouble of going into questions of physical philosophy deeper than he wants to (very much like Cicero before him). An instance of this is his remark at the end of his short

[12] For Cicero, see now the useful discussion of Stephen Gersh, in *Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism. The Latin Tradition*, Vol. I, 58–63, and for Plutarch, Phillip de Lacy's "Plutarch and the Academic Sceptics," *CJ* 49 (1953–54), 79–85.

[13] As against Aenesidemus, for example, who certainly wished to claim Plato and probably the New Academics, as Sceptics. We find the counterpart to this essay in Sextus Empiricus *P. H.* I. 220–35, his chapter "How Scepticism Differs from the Academic Philosophy."

[14] E.g. Thrasymachus in *Rep.* I 366C, and Hippias in Xen. *Mem.* IV 4. 9.

essay *On the Principle of Cold* (955A)—addressed, significantly enough, to the sophist Favorinus, who professed Academic scepticism:

> "Compare these statements, Favorinus, with the pronouncements of others, and if these notions of mine are neither deficient nor much superior in plausibility (πιθανότης) to those of others, say farewell to dogmas (δόξαι), being convinced as you are that it is more philosophical to suspend judgement (ἐπέχειν) when the truth is obscure than to come to conclusions (συγκατατίθεσθαι)."
>
> (Trans. Helmbold, slightly emended)

All this, however, concerns Plutarch's attitude to Scepticism and the allied question of the unity of the Academy. There is a good deal more to the problem of orthodoxy than that, and it is to some of these other areas that we must now turn.

The only place where we find Plutarch setting himself explicitly against what could be regarded as the "orthodox" Platonist position is in his treatise *On the Creation of the Soul in the Timaeus*, and it is interesting to observe how he phrases his opposition. *Pace* Dörrie (*op. cit.* p. 48), he does not present himself as taking on a Platonist "establishment." He recognises that he is going against the views of all, or at least "the most highly regarded" (οἱ δοκιμώτατοι ἄνδρες, 1012D), of previous commentators, but he does not view those commentators as a homogeneous group. Though all choose to deny that the world was created at a point in time (1013A), some are followers of Xenocrates' view, and others of that of Crantor, while others, like Eudorus, seek to reconcile both views, and he deals with each of them in turn. Nor does he speak here as an outsider attacking the establishment, but as the true interpreter of Plato's doctrine correcting the mistakes of predecessors: "Such being the whole of what they say . . . to me they both seem to be utterly mistaken about Plato's opinion, if a standard of plausibility is to be used, not in promotion of one's own doctrines, but with a desire to say something that agrees with Plato" (1013B, trans. Cherniss).

It may seem to us that promoting his own doctrines in the guise of an exegesis of the *Timaeus* is precisely what Plutarch himself is doing, but that is not, plainly, how he sees it. Elsewhere, in his treatise *On Moral Virtue*, though his position of hospitality to Aristotelian ethical doctrine might be considered almost as controversial, we find no suggestion that he has any consciousness of this. His polemic is all with outsiders, chiefly the Stoics. And yet there is much that is peculiar in his doctrine here.

One of Plutarch's most distinctive doctrines, apart from his well-known dualism (though closely involved with it), is his view of the soul as essentially (αὐτὴ καθ' ἑαυτήν) non-rational (*Proc. an.* 1014DE), and distinct from intellect. It is this essential soul that he sees in the "nature divided about bodies" of *Timaeus* 35A, and in the "maleficent soul" of *Laws*

10, and it is the cornerstone of his theory in the *Proc. an.* It also figures in the treatise *On Moral Virtue*.[15]

At the outset (440D), Plutarch raises the question, "what is the essential nature (*ousia*) of moral virtue, and how does it arise; and whether that part of the soul which receives it is equipped with its own reason (*logos*), or merely shares in one alien to it; and if the latter, whether it does this after the manner of things which are mingled with something better, or rather, whether it is said to participate in the potency (*dynamis*) of the ruling element through submitting to its administration and governance."

Here, admittedly, he speaks of a part (*morion*) of the soul, rather than of soul in general, but it becomes plain presently that what he has in mind is not really the lower or "passionate" soul in the traditional Platonic sense, so much as soul distinct from intellect. A little further on, in the course of his introductory survey of previous opinion, he criticizes those, particularly the Stoics, who assume intellect and soul to be a unity:

> "It seems to have eluded all these philosophers in what way each of us is truly two-fold and composite. For that other two-fold nature of ours they have not discerned, but merely the more obvious one, the blend of soul and body."

Pythagoras, on the other hand, and above all Plato, recognized "that there is some element of composition, some two-fold nature and dissimilarity of the very soul within itself, since the irrational, like an alien body, is mingled and joined with reason (*logos*) by some compulsion of nature."[16] Here he speaks, rather misleadingly, of the two-fold nature of "the very soul within itself," but we can take it, I think, that he is using "soul" in a loose sense, as those who have not discerned the true situation would use it. The truth, as we see, is that there are three entities, body, soul, and *nous* (intellect) and this trichotomy leaves soul as essentially and of itself *alogos*, non-rational, though having a part which is receptive of reason (441F ff.).

In the *Virt. mor.*, it must be admitted, Plutarch obscures the doctrine which he presents very plainly in the *Proc. an.*, by speaking, for the most part, of the "non-rational part" (*alogon meros*) of the soul, rather than the soul itself, as opposed to *nous*, and it is possible that he has not yet fully clarified his position in his own mind (if, as I assume, the *Virt. mor.* is earlier than the *Proc. an.*), but he says enough, I think, to show that this

[15] Plutarch's doctrine of the soul has recently been excellently set out in the useful study of Werner Deuse, *Untersuchungen zur mittelplatonischen und neuplatonischen Seelenlehre* (Wiesbaden 1983) 12–47, though Deuse does not pay as much attention to the *Virt. mor.* as he should have, confining himself largely to *Proc. an.* and *De Is. et Osir.*

[16] Helmbold's Loeb trans., slightly emended.

remarkable doctrine was already in his mind.[17] What is interesting for our present purpose is that he shows no consciousness of "unorthodoxy" on this point, as he does on the matter of the temporal creation of the world (though, as I have said earlier, "unorthodoxy" is not quite the right word).

The other notable aspect of the treatise *On Moral Virtue*, of course, is its wholehearted adoption of Aristotelian doctrine, derived directly from the *Nicomachean Ethics*, chiefly Books 2. 5–7 (On the Mean) and 6 (on *Akrasia*), with some influence also from the *De anima*.[18] This can be labelled eclecticism, but I do not see that that term is very useful. It is clear from his presentation of Aristotle's position at 442B–C that Plutarch regards him as substantially adopting Plato's doctrine of the soul (except that he "later" assigned the "spirited" past (*thymoeides*) unequivocally to the irrational part of the soul—a development which Plutarch does not quarrel with). This enables Plutarch to present, for instance, the theory of the Mean (in 444C–445A) unhesitatingly as Platonic doctrine.

Although the chief source of his doctrine here, as I have said, is *Nicomachean Ethics* 2. 5–7, there are some elements observable, modifying the Aristotelian position, which, once again, might misleadingly be termed "eclectic." First of all, Aristotle describes Virtue as a *hexis* or state (1106b36), but Plutarch, at 444F, describes it as a "movement" (*kinesis*) and "power" (*dynamis*) concerned with the management of the irrational, and doing this by fine tuning and harmonising of its discordant excesses (cf. 444E, 445C). This seems a Pythagorizing turn of phrase, and that, together with the laudatory mention of Pythagoras in the doxography (441E), points to a Pythagorean element in the mix which Plutarch is presenting to us. This Pythagoreanism can be shown with fair certainty to be mediated through Posidonius, by a comparison with Galen, *De plac. Hipp. et Plat.* 4. 7. 39 (p. 290 De Lacy) and 5. 6. 43 (p. 334 De Lacy),[19] but Plutarch's interest in Pythagoras and Pythagoreanism is well enough attested apart from this[20] to make it probable that he is not simply dependent on Posidonius here. Further, the activity of virtue is described as a "harmonising" (*synharmoga*) of the irrational by the rational soul in a

[17] Even in the midst of his exposition of the doctrine in the *De facie* (943D) he refers to those who have made τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ἄλογον καὶ τὸ παθητικόν orderly and amenable to their λόγος, using traditional terminology.

[18] See on this the useful discussion of D. Babut, in pp. 44–54 of the Introduction to his edition of the work, *Plutarque, De la vertu éthique* (Paris 1969). He refutes satisfactorily earlier attempts to postulate Posidonius or Andronicus of Rhodes as intermediaries for the doctrine of this part of the work, though the anti-Stoic polemic of the second part (from 446E on) does show dependence on Posidonius (as reported in Galen, *De. plac. Hipp. et Plat.* 4). His view, with which I concur, is that Plutarch read Aristotle for himself, though he was doubtless acquainted with later Peripatetic works as well.

[19] Quoted by Babut in his notes *ad loc.*

[20] E.g. *Is. et Osir.* 360D; 384A; *Proc. an.* 1027F; 1020E ff. *Quaest. conv.* 8.7 and 8; *De. E* 388C, etc.

variety of Pythagorean pseudepigrapha,[21] which indicates a tendency in many of these works to claim Aristotelian ethical theory for Pythagoras. Metopos' treatise *On Virtue* (pp. 116–21 Thesleff) is a good example of this (he also produces the formulation, found at the beginning of *Virt. mor.* (440D), that the passions are the "matter" (*hyle*) of ethical virtue, p. 119. 8). While not being necessarily *dependent* on any of these intermediate sources for his interpretation of Aristotle, therefore, Plutarch was doubtless aware of most of them.

If this is eclecticism, it is certainly not mindless eclecticism. It is based on a view of the history of philosophy, mistaken perhaps, but perfectly coherent, which sees Plato as a follower of Pythagoras, and Aristotle as essentially still a Platonist, and a consistent ethical position being held by all three. As to the doctrine of the distinctness of soul and intellect, which does not, as I say, receive clear articulation in this treatise, but comes out clearly in the dialogues *On the Face of the Moon* (943A ff.), and *On the Daemon of Socrates* (591D ff.), as well as in the *Proc. an.*, that is a piece of "unorthodoxy," on the origins of which I have speculated elsewhere, though without definite conclusions,[22] but it is one for which Plutarch is at pains to find Platonic antecedents (e.g. *Tim.* 30B; 90A, *Phaedr.* 247C; *Laws* 12, 961D; 966D–E), and which, as I have said, he does not regard as setting him in opposition to any official Platonic tradition.[23] In summary, Plutarch may be a bit of a maverick, but he does not view himself as such (except perhaps in the matter of temporal creation), and I can see no evidence of any contemporary "Schulplatonismus" from which he can be said to deviate.

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[21] Archytas, Π. νόμου καὶ δικαιοσύνης, p. 33. 17, Thesleff (*Pythagorean Texts*); Metopos, Π. ἀρετῆς, p. 119. 27; Theages Π. ἀρετῆς, p. 190. 1 ff.

[22] *The Middle Platonists* 211–14. A similar distinction is made in some treatises of the *Corpus Hermeticum* (notably I and X), and it is analogous to the distinction in Gnostic thought between soul and *pneuma*, but I am uncertain what to conclude from this. Attributing the doctrine to Posidonius, in default of any hard evidence, is a once easy option no longer open, I think.

[23] At *De facie* 943A, he criticises οἱ πολλοί for wrongly believing man to be composed of just two parts, but these "many" need not be regarded as any set of philosophers, never mind Platonist philosophers.

12

Plutarch's Portrait of Socrates

JACKSON P. HERSHBELL

Since the recent studies of K. Döring, it is clear that there was a renewal of interest in the person of Socrates in the first and second centuries A.D.[1] Such an interest is reflected, for example, by Dio of Prusa's speeches on Socrates (*Or.* 54 and 55), and by frequent references to him in the works of Seneca and of Epictetus. Indeed, as Döring observed in *Exemplum Socratis*, a study of Socrates' influence on the Cynic-Stoic popular philosophy of the early Empire, Plutarch was influenced by and contributed much to his contemporaries' concerns with Socrates,[2] writing at least three works on Socrates, two of which are lost: *A Defense of Socrates* (Ἀπολογία ὑπὲρ Σωκράτους), and *On the Condemnation of Socrates* (Περὶ τῆς Σωκράτους ψηφίσεως).[3] A third work, *On the Sign of Socrates* (Περὶ τοῦ Σωκράτους δαιμονίου or *De genio Socratis*) is still extant, and has recently received great attention.[4] Moreover, the first of the *Platonic Questions*

[1] K. Döring, "Sokrates bei Epiktet" in *Studia Platonica. Festschrift für Hermann Gundert* (Amsterdam 1974) 195–226. See also his *Exemplum Socratis: Studien zur Sokratesnachwirkung in der kynisch-stoischen Popularphilosophie der frühen Kaiserzeit und im frühen Christentum = Hermes Einzelschriften* 42 (Wiesbaden 1979). For the importance of Socrates in later Greek thought, see also W. Schmid and O. Stählin, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur*, Pt. I, Vol. III: *Die klassische Periode der griechischen Literatur* (Munich 1940) 276–77.

[2] Döring, *Exemplum Socratis*, 9–11, briefly mentions aspects of Plutarch's treatment of Socrates, but he is mainly concerned with Seneca, Epictetus, and Dio of Prusa, and has little on Plutarch.

[3] These are No. 189 and No. 190 respectively in the so-called Lamprias Catalogue of Plutarch's works, on which see K. Ziegler, *Plutarchos von Chaironeia* (Stuttgart 1964) 60–64 = s.v. "Plutarchos," *RE* 21. 1 (1951) cols. 696–702.

[4] For example, by A. Corlu, *Plutarque, Le démon de Socrate* (Paris 1970); A. Aloni, "Osservazioni sul *De genio Socratis* di Plutarco," *Museum Criticum = Quaderni dell' Instituto di Filologia classica dell' Università di Bologna* 10–12 (1977) 233–41, and A. Aloni, "Ricerche sulla forma letteraria del *De genio Socratis* di Plutarco," *Acme* 33 (1980) 45–112; M. Riley, "The Purpose and Unity of Plutarch's *De genio Socratis*," *GRBS* (1977) 257–73; D. Babut, "Le dialogue de Plutarque *Sur le démon de Socrate*. Essai d'interprétation," *BAGB* (1984) 51–76; K. Döring, "Plutarch und das Daimononion des Sokrates (Plut., *de genio Socratis* Kap. 202–04)," *Mnemosyne* 37 (1984) 376–92; and P. Desideri, "Il *De genio Socratis* di Plutarco: Un esempio di 'storiografia tragica,'" *Athenaeum: Studi periodici di Pavia* 62 (1984) 569–85. A. Barigazzi is currently completing a study of Plutarch's *De genio Socratis*, a version of which was presented at a conference of the International Plutarch Society held in Athens, June, 1987 [see *infra*, No. 14].

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